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1GaŶdhi͛s ƌespoŶse to the EŶglish eǀolutioŶaƌǇ theoƌist aŶd diƌeĐtoƌ-general of UNESCO, Huxley, who, 
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The thesis addresses a question of contemporary philosophical debate: What is the 
philosophical basis of human and socioeconomic rights? This is an important 
question given the indeterminacy of rights, and the suspicions regarding their 
universal validity. What I suggest then is the determination of their philosophical 
basis. Such a philosophical task would provide the grounds for the clarification of the 
concept of these rights revealing their true nature, and it would show whether or 
not these rights are universally valid. Further, through the philosophical justification 
of human and socioeconomic rights we can explain many of the rights found in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, and in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights. At the same time, through such a justificatory account we can see 
why some rights are not genuine human rights. Additionally, we can explain why 
some new rights can be included in the major documents. Finally, such a task brings 
philosophy at the heart of rights discourse connecting the two disciplines of 
philosophy and law. Within this context I build my (Kantian) duty-based argument 
for the justification of human and socioeconomic rights indirectly: 1) by presenting 
the weaknesses of a number of noteworthy contemporary accounts of how rights 
are justified, including the justification of them based on the concept of human 
dignity, and 2) by justifying duties, and then explaining how human and 
socioeconomic rights can afterwards be generated, or developed, from them. 
UltiŵatelǇ, I aƌgue that iŶ ouƌ doŵiŶaŶt ͚ƌights eƌa͛, although ǁe should Ŷot ƌejeĐt 
the moral, legal, and political ideas of human and socioeconomic rights, we should 
put these ideas aside for a while, in order to strengthen the old category of duties, so 
that eventually both rights and duties could be seen as equal parts in a future 
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2 Part of chapter 2 has been published under the title: ͚WhǇ DigŶitǇ is Ŷot the FouŶdatioŶ of HuŵaŶ 
‘ights͛ Public Reason, 2017, Vol. 8, Issues 1-2 – This paper challenges the popular arguments 
according to which dignity is the basis of human rights, offering a new duty-based argument. Also, 
section 4 (chapter 4) has been published under the title: ͚WhǇ ǁe haǀe the dutǇ to treat the dead 
ǁith digŶitǇ?͛ Philosophy Now, 2018 – This article challenges four popular explanations of why dead 
should be treated with dignity, offering an alternative explanation. Finally, section 3 (chapter 5) will 
be published by the end of 2019 as a chapter in edited volume under the title: ͚A Duty-Based 
ApproaĐh to ChildreŶ͛s ‘ight to Freedoŵ froŵ Eǆtreŵe PoǀertǇ͛, in Brando, N. and Graf, G. Eds. 
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1. The main research question 
The thesis addresses a question of contemporary philosophical debate: What is the 
philosophical basis3 of human and socioeconomic rights? Such a philosophical task, if 
successful, should provide the grounds for the clarification of the concept of these 
rights revealing their true nature. It should also clearly show whether or not these 
rights are universally valid. Further, through the philosophical justification of human 
and socioeconomic rights we could explain many of the rights found in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, as well as in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights. At the same time, through such a justificatory account we could see why 
some rights are not genuine human rights. Additionally, we could explain why some 
new rights can be included in the major documents. Finally, such a task, if successful, 
could bring philosophy at the heart of rights discourse connecting the two disciplines 
of philosophy and law.  
Within this context, I build my (Kantian)4 duty-based argument for the 
justification of human and socioeconomic rights indirectly: 1) by reporting the 
deficiencies of a number of noteworthy contemporary rights-based accounts of how 
rights are justified; also, the justification of them based on the concept of human 
dignity, and 2) by justifying duties, and then explaining how human and 
socioeconomic rights are afterwards generated or developed from them. Ultimately, 
I aƌgue that iŶ ouƌ doŵiŶaŶt ͚ƌights eƌa͛, although we should not reject the moral, 
legal, and political ideas of human and socioeconomic rights, we should put these 
ideas aside for a while, in order to strengthen the old category of duties, so that 
                                                          
3 As it is mentioned several times throughout the thesis, the words: justification, foundation, 
derivation, grouŶdiŶg, ďasis, etĐ. aƌe used iŶteƌĐhaŶgeaďlǇ to deŶote that ǆ͛s source is y 
4 In chapter 4, is thoƌoughlǇ eǆplaiŶed ǁhǇ soŵetiŵes the ǁoƌd ͚KaŶtiaŶ͛ iŶ the teǆt is put iŶ 
parenthesis, while some other times it is not. Here I briefly mention that the phrase ͚a KaŶtiaŶ dutǇ-
ďased justifiĐatioŶ of ƌights͛, ƌefeƌs oŶlǇ to ͚huŵaŶ ƌights͛; ǁhile, the phƌase ͚a dutǇ-based 
justifiĐatioŶ of ƌights͛, ƌefeƌs ďoth to ͚huŵaŶ ƌights͛ aŶd ͚soĐioeĐoŶoŵiĐ ƌights͛    
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eventually both rights and duties could be seen as equal parts in a future account of 
international justice.  
After addressing the main content of the thesis, in what follows I focus on its 
basic structure. Initially, the thesis consists of three main parts. In the first part, I 
discuss other contemporary justifications of rights. This part consists of chapters 1 
and 2. In chapter 1, which is only introductory, I present the two traditional families 
of rights-based justifications, namely the ͚naturalistic͛ and the ͚political͛, or ͚practice-
based͛, justificatory accounts. In chapter 2, I examine whether the popular notion of 
͚huŵaŶ dignity͛ is the genuine basis of rights.  
Further, the second part of the thesis consists of chapter 3, that is, the 
͚bridging͛ Đhapteƌ ďetǁeeŶ the fiƌst, oƌ ͚Ŷegatiǀe͛, paƌt of the thesis, iŶ ǁhiĐh I report 
the deficiencies of the rights-based and the dignity-based justificatory accounts, and 
the thiƌd, oƌ ͚positiǀe͛, paƌt of it, iŶ ǁhiĐh I deǀelop ŵǇ oǁŶ duty-based account for 
the philosophical foundation of human and socioeconomic rights. In this ͚bridging͛ 
chapter, along with the examination of two more popular contemporary Kantian-
based justifications, that is, Arthur ‘ispteiŶ͛s aŶd Katrin FliksĐhuh͛s aĐĐouŶts, I 
present and analyse the starting point of my new (Kantian) duty-based justification, 
namely the Kantian concept of autonomy.5 Within this context, I attempt the 
conceptual analysis of the Kantian moral concept of autonomy via the Kantian 
aesthetic category of the sublime.  
Finally, the third part of the thesis consists of chapters 4 and 5. In chapter 4 I 
first present the main points of the new (Kantian) duty-based philosophical account; 
second, I respond to four possible objections against the new Duty-Based Approach; 
and, third, I attempt the application of the new duty-based justificatory account to a 
controversial case, that is, the case of the rights of the dead. In chapter 5, along with 
                                                          
5 What I ŵeaŶ ďǇ ͚ƌights-ďased͛ aŶd ͚digŶitǇ-ďased͛ justifications, is that these accounts put rights and 
digŶitǇ fiƌst, ƌespeĐtiǀelǇ. Also, ǁhat I ŵeaŶ ďǇ ͚KaŶtiaŶ-ďased͛ justifiĐatioŶs, is that these 
justifiĐatioŶs aƌe iŶspiƌed ďǇ the KaŶtiaŶ opus. FiŶallǇ, ǁhat is ŵeaŶt ďǇ ŵǇ oǁŶ ͚;KaŶtiaŶͿ dutǇ-
ďased͛ justification, is first, that it is inspired by the Kantian opus, and, second, that it puts duties 
rather than rights first.    
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the review of the whole thesis, I discuss some further implications of it, especially in 
the areas of law and politics. Additionally, I apply the new duty-based argument to 
an indeterminate and unstated right, yet a right of crucial importance today, namely 
the right of children to be free from extreme poverty. Ultimately, at the end of 
chapter 5, the grounds are prepared for a future duty-based account of international 
justice. 
 
2. Introduction to the main issues 
After the overview of the main content and structure of the thesis, I provide a brief 
overview of the basic issues discussed throughout, in order to roughly guide the 
reader into the main contents of each chapter. 
 
2.1 Chapter One 
In the first chapter of the thesis, which has an introductory and historical character, I 
initially offer a concise account of the history of human rights starting from their first 
appearance, during the European Enlightenment, moving on to their decline in the 
nineteenth century, and their re-appearance after the end of the Second World War. 
Within this context, special attention is given to: 1) the  Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR), which was adopted by the Third United Nations General 
Assembly on December 10, 1948, 2) the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) with its two optional Protocols, 3) the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 4) the nine core international human 
rights treaties, which also have a monitoring body within the UN human rights 
system that controls the implementation of the treaty provisions by its State 
parties,6 ϱͿ soŵe otheƌ  uŶiǀeƌsal ͚iŶstƌuŵeŶts͛ ƌelatiŶg to huŵaŶ ƌights, suĐh as: the 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, the Convention against 
Discrimination in Education, the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against 
                                                          
6 Available from: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx 
[accessed 1 November 2017] 
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Women, and the Woƌst Foƌŵs of Child Laďouƌ CoŶǀeŶtioŶ, aŶd ϲͿ the ͚EuƌopeaŶ 
CoŶǀeŶtioŶ foƌ the PƌoteĐtioŶ of HuŵaŶ ‘ights aŶd FuŶdaŵeŶtal Fƌeedoŵs͛ ;ϭϵϱϬͿ7, 
as well as the ͚AŵeƌiĐaŶ CoŶǀeŶtioŶ oŶ HuŵaŶ ‘ights͛ ;ϭϵϲϵͿ.8 Along with all the 
aforementioned documents, I also stress the importance of the ͚Human Rights 
MoǀeŵeŶt͛, ŶaŵelǇ the non-governmental social movement with international force 
engaged in activism related to human rights issues. 
 Following the history of rights, I indicate the fact that in spite of their wide 
acceptance and their ratification by most of the countries, still a great number of 
human rights violations and abuses occur worldwide. Within this context, the two 
main problems of human rights are observed, namely the problem of their 
indeterminacy and the problem concerning their universal validity. It is true that one 
cannot easily explain what human rights are, and whether they are universal or just a 
Western product. I conclude that mainly because of these two problems human 
rights have come under increasing attack in recent years. Hence, I discuss the 
reaction against the idea of human rights in theoretical as well as in practical level.  
Contrary to the negative stance towards human rights today, arising mainly 
from the two aforementioned problems, my claim is that we should not reject the 
idea of human rights; but instead focus on and work on their philosophical 
foundations. This will help us to identify their true nature, and respond to the 
suspicions regarding their universal validity. Within this context, in this chapter of 
the thesis, I start from the presentation of the two historical families of ͚rights-
based͛ justificatory accounts, namely the naturalistic, or traditional, or orthodox 
justifications, and the so-called political or practice-based justifications.  
On the one hand, according to the Orthodox theorists any account for the 
justification of human rights must not overlook the fact that human rights are 
effectively moral rights that all human beings possess by virtue of their humanity. On 
                                                          
7 Available from: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf [accessed 1 November 
2017] 




the other hand, the political accounts for the justification of human rights are built 
upon the idea that the nature of these rights is to be understood in light of their role 
or function in international practice. After this, I discuss the deficiencies of both 
types of justifications, as they have been reported in the current literature.  
 
2.2 Chapter Two 
After the discussion of the ͚ƌights-ďased͛ naturalistic and political justifications of 
human rights, in chapter 2 I discuss the justification of human rights based on the 
moral concept of ͚human dignity͛.  
Within this context, in the first section of chapter 2, I provide a concise 
account of dignitǇ͛s deǀelopŵeŶt thƌoughout histoƌǇ aŶd soŵe ĐƌitiƋues of it. Moƌe 
specifically, I focus on the two main types of dignity throughout history, namely 
digŶitǇ as ͚status͛ aŶd digŶitǇ as ͚ǀalue͛. Afteƌ the oďseƌǀatioŶ of the ŵeaŶiŶg aŶd 
grounds of these two types of dignity in the archaic societies, in the Roman world, in 
the medieval world, in the 18th century, and finally in the 20th century, I move on to 
the presentation of some of the most vehement attacks against the notion of 
dignity. Within this context, I examine the critiques against it expressed by Arthur 
Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche, Oscar Schachter, Ruth Macklin, David Albert 
Jones, and Costas Douzinas. Ultimately, I focus on two more claims: first, that the 
imprecision of the concept of dignity might be an asset or an advantage within the 
contemporary human rights discourse; and, second, that the metaphysical character 
of the Kantian moral concept of human dignity, specifically, renders it impossible to 
be applied to the modern, or post-modern, or meta-modern secular terrain of 
human rights. 
 Further, in the second section of chapter 2, I examine four of the most 
significant recent dignity-based accounts for the justification of human rights, based 
on the two historical conceptions of dignity (status and value). More specifically, I 
discuss: ϭͿ JeƌeŵǇ WaldƌoŶ͛s digŶitǇ-based account for the justification of human 
ƌights, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to ǁhiĐh digŶitǇ as ͚legal status͛ ŵight ďe the ďasis of huŵaŶ ƌights, 
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ϮͿ JohŶ Tasioulas͛s digŶitǇ-based account for the justification of human rights, 
according to ǁhiĐh digŶitǇ as ͚ŵoƌal status͛ is the geŶuiŶe ďasis of rights, 3) the 
Catholic dignity-based justification, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to ǁhiĐh digŶitǇ is aŶ ͚iŶtƌiŶsiĐ͛ ǀalue 
possessed by all (human) beings, and, finally, 4) the so-called ͚ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ͛ KaŶtiaŶ 
conception of human dignity as the basis of human rights, according to which dignity 
is aŶ ͚iŶtƌiŶsiĐ͛ oƌ ͚iŶheƌeŶt͛ value that is possessed by all rational (human) beings, 
and can never be lost. 
 Eventually, apart from the particular criticisms against all the aforementioned 
dignity-based justifications of human rights, I also indicate that the main flaw of all 
these accounts is actually the mistaken interpretation of the concept of ͚dignity͛ 
itself, and the subsequent mistaken application of it to the contemporary rights 
terrain. At the end of chapter 2, after concluding that dignity is not the genuine basis 
of human rights, as it is argued by a number of prominent thinkers today, I propose 
that we should further explore the true meaning of this important moral concept, in 
order to ascribe to it the role and place it deserves within the contemporary rights 
discourse. This proposal takes me to the less descriptive, more philosophical part of 
the thesis. 
 
2.3 Chapter Three 
In chapter 3, with the intention of not abandoning a Kantian perspective as regards 
the philosophical foundations of human rights, I ask whether there can be a truly 
Kantian theory of human rights. 
 More specifically, in the first part of chapter 3 two more Kantian human 
rights justificatory accounts are discussed. These aƌe: ϭͿ Aƌthuƌ ‘ipsteiŶ͛s aƌguŵeŶt 
aĐĐoƌdiŶg to ǁhiĐh huŵaŶ ƌights aƌe gƌouŶded iŶ the KaŶtiaŶ ŶotioŶ of the ͚iŶŶate 
ƌight to fƌeedoŵ͛, in the Doctrine of Right, the Rechtslehre, in the Metaphysics of 
Morals; aŶd ϮͿ KatƌiŶ FliksĐhuh͛s transcendental approach to the justification of 
human rights. Along with the Kantian dignity-based argument for the justification of 
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human rights, in chapter 2, these accounts are considered to be the three most 
important Kantian-based justificatory accounts for rights today. 
Αfter the evaluation of these two Kantian justifications of human rights, 
ŶaŵelǇ ‘ipsteiŶ͛s aŶd FliksĐhuh͛s aĐĐouŶts, iŶ the seĐoŶd paƌt of Đhapteƌ 3, that is, 
the ͚bridging͛ Đhapteƌ of the thesis, I gradually move on to the formulation of a 
genuine (Kantian) duty-based philosophical foundation of human and socioeconomic 
rights, aiming to overcome the obstacles of all the aforementioned accounts. Within 
this context, I counter-argue AŶdƌea “aŶgioǀaŶŶi͛s thesis that there cannot be a truly 
Kantian theory of human rights. My claim here is that there is still room in the 
Kantian opus for the formulation of a truly Kantian justification for human9 rights 
capable overcoming the obstacles arising from all the aforementioned (Kantian and 
non-Kantian) justificatory accounts. Hence, I turn my attention to what I regard as 
the proper starting point of a truly (Kantian) duty-based justification of human rights, 
namely the Kantian supreme principle of morality, that is, the moral concept of 
͚autoŶoŵǇ of the ǁill͛, as it is presented by Kant in 4:440, in the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals.10 
 Given the abstractness of the Kantian moral concept of autonomy of the will, 
and in order to shed more light on it, in the second part of chapter 3 I attempt its 
conceptual analysis through the Kantian aesthetic category of the sublime. Here, I 
focus on the Critique of Judgment, in Book II, in the ͚Analytic of the sublime͛, 
especially in paragraphs: 23-29.11 After the aforementioned conceptual analysis, the 
initial obscure Kantian definition of the autonomy in the Groundwork is transformed. 
Heƌe is KaŶt͛s iŶdeteƌŵiŶate defiŶitioŶ of autoŶoŵǇ: ͚AutoŶoŵǇ of the ǁill is the 
property of the will by which it is a law to itself (independently of any property of the 
objects of volition). The principle of autonomy is, therefore: to choose only in such a 
way that the maxims of your choice are also included as universal law in the same 
                                                          
9 Yet not socioeconomic rights, as explained in more detail in chapter 4. 
10 Gregor (1996), p. 89.  
11 Kant (1987), pp. 97-140 
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ǀolitioŶ...͛12 After the conceptual analysis of autonomy via the sublime, in chapter 3 
of the thesis, KaŶt͛s definition is transformed to:  
Autonomy of the will is both the judgment and feeling of autonomous moral 
agents who, although they feel humiliated by the omnipotence of the moral 
laǁ, they aďaŶdoŶ ͚ǀolitioŶ͛, that is, theiƌ iŶĐliŶatioŶs, ideologies, ǁishes aŶd 
so forth, and, freely self-legislating –yet requiring the same legislation from 
all others– respect the moral ideas of reason, such as the fulfillment of their 
moral duties, realizing their higher self as autonomous moral agents (self-
approbation13), while feeling (and being considered by others), at the same 
time, that they are persons with dignity. 
At the end of chapter 3, I show how the analysis of the two main characters 
iŶ Woolf͛s Ŷoǀel Mrs. Dalloway, namely Clarissa Dalloway and Septimus Warren 
Smith, aids our understanding of the Kantian autonomy of the will, as interpreted via 
the aesthetic concept of the sublime. In the same section, more light is shed on the 
distiŶĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ the KaŶtiaŶ ŵoƌal ĐoŶĐept of ͚autoŶoŵǇ͛ aŶd the KaŶtiaŶ Ŷotion 
of ͚heteƌoŶoŵǇ͛. AdditioŶallǇ, afteƌ the appƌaisal of Woolf͛s Ŷoǀel, I foĐus oŶ aŶd 
examine a piece of modern ǀideo aƌt: Bill Viola͛s ͚fiǀe aŶgels foƌ the ŵilleŶŶiuŵ͛. This 




2.4 Chapter Four 
After the conceptual analysis of the Kantian moral concept of autonomy of the will, 
via the Kantian aesthetic category of the sublime, space is opened up in chapter 4 for 
my proposal that the Kantian supreme principle of morality should be the starting 
point for a new (Kantian) duty-based justification for human and socioeconomic 
rights.  
                                                          
12 Gregor (1996), p. 89 
13 See 5:81, in the Critique of Practical Reason, Gregor (1996), p. 205 
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In this chapter, I initially present my thesis: the new (Kantian) duty-based 
account for the justification of human and socioeconomic rights, or the new Duty-
Based Approach (DBA), according to which both human and socioeconomic rights 
are straightforwardly derived from moral duties. That is to say, duties are the 
͚stƌaightfoƌǁaƌd͛ grounding basis of rights; hence in the absence of the (owed) 
duties, from which they derive, the relevant (claim) rights alone do not exist. 
Additionally, it is explained how rights are further grounded in the autonomy of the 
will, the CI, and the moral law ;͚deeper͛ justifiĐatioŶ of ƌightsͿ, as ǁell as, ultimately, 
iŶ ouƌ puƌe pƌaĐtiĐal ƌeasoŶ ;͚ultiŵate͛ justifiĐatioŶ of ƌightsͿ. 
More specifically, the new justification is formulated indirectly, that is, by 
justifying moral duties first, and then explaining how human and socioeconomic 
rights are afterwards generated, or developed, from them. Having as my starting 
point the Kantian moral concept of autonomy of the will, and focusing in particular 
on the basic characteristic of the autonomous person, that is, her ethical lawgiving 
function of morality, I gradually move on to the fulfillment of her external moral 
duties, namely of: 1) her moral universal perfect duties of right to others, and 2) her 
moral specific perfect duties of right to others, from which, through the 6:239 
passage in the Metaphysics of Morals, 1) human rights and 2) socioeconomic rights, 
respectively, are afterwards developed or generated. Eventually, it becomes clear 
why a truly Kantian justification can be supported and proposed only for human 
rights; while for socioeconomic rights we can speak only of a duty-based justificatory 
account simply inspired by the Kantian opus. 
Additionally, apart from the justification of human and socioeconomic rights, 
in chapter 4 I explain why from our moral universal imperfect duties of virtue to 
others, and 2) our moral specific imperfect duties of virtue to others, no rights are 
derived. Also, I clearly show the role and place of the Kantian moral concept of 
͚huŵaŶ digŶitǇ͛ ǁithiŶ the Ŷeǁ justifiĐatioŶ of huŵaŶ aŶd soĐioeĐoŶoŵiĐ ƌights. 
Overall, the new (Kantian) duty-based justification of human and socioeconomic 
rights –including the division between universal imperfect and specific imperfect 




     Autonomy of the will   >   ethical lawgiving 
                    ↓                                                                    ↓ 
     Dignity (internally)                               Moral duties (externally) 
                                                                                          ↓ 
1. UŶiǀersal perfeĐt duties of right to others → HuŵaŶ rights  
2. SpeĐifiĐ perfeĐt duties of right to others → SoĐioeĐoŶoŵiĐ rights 
3. UŶiǀersal iŵperfeĐt duties of ǀirtue to others → No rights 
4. SpeĐifiĐ iŵperfeĐt duties of ǀirtue to others → No rights        
Following the presentation of the new Duty-Based Approach (DBA), I respond 
to four possible objections against it, namely that: 1) it degrades the idea of rights, 2) 
it wrongly distinguishes between human and socioeconomic rights, 3) it is not 
correct because it is based on the idea that Kant was a moral foundationalist; while 
he was actually a moral constructivist, and 4) it is not correct because it considers 
the Kantian moral and legal/political philosophy as two domains with some degree 
of continuity and coherence between them.  
Finally, at the end of chapter 4 I focus on our duties and rights in a case which 
differs from other cases such as the cases of a normal adult human being, an 
embryo, a baby, a child, a comatose patient, a mentally disabled person, an 
iŵŵigƌaŶt, a ƌefugee, aŶ ͚apatƌis͛, a poor person, a homosexual, and so forth. In 
particular, I discuss our duties and rights in the case of non-living human beings. 
Within this context, I attempt an application of the new duty-based justificatory 
account to the case of a corpse. What it is ultimately argued here is that we have the 
duty to treat the dead with dignity because this is the morally right thing, 






2.5 Chapter Five 
After the presentation and analysis of the new (Kantian) duty-based account for the 
justification of human and socioeconomic rights, I move on to the final, ͚suŵŵaƌǇ 
aŶd iŵpliĐatioŶs͛, chapter of the thesis. My purpose in this last chapter is twofold: 
first, to review the findings presented in chapters 1 to 4 and, second, to discuss some 
further practical implications of them, especially in the areas of law and politics.  
Also, in this chapter I attempt the application of the new duty-based 
justificatory account to one of the most urgent, yet indeterminate and still unstated, 
rights today, namely the right of children to freedom from severe or extreme 
poverty. It is argued that a duty-based justification is preferable in the case of 
children rather than a rights-based approach; and that contrary to the popular claim 
that ĐhildƌeŶ͛s ƌight to fƌeedoŵ fƌoŵ eǆtƌeŵe poǀeƌtǇ is a human right, this is 
actually a moral socioeconomic right.  
Finally, at the end of chapter 5, before the general conclusions of the thesis 
as a whole, I take a step further arguing that the new (Kantian) duty-based 
justification for human and socioeconomic rights may be the starting point for the 
formulation of a future duty-based account of international justice, in the form of a 
new ͚Bill of Duties͛. I explain why is necessary the drafting of a new international Bill 
of Duties, e.g. a new Universal Declaration of Human Duties, aiming effectively at the 
reinforcement of the implementation of human rights stated in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Such a new Bill of Duties would not only 




Having provided an overview of the whole thesis in order to guide the reader into 
the main contents of each chapter, I present now my main methodological tools. In 
order to effectively deal with the main question of the thesis, that is, the question of 
͚ǁhat is the philosophiĐal ďasis of huŵaŶ aŶd soĐioeĐoŶoŵiĐ ƌights͛, I haǀe studied 
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the history of human rights, and kept track of their violations worldwide on a weekly 
basis, during the last three years, by following Human Rights Watch. Further, I have 
collected and examined some of the most vehement critiques against rights, as well 
as collected and examined some objections regarding: 1) the two historical families 
of rights-based justifications, 2) the dignity-based accounts, and 3) the two Kantian-
based justificatory accounts. While discussing these accounts, I do not only focus on 
theoretical sources, e.g. books, research papers, and articles, but also on: 1) a 
number of legal documents, e.g. Declarations, Conventions, treaties, 2) specific case 
law, and 3) some political initiatives, e.g. the Human Rights MoǀeŵeŶt, NGOs͛ 
activities, and so on. Moreover, I haǀe atteŵpted a ͚ĐoŶĐeptual aŶalǇsis͛ of the 
Kantian moral concept of autonomy via the Kantian aesthetic category of the 
sublime. Also, in order to show the difference between the Kantian autonomy and 
the Kantian heteronomy, I haǀe pƌoǀided a ĐoŶĐise aŶalǇsis of ViƌgiŶia Woolf͛s Mrs. 
Dalloway. Additionally, I have examined a contemporary artwork in the area of the 
sublime, that is, Viola͛s ͚fiǀe aŶgels.͛ Furthermore, I have formulated the new 
(Kantian) duty-based justification for human and socioeconomic rights through a 
thorough textual analysis of the two major Kantian works, namely the Groundwork 
of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Metaphysics of Morals. Ultimately, in the last 
chapter of the thesis, I have first atteŵpted the ͚appliĐatioŶ͛ of the thesis to the 
unstated ͚right of children to freedom from extreme poverty͛, and, second, outlined 
a future duty-ďased aĐĐouŶt ĐoŵpleŵeŶtaƌǇ to the ĐuƌƌeŶt UN͛s ƌights-based 
account of international justice.  
 
If the readers want a detailed, yet concise, sense of all the aforementioned claims 
and ideas, please turn to the fifth section of chapter 5 (Conclusions), where they 








The problem of human rights 
 
1. Introduction: The history of human rights  
As mentioned in the introduction, the thesis addresses a question of contemporary 
philosophical debate: What is the philosophical basis of human rights? In the first 
two chapters of the thesis, as well as in the first part of chapter 3, my aim is not to 
provide a detailed, systematic, and rigorous critique of some human ƌights͛ 
justificatory theories. Rather, my aim is more limited, namely to offer an adequate 
overview of the aforementioned ͚ƌights-ďased͛, ͚digŶitǇ-ďased͛, aŶd ͚KaŶtiaŶ-ďased͛ 
theories, which shall further enable me 1) to stress the fact that we still do not have 
positive definite solutions to the two main problems of human rights, namely the 
problem of their indeterminacy, and the question of whether or not they are 
universally valid (see below); and 2) to position my new claims concerning a 
(Kantian) duty-based justification of human and socioeconomic rights, in chapter 4 of 
the thesis.  
In the present chapter, I outline the main problems and criticisms against 
human rights throughout history. Also, I question the two historical families of 
͚ƌights-ďased͛ accounts that attempt to justify human rights. I focus first on the 
family of accounts often called naturalistic, or traditional, or orthodox, and then on 
the family of accounts called political or practice-based. However, before this, I 
present a brief history of human rights.  
The ͚histoƌǇ of huŵaŶ ƌights͛ ǁas Ŷot alǁaǇs uďiƋuitous as it is todaǇ. As 
Samuel Moyn states, the enterprise of writing the ͚histoƌǇ of huŵaŶ ƌights͛ has 
become a widespread activity only in the last two decades.14 Specifically, the search 
                                                          
14 Moyn (2014), p. 1 
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for the background of huŵaŶ ƌights ďegaŶ iŶ the ϭϵϵϬs, ͚afteƌ͛, as MoǇŶ ǁƌites, 
͚theiƌ ƌoŵaŶtiĐ ǀeŶeƌatioŶ͛ aŶd theiƌ ͚ƌude ǀilifiĐatioŶ foƌ theiƌ eŶtaŶgleŵeŶts ǁith 
poǁeƌ͛.15 Eventually, as Moyn points out in his Last Utopia, the true history of 
human rights matters most of all so that we can confront their prospects today and 
in the future.16 
However, Moyn continues, although the ǁƌitiŶg of the ͚histoƌǇ of huŵaŶ 
ƌights͛ is a ƌeĐeŶt pheŶoŵeŶoŶ, huŵaŶ ƌights theŵselǀes aƌe Ŷot at all a ƌeĐeŶt 
invention, but a phenomenon drawing on prior languages and practices.17 In 
particular, equality as obligation of social justice came into view in the eighteenth 
century, the age in which the need for fair commercial processes arose as a result of 
the belief that commerce expands hierarchies of wealth.18 Thus, it is often argued 
that human rights (les dƌoits de l͛hoŵŵe) first appeared during the era of the 
European Enlightenment; in spite of the fact that their idea might have been around 
long before their expression in specific moral, legal, and political language.19 
Specifically, the time of the European Enlightenment was the time of the English Bill 
of ‘ights ;ϭϲϴϵͿ, ǁhiĐh set liŵits oŶ the MoŶaƌĐh͛s poǁeƌs, the American 
Declaration of Independence (1776), which announced the separation of 13 North 
American British colonies from Great Britain, the French Declaration on the Rights of 
MaŶ aŶd CitizeŶ ;ϭϳϴϵͿ, ǁhiĐh ƌefleĐted the idea that huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs had ͚Ŷatuƌal͛ 
rights that should always be protected, and, finally, the US Constitution and Bill of 
Rights (1791), which set out a series of personal freedoms.20 
                                                          
15 Moyn (2018), pp. ix-x. 
16 Moyn (2012) 
17 Moyn (2014), p. 18. 
18 Moyn (2018), p. 19 
19 More on this, in chapter 4 of the thesis 
20 See further the British Institute of Human Rights, available from: https://www.bihr.org.uk/history 
[accessed 24 November 2018] 
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After the Enlightenment, the idea of human rights declined. But human rights 
again became prominent after the end of the Second World War, and the 
extermination by Nazi Germany of over six million Jews, Sinti and Romani, 
homosexuals, and people with disabilities.21 As a result of this, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by the Third United Nations 
General Assembly on December 10, 1948 with the aim of launching a new era of 
international relations. IŶ aƌtiĐle ϭ of the UDH‘, it is stated that ͚All huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs 
are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and 
conscieŶĐe aŶd should aĐt toǁaƌds oŶe aŶotheƌ iŶ a spiƌit of ďƌotheƌhood͛.22   
Further, in order to establish mechanisms for enforcing the UDHR and 
ensuring that state parties will accept both the legal and the moral obligation to 
promote and protect human rights, the UN Commission on Human Rights drafted 
two more treaties which are considered to be the institutional backing of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Both of them were entered into force in 
1976, and have been ratified by a number of nations already. Along with the UDHR 
they make up the International Bill of Rights. 
The first treaty, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966, is 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) with its two optional 
Protocols. Countries who sign this Covenant guarantee to protect fundamental 
rights, such as freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention, all considered as derived 
͚fƌoŵ the iŶheƌeŶt digŶitǇ of the huŵaŶ peƌsoŶ͛.23 The rights the Covenant protects 
belong to every man, woman and child on earth, and may be asserted against any 
authority on earth. For instance, according to the Covenant, every human being has 
aŶ ͚iŶheƌeŶt ƌight to life͛. The CoǀeŶaŶt fuƌtheƌ pƌohiďits toƌtuƌe, aŶd aŶǇ otheƌ 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, slavery, and forced labour. It also 
                                                          
21 Ishay (2004) 
22 Available from: http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ [accessed 1 November 
2017]  




guarantees freedom to move around and choose where to live, fair trials, and 
privacy. 
In the similar vein, the second treaty, adopted by the General Assembly in 
1966, that is, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
;ICE“C‘Ϳ, ƌeĐogŶises that huŵaŶ ƌights ͚deƌiǀe fƌoŵ the iŶheƌeŶt digŶitǇ of the 
huŵaŶ peƌsoŶ͛.24 The ICESCR commits its parties to work toward the granting of 
economic, social and cultural rights to people in communities who are in need. 
Among other things, the Covenant protects the right to an adequate standard of 
living, the best possible physical and mental health, education, work, join trade 
unions, participate in cultural life, marriage, family, and the well-being of pregnant 
women, as well as those who have recently given birth. 
Moreover, there are nine core international human rights treaties, which also 
have a monitoring body within the UN human rights system that controls the 
implementation of the treaty provisions by its State parties.25 These core treaties 
are: 
1. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
2. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
3. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
4. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women 
5.  The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 
6. The Convention on the Rights of the Child 
7.  The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families 
                                                          
24 Available from: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx [accessed 1 
November 2017] 
25 Available from: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx 
[accessed 1 November 2017] 
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8. The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance 
9. The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities   
Additional to the International Bill of Rights and the nine core human rights 
treaties just mentioned, there aƌe ŵaŶǇ otheƌ uŶiǀeƌsal ͚iŶstƌuŵeŶts͛ ƌelatiŶg to 
human rights, such as: the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, the 
Convention against Discrimination in Education, the Declaration on the Elimination 
of Violence Against Women, the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, the 
United Nations Principles for Older Persons, the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, the Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, the Declaration 
on Social Progress and Development, the Slavery Convention, the Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide, and so on.26 Further, there are some significant regional 
documents for the protection and promotion of human rights. For instance, there is 
the ͚EuƌopeaŶ CoŶǀeŶtioŶ foƌ the PƌoteĐtioŶ of HuŵaŶ ‘ights aŶd FuŶdaŵeŶtal 
Fƌeedoŵs͛ ;ϭϵϱϬͿ27, aŶd also the ͚AŵeƌiĐaŶ CoŶǀeŶtioŶ oŶ HuŵaŶ ‘ights͛ ;ϭϵϲϵͿ.28 
Last but not least, along with all the aforementioned international and regional 
doĐuŵeŶts, oŶe should ŵeŶtioŶ the ͚HuŵaŶ ‘ights MoǀeŵeŶt͛, ŶaŵelǇ the ŶoŶ-
governmental social movement with international force engaged in activism related 
to human rights issues arising from totalitarian regimes, war atrocities, crimes 
against humanity, terrorism, and so forth.29  
Overall, one could speak of: 1) the idea of human rights, existing even before 
their expression into specific language, e.g. in the Christian tradition preceding the 
Enlightenment era,30 2) their expression into specific moral, legal, and political 
                                                          
26 All available online 
27 Available from: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf [accessed 1 November 
2017] 
28 Available from: http://www.hrcr.org/docs/American_Convention/oashr.html [accessed 1 
November 2-17] 
29 For the Human Rights Movement, see for instance: Neier (2012)  
30 See further chapter 4 
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language from the Enlightenment onwards,31 aŶd ϰͿ theiƌ ͚ǁƌitteŶ history͛ duƌiŶg the 
last two decades.32 
 
2. Main problems and criticisms 
Since 1948, when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by 
the Third United Nations General Assembly, the moral, legal, and political concept of 
human rights has been widely accepted.33 The relevant rights have further been 
ratified by most of the countries contributing to a great extent to the establishment 
not only of our contemporary international and regional legal orders, but also of our 
constitutional institutions.  
Nevertheless, still a great number of human rights violations and abuses 
occur worldwide. One need oŶlǇ ƌead the ͚HuŵaŶ ‘ights WatĐh͛ ƌepoƌts to see how 
many infringements occur on a daily basis.34 Even if there is a broad human rights 
framework, as it has been showed above, this framework seems to be non-effective. 
For example, the 1951 UN refugee convention says that asylum seekers have the 
right not to be expelled without examining their claims individually.35 However, this 
provision has arguably not been taken seriously into consideration in the case of the 
massive influx of Syrian refugees in Greece in 2015-2016. The question then arises 
why is such a rich human rights framework not efficient and effective enough to 
ensure the protection of our fundamental human rights? Among all other problems 
of human rights, which have occasionally been stated, e.g. the ongoing multiplication 
of human rights, or the fears that these rights have fuelled judicial overreach, and/or 
                                                          
31 See previous analysis 
32 See above 
33 Why I consider human rights as a moral, legal, and political concept is explained thoroughly in 
chapters 4 and 5 
34 Available from: https://www.hrw.org/publications [accessed 1 November 2017] 
35 Available from: http://www.unhcr.org/1951-refugee-convention.html [accessed 1 November 2017] 
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have damaged democracy,36 a number of more specific problems are often stated. 
Here, I report two main problems that many see as crucial:  
The first problem regarding human rights is said to be their indeterminacy or 
abstraction. Classical attacks regarding the abstractness of human rights start from 
Burke and Bentham.37 But even today, the core human rights documents, namely 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESC), are described in extremely abstract terms. But, I think, 
for human rights to be respected by ordinary people, they have first to be fathomed. 
This is helped if the expression of such rights is clear, specific and made concrete.  
Here it might be said that the abstractness of legal concepts, in general, 
enables judges and legal practitioners to exercise judgment in light of specific facts 
and circumstances. However, at the same time the vagueness of these concepts is 
holding back the relevant judgments. That is to say, a non-clarified concept within 
the legal order, e.g. the concept of human rights, cannot easily be interpreted in 
courts; hence it cannot be properly enforced, despite the variety of enforcement 
mechanisms. One example here is the interpretation of the right to freedom of 
religion. As Riǀeƌs Đlaiŵs: ͚Theƌe is Ŷo douďt iŶ the ŵiŶds of the “tƌasďuƌg judges 
that fƌeedoŵ of ƌeligioŶ is iŵpoƌtaŶt ďut eǆaĐtlǇ ǁhat it is... ƌeŵaiŶs elusiǀe.͛38  
Eventually, an abstract concept can hardly be implemented by political institutions. 
That is to say, the overall lack of specificity in the notion of human rights has 
negative effects not only on everyday life (see above ordinary people), but also on 
the legal and political terrain. 
The second problem of human rights is often said to be their difficulty to be 
universally accepted. This is often called the problem of the universal validity of 
                                                          
36 Fƌoŵ OŶoƌa O͛Neill͛s talk oŶ ϮϮ FeďƌuaƌǇ ϮϬϭϴ iŶ QUB “Ǉŵposiuŵ ǁith C. MĐCƌuddeŶ aŶd O. 
O͛Neill, see https://ǁǁw.qub.ac.uk/International/global-challenge-debates/human-rights-age-trump-
brexit/ [accessed 1 March 2018] 
37 See: Burke (1999) and Bentham (2007) 
38 Rivers (2013), p. 405. 
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human rights. The universality of human rights has been a subject of intense debate 
throughout the 20th century, and is still one of the major problems of human rights 
today. These rights aƌe tǇpiĐallǇ seeŶ as a ͚ǁesteƌŶ pƌoduĐt͛ iŵposed top-down by 
western circles unto the rest of the world.39 Within this context, it is argued that 
human rights, as we understand them in our western societies, are not applicable to 
other, non-western cultures, which have different values, customs, and mores.40 For 
example, it might be said that Saudi Arabia women do actually prefer to be inferior 
to men. Hence, not all countries in the world are obliged to respect human rights. 
Examining this issue, Michael Ignatieff, in his recent micro-ethnographic research, 
has found that human rights are not a concept shared by all. While rights are the 
language of the states and liberal elites, this language is not actually shared by 
ordinary people all over the world.41 The question arises as to why human rights are 
not shared by all? Here are my thoughts: 
Initially, people in some countries do not even get the opportunity of learning 
what human rights are, namely that they are not something constructable by the 
western world, but something discoverable, namely something that does really exist, 
if we carefully (and philosophically) examine our human nature.42 For example, Saudi 
Arabia is a state that does not foster the human rights education.43 The question 
here arises as to why some states do not foster the human rights education? One 
reason might be that some of them do not have the means to run such educational 
programs. In this case, it could be argued that the wealthy countries have the duty to 
support them financially. 
But there is, also, another reason why human rights education is not 
fosteƌed. Theƌe aƌe soŵe states iŶ the ǁoƌld ǁhiĐh Đould ďe Đalled ͚ŵuƌdeƌeƌs-
                                                          
39 See also Marx (1844) 
40 See Mutua (2002), p. 15; also: Tierney (2004), pp. 1-13 
41 Ignatieff (2017) 
42This is explained further in chapter 4.  
43 See for instance the European Saudi Organisation for Human Rights, available online from: 
http://www.esohr.org/en/?p=590 [accessed 17/1/2019] 
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states͛; foƌ eǆaŵple, Noƌth Koƌea, ǁheƌe teŶs thousaŶds of people aƌe eŶslaǀed aŶd 
tortured.44 In such totalitarian states, or ͚ŵuƌdeƌeƌs-states͛, as I Đall theŵ, huŵaŶ 
ƌights aƌe ǀiolated ďǇ the ͚ŵuƌdeƌeƌ-state͛, aŶd it is the ͚ŵuƌdeƌeƌ-state͛ itself that 
does not foster human rights education for its own unwholesome reasons. Following 
Rawls, in such cases, I think, the rest of the world has the duty to intervene and 
protect the innocent people, who are in danger under these established killing 
territories.45 
Mainly because of the two main problems of human rights, these have come 
under increasing attack in recent years. More specifically, the opponents of rights 
not only argue that rights are currently in some crisis, but also that, because of the 
two aforementioned problems, rights have actually failed to accomplish their 
objectives, that there may not be such things as human rights, and, eventually, that 
we should reject the idea of human rights. For instance, Alasdair MacIntyre has 
deĐlaƌed that ͚theƌe aƌe Ŷo suĐh ƌights aŶd ďelief iŶ theŵ is oŶe ǁith ďelief iŶ 
ǁitĐhes aŶd iŶ uŶiĐoƌŶs.͛46 Also, Costas Douzinas has claimed that there is at least a 
kind of paradox in the case of human rights: Even though the 20th century was the 
͚ĐeŶtuƌǇ of huŵaŶ ƌights͛, Ǉet, iŶ that ĐeŶtuƌǇ, ǁe had the gƌeatest Ŷuŵďeƌ of 
violations and abuses of these rights in world history, genocides, and, of course, the 
Holocaust.47 Further, Eric Posner, in his Twilight of Human Rights Law, has evinced a 
high controversial skepticism about human rights law.48 Incidentally, what must be 
pointed out is the fact that all these critiques against human rights come from across 
the political and ideological spectrum. For instance, Douzinas is a leftist critical legal 
scholar, while Posner is a conservative international lawyer.  
                                                          
44 https://www.amnesty.org.uk/issues/north-
korea?&gclid=Cj0KCQiA7IDiBRCLARIsABIPohj9SsfEmZdGFN-
JkT0X5rxYekN8XQIettPU8kUBgVKFpS6WPiR-AOoaApJPEALw_wcB [accessed 17/1/2 
45 See Rawls (1999), pp. 79-ϴϭ. Moƌe oŶ this issue ;͚iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶ͛Ϳ at the eŶd of Đhapteƌ 1 (Conclusion) 
46 MacIntyre (2007), p. 69; see also, Posner (2014) 
47 Douzinas (2000), p. 2 
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Contrary to nihilism or scepticism towards human rights, yet recognising their 
deficiencies, it cannot be claimed, I think, that there are not such things as human 
rights, or that we should completely reject the idea of human rights. Such radical 
views have little to offer to the world today, in which numerous violations of human 
and socioeconomic rights are taking place daily, and we have the duty, either as 
individuals or as states and organisations, to act with urgency. Consequently, despite 
the vagueness of the concept of human rights, despite the fundamental criticisms 
regarding their universal validity, despite the disappointment derived from their 
practice in several cases, I argue that we should keep a more modest stance and not 
reject or underestimate the idea of human rights. Besides, how can we overlook 
other cases which show that human rights have succeeded? For example, the 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s ƌights ŵoǀeŵeŶt has suĐĐeeded iŶ gaiŶiŶg ŵaŶǇ ƌights foƌ ǁoŵeŶ, suĐh as 
the right to vote. The same applies to children and their rights.  
However, this does not mean that we are not allowed to question the 
contemporary human rights practice. Recently, the human rights activist Mutua 
Makau has ƋuestioŶed AfƌiĐa͛s huŵaŶ ƌights Đultuƌe.49 Yet, in his talk, he has argued 
that a new moral language has to be found to fill the vacuum resulting from the 
inadequacy, or the failure, of the western human rights language, but –and this is of 
great importance– without de-appreciating or devaluing the idea of human rights. 
Also, Professor Samuel Moyn has recently claimed that, in spite of the Human Rights 
Movement failure, policymakers, politicians and the rest of the elite must keep 
human rights in perspective.50 I am sympathetic to Makau͛s and Moyn͛s ǀieǁs. 
Hence, in chapter 4 of the thesis, I thoroughly explain why nihilism with regard to 
human rights must be avoided, why human rights do not simply matter, but they 
do morally exist, and why the establishment of a new moral language based on the 
idea of ͚duties͛, is aďsolutelǇ ŶeĐessarǇ to fill the vacuum resulting from the 
inadequacy of rights. 
                                                          
49 See https://rekordeast.co.za/161584/africa-abandoning-human-rights-expert/ [accessed 21 
February 2018]  
50 See https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/23/opinion/human-rights-movement-failed.html [accessed 
24 April 2018]. 
32 
 
3. The two historical families of human rights justificatory accounts 
As mentioned above, there are two main problems of human rights: their 
indeterminacy and the suspicions regarding their universal validity. I think there is 
solution to both problems. The solution is the determination of the philosophical 
grounds of human rights. Now, the problem is that the idea of the philosophical 
foundations of human rights is not an idea which is accepted by all thinkers.51 For 
instance, legal positivists typically argue that we do not need to determine the 
grounds of human rights philosophically; and that we do not need to know what the 
nature of law is, aŶd ǁhetheƌ it applies uŶiǀeƌsallǇ. “peĐifiĐallǇ, legal positiǀists͛ 
position is that judges should focus on legislation and previous decisions (common 
law or case law), when they have to decide upon a particular case. They also argue 
that we must all respect law just because it is law, indepedently of any other moral 
considerations.52 Here two crucial issues arise.  
First, judges often face difficulties while they are trying to interpret 
legislation or/and previous decisions entailing indeterminate concepts, such as the 
concept of human and socioeconomic rights. An example here is the right to fredom 
of religion. As Rivers saǇs: ͚Theƌe is Ŷo douďt iŶ the ŵiŶds of the “tƌasďouƌg judges 
that freedom of religion is important, but exactly what it is and why it matters 
ƌeŵaiŶs elusiǀe͛.53 AppaƌeŶtlǇ, iŶ suĐh Đases, lookiŶg at huŵaŶ ƌights ͚legislatioŶ͛ 
aŶd otheƌ huŵaŶ ƌights ͚deĐisioŶs͛ does Ŷot offeƌ ŵuĐh. It seems then that the law 
itself, the article 18 of the UDHR in this case, does not provide the grounds for the 
understanding of the relevant right. But there must be an exact and correct 
interpretation of rights because, without prior interpretation, there cannot be 
proper application of law.54 
To the aforementioned argument, according to which human and 
socioeconomic rights, as they appear in legislation and case law, are indeterminate 
                                                          
51 I use the fouƌ ǁoƌds ͚justifiĐatioŶ͛, ͚fouŶdatioŶ;sͿ͛, ͚ďasis͛, aŶd ͚gƌouŶds͛ iŶteƌĐhaŶgeaďlǇ. 
52 See for instance, Hart (1994), pp. 124-154; Dworkin (1986), pp. 36-37; Luban (1988), pp. 20-21. 
53 McCrudden (2013), p. 405 
54 McCrudden (2013), p. 381 
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concepts, a legal positivist would respond that law might be unfinished at its 
͚ŵaƌgiŶs͛, foƌ eǆaŵple iŶ the details ĐoŶĐeƌiŶg its eŶfoƌĐeaďilitǇ, ďut it is Ŷeǀeƌ 
iŶdeteƌŵiŶate iŶ its ͚Đoƌe͛, oƌ its ͚Ŷatuƌe͛, oƌ its ͚ŵeaŶiŶg͛ –as it is argued, for 
instance, by the so-called legal realists, oƌ ͚judiĐial aĐtiǀists͛.55 To this counter-
argument by legal positivists, my response is that human and socioeconomic rights, 
in particular –not necessarily all other rights– are indeterminate in their core, or 
their nature, or their meaning. That is the reason why sometimes they are called 
͚ŵoƌal͛ ƌights, ǁhile soŵe otheƌ tiŵes, theǇ aƌe Đalled ͚legal͛ oƌ ͚politiĐal͛ ƌights. 
Apparently, this shows that there are at least three different views regarding their 
nature or meaning; hence, the need for the determination of their basis or their 
souƌĐe, fƌoŵ ǁhiĐh theǇ deƌiǀe aŶd ͚get͛ theiƌ ŵeaŶiŶg.56  
Moreover, not only legal positivists, but also some other thinkers have 
explicitly argued against any philosophical account for the foundation of human 
rights claiming, in particular, that politics are generally better off the notion of good. 
For instance, Rawls has claimed that the historical foundation provided by the liberal 
tradition is good enough.57 In the same vein, Ignatieff has argued that the 
formulation of a justificatory account for human rights is a futile task in the context 
of the post-modern multicultural age.58  
On the contrary, my claim is that the historical justification of human rights 
suggested by Rawls is unevenly constrained to the liberal tradition, excluding the 
ƌest of the ǁoƌld. Also, IgŶatieff͛s Đlaiŵ, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to ǁhiĐh the formulation of a 
                                                          
55 Hart, H.L.A. (1994). The Concept of Law 2nd ed. Clarendon Law Series, p. 147. More on the history of 
legal ƌealisŵ, oƌ ͚judiĐial aĐtiǀisŵ͛, as a theoƌǇ of laǁ, as ǁell as the eǆaŵiŶatioŶ of the positioŶ of 
some prominent legal realists, see Green, M.S. (2005). Legal realism as a theory of law. In: William 
and Mary Law Review. 46(6): 1915-2000. A prominent example of the renewed interest in legal 
realism is Leiter, B. (2001). Legal realism and legal positivism reconsidered. In Ethics, 111(2): 278-301. 
56 More on this in chapter 4, in which the main justificatory argument of the thesis is presented and 
discussed. 
57 Moƌe oŶ this, iŶ the seĐtioŶ ͚politiĐal aŶd pƌaĐtiĐe-ďased justifiĐatioŶs͛ ďeloǁ. “ee also ‘aǁls 
(1999), p. 15; Birmingham (2006), p. 2. 
58 Ignatieff (2001), p. 83.  
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justificatory account for human rights is a futile task, within the post-modern 
multicultuƌal age, ĐaŶŶot easilǇ ďe aĐĐepted, giǀeŶ the faĐt that, espeĐiallǇ iŶ todaǇ͛s 
postmodern, multicultural world, in which all great narratives have fallen apart, and 
people feel strangers even within their own countries, a universal ideal, such as the 
ideal of human rights based on a common ground, is needed more than ever to unite 
us all.  
Consequently, I think some non-legal basis of rights (if there is one) must be 
discovered; hence I argue in favour of supplementing the body of rights in the major 
human rights documents by their philosophical grounding. Incidentally, at this point, 
it must be stressed that, throughout the thesis, I use the verbs: ͚Đoŵe fƌoŵ͛, ͚deƌiǀe͛, 
͚gƌouŶded iŶ͛, and ͚ďased oŶ͛, as ǁell as the ŶouŶs: ͚gƌouŶdiŶg͛, ͚justifiĐatioŶ͛, aŶd 
͚fouŶdatioŶ;sͿ͛ interchangeably. Such a foundational task would provide the grounds 
for the clarification of the concept of rights revealing their true nature, and answer 
the question of whether they are universally valid; hence why they should effectively 
be respected by all.59 Ultimately, given that the number of rights violations 
unfortunately has not been decreased during the last decades, and the institutions, 
e.g. the United Nations, have in many cases failed to protect and secure them,60 
their justification becomes even more urgent.61 Within this context, the present 
thesis aims to offer a new argument concerning the philosophical foundations of 
human and socioeconomic rights. Before the presentation of my thesis in chapter 4, I 
have to examine first a number of noteworthy justificatory accounts. I start with the 
͚ƌights-ďased͛ aĐĐouŶts, iŶ the seŶse that, under these justifications, rights are being 
put first. Generally, they are categorised into two families: On the one hand, there 
                                                          
59 More on this in the last two chapters of the thesis. 
60 “ee foƌ iŶstaŶĐe, ͚The Oďseƌǀeƌ ǀieǁ oŶ the UN failuƌe to stop slaughteƌ iŶ easteƌŶ Ghouta͛, 
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are the naturalistic, or traditional, or orthodox justifications; and on the other hand, 
there are the so-called political or practice-based justifications.62 
Initially, the Orthodox theorists claim that any account for the justification of 
human rights must not overlook the fact that human rights are effectively moral 
rights that all human possess by virtue of their humanity. It is also argued that these 
moral rights are the necessary background of a contemporary theory of International 
Legal Human Rights (ILHR).63 On the contrary, the political accounts for the 
justification of human rights are built upon the idea that the nature of these rights ͚is 
to be understood in light of their role or function in modern international legal 
practice.͛64 Hence any justificatory approach has to pay attention to the practical 
role of human rights within the international relations today. Eventually, the aim of 
political theorists is to systematize the existing international legal human rights 
practice without drawing on prior moral considerations.  
In what follows, I discuss both families of rights-based justifications, that is, 
the naturalistic and the politiĐal, as ǁell as a ͚ŵiǆed͛ justifiĐatioŶ ǁith ŶatuƌalistiĐ 
and political elements. My aim is twofold: first, to show that in spite of the richness 
of all these theories, we still do not have positive definite solutions to the two main 
problems of human rights; and, second, to position my new claims, concerning a 
(Kantian) duty-based justification, in chapter 4 of the thesis, in relation to this 
broader field of research. 
 
3.1 Naturalistic, or traditional, or orthodox accounts 
The first family of ͚ƌights-ďased͛ justifications goes under various labels or terms. 
Some call them naturalistic, while some others traditional, or orthodox. According to 
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these justifications, human rights are typically seen as moral rights that all human 
beings possess at all times and in all places simply in virtue of being human. This 
view comes from the concepts of natural law (ius naturale) and natural rights. In 
recent years, John Finnis is one of the most prominent defenders of the orthodox 
conception of human rights. In particular, Finnis considers rights as a contemporary 
idiom for natural rights.65 All the naturalistic, or traditional, or orthodox justifications 
of human rights are effectively based on the idea that these rights are grounded in a 
distinguishing aspect of human nature, or a fundamental element of human 
existence. There are four features of human life in which rights are, in principle, 
grounded in this case: 1) the notion of agency, 2) the notion of good life, 3) the 
notion of basic needs, and 4) the notion of capabilities.66 In the following analysis, I 
offer an overview of these accounts, along with what I regard as their main flaws.  
In his book, On Human Rights, James Griffin, does not only offer one of the 
most significant justificatory accounts for human rights, but also one of the most 
important contemporary accounts of human agency.67 Initially, Griffin claims that 
the justification of human rights is a quite important issue. Even if we agree on a list 
of human rights, there are still different opinions concerning their foundations. 
According to Griffin, the convergence on the justification of any list of rights 
pƌoduĐes ͚ŵoƌe ǁholeheaƌted pƌoŵotioŶ of huŵaŶ ƌights, feǁeƌ disagƌeeŵeŶts 
over their content, fewer disputes about priorities between them, and more rational 
and more uniform resolution of their conflicts– all much to be desired.͛68 
Griffin starts the formulation of his foundational account with the notion of 
͚peƌsoŶhood͛. Moƌe speĐifiĐallǇ, he argues that personhood is something more than 
one being a member of the species homo sapiens. To exercise our personhood is to 
choose our own path through life autonomously (autonomy), to be able to act 
having at least the minimum provision of resources and capabilities that it takes, and 
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to be free, that is to say, not to be forcibly stopped by others from pursuing what we 
see as a worthwhile life (liberty); in other words, to have a human standing or 
human status as agents. This is the concept of normative agency, which Griffin 
further contrasts with the agency that is common to higher animals as well.69 
Eventually, considering human rights as moral rights that we have simply in virtue of 
being humans, Griffin argues that these rights should be grounded in the notion of 
͚Ŷoƌŵatiǀe͛ ageŶĐǇ. IŶĐideŶtallǇ, GƌiffiŶ relates the notion of normative agency to 
the notion of dignity arguing that it is in the terms of the former, namely of the 
capacity of human beings to form a personal conception of life and to pursue it 
without interference, that we should understand the latter. Hence, any violation of 
our rights is to be uŶdeƌstood as ͚taƌgetiŶg͛ ouƌ digŶitǇ, that is, ouƌ Ŷoƌŵatiǀe 
agency. 
Furthermore, John Finnis is an advocate of an ͚objective list͛ account of 
human rights based on our well-being. That is to say, he builds his human rights 
fouŶdatioŶal aĐĐouŶt oŶ the ŶotioŶ of ͚ǁell-ďeiŶg͛. More specifically, Finnis has 
eŶlisted seǀeŶ ďasiĐ ͚goods͛, ǁhiĐh seƌǀe as pƌoteĐtoƌs of ĐoŶditioŶs foƌ ouƌ ǁell-
being.70 These goods are: 1) life, 2) knowledge (for its own sake), 3) play (for its own 
sake), 4) aesthetic experience, 5) sociability (friendship), 6) practical reasonableness 
i.e. the ability to reason correctly about what is best for yourself, and to act on those 
decisions, and 7) religion, i.e. a connection with, and participation with, the orders 
that transcend individual humanity. The value of these seven basic goods stems, in 
FiŶŶis͛s ǀieǁ, Ŷot fƌoŵ the faĐt that we desire them, but from their being basic 
aspects of human well-ďeiŶg; heŶĐe the ĐhaƌaĐteƌizatioŶ of his list as ͚oďjeĐtiǀe͛. 
Eventually, following Aquinas, Finnis treats these basic goods as paƌt of the ͚ĐoŵŵoŶ 
good͛, that is, the iŶteƌest of all ŵeŵďeƌs of the ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ to ďƌiŶg aďout a state of 
affairs where everyone, and not only the few, will be able to enjoy the basic goods in 
their life.71 Ultimately, according to Finnis, human rights are grounded in these seven 
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fundamental goods, in the sense that they fuŶĐtioŶ as a kiŶd of ͚safetǇ ǀalǀes͛ ǁhich 
eŶsuƌe theiƌ ;ƌights͛Ϳ fulfillŵeŶt. 
Moreover, there are the so-called ͚ďasiĐ Ŷeeds͛ aĐĐouŶts ƌegaƌdiŶg the 
philosophical foundations of human rights.72 Within this context, it is argued that 
there is a class of basic needs that we have in virtue of our humanity, independently 
of any other goals. Such needs are, for example, our need to food, water, air, 
medical aid, home, health, and social relations, that is, conditions that human beings 
require in order to have a minimum of a healthy biological, and psychological 
eǆisteŶĐe, oƌ a ͚ŵiŶiŵallǇ deĐeŶt life͛.73 According to the basic needs accounts, 
without these basic needs being fulfilled we cannot have a decent human life; so 
that human rights are in effect the principles which guarantee them. Consequently, 
human rights are grounded in this class of basic needs. What is further pointed out is 
that the advantage of this approach is that not only the fully rational human beings, 
but also children, the mentally disabled, and so forth, are protected. Ultimately, the 
basic needs account is typically seen as neither too narrow as GƌiffiŶ͛s ageŶĐǇ 
account, nor too expansive as FiŶŶis͛s seǀeŶ fuŶdaŵeŶtal goods aĐĐouŶt above. 
Finally, there is the Capabilities Approach. This approach has recently been 
connected by Martha Nussbaum with human rights. According to Nussbaum, 
Đapaďilities aƌe aŶsǁeƌs to the ƋuestioŶ ͚What is this peƌsoŶ aďle to do aŶd to ďe?͛74 
Capabilities, Nussbaum argues, ͚aƌe Ŷot just aďilities ƌesidiŶg iŶside a peƌsoŶ ďut also 
the freedoms or opportunities created by a combination of personal abilities and the 
political, social, and economic environment.͛75 “iŵilaƌlǇ to FiŶŶis͛s seǀeŶ 
fundamental goods, Nussbaum argues that a decent political order must secure to all 
ĐitizeŶs at least a thƌeshold leǀel of ͚teŶ͛ CeŶtƌal Capaďilities of paƌtiĐulaƌ 
importance, which are entailed by the idea of a life worthy of human dignity. These 
ten central capabilities are: 1) life, 2) bodily health,3) bodily integrity, 4) senses, 
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imagination and thought, 5) emotions, 6) practical reason, 7) affiliation, 8) relations 
to otheƌ speĐies, ϵͿ plaǇ, aŶd ϭϬͿ ĐoŶtƌol oǀeƌ oŶe͛s eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt.76  
Eventually, Nussbaum emphasizes the close link between these capabilities 
aŶd huŵaŶ ƌights. IŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ, she Đlaiŵs that ͚the ĐoŵŵoŶ gƌouŶd ďetǁeeŶ the 
Capabilities approach and human rights approaches lies in the idea that all people 
have some core entitlements just by virtue of their humanity, and that it is a basic 
duty of society to respect and support these entitlements.͛77 In other words, all 
human beings are entitled to these capabilities, which eventually function as the 
foundations of their rights; or, human beings have rights that guarantee these ten 
central capabilities.  
After this concise presentation of some of the most important naturalistic, or 
traditional, or orthodox ͚ƌights-ďased͛ justificatory accounts, I turn to their main 
flaws. Here, I admit that I generally favour the naturalistic, or traditional, or orthodox 
view, according to which human rights are moral rights that all human beings 
possess at all times and in all places in virtue of their humanity. My new Duty-Based 
Account (DBA) might be seen as an account belonging to some extent to this family 
of justifications. Yet, as I shall explain in chapter 4, rationality, which lies above 
humanity, is, in my view, the crucial factor that guarantees our human and 
socioeconomic rights. In what follows, I move on to the discussion of some of the 
most serious deficiencies of the naturalistic, or orthodox, or traditional accounts. I 
staƌt ǁith GƌiffiŶ͛s theoƌǇ foƌ the justifiĐatioŶ of huŵaŶ ƌights. I repeat here that this 
is not an exhaustive discussion of these accounts; rather my aim is to present some 
of their deficiencies, most of which are already highlighted in the existing literature.  
Initially, Griffin͛s aĐĐouŶt is a significant philosophical account. The notion of 
normative agency, as he calls it, is quite important for human beings, as, without it, 
theǇ ǁouldŶ͛t ďe aďle to ďƌiŶg aďout aŶǇ ƌatioŶal aĐtioŶ at all iŶ theiƌ liǀes. IŶ this 
sense, agency should be protected with human rights. Additionally, the 
strengthening of the notion of agency is an important task in our ͚human rights era͛, 
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in which the spirit of giving and respecting others (activity) is of lesser importance 
than the spirit of getting more and more, and asking for respect from others 
(passivity). That is to saǇ, GƌiffiŶ͛s foĐus oŶ the ŶotioŶ of ͚agency͛, ǁhiĐh is ideŶtified 
ǁith the ŶotioŶ of ͚aĐtiŶg͛, is important because only thƌough ͚aĐtiŶg͛ may we 
become more active in an era in which what generally dominates is lethargy. 
However, there are two ŵaiŶ pƌoďleŵs ǁith GƌiffiŶ͛s aĐcount that cannot be 
overlooked. 
First, the argument based on the notion of normative agency encounters 
problems with respect to human beings who lack the capacity to act as autonomous 
ŵoƌal ageŶts. The pƌoďleŵ ǁith GƌiffiŶ͛s aĐĐouŶt is that is foĐused oŶlǇ oŶ the 
actual, rather than the potential, normative agency of human beings. But not all 
human beings are actual agents. For instance, children, the severely mentally 
disabled, dementia sufferers, and so forth, are not actual agents. Children are 
potential agents, while the mentally disabled and dementia sufferers used to be 
actual agents, but they are not any more. Hence, the acceptance of an agency-based 
account for the justification of human rights may lead us to the implausible 
conclusion that all these human beings have no rights. Griffin himself admits that 
͚oŶlǇ Ŷoƌŵatiǀe ageŶts ďeaƌ huŵaŶ ƌights – no exceptions: not infants, not the 
seriously mentally disabled, not those in a permanent vegetative state, and so on.͛78  
But is this actually something that we can accept lightly? I think this is 
something that neither morality nor law can accept. It is not by accident the fact that 
not only the former, but also the latter attributes human rights both to children and 
the mentally disabled. There are many legal documents drafted upon this idea, e.g. 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.79 Consequently, as has 
been addressed in the relevant literature, contrary to what they assert, agency-
ďased aĐĐouŶts, suĐh as GƌiffiŶ͛s, do not understand human rights as rights that all 
human beings have in virtue of being human. Instead, human rights are seen as 
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rights that all persons have in virtue of being persons, that is, of being agents.80 But 
when we are talking about human rights we typically refer to and mean rights 
possessed by human beings, not just persons, namely citizens or members of a 
certain society.81  
“eĐoŶd, GƌiffiŶ͛s aĐĐouŶt is regarded as a ͚ƌeduĐtiǀe͛ aĐĐouŶt, in the sense 
that it constrains the human rights violation factors only to the concept of agency. 
But even though agency is a crucial factor in considering a particular action as a 
violation of a human right, there are cases in which it is not the only one. For 
example, the limitation of our agency in the case of torture is not the only reason 
ǁhǇ ͚Ŷot to ďe toƌtuƌed͛ is a huŵaŶ ƌight.82 Liao aƌgues that toƌtuƌe͛s ĐƌeatioŶ of 
great pain to human beings could also be considered as a crucial factor in 
ĐoŶsideƌiŶg ͚Ŷot to ďe toƌtuƌed͛ as a huŵaŶ ƌight.83 But GƌiffiŶ͛s fouŶdatioŶal 
account does not entail all the factors; hence it may be considered as an incomplete 
and reductive account. 
Surprisingly, Griffin himself allows other elements to influence and contribute 
indirectly to the determination of the content of human rights. In particular, he says 
that the two core values that constitute the notion of agency, namely autonomy and 
liberty, do not exhaust all the elements of a good life. He then mentions other 
eleŵeŶts, suĐh as aĐĐoŵplishiŶg soŵethiŶg iŶ the Đouƌse of oŶe͛s life, uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg 
certain moral and metaphysical matters, deep personal relations, enjoyment, and so 
on, as forming a good life.84 The question then arises as to why Griffin does not 
mention these factors when considering a human rights violation in the first place? 
Moƌeoǀeƌ, FiŶŶis͛s ͚seven basic goods͛ account, within the context of his 
defense of natural law theory in his Natural Law and Natural Rights,85 has generated 
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a very considerable and sophisticated body of scholarship.86 However, as has been 
clarified at the beginning of this chapter (Introduction), my aim is not to provide a 
detailed and rigorous account of the naturalistic and the practiced-based theories for 
the justification of human rights. Rather, my aim is more limited. Hence, here I focus 
on what has been considered to ďe the ŵaiŶ pƌoďleŵ of FiŶŶis͛s seǀeŶ fuŶdaŵeŶtal 
goods account, namely the fact that, although it does promote our well-being and a 
good life, it favours a plurality of goods for the justification of human rights. 
To be more specific, I agree with those who point out that we must be careful 
with accounts favouring the plurality of goods for the justification of human rights. 
As has been pointed out, the problem is that such accounts produce a broad list of 
human rights.87 But it is not plausible to turn everything we might require for our 
personal well-being into a human right. For instance, the fact that, besides my 
husband and my daughter, I need the presence of a friend in my life for the purpose 
of my well-being does not mean that that could, or should, become a human right. 
Paradoxically, Finnis himself has admitted that there are countless aspects to human 
self- determination and self-realization.88 However, he still does not seem to offer a 
treatment to this flaw. Incidentally, the same problem appears on the ͚interest-
based͛ accounts for the justification of human rights. For instance, Raz argues that 
human rights are held to be grounded in human interests.89 Yet, as in the case of 
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fundamental goods, such interest-based accounts favour the plurality of interests 
producing further an implausible broad list of human rights. The question then arises 
whether it makes sense to produce countless rights corresponding to each one of 
those interests? As in the case of the plurality of goods, the answer I think must be 
negative. 
Ultimately, one can object to both fundamental goods and interest-based 
accounts that what effectively distinguishes rights from goods and interests is the 
fact that, in contrast to rights, goods and interests do not involve duties. Goods and 
interests can be impaired without any wrong being committed. For example, my 
iŶteƌest iŶ ďeiŶg soŵeoŶe͛s loǀeƌ ĐaŶ ďe uŶsatisfied, oƌ ͚ǀiolated͛, ǁithout aŶǇ 
wrongdoing. But this is not the case for rights, which are typically seen as closely 
connected with duties. This is a point of significance within the context of the 
formulation of the new (Kantian) Duty-Based Account for the justification of human 
and socioeconomic rights in the present thesis.90 
Furthermore, the ͚basic needs͛ accounts promise to be neither too narrow as 
GƌiffiŶ͛s agency account, nor too expansive as FiŶŶis͛s seǀeŶ fuŶdaŵeŶtal goods 
account. Hence, it could be argued that they might avoid many of the problems of 
both the agency and the good life accounts which have been discussed above. 
However, as has been stressed in the current literature, a number of other 
significant rights, such as civil and political rights, remain unsupported within the 
constrained context of a basic-needs justificatory type; for example, there is no room 
left for the justification of rights such as the right to fair trial.91 Generally, I do not 
think that a basic needs account does offer a satisfactory answer to these two 
categories of rights (civil and political), which are part of the International Bill of 
Rights. 
Finally, the main pƌoďleŵ of Nussďauŵ͛s appƌoaĐh, as Liao has argued, is the 
language she uses in the case of children.92 Because of their cognitive immaturity, 
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Nussbaum argues, children do not have the real opportunities to choose and act 
(capabilities). For example, a child cannot actually choose to have, or not to have, a 
name or nationality. Thus, Nussbaum claims that the language of functionings, rather 
than the language of capabilities, is the appropriate language for children. That is to 
say, the achieved functionings matter in their case, and not their capabilities, namely 
their real opportunities to judge and act in relation to a set of functionings.93 Within 
this context, Nussbaum further argues in favour of compulsory education, 
compulsory health care, and other aspects of compulsory functioning. Ultimately, 
these functionings, as Nussbaum argues, can further help children to develop adult 
capabilities.94  
Now, it is true that children, as well as the mentally disabled, the comatose 
patients, and so forth, are cognitively immature or deficient. Hence, that is the 
reason why, according to the main argument of the thesis (chapter 4), in these cases, 
particularly, the language of duties, rather than the language of rights, is 
appropriate. However, the choice of the language of duties, rather than the language 
of rights, within the context of the new (Kantian) Duty-Based Approach (DBA), is not 
a choice that degrades children, the mentally disabled, the comatose patients, and 
so forth. On the contrary, it is a language that highlights the special level of 
protection required in these and other similar cases. UŶluĐkilǇ, Nussďauŵ͛s 
distinction between the functionings and capabilities, and her decision to choose the 
pejorative language of former rather than the latter in the case of children, the 
mentally disabled, comatose patients, and so forth, straightforwardly degrades 
them. Ultimately, by arguing that these functionings can further help children to 
develop adult capabilities, Nussbaum seems to ignore the fact that many children, 
unfortunately, do not live to adulthood in order to develop adult capabilities; hence 
the disparaging language of functionings never actually turns into the advanced 
language of capabilities for them. 
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Overall, one might say that most of the rights-based naturalistic, or orthodox, 
or traditional justificatory approaches present the relations: agency-rights, or good 
life-rights, or interest-rights, or basic needs-rights, or capabilities-rights, in such a 
ǁaǇ that if oŶe͛s rights have been violated, she is also deprived of her agency, or 
good life, or interests, or basic needs, or capabilities. But there are examples in 
history that show that people, though deprived of their human rights, they still had 
some sort of agency, or a good life, or their interests satisfied, or their basic needs 
and capabilities fulfilled; so that they were eventually considered to enjoy a minimal 
decent life. For instance, despite the violations of most of his rights during the 
Second World War, in Greece, my grandfather has several times told me that his life 
was a good life after all. Also, reĐeŶtlǇ, BuĐhaŶaŶ has said that ͚a ǁoŵaŶ oƌ a peƌsoŶ 
who is gay or lesbian may be subjected to discrimination in the workplace or in 
various other social settings, yet may be able to achieve high levels of well-ďeiŶg͛.95  
Ultimately, as has been mentioned in literature, all the justifications above 
have a consequentialist, or instrumental, or utilitarian character, ascribing human 
rights to human beings only on the basis of the contribution of the rights to the 
realization of a specific aspect of humanity worthy of protection (e.g. agency).96 One 
might argue here that a consequentialist, or instrumental, or utilitarian aspect is 
important in order for us to determine more precisely the exact content of a right. 
Besides, the determination of the content of rights is a conditio sine qua non for the 
formulation of a substantive theory of rights. For example, in the case of the rights to 
speech, a legal reasoning based on consequentialist, or instrumental, or utilitarian 
considerations would possibly explain why we ascribe broader rights to political 
rather than to commercial speakers.97 
Nevertheless, I think that, in this particular case, an instrumentalist would 
struggle to show why a politician has broader speech rights than a commercial 
speaker. A consequentialist ǁould siŵilaƌlǇ stƌuggle to pƌoǀide the adeƋuate ͚effeĐts 
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iŶfoƌŵatioŶ͛ upoŶ ǁhiĐh to build his or her legal reasoning. Finally, a utilitarian 
would struggle even more to show the benefits of restricting the speech rights of 
commercial speakers in favor of the relevant rights of political speakers. Thus, my 
proposal, in chapter 4 of the present thesis, is that we should better see human 
rights in deontological terms, namely as something that human beings hold 
independently of whether these rights promote and protect some valuable aspects 
of humanity such as agency, interests, needs and so forth.98 
 
3.2 Political and practice-based accounts 
The advocates of the second family of rights-based justifications consider human 
rights, in principle, as legal and political rights generated within the international 
political practice.99 According to this type of justifications, human rights are typically 
seen as based on: a) the public reason within a liberal constitutional democratic 
ƌegiŵe, oƌ a deĐeŶt hieƌaƌĐhiĐal soĐietǇ ;e.g. ‘aǁlsͿ, oƌ ďͿ the iŶteƌŶatioŶal ͚pƌaĐtiĐe͛ 
;e.g. ‘az, BeitzͿ, oƌ ĐͿ aŶ ͚oǀeƌlappiŶg ĐoŶseŶsus͛ aŵoŶg holdeƌs of diffeƌeŶt 
religious, philosophical and moral views (e.g. Nussbaum). I will first present some of 
the most important political and practice-based justifications of human rights, and 
then I will point out some of their weaknesses. 
OŶe of the ŵost pƌoŵiŶeŶt theoƌists of the ͚politiĐal ŵoǀe͛ ǁho has 
challenged the naturalistic conception of human rights is John Rawls. More 
specifically, Rawls has claimed that because of the fact that people hold different 
religious, philosophical and moral views, we should avoid grounding human rights on 
͚a theologiĐal, philosophiĐal, oƌ ŵoral conception of the nature of the human 
peƌsoŶ͛.100 Given the wide range of positions, and the consequent disagreements 
among peoples, on such issues, Rawls has claimed that the use of such forms of 
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͚oƌdiŶaƌǇ ŵoƌal ƌeasoŶiŶg͛ aƌe pƌoďleŵatiĐ aŶd uŶaĐĐeptable to ground human 
rights for all people. Hence, contrary to the naturalistic conceptions, according to 
which human rights are grounded in a distinguishing aspect of human nature, or a 
fundamental element of human existence, Rawls has argued that an account of the 
justifiĐatioŶ of huŵaŶ ƌights should ďe ďased oŶ ǁhat he has Đalled ͚puďliĐ ƌeasoŶ͛, 
that is, the ƌeasoŶ of fƌee aŶd eƋual peoples, of ǁhiĐh ;ƌeasoŶ͛sͿ pƌiŶĐiples aƌe Ŷot 
derived from any particular religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines, but from 
the values and ideas that can be shared and freely agreed by all within a liberal 
democratic or a non-liberal democratic yet decent hierarchical society.  
UŶdeƌ this positioŶ, puďliĐ ƌeasoŶ is solelǇ ďased oŶ the idea of the ͚politiĐallǇ 
reasonable͛ addƌessed to ĐitizeŶs as ĐitizeŶs.101 Overall, in this view, well-ordered 
people, that is, liberal people, as well as non-liberal but decent people who are 
members of non-aggressive hierarchical societies, agree on human rights derived 
from a kind of public reason, of which principles come from the ideas that have 
previously been agreed by all. FiŶallǇ, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to ‘aǁls͛s theoƌǇ, the pƌiŶĐiples 
derived from the values and ideas that can be shared and agreed by all, at the 
international level, refer to:102 
1. People͛s fƌeedoŵ aŶd iŶdepeŶdeŶĐe, aŶd the ƌespeĐt of theŵ ďǇ otheƌ 
people. 
2. The observance of treaties and undertakings. 
3. The equality of people, and the fact that they are parties to the 
agreements which bind them. 
4. The observance of a duty of non-intervention. 
5. People͛s ƌight of self-defence but not of their right to instigate war for 
reasons other than self-defence. 
6. The honor of human rights. 
7. The observance of certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war. 
                                                          
101Rawls (1999), p. 55 
102Rawls (1999), p. 37 
48 
 
8. The duty of assistance of other people living under unfavorable 
conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social 
regime. 
Furthermore, in order to justify human rights, Raz focuses on the 
international practice, or what he calls the ͚PƌaĐtiĐe͛, iŶ the iŶteƌŶatioŶal ǁoƌld 
order.103 Moƌe speĐifiĐallǇ, he Đlaiŵs that ͚huŵaŶ ƌights aƌe iŶ pƌiŶĐiple ŵoƌal ƌights 
held by individuals only when the conditions are appropriate for governments to 
have the duties to protect the interests which the ƌights pƌoteĐt͛. In particular, Raz 
Đalls huŵaŶ ƌights ͚sǇŶĐhƌoŶiĐallǇ uŶiǀeƌsal͛, ďǇ ǁhiĐh he ŵeaŶs that theǇ aƌe 
possessed only by people alive today.104 He then gives as an example the right to 
education to show that this right exists only where the social and political 
organization of a country makes it appropriate to hold the state to have a duty to 
provide education.105 Within this context, Raz claims that there cannot be a right to 
education for cave dwellers.106 Overall, (moral) human rights are, in Raz͛s ǀieǁ, Ŷot 
independent from the conditions of the international community that guarantees 
them or not; but they exclusively depend on the contingencies of the current system 
of international relations.107 
In a similar vein, Beitz believes that a coherent notion of human rights is 
derived from observing their practice. Beitz further argues that human rights are 
intended to play a role only within a certain range of societies.108 More specifically, 
he claims that these societies are those that have at least some of the defining 
features of modernization: for example, a minimal legal system including a capability 
for enforcement, an economy that includes some form of wage labour for at least 
some workers, some participation in global cultural and economic life, and a public 
institutional capacity to raise revenue and provide essential collective goods.109 Beitz 
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also claims that states are responsible for satisfying certain conditions in the 
treatment of their own people, and that failure, or prospective failure, to do so may 
justify some form of remedial or preventive action by the world community or those 
acting as its agents.110 
Last but not least, there are some other practice-based justifications which 
ground human rights in the fact that theǇ aƌe the oďjeĐt of aŶ ͚oǀeƌlappiŶg 
ĐoŶseŶsus͛ aŵoŶg holdeƌs of diffeƌeŶt ƌeligious, philosophiĐal aŶd ŵoƌal ǀieǁs. 
AĐĐoƌdiŶg to these justifiĐatioŶs, despite the diffeƌeŶt ĐoŶĐeptioŶs of the ͚good͛, 
different cultures could at least reasonably agree about unacceptable violations of 
fundamental human rights.111 Within this context, human rights are considered to be 
norms for international practice reachable from a variety of incompatible positions. 
What should be stressed here though is that, in spite of the fact that the idea of an 
overlapping consensus is a Rawlsian idea, Rawls himself never used it to describe 
human rights; that is to say, he never connected his overlapping consensus view with 
human rights.112 Instead, other writers, such as Nussbaum, have related it to human 
rights.113 More specifically, Nussbaum has argued that the basic point of the central 
Đapaďilities aĐĐouŶt, ǁhiĐh has ďeeŶ disĐussed iŶ the pƌeǀious seĐtioŶ, is ͚to put 
forward something that people from many different traditions, with many different 
conceptions of the good, can agree on as a necessary basis for pursuing their good 
life͛.114 WithiŶ this ĐoŶteǆt, Nussďauŵ͛s list of the teŶ Đapaďilities Đould, iŶ effeĐt, ďe 
seen as an attempt to answer such a broad cross-cultural inquiry. 
Most of the political and practice-based justifications, which have been 
presented above, are very popular within the context of the human rights discourse 
today. However, there are some weaknesses, which cannot be ignored. Again, I must 
stress here that my critique is not extensive; rather it is focused on the deficiencies 
which have already been recognised in the current literature. I staƌt fƌoŵ ‘aǁls͛s 
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account, which might be seen as problematic in the sense that only liberal, and some 
decent hierarchical societies, are included in his argument concerning the 
justification of human rights. 
The Law of Peoples, in which Rawls discusses the issue of human rights, has 
been developed within the narrow horizon of the political system of liberalism, and 
is strictly restricted to it. However, not all countries in the world are liberal 
democracies. But even liberal democratic societies are, today, pluralistic societies 
ĐoŶsistiŶg of ŵaŶǇ soĐial gƌoups. HeŶĐe, ‘aǁls͛s aĐĐouŶt Đould at ŵost pƌoǀide a 
limited, communitarian justification, far from the standards of international and 
global justice. In addition, it could be claimed that a conception of justice operating 
in a bounded society, e.g. in a liberal society, typically operates under a power, e.g. a 
liberal state, of which main goal is to keep that society bounded in a Weberian 
seŶse, that is, ŵoŶopolised ďǇ the ͚legitiŵate͛ poǁeƌ of the liďeƌal state.115  
Consequently, I think human rights should be discussed within a wider, more 
universal, scope than the limited scope of a liberal democracy, which would 
guarantee their protection all over the world. Only under this condition, we could 
further speak of a conception of justice freely operating in a pluralistic environment. 
Hence, our considerations about the justification of human (and socioeconomic) 
rights should not be restricted to and express a western moral order, but a wider 
moral order. Otherwise, human rights could unluckily be seen as an infliction or 
imposition of the western moral values towards other forms of civilization; hence 
oŶe Đould ĐoŶteŵptuouslǇ, Ǉet justlǇ, speak of the ͚gloďalizatioŶ of huŵaŶ ƌights.͛116 
Moƌeoǀeƌ, as ƌegaƌds ‘az͛s aƌguŵeŶt foƌ the justifiĐatioŶ of huŵaŶ ƌights, it 
could be said that if human rights existed only when the states had the means or the 
volition to protect them, then, in many cases, rights would remain unprotected. We 
must not ignore the fact that there are many states in the world that do not have the 
means to protect human rights, e.g. they do not have the resources to construct the 
appropriate institutions. Also, we must not overlook the fact that there are states 
which do not have the volition to protect human rights in their territories e.g. North 
                                                          
115 O͛Neill ;ϮϬϭϱͿ, p. ϴϰ. 
116 Mutua (2002) 
51 
 
Korea. Additionally, it might be argued that given that the right to education is part 
of the general right to knowledge, which is not restricted only to particular societies, 
but it is applied to all times and all places, the right to education could be seen as a 
right which does actually exist in the Stone Age, as well as in all un-contacted tribes 
in the world today. Here Liao makes an interesting distinction between: 1) the aim or 
goal of a right, and 2) the object or the means to achieving the relevant goal of a 
right. Within this context, it could legitimately be claimed that although the latter 
may indeed vary across time and location, the former are timeless and independent 
of the specific loci.117   
Furthermore, concerning Beitz͛s thesis, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to ǁhiĐh huŵaŶ ƌights͛ 
theoretical conception can be grasped only through interpreting their practice, has 
been claimed that the current deep confusion about the use of human rights in 
practice in several cases, indicates a deeper confusion about their meaning;118 so 
that one should start from analyzing the concept of human rights, and then move on 
to the examination of their practice.119 Also, ƌegaƌdiŶg Beitz͛s claim that human 
ƌights eǆist aŶd aƌe gƌouŶded oŶlǇ iŶ ͚soĐieties of ŵodeƌŶitǇ͛, ǁhiĐh haǀe ďeeŶ 
structured in a way that favours their fulfilment, one might counter-argue that 
human rights actually do not play a role only in modern societies. Apparently, this 
would leave open the possibility of people unprotected in other states which do not 
have the characteristics of modernity. For example, there are over a hundred tribes 
iŶ the ǁoƌld todaǇ, ǁhiĐh haǀe Ŷot eǀeŶ the ŵiŶiŵuŵ ĐoŶtaĐt ǁith the ͚outside͛ 
world.120 I think it is difficult one to think that people belonging to these tribes, or to 
other civilizations in the past, or to future communities with other characteristics, do 
not possess rights.  
IŶ additioŶ, Beitz͛s ŵaiŶ idea that oŶlǇ states aƌe ƌespoŶsible for satisfying 
certain conditions aiming at the fulfilment of human rights renders the issue of 
ƌights͛ ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ too Ŷaƌƌoǁ. OŶ the ĐoŶtƌaƌǇ, the  UN͛s DeĐlaƌatioŶ of HuŵaŶ 
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‘ights, iŶ its Pƌeaŵďle, pƌoĐlaiŵs that ͚eǀeƌǇ iŶdiǀidual aŶd eǀeƌǇ oƌgan of society, 
keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to 
promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, 
national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and 
observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the 
peoples of teƌƌitoƌies uŶdeƌ theiƌ juƌisdiĐtioŶ͛.121 Consequently, the responsibility for 
the protection of human rights is not and cannot be restricted only to governments, 
but it applies to all: individuals, e.g. ordinary people, legal practitioners, politicians, 
governments, organisations, corporations, and so forth. 
Ultimately, one might respond to Beitz that the international practice 
regarding human rights is not sufficiently homogenous to warrant that any case of 
domestic harmful conduct of governments shall be subject of international concern. 
Hence, failures in domestic level are not prevented or remedied in international level 
in most cases. The ascertainment of cases of international concern is quite difficult 
or impossible, given the disagreements among societies as to which human rights 
are genuine, and hence as to the contours of the practice that should be followed in 
certain circumstances. Even if there is a growing body of documents to which we can 
point in articulating what the international practice of human rights is, there is 
always the problem of the interpretation of the abstract human rights in these 
documents. Eventually, a good interpretation presupposes the clarification of the 
obscure concept of human rights. Hence, one of the main goals of the present thesis 
is the elucidation of the abstract concept of human (and socioeconomic) rights 
through the philosophical determination of their grounds.  
Finally, as ƌegaƌds the ͚oǀeƌlappiŶg ĐoŶseŶsus͛ ǀieǁs ƌegaƌdiŶg the 
justification of human rights, I would first like to stress the fact that one can hardly 
ignore the attractiveness of the thought that rights can be objects of an intercultural 
consensus. One of the main reasons, among others, why one should advocate such 
aŶ agƌeeŵeŶt aĐƌoss a ƌaŶge of ƌelatiǀelǇ staďle soĐieties is that it ͚seƌǀes to ĐoŶfiƌŵ 
that the ƌights ǁe ideŶtifǇ as ͞huŵaŶ͟ aƌe, iŶ faĐt, ĐoŶditioŶs foƌ legitiŵatioŶ, aŶd 
                                                          




that our confidence that they have this character is not distorted by our experience 
living in one rather than another kind of society with one rather than other kinds of 
iŶstitutioŶs͛.122 Another (perhaps more pragmatist) reason is that an agreement 
regarding international human rights is important to elicit the willing support of 
governments and other agents.123 Eventually, each and all individuals, governments, 
and other agents might more easily accept human rights as binding, if they see and 
understand them as objects of an intercultural agreement. 
Neǀeƌtheless, the ͚oǀeƌlappiŶg ĐoŶseŶsus͛ appƌoaĐhes to huŵaŶ ƌights haǀe 
to respond to the following counter-argument: human rights, as has already been 
mentioned above, are, in most cases, seen as a Western product imposed by the 
Western world to non-Western countries only to serve the interests of the Western 
world. Within this context, it could be claimed that the idea of ͚ƌight͛ does Ŷot look 
at all familiar to the non-Western world. In his recent micro-ethnographic research, 
Michael Ignatieff examined the claim whether human rights are a concept shared by 
all. What he found is that while rights are the language of the states and liberal 
elites, this language is not actually shared by ordinary people all over the world.124 
CoŶseƋueŶtlǇ, aƌguŵeŶts suĐh as Maƌtha Nussďauŵ͛s, ǁhiĐh aƌe ďased oŶ 
the idea of aŶ ͚oǀeƌlappiŶg ĐoŶseŶsus͛ aƌe pƌoďleŵatiĐ iŶ this ƌespeĐt. “o, apaƌt from 
the ŵaiŶ pƌoďleŵ of Nussďauŵ͛s ͚capabilities approach͛, which has been discussed 
aďoǀe, ŶaŵelǇ its diffiĐultǇ to eǆplaiŶ ŵaŶǇ ƌights, e.g. ĐhildƌeŶ͛s ƌights, heƌ ;ŵiǆed 
naturalistic and political) account is not satisfactory in the sense that it is not 
thoroughly explained how an overlapping consensus can be achieved in a world, 
which does not share the same views either concerning the ten central capabilities in 
relation to human rights, or concerning human rights themselves.  
Ultimately, most of these intercultural agreements, which are based on the 
idea of an overlapping consensus, seem to have been built upon a constructivist 
base, without any other moral considerations rather than the construction of the 
intercultural agreement itself. The question then arises as to how human rights can 
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effectively be respected by individuals if they can only be seen as the product of a 
technical or constructed agreement without a deeper moral background. I think 
morality should not be excluded within the contemporary human rights discourse. 
MoƌalitǇ is effeĐtiǀelǇ the ͚ďallast͛ of legalitǇ, ǁithout ǁhiĐh ;ŵoƌalitǇͿ, legalitǇ 
cannot effectively work. Eventually, one can more easily respect something if she 
does have a moral reason to do so. This is part of the nature of human beings, and it 
is indeed the way most of them act in real life circumstances. 
Concluding the discussion of the political and the practice-based 
justifications, I add that in all these accounts, the practice of recognizing, claiming, 
and enforcing universal human rights is based on the international practice, or just 
the ͚PƌaĐtiĐe͛. But it is oǀeƌlooked the faĐt that the iŶteƌŶatioŶal pƌaĐtiĐe is ailiŶg 
today. BǇ aŶ ͚ailiŶg͛ pƌaĐtiĐe, I poiŶt to all the suspiĐioŶs aŶd ĐƌitiĐisms, without or 
not logical base, against states, governmental, and non-governmental organizations, 
which are typically seen as responsible for the protection of human and 
socioeconomic rights. It is well-known, for example, the critique against the 
structure and operational mechanisms of the UN Security Council.125 The question 
then arises as to how a practiced-oriented justification of human rights based on 
ailing grounds can be a successful one.  
At this point, it might be argued that the political and practice-based 
accounts could be combined with the naturalistic, or orthodox, or traditional 
accounts. A synthesis, as Buchanan claims, might offer us the solutions to the 
problems arising from the two types of justification when they are functioning 
separately. In what follows, I examine the plausibility of a synthesis between the 
naturalistic and the political perspectives in the philosophy of human rights. 
IŶĐideŶtallǇ, it ŵight ďe said that Nussďauŵ͛s theoƌǇ aŶd, to soŵe eǆteŶt, ‘az͛s 
theory do fall within the scope of both types of justification.126 Eventually, one could 
claim that things might not be black or white, but there might be a grey area as well.  
Buchanan does examine this grey area. 
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More specifically, combining characteristics of both of the two types of 
justifiĐatioŶ, ŶaŵelǇ the ŶatuƌalistiĐ aŶd the politiĐal, BuĐhaŶaŶ͛s Đoŵpleǆ aĐĐouŶt 
aims to show that the gap between them is not unbridgeable. What is addressed at 
The Heart of Human Rights is the question of the moral justifiability of international 
legal human rights (ILHR).127 Initially, Buchanan argues for taking international 
human rights as a legal practice, or a legal phenomenon, constituted solely by legal 
rights which are owed to the right-holders without reference only to corresponding 
moral human rights.128 There are, as he says, a number of prominent international 
legal human rights that cannot be justified only by appeal to corresponding moral 
rights. He gives, then, as an example the right to health care, arguing that ͚Ŷo 
iŶdiǀidual͛s iŶteƌest iŶ health is ŵoƌallǇ suffiĐieŶt to justifǇ the gƌeat Đosts that suĐh 
large-sĐale poliĐies eŶtail aŶd the sigŶifiĐaŶt ƌestƌiĐtioŶs oŶ ŵaŶǇ iŶdiǀiduals͛ liďeƌtǇ 
that theǇ ǁould iŶeǀitaďlǇ ƌeƋuiƌe͛.129 Instead, there are a number of different 
grounds for having this right. If we do not appeal solely to a corresponding moral 
right, the right to health care can be justified, for example, by appealing to the fact 
that it promotes social solidarity, that it contributes to economic prosperity, or that 
it is an important ingredient of a decent society. Of course, Buchanan does not 
exclude the possibility of justifying an international legal human right in a moral way. 
Rather, he argues that international legal human rights should be justified in a 
pluralistic way, namely by appealing to a variety of justifications, including moral 
considerations.130  
Eventually, Buchanan formulates a moral account for the justification of 
international legal human rights (as he understands them). However, there is a 
problem in his account which cannot be overlooked. By giving emphasis solely to the 
legal ĐhaƌaĐteƌ of iŶteƌŶatioŶal huŵaŶ ƌights oƌ, iŶ LuďaŶ͛s ǁoƌds, oŶlǇ to the 
͚juƌisdiĐtioŶal deĐisioŶ aďout ǁhiĐh iŶstitutioŶs ǁill defiŶe, ĐodifǇ, ŵoŶitoƌ, aŶd 
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enfoƌĐe huŵaŶ ƌights͛,131 Buchanan seems to disregard the fact that not all human 
rights are legal. There are, indeed, a number of rights, included in treaties and 
bilateral and multilateral agreements between states, which have binding legal 
effect between the parties that have agreed to them. There are also other 
international human rights instruments, such as the Conventions under international 
law, which are legally binding e.g. the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989).  
However, there are other documents, which, even though they are, in 
principle, not legally binding, they contribute to the implementation and the 
development of international human rights law by being a source of political 
obligation. For instance, and most importantly, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) was designed as a non-legally binding document. Indirect arguments 
for the binding force of the UDHR, based on customary or treaty law, are piecemeal 
and cannot make obligatory what is mentioned in this Declaration. Also, rules of law 
derived from the consistent conduct of states acting out of the belief that the law 
ƌeƋuiƌed theŵ to aĐt that ǁaǇ, kŶoǁŶ as ͚ĐustoŵaƌǇ iŶteƌŶatioŶal laǁ͛, aƌe ŶoŶ-
legally binding as well. Finally, NGOs and human rights activism are non-legal aspects 
within the practice of human rights today; yet they do play a significant role within 
the contemporary international human rights arena, in general. Eventually, one 
Đould aƌgue ǁith NiĐkel that a full aĐĐouŶt of the ͚PƌaĐtiĐe͛ should eŶĐoŵpass laǁ, 
philosophy, politics, activism, and even journalism.132 
Fuƌtheƌ, I do Ŷot uŶdeƌstaŶd BuĐhaŶaŶ͛s Đlaiŵ that theƌe aƌe a Ŷuŵďeƌ of 
different grounds for having a human right. It is not only that such a justificatory 
plurality would complicate even more the controversial and obscure notion of 
human rights in the minds of ordinary people, as well as in legal reasonings in courts, 
and in international politics, but also that, following the examination of the grounds 
of human (and socioeconomic) rights, within the context of the present thesis, I have 
concluded that these rights are actually grounded in a moral basis solely. This is 
thoroughly developed in chapter 4, as an essential part of the thesis.  
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Finally, I point out that, despite its attractiveness, a synthesis between the 
naturalistic and the practice-based perspectives in the philosophy of human rights is 
quite difficult to be achieved. These two perspectives represent two quite different 
philosophical insights. However, this does not mean that, generally, morality and 
legality cannot be reconciled, as George Letsas has argued.133 In spite of their 
differences, my view is that morality and legalitǇ ĐaŶ iŶdeed ďe ĐoŶsideƌed as ͚tǁo 
heaƌts ďeatiŶg as oŶe͛ ǁithiŶ the (Kantian) duty-based ethics. Light is shed on this 
proposition in the last two chapters of the thesis. 
 
4. Conclusion     
In this first chapter of historical and introductory character, I started with the 
presentation of a brief history of human rights, before I discuss their two main 
problems and, also, some criticisms against them today. In addition, I offered an 
overview of some of the most significant contemporary ͚ƌights-ďased͛ justifications 
of human rights. More specifically, I focused on: 1) the naturalistic, or traditional, or 
orthodox accounts; and 2) on the political and practice-based accounts. Apart from 
their specific problems, which have already been highlighted in the relevant 
literature, in this concluding paragraph, I claim that in all these accounts there seems 
to be an emphasis on and priority of rights over duties. Indeed, all these accounts 
seem to be in line with our so-called ͚huŵaŶ ƌights eƌa͛. HeŶĐe, I Đall theŵ ͚ƌights-
based accounts͛ for the justification of rights. 
Nevertheless, as has been discussed in section two above, there are two 
main problems of human rights, which cannot be ignored: First, the idea of human 
rights is not something that can be deeply understood (problem of indeterminacy); 
and, second, human rights are not accepted by all (problem of universal validity). As 
has already been mentioned, it might be argued that other countries have the duty 
to assist those countries which either do not understand, or/and accept human 
rights. The question here arises as to what extent a ͚Rawlsian-type͛ intervention is 
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͚iŶŶoĐeŶt͛ aŶd aĐĐeptaďle.134 That is to say, do other countries have the right to 
intervene, or not? My view, on this controversial issue (intervention), which has 
troubled legal philosophers for ages, is that any kind of intervention is, in principle, 
unacceptable. Hence, I am against the idea of one country intervening to another, 
except from exceptional circumstances (e.g. ͚ŵuƌdeƌeƌs-states͛ suĐh as North Korea). 
The reason why I do not generally favour interventionism is that, to some extent, I 
see countries as rational human beings, that is, as autonomous entities. Only in 
exceptional circumstances (e.g. children, mentally disabled, and so forth) does one 
have the right to make decisions on behalf of someone else. Similarly, only in 
exceptional circumstances, for example, in the case of prison camps in North Korea, 
do have other countries a right to intervention. 
The fact that I am, in principle, against the idea of intervention has forced me 
to find another way of justifying human rights. Hence, instead of developing a 
͚rights-based͛ justifiĐatoƌǇ account, such as those discussed above, in the present 
thesis, I have seen things from another point of view, namely from the scope of 
duties. Consequently, the general view, upon which the present thesis (fully 
developed in chapter 4) has been built, that is to say, its overarching narrative, is 
that, although the language of rights has (but should not) come to an end, the 
emphasis on and priority of duties over rights must be shown somehow; and a ͚dutǇ-
ďased aĐĐouŶt͛ for the justification of rights should be examined that might be 
better understood and more easily accepted by the non-western world. We must 
not ignore the fact that most non-ǁesteƌŶ ĐouŶtƌies͛ ethiĐs is dutǇ-based. For 
example, African ethics is ethics of duties not of rights. It is the African 
communitarian society that mandates a morality weighted on duties rather than on 
rights.135 Further, even the most radical Islamist terrorist justifies his crimes through 
the invocation of a higher sacred/ailing ͚dutǇ͛, according to which he must fulfill the 
wishes of a ͚God͛. Ultimately, this is, I think, the main problem of all the ͚ƌights-
ďased͛ aĐĐouŶts ǁhiĐh haǀe ďeeŶ disĐussed iŶ this Đhapteƌ: none of them gives 
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emphasis on and prioritise the idea of duties over the idea of rights. I explore this 
























Is dignity the foundation of human rights? 
 
͚“o ŵaŶǇ ƌoads, so ŵuĐh at stake 
so ŵaŶǇ dead eŶds, I͛ŵ at the edge of the lake 
soŵetiŵes I ǁoŶdeƌ ǁhat it͛s goŶŶa take 
to fiŶd digŶitǇ͛ 
Bob Dylan, Dignity 
 
1. Introduction: A brief history of dignity and some critiques 
Before I fully develop my (Kantian) duty-based argument for the justification of 
human and socioeconomic rights, I consider it necessary to examine a few more 
significant arguments for the justification of human rights, particularly, those based 
oŶ the ĐoŶĐept of ͚digŶitǇ͛. This is soŵethiŶg that has to ďe doŶe Ŷot oŶlǇ ďeĐause 
the number of the dignity-based accounts is increasing more and more day by day, 
and most of them are quite popular,136 but also because dignity is regarded by many, 
say judges iŶ Đouƌts, as the ͚offiĐial͛ justifiĐatioŶ of huŵaŶ ƌights, as a ƌesult of the 
fact that is actually mentioned as the grounding basis of rights in the major human 
rights documents, e.g. in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.137 Thus, along 
with the weighty and influential ͚rights-based͛ justificatory accounts, which have 
been examined in the previous chapter, I think it is important to discuss the ͚dignity-
ďased͛ aĐĐouŶts too.  
Initially, dignity appears in the major human rights documents, in the 
Constitutions of many democratic countries, as well as in a number of legal decisions 
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in courts today. What dominates in all these documents, Constitutions, and decisions 
is the idea that all rights, to which they refer, are grounded, either explicitly or 
implicitly, in the notion of human dignity. For example, in the Preamble of the 
UŶiǀeƌsal DeĐlaƌatioŶ of HuŵaŶ ‘ights ;UDH‘Ϳ ǁe ƌead that the ͚…ƌeĐogŶitioŶ of the 
inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family is the fouŶdatioŶ of fƌeedoŵ, justiĐe aŶd peaĐe iŶ the ǁoƌld͛, aŶd theŶ, iŶ 
aƌtiĐle ϭ, that ͚all huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs aƌe ďoƌŶe fƌee aŶd eƋual iŶ digŶitǇ aŶd ƌights…͛.138 
Also, in the Preamble of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
;ICCP‘Ϳ, it is ƌeĐogŶized that huŵaŶ ƌights ͚deƌiǀe fƌoŵ the iŶheƌeŶt digŶitǇ of the 
huŵaŶ peƌsoŶ͛.139 In addition, in the Preamble of the International Covenant of 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), once more, it is recognized that 
huŵaŶ ƌights ͚deƌiǀe fƌoŵ the iŶheƌeŶt digŶitǇ of the huŵaŶ peƌsoŶ͛.140  
Moreover, the conception of dignity appears in the Basic Law of the Federal 
Republic of Germany (1949). In particular, in article 1 of the German Basic Law, is 
stated that ͚huŵaŶ digŶitǇ shall ďe iŶǀiolaďle. To ƌespeĐt aŶd pƌoteĐt it shall ďe the 
dutǇ of all state authoƌitǇ͛.141 Incidentally, the German Constitution has been a 
model for the construction of many other Constitutions around the world, for 
example the Greek Constitution. According to the Greek Constitution, ͚toƌtuƌe, aŶǇ 
bodily maltreatment, impairment of health or the use of psychological violence, as 
well as any other offence against human dignity are prohibited and punished as 
pƌoǀided ďǇ laǁ͛.142 Finally, dignity has several times been invoked as the foundation 
of human rights in a number of legal decisions in courts. For example, dignity was 
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invoked by the German Court in order to protect hijacked airliners from a law 
peƌŵittiŶg shootiŶg doǁŶ aŶ aiƌplaŶe to saǀe otheƌ peoples͛ liǀes oŶ eaƌth.143 In the 
same vein, the European Court of Human Rights in a number of cases presents 
dignity as the justification of human rights.144 Eventually, all these legal decisions 
have been influenced by the relevant human rights documents in which dignity 
appears as the foundation of human rights.  
However, dignity is not expressed in precise or accurate terms in the 
aforementioned documents. That is to say, the way dignity appears in these 
documents cannot reassure us that it is indeed the foundation of human rights. For 
instance, while in the two Covenants dignity appears to be the basis of human rights, 
iŶ the UŶiǀeƌsal DeĐlaƌatioŶ of HuŵaŶ ‘ights it doesŶ͛t. IŶ the UDH‘, iŶ particular, as 
JeƌeŵǇ WaldƌoŶ ĐoƌƌeĐtlǇ iŶdiĐates, digŶitǇ aŶd ƌights seeŵ to ďe ͚ĐooƌdiŶate ideas 
ƌatheƌ thaŶ deƌiǀiŶg oŶe fƌoŵ the otheƌ͛.145 Also, in the Basic Law of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, is not clearly expressed that dignity is the foundation of 
human rights. Hence the question arises as to whether dignity is indeed the 
foundation of human rights as it is implied or declared depending on the 
document?146  
In order to answer this question, one has to put aside the textual analysis, 
and attempt a conceptual analysis of the concept of dignity. The reason is that most 
of the times documents, as Waldron claims, are not noted for their philosophical 
depth; rather, they represent political compromises.147 In many cases, framers 
intentionally leave the concepts diffuse in order to render them flexible objects of 
reconciliation in the political domain. Jacques Maritain, who had participated in the 
drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, has said that the drafters 
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Đould ͚agƌee aďout the ƌights ďut oŶ ĐoŶditioŶ that Ŷo oŶe asks us ǁhǇ͛.148 
Consequently, only through a philosophical analysis of the concept of dignity we can 
determine its true nature, and further affirm or not the claim that it is the 
foundation of human rights. This is something attempted within the context of the 
ĐoŶĐeptual aŶalǇsis of the ŵoƌal ĐoŶĐept of ͚autoŶoŵǇ͛ iŶ Đhapteƌ 3. Here, I focus on 
1) the history of the concept of dignity and some critiques against it and 2) on four 
noteworthy contemporary dignity-based justifications of human rights. 
To begin with, I consider it important to provide a concise account of the 
development of the notion of dignity, given that it is not a static concept, but a 
concept which has been used in different ways throughout history. Given that it is 
iŵpossiďle to offeƌ heƌe a thoƌough pieĐe of histoƌiĐal aŶalǇsis, I͛ǀe ŵade a seleĐtioŶ 
of sources which offer an adequate understanding of the two main types of dignity, 
thƌoughout histoƌǇ, ŶaŵelǇ digŶitǇ as ͚status͛ aŶd digŶitǇ as ͚ǀalue͛.149 On these two 
notions of dignity are based some of the most important contemporary dignity-
based accounts for the justification of human rights. 
The starting point of this brief historical analysis is the meritocratic concept 
of dignity in archaic societies. In Homeric epics dignity is accorded to persons with 
high status.150 This is the status arising from the possession of characteristics 
regarded as meritorious. Special characteristics such as family and friendships 
determine where one stands. Dignity, in this sense, is determined by the place 
people hold in the social hierarchy, and is ascribed only to those of high rank. Those 
beneath someone else in the hierarchy of merit recognize and offer their respect to 
the high-ranked. Eventually, among those of high status, there is an ongoing 
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ĐoŵpetitioŶ of ǁho is ͚the ďest of the ďest͛. Foƌ eǆaŵple, AgaŵeŵŶoŶ aŶd AĐhilles 
must constantly prove that they really deserve their dignity or high-ranking status.151 
In the same vein, we see dignity as status (dignitas) in the Roman world, in 
which it is associated with the respect and honour due to a person with an important 
position.152 IŶ CiĐeƌo͛s De Inventione, digŶitǇ deŶotes oŶe͛s ƌole iŶ the soĐietǇ, as 
well as the honours and the respectful treatment that are due to whoever has this 
role. Here, one possesses an elevated social status in the social order if he or she 
belongs, for example, to the nobility or to the church.153 This kind of status 
conception of dignity continued to exist until the Enlightenment, in the 18th century, 
when it started gradually to fade away, as a result of the abolition of aristocratic 
͚digŶities͛ assoĐiated ǁith aƌistoĐƌatiĐ ͚status͛.154 
CoŶtƌaƌǇ to the ͚ŵeƌitoĐƌatiĐ digŶitǇ͛ iŶ De Inventione, Cicero also developed 
the opposite type of dignity, namely the conception of intrinsic human dignity, that 
is, the idea that each human being inherently possesses dignity. In his last treatise De 
Officiis (On Duties or On Obligations), in which Cicero expands his notion on moral 
obligations emphasizing the meaning of them in relation to ourselves and our 
communities, he describes dignitas as going beyond merely describing an elevated 
status of individuals. Specifically, in this work, Cicero understands dignity as a value 
shared by all human beings in virtue of their humanity.155 
FolloǁiŶg CiĐeƌo͛s defiŶitioŶ of digŶitǇ, traditional Catholic thought generally 
understands dignity as an intrinsic value possessed by all human beings because of 
the fact that they iŶĐaƌŶate God͛s iŵage. Foƌ iŶstaŶĐe, foƌ Thoŵas AƋuiŶas, digŶitǇ is 
an intrinsic value; yet a value possessed by human beings who are not only created 
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by God, but also capable of having goodness on account of themselves.156 In 
particular, Aquinas claims that the dignity of persons is what worsens rather than 
lessens a sin, or wrongdoing, committed by them.157 Eventually, Aquinas associates, 
or connects, dignity with human responsibility.  
In the same vein, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, in the first part of his 
Oration on the Dignity of Man in which he deals extensively with the topic of human 
dignity, defines dignity as a value possessed by each human being inherently.158 
Hoǁeǀeƌ, siŵilaƌ to AƋuiŶas, his foĐus is oŶ the ͚Đƌeatiǀe poǁeƌ͛ of ŵaŶ, that is, the 
power of man to choose between different routes of development. Dignity is 
ultimately connected by Pico with human capacity for self-determination. 
Furthermore, in the 18th century, Immanuel Kant, makes the dignity of 
humanity central in his philosophy. More specifically, Kant discusses thoroughly the 
dignity of humanity, or human dignity, in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 
Morals, ǁhiĐh pƌoǀides the fouŶdatioŶ foƌ all KaŶt͛s suďseƋueŶt ǁƌitiŶgs iŶ pƌaĐtiĐal 
philosophy.159 Heƌe is KaŶt͛s faŵous passage: 
͚… the idea of the dignity of a rational being, who obeys no law other than 
that which he himself at the same time gives. 
In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity. 
What has a price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; what 
on the other hand is raised above all price and therefore admits of no 
equivalent has a dignity. 
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What is related to general human inclinations and needs has a market price; 
that which, even without presupposing a need, conforms with a certain taste, 
that is, with delight in the mere purposeless play of our mental powers, has a 
fancy price; but that which constitutes the condition under which alone 
something can be an end in itself has not merely a relative worth, that is, a 
price, but an inner worth, that is, dignity. 
Now, morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can be an 
end in itself, since only through this is it possible to be a lawgiving member in 
the kingdom of ends. Hence, morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of 
ŵoƌalitǇ, is that ǁhiĐh aloŶe has digŶitǇ͛ ;Ak. ϰ:ϰϯϰ-435).160 
Also, in the Ak. 4:436 of the Groundwork, Kant argues that every rational 
human being has inner value, that is, dignity, because he or she has autonomous 
will. Kant writes: 
͚But the laǁgiǀiŶg itself, ǁhiĐh deteƌŵiŶes all ǁoƌth, ŵust foƌ that ǀeƌǇ 
reason have dignity, that is, an unconditional, incomparable worth; and the 
word respect alone provides a becoming expression for the estimate of it that 
a rational being must give. Autonomy is therefore the ground of the dignity of 
huŵaŶ Ŷatuƌe aŶd of eǀeƌǇ ƌatioŶal Ŷatuƌe͛.161    
Overall, and in line with the above passages, Kant defines dignity as an inner (not 
intrinsic or inherent) value potentially shared by all rational beings. This inner value 
is, iŶ KaŶt͛s ǀieǁ, fuƌtheƌ gƌouŶded iŶ the ͚autoŶoŵǇ of the ǁill͛, that is, the ǁill of 
autonomous agents who are subjects to reason or practical reasoning (rational 
agents). Under this definition, apparently, Kant does not constrain dignity only to 
human beings, but he extends it to all rational beings.  
After Kant –and also some other pre-ǁaƌ legal uses of the teƌŵ ͚digŶitǇ͛ iŶ the 
20th century, for instance in the Irish Constitution of 1937162– dignity appeared as the 
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grounding value of human rights in the major human rights documents, such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR).163 As has been stressed, digŶitǇ seeŵs to ďe the ͚offiĐial͛ 
justification of human rights in these documents; that is to say, what dominates in 
these documents is the idea that all rights to which they refer are grounded in 
dignity. However, dignity is not expressed precisely in the major human rights 
documents, so that it still remains an abstract concept. The vagueness of the notion 
of dignity is the main reason why, despite its popularity throughout centuries, and 
especially nowadays, dignity has also been much criticised. In what follows I focus on 
some important criticisms against the concept of human dignity. 
One of the most vehement attacks in history against dignity –in particular against 
the KaŶtiaŶ ĐoŶĐept of huŵaŶ digŶitǇ as a ͚ǀalue͛– was advanced by Arthur 
Schopenhauer. In the Basis of Morality, Schopenhauer writes that the expression 
͚͞huŵaŶ digŶitǇ͟, oŶĐe it ǁas utteƌed ďǇ KaŶt, ďeĐaŵe the shibboleth of all 
perplexed and empty-headed moralists. For behind that imposing formula they 
concealed their lack, not to say, of a real ethical basis, but of any basis at all which 
ǁas possessed of aŶ iŶtelligiďle ŵeaŶiŶg.͛164 Obviously, Schopenhauer sees no real 
or moral substance behind the word ͚dignity͛. Ultimately, in the Parerga and 
Paralipomena, “ĐhopeŶhaueƌ Đalls the KaŶtiaŶ ͚digŶitǇ of ŵaŶ͛ just a ͚holloǁ͛ aŶd 
͚pƌeteŶded͛ ĐoŶĐept.165 
AŶotheƌ ͚histoƌiĐal͛ attaĐk agaiŶst digŶitǇ ǁas adǀaŶĐed ďǇ Fƌiedƌich Nietzsche. In 
his essaǇ ͚The Gƌeek “tate͛, NietzsĐhe ǁƌites that foƌ the Gƌeeks ͚the idea that laďouƌ 
is a disgƌaĐe is eǆpƌessed ǁith staƌtliŶg fƌaŶkŶess͛.166 It is only the humanism of the 
19th ĐeŶtuƌǇ that ƌeƋuiƌes suĐh ͚fiĐtioŶs as the digŶitǇ of ŵaŶ͛, according to 
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Nietzsche.167 Nietzsche invokes the idea of dignity in his own way. Dignity is, for him, 
an aesthetic quality. More specifically, he claims that what gives value to life is art, 
and for that purpose, leisure is necessary. Therefore, slavery is justified as absolutely 
ŶeĐessaƌǇ to those ǁho ŵust ďe left fƌee to Đƌeate. IŶ NietzsĐhe͛s ǀieǁ, the 
subordination of the (dignified) lower classes to the higher classes, that is, the fact 
that they become a tool in the hands of the superior, in order to contribute to the 
ƌealizatioŶ of theiƌ ;supeƌioƌs͛Ϳ aspiƌatioŶs is due a degƌee of digŶitǇ. NietzsĐhe 
writes: 
͚… eǀeƌǇ huŵaŶ ďeiŶg…oŶlǇ has digŶitǇ iŶ so faƌ as he is a tool of the geŶius, 
ĐoŶsĐiouslǇ oƌ uŶĐoŶsĐiouslǇ... ŵaŶ… oŶlǇ as a ǁhollǇ deteƌŵiŶed ďeing 
seƌǀiŶg uŶĐoŶsĐious puƌposes ĐaŶ eǆĐuse his eǆisteŶĐe͛.168 
The attacks against dignity continue in our time.169 Mainly because of its 
vagueness, the concept of dignity has been much criticized since the end of the 
Second World War, and the subsequent drafting of the human rights documents. For 
instance, Oscar Schachter, the human rights jurist, has argued that there is no 
specific definition of dignity, and its meaning has been left to intuitive 
understanding.170 Within this context, it is argued that the imprecision of dignity 
might create problems concerning its legal interpretation in courts. There are indeed 
many areas of legal controversy today, especially in the area of bioethics, in which 
dignity has a protagonist role. Here, a number of crucial questions arise. For 
example, does dignity justify assisting a suffering person to die, or does it require 
respect for human life? Also, is the embryo a full bearer of human dignity and 
therefore inviolable, or not?  
In the same vein, ‘uth MaĐkliŶ has Đlaiŵed that ͚digŶitǇ is a useless ĐoŶĐept͛ 
arguing that its vagueness makes it extremely difficult for it to be used in making 
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judgments about controversial medical issues.171 In addition, David Albert Jones has 
argued that dignity plays only a limited role in securing agreement in debates 
concerning abortion.172 What is effectively pointed out in these arguments is the fact 
that the imprecision of dignity makes it difficult for it to be used in making reliable 
legal judgments. Also, because dignity is seen as a concept stemming from different 
cultural contexts, hence it is understood as culturally relative notion, it is claimed 
that it can hardly play a role in securing agreement in controversial cases in the area 
of bioethics.    
But the accusations against dignity do not stop here. There are also those who 
claim that human dignity is not just an abstract and imprecise notion that might still 
seƌǀe a positiǀe ƌole iŶ the ǁoƌld todaǇ, ďut aŶ ͚eŵptǇ͛ WesteƌŶ pƌoduĐt, deƌiǀiŶg 
from the Western Christian tradition, which aims to domination and universality.173 
Authors, such as Costas Douzinas, suggest that we should release ourselves from the 
oppressive power of empty concepts such as the concept of human dignity. In 
particular, Douzinas believes that we should favour a postmodern type of humanity, 
and human rights, constantly groundless and open to revolution and eternal 
redefinition.174  
Moreover, there are those who argue that dignity has to be an abstract concept, 
in order to function as a placeholder in the case of human rights, in particular. More 
specifically, many scholars today see the imprecision of the concept of dignity as an 
asset, or an advantage, within contemporary human rights discourse.175 For instance, 
Christopher McCrudden has claimed that dignity was written into the Preambles of 
the huŵaŶ ƌights ĐoǀeŶaŶts ͚Ŷot to ĐoŶǀeǇ aŶǇ paƌtiĐulaƌ ŵeaŶiŶg, ďut to opeƌate as 
a sort of place-holder in circumstances where the drafters wanted to sound 
philosophiĐal ďut ĐouldŶ͛t agƌee oŶ ǁhat to saǇ͛.176 Within this context, McCrudden 
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argues, that a type of dignity left to our intuitive understanding is better than a 
crystallised concept of dignity. Why? It would be better because it would be more 
easily accepted and adopted by all cultures. That is to say, because of the fact that 
there are different cultures in the world, with different cultural codes and values, a 
non-crystallised ŶotioŶ of digŶitǇ, ǁould ďe ďetteƌ, ďeĐause it ǁouldŶ͛t ƌaise aŶǇ 
concerns or doubts regarding its (specific) content, from one culture to another; so 
that eventually a universal agreement on human rights based on the fact that these 
rights are grounded in dignity would be more feasible. 
Finally, I mention one of the most recent criticisms against human dignity, aimed 
against the Kantian ŵoƌal ĐoŶĐept of huŵaŶ digŶitǇ as a ͚ǀalue͛ as disĐussed ďǇ KaŶt 
in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Ak. 4:434-435).177 Michael Rosen 
disagrees with the alleged metaphysical character of this Kantian type of human 
digŶitǇ; he Đalls it a ͚tƌaŶsĐeŶdeŶtal keƌŶel͛.178 Apparently, Rosen thinks of this 
Kantian type of human dignity as not (easily) applicable to the modern or post-
modern secular terrain of human rights. That is to say, Rosen questions the fact that 
a transcendental concept, as he understands the Kantian concept of human dignity, 
can be applied to the external, secular domain of human rights. 
I think we should be careful when examining each one of these criticisms. It is 
true that, despite its rich historical background, dignity still remains a non-clarified, 
or a vague, concept. Therefore, as in the case of human rights, dignity seems to be 
too abstract to help us in several practical cases in the legal domain today, for 
example, cases regarding the dignity of embryos and mothers whose life is 
threatened. In these, and other similar cases, a number of controversies arise when 
dignity is invoked as the foundation of the relevant rights. For instance, some argue 
that the embryo is a full bearer of dignity, hence a right-holder; while some others 
do Ŷot, ĐlaiŵiŶg that oŶlǇ ŵotheƌs, as ͚Đoŵplete͛ huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs, aƌe full ďeaƌeƌs of 
dignity, hence they can be right-holders. Incidentally, a textual analysis of dignity in 
these cases complicates things even more, as its meaning is not clearly delineated 
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within the major human rights documents. As has already been mentioned, dignity is 
not expressed in precise terms in the documents.179 Consequently, I think 
substantive arguments, namely arguments independent of what is put forth in the 
͚letteƌ of the laǁ͛, oƌ ǁhat is aĐtuallǇ ǁƌitteŶ iŶ the laǁ, aƌe Ŷeeded to eǆplaiŶ 
whether or not dignity is the foundation of human rights. 
My view is that the abstractness of dignity does not mean that it is an empty 
concept, as Douzinas claims, or a type of placeholder, that is, a notion getting 
different meanings in different contexts, as McCrudden argues. Rather, despite its 
indeterminacy, I see dignity as a rich concept with deep moral roots referring to all 
rational (human) beings (see further chapter 4). Additionally, I question the recent 
criticism against dignity, in particular the Kantian human dignity, as it is presented by 
Rosen. According to his understanding of Kantian human dignity, this cannot be 
applied to the secular terrain of human rights today as it is too metaphysical. To this, 
I iŶǀoke Thoŵas Hill͛s Đlaiŵ that the KaŶtiaŶ huŵan dignity is not and should not be 
seeŶ as a ŵǇsteƌious ŵetaphǇsiĐal ͚keƌŶel͛. Hill aƌgues:  
͚… the Ŷoƌŵatiǀe pƌiŶĐiple pƌesĐƌiďiŶg ƌespeĐt foƌ huŵaŶ digŶitǇ does Ŷot itself 
assert anything that belongs to metaphysics, as this is traditionally conceived. 
Metaphysics so conceived is about the world as it is, and it is the product of 
theoretical reason. Ethics is about our aims and choices as they ought to be, and 
it is the pƌoduĐt of pƌaĐtiĐal ƌeasoŶ… IŶ suŵ, KaŶt͛s affiƌŵatioŶ of huŵaŶ digŶitǇ 
is a normative claim about what is rationally imperative for those who have 
ŵoƌal ĐapaĐities… it is Ŷot aŶ asseƌtioŶ of ŵetaphǇsiĐs ďased oŶ theoƌetiĐal 
ƌeasoŶ͛.180  
 
2. Contemporary dignitarian justifications of human rights 
All the attacks against dignity have not stopped it from still being today the focus of 
the human rights discourse. Despite all the criticisms, dignity is presented by a 
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number of contemporary scholars as the genuine basis of human rights holding a 
privileged position within the contemporary human rights discourse. Eventually, 
through the proposed accounts, is implicitly confirmed the decision of the drafters of 
the major human rights documents to set forth dignity as the grounding basis of 
human rights. There are a number of dignity-based accounts for the justification of 
huŵaŶ ƌights todaǇ. Most of theŵ ĐoŶsideƌ digŶitǇ eitheƌ as a ͚status͛, oƌ as a 
͚ǀalue͛; that is to saǇ, the tǁo ďasiĐ ĐoŶĐeptioŶs of digŶitǇ, as they have been 
developed throughout history. The question here arises as to whether these dignity-
based accounts are plausible or not; as well as whether dignity is correctly set forth 
by the drafters of the documents as the grounding basis of human rights. In what 
follows, I examine four of the most significant recent dignity-based accounts for the 
justification of human rights, centered around the two historical conceptions of 
digŶitǇ ƌespeĐtiǀelǇ, ŶaŵelǇ the digŶitǇ as ͚status͛ aŶd the digŶitǇ as ͚ǀalue͛.  
 
Ϯ.ϭ The ͚status͛ ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of dignity as the basis of human rights 
The modern status conception of dignity is rooted in the old notion of the 
͚ŵeƌitoĐƌatiĐ͛ digŶitǇ.181 Recently, Oliver Sensen has called the modern status 
conception of dignity, which is related to the old aristocratic usage of it, as ͚the 
traditional paƌadigŵ of huŵaŶ digŶitǇ͛.182 As has already been discussed, the 
͚ŵeƌitoĐƌatiĐ͛ digŶitǇ is uŶdeƌstood as a high status of people ǁho aƌe at the top of a 
hierarchical society. In what follows, I discuss one of the most prominent status-
based dignitarian accounts for the justification of human rights today, namely 
JeƌeŵǇ WaldƌoŶ͛s aĐĐouŶt, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to ǁhiĐh digŶitǇ as ͚legal status͛ may be the 
basis of human rights. 
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Ϯ.ϭ.ϭ JeƌeŵǇ WaldƌoŶ͛s digŶitǇ-based account for the justification of human rights 
JeƌeŵǇ WaldƌoŶ is oŶe of the ŵaiŶ suppoƌteƌs of the ͚status͛ ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of digŶitǇ. 
IŶ ŵost of his ƌeĐeŶt ǁoƌks, WaldƌoŶ aƌgues that digŶitǇ as a ͚legal status͛ ŵaǇ ďe 
seen as the genuine basis for the derivation of human rights.183 Specifically, Waldron 
claims that given the current failures and all disagreements arising from the practice 
of human rights today, we must examine these rights from scratch, or redefine 
them, in order to understand them in depth.184 He then claims that to begin with 
morality is not the best way to understand human rights; rather he argues we should 
start from the law of human rights. That is to say, if we wanted to see what human 
rights are, WaldƌoŶ suggests, ǁe should foĐus oŶ ͚huŵaŶ ƌights laǁ͛, ŶaŵelǇ the 
Declarations and Conventions, and not on the moral idea underlying them, or 
residing in the background of law.  
According to Waldron, the best way to understand human rights law is to 
staƌt ďǇ eǆaŵiŶiŶg its ͚offiĐial͛ justifiĐatioŶ, that is, the ŶotioŶ of huŵaŶ digŶitǇ. EǀeŶ 
though, he adŵits that huŵaŶ ƌights doĐuŵeŶts ͚aƌe Ŷot Ŷoted foƌ theiƌ 
philosophiĐal ƌigoƌ͛, he aƌgues that ǁe should still tuƌŶ ouƌ atteŶtioŶ to digŶitǇ giǀeŶ 
that this appears to be the basis of rights in most documents.185 In particular, 
Waldron claims that we should treat dignity not as a moral, but as a legal concept in 
the first instance.186 The legal conception of dignity seems for Waldron to have 
priority over the moral conception of it within the construction of a contemporary 
justificatory account of human rights. 
Moƌe speĐifiĐallǇ, WaldƌoŶ seeŵs to faǀouƌ the old ͚status͛ ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of 
dignity. That is to say, he is following the old tradition, according to which dignity is 
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ideŶtified ǁith ͚ŵeƌitoĐƌatiĐ͛ digŶitǇ, namely a type of status connected with rank.187 
Waldron seems to have been influenced by Gregory Vlastos, who has argued that we 
should organize ourselves like an aristocratic or caste society.188 Within this context, 
WaldƌoŶ ǁƌites: ͚My own view of dignity is that we should contrive to keep faith 
soŵehoǁ ǁith its aŶĐieŶt ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶ to Ŷoďle ƌaŶk oƌ high offiĐe͛.189 Waldron 
defiŶes status as a ͚high-ranking status –high eŶough to ďe teƌŵed a ͞digŶitǇ͛͟.190 He 
eventually claims that to treat someone as dignified is to treat her as royalty.191 
Hence one whose dignity is not respected should effectively be seen as a prince or a 
duke, in the past, which have not been respected, on a certain occasion.192 
Further, Waldron argues that dignity is specifically a legal status, namely 
something accorded to people by law. A legal status in law is, in principle, as 
Waldron says, a package of rights and duties accorded to a person, or to a group of 
persons, exclusively by law. For exaŵple, ͚iŶfaŶĐǇ͛ is a tǇpe of legal status iŶ the 
seŶse that the ͚status͛ heƌe opeƌates like aŶ aďďƌeǀiatioŶ foƌ the list of ƌights that a 
person has.193 However, Waldron considers a legal status not just as a given package 
of rights and duties, but as a special package that also entails a deeper explanation 
of why these rights and duties are accorded to persons.194 For example, in the case 
of infancy, the list of rights accorded to infants is a special package entailing a deeper 
explanation of why this package is accorded; apparently because infants are not 
capable of looking after themselves. Eventually, a legal status, as Waldron 
understands it, can explain why rights and duties are attributed to citizens by law. 
                                                          
187 See Waldron (2012), pp. 14, 17, 21, 22, 24, 30; Cruft, R., Liao, S.M., Renzo, M. (2015), p. 133; 
McCrudden (2013), p. 336. 
188 Vlastos (1984) 
189 Waldron (2012), p. 30. 
190 Waldron (2012), p. 59. 
191 Waldron, J. (2010b), pp. 1-28 
192 Waldron, J. (2010b), pp. 1-28 
193 In: Cruft, R., Liao, S.M., Renzo, M. (2015), p. 134. 
194 Cruft, R., Liao, S.M., Renzo, M. (2015), pp. 135-136. 
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Ultimately, this kind of legal status conception of dignity might be seen, as Waldron 
claims, as the foundation of human rights.195 
Finally, contrary to one who would claim that this status conception of 
dignity seems to be favouring inequalities within societies, Waldron understands the 
above described legal status conception of dignity as perfectly combined with 
equality arguing that all people in modern democracies possess this type of status 
dignity.196 In order to support his claim, Waldron points to a passage in the 
Metaphysics of Morals ;Ak. ϲ:ϯϮϵͿ, iŶ ǁhiĐh KaŶt ǁƌites: ͚No huŵaŶ ďeiŶg iŶ a state 
can be without any dignity, since he at least has the digŶitǇ of a ĐitizeŶ͛.197 Waldron 
then argues that dignity as a legal status can be combined with equality in the case 
of the ͚digŶitǇ of ĐitizeŶship͛. That is to saǇ, all huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs iŶ a state haǀe digŶitǇ, 
given that they all possess the Kantian dignity of citizenship. Waldron eventually 
Đlaiŵs that the legal status of the ͚digŶitǇ of ĐitizeŶship͛ ĐaŶ legitiŵatelǇ ďe pƌoposed 
as the foundation of the rights of all citizens in modern democracies.198  
Recently, Waldron has examined the extension of the notion of legal status of 
the ͚digŶitǇ of ĐitizeŶship͛ fƌoŵ the doŵestiĐ to the gloďal leǀel. IŶ otheƌ ǁoƌds, 
instead of talking only about the dignity of citizens in a specific territory, he argues 
that we could legitimately argue in favour of a kind of dignity of citizens in 
iŶteƌŶatioŶal leǀel. To suppoƌt his Đlaiŵ, WaldƌoŶ iŶǀokes the KaŶtiaŶ ͚uŶiǀeƌsal 
ĐitizeŶship͛ thƌough ǁhiĐh it Đould ďe aĐhieǀed, iŶ his ǀieǁ, the eǆteŶsioŶ of the legal 
status of the dignity of citizenship from the domestic to the international level.199 
Eventually, Waldron implies that the legal status concept of dignity he is favoring 
may legitimately be seen as the grounding basis of human rights both at domestic 
and international level. 
 
                                                          
195 Cruft, R., Liao, S.M., Renzo, M. (2015), pp. 133-136; see also Waldron (2012), p. 14 
196 Waldron (2012), pp. 14, 31, 33; McCrudden (2013), p. 327 
197 Gregor (1996), p. 471 
198 Waldron (2012), p. 60; McCrudden (2013), pp. 327-343 
199 McCrudden (2013), p. 332; see also: Gregor (1996), p. 281 
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IŶ suŵŵaƌǇ, heƌe aƌe WaldƌoŶ͛s ŵain claims: 
1. Because of the disagreements regarding human rights today, we must 
reconsider their grounds.  
2. We should begin from law itself, not its moral background, in order to 
understand the law of human rights. 
3. We should start by examining what appears to be the official justification of 
human rights law in the major documents, that is, the notion of human 
dignity treating it as a legal rather than a moral concept in the first instance. 
4. Dignity is a type of status traditionally connected with rank. 
5. In particular, dignity as a legal status may guarantee our human rights. 
6. The legal status conception of dignity, which can be combined with equality, 
may guarantee the rights of citizens in the domestic level.  
7. The extension of the notion of legal citizenship from the domestic to 
international level, may guarantee the rights of citizens in the international 
level as well. 
 
In what follows, I respond to each one of these claims before I conclude that the 
legal status concept of dignity that Waldron favours is not the grounding basis of 
rights either at domestic or at international level. 
 
1. and 2. Waldron is right that the controversies regarding human rights law today 
force us to understand it in depth. For instance, many argue that human rights law is 
just a Western concept imposed by Western cultural circles on non-Western states, 
with other values, Đustoŵs aŶd ŵoƌes, oŶlǇ foƌ seƌǀiŶg West͛s speĐial iŶteƌests. 
Hence, we should understand the nature of human rights law in order to cope with 
such disagreements. Surely, the need for the determination of the nature of human 
rights leads us to the examination of their grounds (see chapter 1). Nevertheless, I 
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do Ŷot uŶdeƌstaŶd WaldƌoŶ͛s reluctance to start from the moral background of 
human rights law.200 Here are two reasons. 
First, as already mentioned in chapter 1, human rights are typically seen as 
moral ƌights. HeŶĐe, although it is laǁ, ͚huŵaŶ ƌights laǁ͛ ĐaŶŶot ďe detaĐhed fƌoŵ 
the moral idea of human rights preceding it. In chapter 4, I explain the claim that 
human rights are primarily moral rights, with political connotations, which are 
further protected by law. Consequently, in order to understand the law of human 
rights, we should start from the examination of its moral nature and grounds, and 
give priority to them over the law itself, which follows them. Ultimately, starting 
from morality in order to understand human rights law, and not from the law –as, 
for example, Hohfeld did,201 and now Waldron explicitly suggests– is a significant 
philosophical stance that brings philosophy at the heart of human ƌights͛ disĐouƌse 
connecting the two disciplines, namely the principles of philosophy and law. 
Second, let͛s saǇ that ǁe folloǁ WaldƌoŶ aŶd put the law (not morality) first 
iŶ oƌdeƌ to uŶdeƌstaŶd ͚huŵaŶ ƌights laǁ͛. The issue heƌe is ǁhetheƌ this ĐaŶ aŶsǁer 
the question of what effectively human rights are. Unfortunately, in most human 
rights cases today there is a large controversy regarding the interpretation of the 
relevant rights, that is, strictly speaking, the law of human rights. One example is the 
interpretation of the (legal) human right to freedom of religion202 initiated by the 
landmark case of the ECJ, that is, Kokkinakis v Greece (1993).203 As Rivers says: 
͚Theƌe is Ŷo douďt iŶ the ŵiŶds of the “tƌasďouƌg judges that fƌeedoŵ of ƌeligioŶ is 
iŵpoƌtaŶt, ďut eǆaĐtlǇ ǁhat it is aŶd ǁhǇ it ŵatteƌs ƌeŵaiŶs elusiǀe͛.204 It seems 
then that the law itself does not provide the grounds for a deep understanding of 
the relevant right.  
                                                          
200 Waldron does not stress the distinction between human rights and human rights law. The first are 
the rights for example in the UDHR, while the second is the body of human rights which for example 
has been ratified by states and has afterwards become law. 
201 Hohfeld (1919) 
202 ͚Legal͛ iŶ the seŶse that it has ďeeŶ ƌatified aŶd Đodified iŶto laǁ iŶ ŵaŶǇ juƌisdiĐtioŶs 
203 Available from: http://www.hrcr.org/safrica/religion/Kokkinakis.html [accessed 19 November 
2017] 
204 McCrudden (2013), p. 405 
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But there must be an exact and correct interpretation of rights because 
without prior interpretation, there cannot be proper application of law.205 Therefore, 
we should not only connect the law of human rights with its morality, but also give 
priority to its moral nature over its legal character in order to adequately interpret 
some controversial rights in courts, such as the right to freedom of religion. Only a 
thorough investigation of the morality of human rights could enrich our 
understanding of the subsequent law of human rights as it has been formulated 
after the end of the Second World War. 
 
3. Moreover, the fact that dignity seems to be the official justification of human 
rights in the major documents (e.g. in UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR), is not sufficient reason 
for us to conclude that dignity is indeed the foundation of human rights. Waldron 
hiŵself adŵits that huŵaŶ ƌights doĐuŵeŶts ͚aƌe Ŷot Ŷoted foƌ their philosophical 
ƌigoƌ͛.206 The meaning of dignity is not clearly delineated within the context of the 
major human rights documents. For instance, dignity does appear as the moral basis 
of human rights in the ICCPR, in which is written that the rights it coŶtaiŶs ͚deƌiǀe 
fƌoŵ the iŶheƌeŶt digŶitǇ of the huŵaŶ peƌsoŶ͛.207 But, dignity does not appear as a 
stƌaightfoƌǁaƌd fouŶdatioŶal ĐoŶĐept iŶ the UDH‘, iŶ ǁhiĐh it is ǁƌitteŶ that ͚all 
huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs aƌe ďoƌŶ fƌee aŶd eƋual iŶ digŶitǇ aŶd ƌights͛.208 Consequently, given 
the great confusion regarding the meaning of dignity in several documents, I think 
we should not focus on the law itself to shed light on the obscure concept of human 
dignity. Hence, I do not understand why Waldron still insists that the legal, rather 
than the moral meaning of dignity, should be our starting point.209 
In addition, we must bear in mind that, even though the legal concept of 
digŶitǇ, e.g. ǁithiŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of a ŶatioŶal CoŶstitutioŶ, is ͚autoŶoŵous͛, it is still a 
                                                          
205 McCrudden (2013), p. 381 
206 Cruft, R., Liao, S.M., Renzo, M. (2015), p. 118. 
207 Available from: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx [accessed 19 
November 2017] 
208 Available from: http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ [accessed 19 
November 2017] 
209 Waldron (2012), pp. 13, 15; also, Cruft, R., Liao, S.M., Renzo, M. (2015), pp. 118, 121, 123 
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rich concept with deep philosophical and theological roots which should not be 
overlooked. Thus, if we wanted to understand in depth the legal meaning of dignity, 
or its use within the legal context today, we should not ignore its moral character. 
This is attempted below. ConseƋueŶtlǇ, I thiŶk oŶe should ƌetuƌŶ to digŶitǇ͛s moral 
roots treating it as a moral idea in the first instance, and not vice versa, as Waldron 
suggests.210 However, this does not mean that one cannot return to the legal 
concept of dignity afterwards. 
 
4. and 5. Fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, WaldƌoŶ͛s idea of grounding human rights in dignity, 
understood as a status with references to aristocracy, seems to be an anachronistic 
idea that cannot be applied in the post-Enlightenment world, of which the central 
ideal and goal is the civil, political, social, and economic equality of all people. 
Besides, we must not ignore the fact that there are many examples in history which 
show that not all princes and dukes had high status.211 Additionally, I do not 
understand how dignity as a legal status may guarantee human rights for all people. 
For instance, this connection might lead one to the unreasonable claim that in 
politiĐal sǇsteŵs iŶ ǁhiĐh legal status, i.e. digŶitǇ, iŶ WaldƌoŶ͛s teƌŵs, is ĐoŶfeƌƌed 
only to men but not to women (e.g. iŶ “audi AƌaďiaͿ, oŶlǇ ŵeŶ͛s ƌights aƌe justified. 
But this would be an unacceptable claim. Therefore, dignity as legal status and 
human rights should be kept distinct from one another, and should not be associated 
with each other. 
 
6. In addition, I do Ŷot uŶdeƌstaŶd hoǁ WaldƌoŶ͛s ŶotioŶ of the ͚digŶitǇ of 
ĐitizeŶship͛ ĐaŶ ďe the fouŶdatioŶ of huŵaŶ ƌights of all people. There are four 
problems here: 1) The dignity of citizenship which Waldron suggests refers by 
definition only to the citizens of democratic countries excluding all other people 
                                                          
210 McCrudden (2013), p. 383 
211 See for instance the Earl of Shrewsbury's Case, 12 Co. Rep. 106, 77 Eng. Rep. 1383 (1612) cites the 
terms of an act of Parliament in the reign of Edward IV for the formal degradation of George Nevill, 
Duke of Bedford.  
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ƌesidiŶg iŶ it, foƌ eǆaŵple iŵŵigƌaŶts, ƌefugees, aŶd ͚apatƌides͛; ϮͿ it does Ŷot 
include the citizens who live in countries which have not the characteristics of a 
democracy (e.g. North Korea is a democratic republic only on paper); 3) it does not 
include all those who live in non-democratic countries (e.g. Qatar, Saudi Arabia); 4) it 
does not include those who still live in isolated jungle tribes in the world. 
Consequently, this kind of dignity of citizenship cannot support, in my view, either an 
argument for the justification of human rights for all people in a certain territory or 
State, or an argument for the justification of human rights for all people around the 
world.212  
 
7. Finally, I do not understand the extension of the dignity of citizenship from 
doŵestiĐ to gloďal leǀel thƌough the KaŶtiaŶ ŶotioŶ of ͚uŶiǀeƌsal ĐitizeŶship͛. 
Contrary to what Waldron argues, Kant does not favour such a citizenship of the 
world. Even though Kant speaks aďout ͚the ƌelatioŶ of theoƌǇ to pƌaĐtiĐe… fƌoŵ a 
ĐosŵopolitaŶ peƌspeĐtiǀe͛, ĐleaƌlǇ, he does Ŷot faǀouƌ the ŶotioŶ of a uŶiǀeƌsal 
citizenship.213 The reason is that universal citizenship presupposes a world, or a 
global state, which Kant explicitly rejects. In 8:367 in Perpetual Peace Kant writes: 
͚… the separation of ŵaŶǇ ŶeighďoƌiŶg states iŶdepeŶdeŶt of oŶe aŶotheƌ… 
is nevertheless better, in accordance with the idea of reason than the fusion 
of them by one power overgrowing the rest and passing into a universal 
monarchy, since as the range of government expands laws progressively lose 
their vigor, and a soulless despotism, after it has destroyed the seed of good, 
fiŶallǇ deteƌioƌates iŶto aŶaƌĐhǇ͛.214  
Consequently, the rejection by Kant of the possibility of a world government 
makes it impossible further to be argued that Kant favours a kind of world 
ĐitizeŶship, as WaldƌoŶ Đlaiŵs. HeŶĐe, WaldƌoŶ͛s ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of the digŶitǇ of the 
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citizens of the world, ǁhiĐh is allegedlǇ ďased oŶ the KaŶtiaŶ ͚uŶiǀeƌsal ĐitizeŶship͛, 
cannot legitimately be proposed as the basis of the rights of the citizens of the 
world, given that it is based on a misinterpretation of the Kantian text. Therefore, 
WaldƌoŶ͛s aƌguŵeŶt aĐĐording to which human rights might be seen as grounded in 
this kind of legal status of the dignity of (the Kantian) universal citizenship is 
flawed.215  
FolloǁiŶg the disĐussioŶ of WaldƌoŶ͛s theoƌǇ ƌegaƌdiŶg the justifiĐatioŶ of 
human rights, I conclude that the type of dignity he favours, that is, the legal status 
conception of dignity is not the basis of human rights either at the domestic, 
regional, or international level. Perhaps Waldron could have followed his initial 
suspicion that dignity might not be the geŶuiŶe ďasis of huŵaŶ ƌights. IŶ his essaǇ ͚Is 
digŶitǇ the fouŶdatioŶ of huŵaŶ ƌights͛, WaldƌoŶ ǁƌites: ͚… eǀeŶ if it tuƌŶs out that a 
strict understanding of the foundationalist claim cannot be defended, still there may 
be other ways in which dignity will turn out to be important in our understanding of 
huŵaŶ ƌights͛.216 I have no doubt that dignity is an important notion within the 
contemporary human rights discourse. Yet, as it is shown in the following two 
chapters of the thesis, dignity actually plays only a secondary role within the context 
of justifying human rights.    
Consequently, even though Waldron is right that dignity is important in our 
understanding of human rights (and duties), a strict foundationalist claim regarding 
dignity and human rights cannot legitimately be defended. This is explained more 
thoroughly in chapters 3 and 4. At the moment, I turn to the discussion of one more 
significant contemporary dignity-based account for the justification of human rights, 
                                                          
215 Following Kant, I argue that serious problems would arise from the creation of a global political 
entity. There would not only be practical problems regarding the cohesion between the different 
politiĐal eŶtities, ďut also the ĐƌuĐial pƌoďleŵ of despotisŵ as deƌiǀed fƌoŵ the ͚LeǀiathaŶ-tǇpe͛ gloďal 
governance. These are the main reasons why I argue against globalization, in general, favouring, 
instead, a soft-cosmopolitan model for the world countries in the 21st century. According to this soft-
cosmopolitan model, states would be able to communicate between them without losing their 
sovereignty. Eventually, within such a soft-cosmopolitan model, with no global government, one 
could at most see –and surely Kant would see– the idea of the World citizen just as a metaphor.   
216In: Cruft, R., Liao, S.M., Renzo, M. (2015), p. 117. 
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according to which rights are grounded not in a legal, but in a moral status 
conception of human dignity.     
 
Ϯ.ϭ.Ϯ JohŶ Tasioulas͛s digŶitǇ-based account for the justification of human rights 
Following Jeremy Waldron, John Tasioulas understands dignity as status, yet not as a 
legal, but as a moral status. Tasioulas elaborates on the moral status conception of 
dignity as –ĐoŶtƌaƌǇ to WaldƌoŶ͛s legal status conception of dignity– this seems to 
him to denote an equality of the basic moral status among all human beings.217 
Eventually, Tasioulas formulates a two-level account for the grounding of human 
rights, which appeals to both moral (equal human dignity) and prudential (universal 
human interests) considerations.218 
Tasioulas locates human rights within the realm of moral philosophy. That is 
to say, he sees human rights as moral rights; hence he defends the so-called 
͚oƌthodoǆǇ͛ ƌegaƌdiŶg the Ŷatuƌe of huŵaŶ ƌights, ŶaŵelǇ the idea that huŵaŶ ƌights 
are moral rights possessed by all human beings simply in virtue of their humanity.219 
More specifically, Tasioulas argues that these moral human rights are grounded in 
͚the uŶiǀeƌsal iŶteƌests of theiƌ holdeƌs, all of ǁhoŵ possess the eƋual ŵoƌal status 
of huŵaŶ digŶitǇ͛.220 The question here arises as to what Tasioulas means by 
͚iŶteƌests͛ aŶd ͚digŶitǇ͛. I staƌt fƌoŵ the ŶotioŶ of digŶitǇ, as he does himself in his 
essaǇ ͚OŶ the fouŶdatioŶs of huŵaŶ ƌights͛.221 
Dignity is seen by Tasioulas as a moral status inhering in all human beings by 
ǀiƌtue of the faĐt that theǇ aƌe huŵaŶs. He also poiŶts out that digŶitǇ͛s sigŶifiĐaŶĐe 
is something understood independently of the interests of the human beings who 
possess it.222 He then offers a more detailed definition of this moral status 
                                                          
217 Cruft, R., Liao, S.M., Renzo, M. (2015), p. 54. 
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conception of human dignity. According to this, our dignity consists in the fact that 
we all belong to human species which is characterized by certain features such as: a 
characteristic form of embodiment; a finite life-span; capacities for physical growth 
and reproduction; psychological capacities; and rational capacities. Overall, this is 
ǁhat Tasioulas Đalls as ͚the huŵaŶ Ŷatuƌe ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of huŵaŶ digŶitǇ͛.223 
Further, Tasioulas claims that even though human dignity lies at the 
foundations of human rights, it does not by itself exhaust them. Rather, this moral 
status conception of dignity operates in union with universal human interests in 
geŶeƌatiŶg huŵaŶ ƌights͛.224 Following George Kateb, who has similarly argued in 
favour of a two-level pluralist account for justifying human rights, that is, an account 
ďased oŶ ďoth ͚the eƋual iŶdiǀidual status͛ aŶd the ͚ŵiŶiŵiziŶg of paiŶ aŶd 
suffeƌiŶg͛,225 Tasioulas claims that both our dignity and universal interests, that is, 
the universal standards enhancing our well-being, are equally fundamental in the 
task of justifying our human rights.226 Eventually, Tasioulas favours a kind of value 
pluralism, which embraces both moral and prudential elements, in grounding human 
rights. As regards the role of universal human interests, specifically, within the 
construction of a philosophical account for the justification of human rights, 
Tasioulas seeŵs to haǀe ŵuĐh ďeeŶ iŶflueŶĐed ďǇ Joseph ‘az͛s iŶteƌest-based 
theory of individual moral rights.227 
More specifically, according to Tasioulas, our human rights exist if our 
interests in the object of the putative rights are as important as to justify the 
imposition of duties on others to respect them (our interests).228 For example, 
Matina has the right not to be tortured by John because her interest not to be 
tortured is as important as to impose a duty to John to respect this interest, as well 
as her subsequent human right (ban on torture), as it is stipulated in the Universal 
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Declaration of Human Rights. AccoƌdiŶg to aƌtiĐle ϱ of the UDH‘, ͚Ŷo one shall be 
suďjeĐted to toƌtuƌe oƌ to Đƌuel, iŶhuŵaŶ oƌ degƌadiŶg tƌeatŵeŶt oƌ puŶishŵeŶt͛.229 
EǀeŶtuallǇ, thƌough Tasioulas͛s account, human rights protect some of our most 
important interests, imposing duties to all others to respect and advance both these 
interests and the relevant human rights deriving from them. Finally, Tasioulas 
stresses the fact that the corresponding duties are not necessarily universal, that is 
to say, not all humans have to be the duty-bearers of the correlative human rights. 
Heƌe is Tasioulas͛s deƌiǀatioŶ of huŵaŶ ƌights fƌoŵ ouƌ uŶiǀeƌsal huŵaŶ iŶteƌests: 
͚;iͿ Foƌ all huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs, ǁithiŶ a giǀeŶ historical context, and simply in virtue 
of their humanity, having X (the object of the putative right) serves one or 
more of their basic interests, for example, interests in health, physical 
security, autonomy, understanding, friendship, achievement, play, etc. (ii) 
The interest in having X is, in the case of each human being and simply in 
virtue of their humanity, pro tanto of sufficient importance to justify the 
imposition of duties on others, for example, to variously protect, respect or 
advance their interest in X, (iii) The duties generated at (ii) are feasible claims 
on others given the constraints created by general and relatively entrenched 
facts of human nature and social life in the specified historical context. 
Therefore, (iv) All human beings within the specified historical context have a 
ƌight to X͛.230 
 Tasioulas concludes that human rights are grounded in the above universal 
human interests which belong to all human beings as a result of the fact that they all 
equally share the moral status of human dignity. Apparently, under this justificatory 
account of human rights, any violation of them constitutes the wrongdoing of both 
our individual interests and human dignity.231  
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I agƌee ǁith Tasioulas͛s ƌejeĐtioŶ of WaldƌoŶ͛s legal status conception of 
dignity. As has already been argued, from this type of legal status a number of 
inequalities may arise within societies as well as in the global level. Also, I agree with 
Tasioulas͛s general approach to the justification of human rights, namely the location 
of them within the realm of moral philosophy. However, I find it quite difficult to 
grasp his pluralist account for the justification of human rights based on both the 
moral status concept of human dignity possessed by all human beings, and 
international human interests.232 Tasioulas claims that human rights are grounded in 
both moral (human dignity) and prudential (universal human interests) 
considerations; and further that human dignity is a status, which by definition entails 
inequality; yet a moral status possessed by all human beings (equality). What I find 
difficult to understand is effectively the insertion into contemporary human rights 
discourse of such diverse constitutive marks as: 1) dignity and interests, and 2) equal 
moral status, in anyhow indeterminate concepts such as human rights and dignity. 
Moreover, as I understand Tasioulas, one has a human right to something 
because it protects a human interest closely connected with the aforementioned 
right. Apparently, Tasioulas has been influenced here by two other significant 
aĐĐouŶts, ŶaŵelǇ ‘az͛s interest-ďased aĐĐouŶt aŶd FiŶŶis͛s seǀeŶ fuŶdaŵeŶtal goods 
account. These two accounts have already been discussed. Here I briefly repeat that 
they both produce a broad list of human rights corresponding to each one of those 
iŶteƌests oƌ goods. Tasioulas͛s iŶteƌest-based account does not seem to surpass the 
͚ƌeduŶdaŶĐǇ pƌoďleŵ͛ of the tǁo afoƌeŵeŶtioŶed aĐĐouŶts. Tasioulas oǀeƌlooks the 
fact that there are countless aspects to human self- determination which cannot all 
be taken into consideration in the construction of a theory of human rights. Thus, I 
am afraid that, following his interest-based account, we would conclude to the 
unreasonable claim that I have the right to be loved by a friend; hence she has the 
duty to respect the alleged right. Although Tasioulas tries to set some limits to this 
undesirable redundancy of rights resulting from the excessiveness of human 
iŶteƌests, ďǇ desĐƌiďiŶg the ĐhaƌaĐteƌ of these iŶteƌests as ͚oďjeĐtiǀe, staŶdaƌdized, 
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pluralistic, open-eŶded, aŶd holistiĐ͛, that is, significant in some sense, still, he 
cannot actually treat the basic redundancy problem arising from his account.233  
FolloǁiŶg the pƌeǀious aƌguŵeŶt, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to ǁhiĐh Tasioulas͛ uŶƌestƌiĐted 
interest-based account is excessively permissive,234 one could also add here that 
Tasioulas͛s iŶteƌests-based account faces the problem of determining which interests 
are of sufficient importance, as well as why they are significant to justify the 
iŵpositioŶ of duties oŶ otheƌs. FolloǁiŶg OŶoƌa O͛ Neill, oŶe ŵight ask, ͚Hoǁ aƌe ǁe 
goiŶg to deĐide if aŶ iŶteƌest is iŵpoƌtaŶt oƌ Ŷot͛, iŶ oƌdeƌ to fuƌtheƌ ĐoŶŶeĐt it ǁith 
the relevant right?235 EǀeŶtuallǇ, Tasioulas͛s appƌoaĐh Đoŵpels us to rank the 
interests in order to avoid conflicts between them. Apparently, there is no such a 
metric. For instance, there is no metric through which we could plausibly rank our 
iŶteƌests iŶ ͚Đlose ƌelatioŶships ǁith otheƌs͛ aŶd ouƌ ͚fƌeedoŵ͛. That is to say, we do 
not have the means to argue with certainty that our interest in a close relationship 
with someone is more important than our freedom, and vice versa.236 But without 
such a metric, we cannot arguably decide which interests are of sufficient 
importance to justifǇ the iŵpositioŶ of duties oŶ otheƌs, as stipulated iŶ Tasioulas͛s 
interested-based theory for the justification of human rights. 
It seems that Tasioulas understands the inadequacy of a human rights 
justificatory account based on the concept of human interests, and the identification 
of the latteƌ ǁith the foƌŵeƌ. IŶ otheƌ ǁoƌds, he uŶdeƌstaŶds that ͚iŶteƌests ofteŶ go 
beyond rights;237 thus he eventually proposes a two-level pluralist account according 
to which our human rights are grounded not only in universal human interests, but 
also in our equal human dignity. There are fouƌ ŵaiŶ pƌoďleŵs iŶ Tasioulas͛s 
ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of ͚huŵaŶ digŶitǇ͛, aŶd its ƌole iŶ the task of justifǇiŶg huŵaŶ ƌights. 
                                                          
233 In: Cruft, R., Liao, S.M., Renzo, M. (2015), p. 51. 
234 Griffin (2008), p.55 
235 O͛Neill, O. ;ϮϬϭϱaͿ, p. 74. 
236 In: Cruft, R., Liao, S.M., Renzo, Μ. (2015), p. 74; also Eddy (2007), 307-28, 314. 
237 This is also stƌessed ďǇ OŶoƌa O͛Neill iŶ heƌ ƌespoŶse to Tasioulas͛s iŶteƌest-based account in: 
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1. As has already been discussed, Tasioulas sees dignity as a moral status inhering in 
all human beings by virtue of the fact that they are all humans.238 But, as in 
WaldƌoŶ͛s aĐĐouŶt, a status ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of digŶitǇ, iŶ geŶeƌal, is problematic. The 
reason is that the status conception of dignity is an anachronistic idea entailing 
inequalities that cannot be applied in the post-Enlightenment world. This is 
something which has been explained above. 
2. DigŶitǇ is, iŶ Tasioulas͛s view, a moral status equally shared by all.239 Here, I do 
Ŷot uŶdeƌstaŶd hoǁ ͚status͛ aŶd ͚eƋualitǇ͛ ĐaŶ ďe ƌeĐoŶĐiled iŶ a siŶgle aĐĐouŶt of 
dignity. Status by definition entails inequality which contradicts the conditio sine qua 
non of the idea of human rights, namely the notion of equality. Therefore, I do not 
see hoǁ huŵaŶ ƌights ĐaŶ ďe ďased oŶ Tasioulas͛s ŵoƌal status ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of 
dignity. It seems that Tasioulas tries to reconcile two different and opposing ideas 
that cannot actually be reconciled. Tasioulas does the same when he builds his 
human rights justificatory account on both moral (human dignity) and prudential 
(international human interests) considerations. But, again, how can these opposing 
ideas properly and legitimately be reconciled. Dignity and interests, in the case of 
human rights typically come from two different traditions, namely from the 
deontology and consequentialism terrains, respectively. Even though, this is an 
iŶteƌestiŶg aŶd ĐhalleŶgiŶg ͚ƌeĐoŶĐiliatoƌǇ͛ appƌoaĐh, ǁhiĐh suƌelǇ raises fewer 
objections from those other approaches which focus on a single element only, e.g. 
status (Waldron), interests (Raz), goods (Finnis), dignity (Griffin), this mixing of all 
these concepts weakens the strength and dynamic of the argument as a whole. 
Consequently, I think that philosophically we should keep core concepts distinct 
from one another. 
3. FolloǁiŶg the pƌeǀious pƌoďleŵ, Tasioulas͛s supeƌ-pluralist ͚huŵaŶ Ŷatuƌe 
ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of huŵaŶ digŶitǇ͛240 could confuse even more the relevant parties in 
courts by expanding the range of the contingent interpretations of dignity. The 
difficulties arising from the vagueness of the concept of human dignity are apparent, 
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for example, in the well-known German Airliner Case.241 In that case, the German 
Court decided that the shooting down of a hijacked aircraft in order to prevent other 
deaths on earth would be unconstitutional, hence illegal, because it would offend 
the dignity of the innocent passengers who would be treated as mere means, not 
ends, according to the Kantian Formula. Yet, in the same case the Court judged that 
this would not apply in the case in which the airplane was manned exclusively by 
terrorists. In this case, the shooting down of the aircraft would be permissible. This 
is, in my view, problematic. The Kantian moral concept of human dignity cannot be 
applied only in the case of the innocent passengers, but indifferently to all human 
beings, even if these are the terrorists themselves. By excluding the case in which 
the aircraft is manned only by the terrorists, the Court seems to apply a different 
notion of dignity; yet without specifying exactly which one, which confuses even 
ŵoƌe the ƌeleǀaŶt paƌties, aŶd theiƌ ĐoŶfideŶĐe iŶ Đouƌts͛ judgŵeŶts aŶd ƌeasoŶings. 
4. Eventually, as it is clearly shown in the following chapters of the thesis, the moral 
concept of human dignity cannot be the basis of human rights because dignity is not 
actually a value possessed by the right-holders, as Tasioulas and many others 
suggest. Rather, dignity is an inner (not intrinsic or inherent) value attributed to duty-
bearers in certain circumstances (fulfilment of their duties). However, only a hasty 
researcher would offer her own analysis prior to the discussion of the most 
significant contemporary analyses on a concept. Hence, in what follows, I continue 
with the discussion of the second major conception of dignity throughout history, 
ŶaŵelǇ the ͚ǀalue͛ ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of digŶitǇ and its relation to human rights.  
 
Ϯ.Ϯ The ͚ǀalue͛ ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of digŶitǇ as the ďasis of huŵaŶ ƌights 
In this section I turn to the examination of the second historical conception of 
digŶitǇ, ŶaŵelǇ the ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of digŶitǇ as a ͚ǀalue͛ tǇpiĐallǇ uŶdeƌstood as 
possessed by all human beings on their own account. Kant and the Catholics are the 
main figures in the formulation of this type of dignity. In the following analysis, I first 
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focus on the Catholic conception of dignity, according to which dignity is primarily 
seen as the value of man being made in the image of God (Imago Dei);242 and, 
seĐoŶd, oŶ the KaŶtiaŶ ͚ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ͛ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of huŵaŶ digŶitǇ, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to 
which people have to be treated not as means to an end, but as ends in 
themselves.243 My aim is to show that neither the former, that is the Catholic, nor 
the latteƌ, that is the ͚ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ͛ KaŶtiaŶ, ĐoŶĐept of digŶitǇ ŵaǇ gƌouŶd huŵaŶ 
rights –in spite of the fact that most of the major human rights documents, such as 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and a number of Constitutions and legal decisions, either 
implicitly or explicitly, invoke these two conceptions of dignity as the foundation of 
human rights. 
 
2.2.1 The Catholic value conception of dignity as the basis of human rights 
Within the Catholic tradition, dignity is typically understood as an intrinsic value 
possessed by all huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs ďeĐause of the faĐt that theǇ iŶĐaƌŶate God͛s iŵage 
(Imago Dei).244 Despite some slight differences among Catholics (see below, Thomas 
Aquinas), the dominant idea is basically that the dignified human being is one who 
has ďeeŶ Đƌeated iŶ God͛s image. In this section, I discuss the main Catholic 
conception of dignity based on the doctrine of Imago Dei, as well as Thomas 
AƋuiŶas͛ ǀieǁ, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to ǁhiĐh digŶitǇ sigŶifies, iŶ effeĐt, soŵethiŶg͛s goodness 
on account of itself.245 Then, I focus on the relation between the Catholic notion of 
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dignity and human rights, arguing specifically that the Catholic notion of dignity is 
not the basis of human rights. 
To begin with, traditional Catholics do not favour the ͚status͛ ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of 
digŶitǇ, eitheƌ iŶ its legal, e.g. WaldƌoŶ͛s, oƌ iŶ its ŵoƌal, e.g. Tasioulas͛s, ǀeƌsioŶ. 
‘atheƌ, theǇ geŶeƌallǇ faǀouƌ the ͚ǀalue͛ ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of digŶitǇ, ǁhiĐh tǇpiĐallǇ 
emphasizes the equality among all human beings. For instance, the German 
theologiaŶ JuƌgeŶ MoltŵaŶŶ has aƌgued that ͚the digŶitǇ of eaĐh aŶd eǀeƌǇ huŵaŶ 
ďeiŶg is gƌouŶded iŶ [its] oďjeĐtiǀe likeŶess of God͛.246 That is to say, each and every 
human being, no matter how poor, or burdened, or ill, is considered to be dignified, 
ďeĐause she iŶĐaƌŶates God͛s iŵage. The idea that all huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs aƌe Đƌeated iŶ 
the image of God comes from the book of Genesis (Gen. 1:26), in which God says: 
͚let us ŵake ŵaŶkiŶd iŶ ouƌ iŵage, iŶ ouƌ likeŶess…͛247 This is the most common 
Catholic route to an understanding of the notion of human dignity.248 Ultimately, as 
Janet Soskice points out, given that it is not in virtue of our body that we are in the 
image of God, there are actually different interpretations of what the nature of the 
image of God consists in;249 for instance, goodness, rationality, and so forth.250 For 
example, Mother Teresa used to see Christ in every person, especially in persons in 
need. 
Now, the Catholic notion of dignity of humanity is historically connected with 
huŵaŶ ƌights. This is appaƌeŶt, foƌ iŶstaŶĐe, iŶ Pius͛ XII Chƌistŵas ŵessage oŶ 
December 25, 1942:  
͚… the ƌoad fƌoŵ Ŷight to full daǇ ǁill ďe loŶg; ďut of deĐisiǀe iŵpoƌtaŶĐe aƌe 
the first steps on the path, the first five mile-stones of which bear chiseled on 
them the following maxims: 
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1. Dignity of the Human Person. He who would have the Star of Peace shine 
out and stand over society should cooperate, for his part, in giving back to 
the human person the dignity given to it by God from the very beginning; 
should oppose the excessive herding of men, as if they were a mass without a 
soul; their economic, social, political, intellectual and moral inconsistency; 
their dearth of solid principles and strong convictions, their surfeit of 
instinctive sensible excitement and their fickleness. 
He should favour, by every lawful means, in every sphere of life, social 
institutions in which a full personal responsibility is assured and guaranteed 
both in the early and the eternal order of things. He should uphold respect 
for and the practical realization of the following fundamental personal rights; 
the right to maintain and develop one's corporal, intellectual and moral life 
and especially the right to religious formation and education; the right to 
worship God in private and public and to carry on religious works of charity; 
the right to marry and to achieve the aim of married life; the right to conjugal 
and domestic society; the right to work, as the indispensable means towards 
the maintenance of family life; the right to free choice of state of life, and 
hence, too, of the priesthood or religious life; the right to the use of material 
goods; iŶ keepiŶg ǁith his duties aŶd soĐial liŵitatioŶs͛.251 
In particular, after the end of the Second World War, the Catholic value 
conception of dignity (Imago Dei) has influenced the drafters of the major human 
rights documents, bringing Christianity in close dialogue with human rights. 
Incidentally, we must not ignore the fact that it was the French Catholic philosopher 
Jacques Maritain who actively involved in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948.252 Further, in 1949, the Imago Dei doctrine, 
specifically in relation to human dignity, played significant role to the construction of 
the German Constitution (Grundgesetz), which is a model for many other 
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Constitutions around the world.253 Generally, Catholic thought has a prominent role 
within the German law and politics. Even though the Bundesrepublik is considered to 
be a modern democratic state, the influence of Catholicism is undeniable. For 
instance, the main German political parties of the centre-right, such as the Christlich 
Demokratische Union (CDU), have an explicitly Catholic orientation.254 
More recently, within the context of the encyclical Evangelium Vitae, the 
Catholic conception of dignity, as the value arising from the fact that we incarnate 
God͛s iŵage, ǁas assoĐiated, ďǇ Pope John Paul II, with human rights. Pope John 
Paul II has addressed issues such as contraception, abortion, and new reproductive 
technologies.255 What he has argued is that dignity, in the Catholic sense, grounds 
the rights of every human being including embryos even from the moment of 
conception. Hence, dignity requires the inviolability of human life throughout our 
lifespan. Such understanding of dignity has further influenced judges in several legal 
cases in courts.256 Incidentally, this Catholic idea of dignity has raised a number of 
oďjeĐtioŶs todaǇ, espeĐiallǇ fƌoŵ oƌgaŶizatioŶs suĐh as the “ǁiss ͚DigŶitas͛, ǁhose 
aiŵ is to assist those ǁho ǁish to ͚die ǁith digŶitǇ͛ to eŶd theiƌ liǀes.257 In the 
following analysis, I explain why the Catholic notion of dignity is not the basis of 
human rights. 
First, the notion of Imago Dei is not properly explained and understood. The 
ǁoƌd ͚iŵage͛ itself is not adequately defined by the proponents of the Catholic 
conception of dignity. Hence, the question here arises as to what is meant by 
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͚iŵage͛. OŶe Đould aƌgue that ͚image͛ might mean the same representation of 
external forms between us and God. Another could argue that image is used 
symbolically to denote the same ͚rationality͛ or ͚goodness͛ between us and God. 
That is to say, it could be claimed that we all have dignity because we all share the 
same external form with God, or because we share the same rationality and 
goodness with God. Here another question arises as to how we can be sure that we 
do share these particular characteristics with God. To this, I am following Kant. At 
the beginning of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Kant famously writes: 
͚Human reason has the peculiar fate in one species of its cognitions that it is 
burdened with questions which it cannot dismiss, since they are given to it as 
problems by the nature of reason itself, but which it also cannot answer, 
siŶĐe theǇ tƌaŶsĐeŶd eǀeƌǇ ĐapaĐitǇ of huŵaŶ ƌeasoŶ͛.258 
Consequently, even if we truly believe in God, we cannot be really sure 
whether or not we share the above characteristics (e.g. external form, rationality, 
goodŶessͿ ǁith Hiŵ, as ǁe aƌe Ŷot Đapaďle of aŶǇ God͛s experience. Hence, I cannot 
aĐĐept the Đlaiŵ that huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs͛ digŶitǇ aƌises fƌoŵ the faĐt that theǇ shaƌe oŶe 
or more common characteristics with God since these need to be defined and then 
defended. Consequently, the argument according to which dignity, understood as 
the ǀalue ǁe possess ďeĐause of the faĐt that ǁe iŶĐaƌŶate God͛s iŵage, ĐaŶ hardly 
be invoked within the human rights foundations discourse. 
Second, we must not ignore the fact that Imago Dei gets different meanings 
within the Jewish and Christian traditions themselves. In the Scriptures we find a 
variety of possible meanings of Imago Dei. It is not only said that humans have being 
created in the likeness of God, but it is also suggested that there might have been 
two phases of creation of human beings with the Imago Dei playing a different role 
in each one of them. Consequently, given its indeterminacy, a controversial doctrine, 
such as the Imago Dei, does Ŷot offeƌ ŵuĐh to a huŵaŶ ƌights͛ justifiĐatoƌǇ theoƌǇ. 
Eventually, as Fletcher correctly points out, I do not see any assets in connecting an 
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indeterminate notion, such as the Imago Dei, with another indeterminate concept, 
such as human rights.259 
Third, on the one hand, the Catholic Church claims that all human beings 
haǀe ƌights ďeĐause theǇ all aƌe digŶified as theǇ iŶĐaƌŶate God͛s iŵage; ǁhile, oŶ 
the other hand, it explicitly discriminates individuals. For instance, in the Arcanum 
divinae sapientiae on Christian marriage, Pope Leo XIII, writes that women must be 
subject to men, and obey them because they are flesh of their flesh and bones of 
their bones. Apparently, here women are considered to be dignified only as long as 
they blindly obey their husbands.260 More recently, the Catholic Church has criticized 
homosexuality as intrinsically disordered, and homosexuals as individuals with 
abnormal sexual behaviour; hence as individuals without dignity.261 In his recent 
book, Dignity: Its History and Meaning, Michael Rosen reminds us the nineteenth 
ĐeŶtuƌǇ͛s aŶti-egalitarian character of Catholic thought about dignity. The Catholic 
polemic against egalitarianism in its various forms: liberalism, socialism, democracy, 
and the emancipation of women may lead us to the conclusion that the Catholic 
notion of dignity is not the basis of human rights.262 
Fourth, we must not ignore the fact that many people are atheists, that is, 
persons who do not share a religious worldview. Also, there are many people who 
are followers of a religion other than the Jewish-Christian religious tradition, or who 
are committed to an approach to human rights that favours a multi-faith society. In 
Rawlsian terms it could be argued that if we wanted to attribute human rights to all 
people, we should not base them on grounds that cannot by definition be shared by 
all. Incidentally, this is one of the strongest secular political objections, among 
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liberals today, against a religious account of rights. Consequently, if we wanted to 
ground human rights for all people, we should not select dignity understood through 
the obscure doctrine of Imago Dei, as this would not help us to the determination of 
the vague concept of human rights themselves. Further, it would not contribute to 
the resolution of the second main problem of human rights today, namely the 
problem of their universal validity. 
Fifth, the notion of dignity understood in Catholic terms as the intrinsic value 
attributed indiscriminately to all human beings, including embryos from the moment 
of conception, as Pope John Paul II suggests,263 might lead to unreasonable claims 
such as that abortion, or the premature infant delivery, are impermissible, even in 
serious pregnancy complications, in which a motheƌ͛s life is thƌeateŶed. In the same 
vein, the association of the Catholic value conception of dignity with human rights 
ĐoŶtƌadiĐts ĐeƌtaiŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s ƌights suĐh as theiƌ ƌight to ƌepƌoduĐtiǀe fƌeedoŵ. 
Therefore, dignity, understood in religious terms, and human rights cannot be 
compatible – especially in the so-Đalled ͚haƌd Đases͛ iŶ laǁ suĐh as aďoƌtioŶ.264  
For all these reasons, we must be careful with the invocation of the religious 
Imago Dei doctrine as the basis of human rights. Perhaps Rawls is right here to claim 
that the legitimacy of human rights is much better secured if it rests on plain truths 
widely accepted, rather than a religious dogma such as the Imago Dei.265 Given all 
these flaws, it seems to me a paradox the implicit reference to the CatholiĐ ͚ǀalue͛ 
ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of digŶitǇ iŶ the ŵajoƌ huŵaŶ ƌights doĐuŵeŶts, iŶ soŵe “tates͛ 
ConstitutioŶs, aŶd iŶ legal Đases iŶ Đouƌts. I tuƌŶ Ŷoǁ to the eǆaŵiŶatioŶ of AƋuiŶas͛s 
notion of dignity. 
Both AƋuiŶas͛ aŶd CatholiĐs͛ ǀieǁs oŶ digŶitǇ, aƌe Ŷot ƌestƌiĐted aŶd applied 
only to human beings, but it is also extended to all other beings (e.g. animals, 
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264 For a similar claim, see: Waldron, J. (2010a), pp. 216-235 
265 Rawls (1993), pp. 224-225. 
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plants); and, generally, to everything which has been created by God, or occupies a 
place within a divine order, independently of their/its rational capacities. However, 
Aquinas defines dignity in a slightly different sense than Catholics, namely as the 
value signifying soŵethiŶg͛s goodness on account of itself.266 The main difference 
between Aquinas and other Catholics as regards the conception of dignity is that 
while the latter consider dignity to be an intrinsic value possessed by all human 
ďeiŶgs as a ƌesult of the faĐt that theǇ iŶĐaƌŶate God͛s iŵage, the foƌŵer thinks of 
dignity as a value accorded to someone or something not only because they/it are/is 
God͛s ĐƌeatioŶ, aŶd ǁe haǀe to see God in them/it, but also because they/it are/is 
good on account of themselves/itself. This approach gives, I think, Aquinas to some 
extent a place between the Catholics and the Enlightenment philosophers, in the 
sense that he does not invoke only religious elements, but also humanistic ones. 
That is to say, human beings are not simply beings created in the image of God, but 
also beings capable of using their own reason to think, judge, and act. That is an 
interesting approach in the sense that it does not only incorporate traditional 
Catholic elements, but also humanistic ones. These humanistic elements are a 
͚ĐoŶditio siŶe Ƌua ŶoŶ͛ ǁithiŶ the disĐouƌse of human rights. That is to say, 
considering human beings as capable of using their own reason to think, judge, and 
act, is generally important in the case of human rights, as only through such a 
capacity we can further speak of human responsibility in certain cases.  
Hoǁeǀeƌ, I do Ŷot uŶdeƌstaŶd hoǁ AƋuiŶas͛s ŶotioŶ of digŶitǇ ĐaŶ ďe 
ƌeĐoŶĐiled ǁith CatholiĐs͛ digŶitǇ. IŶ otheƌ ǁoƌds, I do Ŷot see hoǁ iŶ AƋuiŶas͛s 
account a humanistic version of dignity can coexist with a traditional Catholic 
uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of digŶitǇ. Although aŵďitious, AƋuiŶas͛s ƌeĐoŶĐiliatioŶ of these tǁo 
notions of dignity in a single account does not seem to be feasible. According to the 
traditional Catholic understanding of dignity, dignity is an inherent value, that is, a 
ǀalue that ĐaŶŶot ďe lost. But, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to AƋuiŶas͛s huŵaŶistiĐ digŶitǇ, 
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accompanied by human responsibility, dignity seems to be a value that can 
potentially be lost; hence it cannot be seen as an intrinsic or inherent value. 
 
Ϯ.Ϯ.Ϯ The ͚ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ͛ KaŶtiaŶ ǀalue ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of digŶitǇ as the ďasis of huŵaŶ 
rights 
Immanuel Kant makes the dignity of humanity one of the central notions in his 
philosophy. Kant discusses thoroughly the dignity of humanity, or human dignity, in 
the first moral work of his critical period, namely in the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, ǁhiĐh pƌoǀides the fouŶdatioŶ foƌ all KaŶt͛s suďseƋueŶt 
writings in practical philosophy.267 I re-ǁƌite heƌe KaŶt͛s faŵous passage: 
͚… the idea of the dignity of a rational being, who obeys no law other than 
that which he himself at the same time gives. 
In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity. 
What has a price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; what 
on the other hand is raised above all price and therefore admits of no 
equivalent has a dignity. 
What is related to general human inclinations and needs has a market price; 
that which, even without presupposing a need, conforms with a certain taste, 
that is, with delight in the mere purposeless play of our mental powers, has a 
fancy price; but that which constitutes the condition under which alone 
something can be an end in itself has not merely a relative worth, that is, a 
price, but an inner worth, that is, dignity. 
Now, morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can be an 
end in itself, since only through this is it possible to be a lawgiving member in 
                                                          
267 Wood (1996), p. xxiii, Kant also talks about the dignity of humanity in his Lectures on Ethics. In 
particular, in Ak. Ϯϳ:ϯϳϳ he ǁƌites: ͚… ǁhat ŵatteƌs is that, so loŶg as he liǀes, he should liǀe 
hoŶoƌaďlǇ, aŶd Ŷot dishoŶoƌ the digŶitǇ of huŵaŶitǇ… But ŵoƌal life is at aŶ eŶd if it Ŷo loŶgeƌ 
aĐĐoƌds ǁith the digŶitǇ of huŵaŶitǇ͛. 
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the kingdom of ends. Hence, morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of 
morality, is that which alone has digŶitǇ͛ ;Ak. ϰ:ϰϯϰ-435).268 
Also, in the Ak. 4:436 of the Groundwork, Kant argues that every rational human 
being has an inner value (dignity), because he or she has autonomous will. Kant 
writes: 
͚But the laǁgiǀiŶg itself, which determines all worth, must for that very 
reason have dignity, that is, an unconditional, incomparable worth; and the 
word respect alone provides a becoming expression for the estimate of it that 
a rational being must give. Autonomy is therefore the ground of the dignity of 
huŵaŶ Ŷatuƌe aŶd of eǀeƌǇ ƌatioŶal Ŷatuƌe͛.269    
AppaƌeŶtlǇ, the KaŶtiaŶ ŵoƌal ĐoŶĐept of huŵaŶ digŶitǇ, oƌ ͚ǁuƌde͛ ;iŶ GeƌŵaŶͿ, 
ǁhiĐh etǇŵologiĐallǇ Đoŵes fƌoŵ the ǁoƌd ͚ǁeƌt͛ which means value, is considered 
to be an inner, unconditional, and incomparable (i.e. not relational) value which 
exhibits rational moral will, and is shared by human and all other rational beings who 
respect the moral law by doing their moral duty. That is to say, the inner Kantian 
moral value (dignity) is grounded in the autonomy of the will, namely the will of 
autonomous agents who consciously subject themselves to reason, or practical 
reasoning (rational agents), and fulfill their moral duties (duty-bearers). This is the 
genuine Kantian human dignity.270 In what follows I focus on and discuss a different, 
popular yet mistaken, Kantian conception of dignity, and its relation to human rights. 
I call this the ͚ŵaiŶstreaŵ͛ KaŶtiaŶ ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of digŶitǇ, within the contemporary 
human rights discourse.  
As has been mentioned above, Kant writes in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics 
of Morals: ͚that ǁhiĐh ĐoŶstitutes the ĐoŶditioŶ uŶdeƌ ǁhiĐh aloŶe soŵethiŶg ĐaŶ ďe 
an end in itself has not merely a relative worth, that is, a price, but an inner worth, 
that is, dignity͛ ;ϰ:ϰϯϰ-ϱͿ. He also aƌgues that ͚Autonomy is therefore the ground of 
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the digŶitǇ of huŵaŶ Ŷatuƌe aŶd of eǀeƌǇ ƌatioŶal Ŷatuƌe͛ ;ϰ:ϰϯϲͿ.271 What is 
popularly yet mistakenly argued is that we all have human rights, namely 
entitlements to be respected and treated as ends, not as means (4:429), as a result 
of the fact that we are all dignified as autonomous persons. That is to say, according 
to KaŶt͛s Foƌŵula of HuŵaŶitǇ, ǁe should aĐt iŶ ǁaǇs that ǁe use humanity, 
whether in our own person, or in the person of any other, always at the same time 
as an end, never merely as a means.272 Eventually, we all possess human rights, or 
else entitlements to be respected and treated as ends as the result of the fact that 
we all possess an intrinsic or inherent value or worth that cannot be lost.273 This 
value or worth is, according to this view, the Kantian human dignity, which is further 
based on the fundamental Kantian moral principle of autonomy.  
In other words, what most Kantian and non-Kantian scholars understand today is 
that from our intrinsic value, that is, our dignity (an inherent value that cannot be 
lost), which derives from Kantian autonomy, namely our capacity to make our own 
decisions independently without guidance or coercion from others, through the 
Formula of Humanity (4:429), we are led to human rights. For instance, according to 
Oliǀeƌ “eŶseŶ͛s aĐĐouŶt, giǀeŶ that digŶitǇ deƌiǀes fƌoŵ the ŵoƌal laǁ, aŶd ƌights͛ 
ultimate source is taken to be the moral law too, it is legitimate for one to argue that 
human rights are in effect derived from human dignity.274 Further, Habermas argues 
that human rights have been developed in response to violations of human dignity; 
hence dignity can be conceived as their moral source.275 Ultimately, Kant is 
understood as claiming, for example, that slavery is wrong because it is incompatible 
with the idea that human beings, and all other rational beings, have to be treated as 
ends, namely as persons with intrinsic or inherent dignity, and further with 
                                                          
271 Gregor (1996), pp. 84-85. 
272 “ee KaŶt͛s ͚Foƌŵula of HuŵaŶitǇ͛ iŶ: Gƌegoƌ ;ϭϵϵϲͿ, p. ϴϬ.   
273 We ŵust Ŷot igŶoƌe the diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ the ǁoƌds ͚iŶŶeƌ͛ aŶd ͚iŶtƌiŶsiĐ͛ oƌ ͚iŶheƌeŶt͛; ǁhile 
the former denotes a value that can be lost, the latter denote a value or worth that cannot be lost and 
is totally independent of the judgments and actions of the person who possess it.  
274 See Sensen, O. (2011). Kant on Human Dignity. De Gruyter. 
275 Habermas, J. (2010); Griffin (2008), p. 50; Hill (2013), pp. 313-325; Bennett (2015), pp. 76-77.  
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autonomy understood as freedom from coercion; or (another example) that torture 
is wrong because the tortured man is not being treated as an end, namely as a 
dignified person with autonomous will in the above sense. 
Despite its resonance, the fundamental problem with this argument is the 
misinterpretation, by scholars and legal practitioners, of the grounding basis of 
human dignity, that is, the moral concept of autonomy. It is true that the Kantian 
autonomy of the will is an obscure concept that Kant does not clearly define in 4:440 
in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.276 Perhaps this is the reason why 
Kantian human dignity is considered to be an obscure concept as well. In the 4:440, 
in the Metaphysics of Morals, KaŶt ǁƌites: ͚AutoŶoŵǇ of the ǁill is the pƌopeƌtǇ of 
the will by which it is a law to itself (independently of any property of the objects of 
ǀolitioŶͿ͛.277 What most scholars argue is that the autonomous humans, and all other 
rational beings, are those who are independent and free to make their own decisions 
without supervision or coercion from others. For instance, Simon Kirchin says that 
͚ŵuĐh of the appeal of autoŶoŵǇ lies iŶ ĐhoosiŶg ǁhat to do ǁith Ǉouƌ oǁŶ life…͛278 
But just the freedom to choose the course of our own lives however we see fit is not 
the correct understanding of the Kantian autonomy.  
Contrary to the ͚ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ͛ understanding of autonomy, I see the Kantian 
autonomous person as not just a person who does as she pleases, but as a freely 
self-legislating person who, applying reason or rationality to her inclinations, 
passions, social conventions, religious beliefs, ideologies etc., does her duty for 
dutǇ͛s sake, oƌ ďeĐause it is the ƌight thing to do, or out of respect for the moral law 
(in singular). This is my interpretation of the Kantian autonomy of the will, which 
contradicts many other prevalent explanations of it today. My understanding of 
Kantian autonomy is not only based on the interpretation of the relevant passage 
(4:440), but it is also is part of a thorough conceptual analysis of autonomy 
developed in the following chapter. 
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In addition, the ͚ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ͛ digŶitǇ-based Kantian argument for the justification 
of human rights is not only mistaken because of the misinterpretation of the 
grounding basis of dignity, that is, of the Kantian autonomy of the will, but also 
because of the subsequent misunderstanding of the Kantian moral concept of 
͚huŵaŶ digŶitǇ͛ itself, that is, the alleged ground of human rights. Specifically, what 
is mistakenly argued, or implied, is that the Kantian human dignity is an intrinsic or 
inherent value, namely a value always possessed by all human beings, which by 
definition cannot be lost. But, if dignity was indeed an intrinsic or inherent value, 
that is, a value that can never be lost by rational beings, then those of us who are 
not autonomous, that is, persons who cannot do our duties in accordance with the 
ŵoƌal laǁ͛s ĐoŵŵaŶds, e.g. the criminals, could still be considered as dignified 
persons. However, this is not correct in Kantian terms. Kant writes in 4:434-435 in 
the Groundwork: ͚… the idea of the dignity of a rational being, who obeys no law 
otheƌ thaŶ that ǁhiĐh he hiŵself at the saŵe tiŵe giǀes…͛279 And in 4:436 he points 
out that ͚autonomy is therefore the ground of the dignity of human nature and of 
eǀeƌǇ ƌatioŶal Ŷatuƌe͛.280 Consequently, what actually attributes value, that is, 
dignity to agents is their autonomous moral agency, namely their capacity to fulfill 
their duties in accordance with reasons commands, or, in other words, their capacity 
to do their moral duty treating others as ends, that is, with respect.  
Apparently, not all agents are autonomous in the Kantian sense, so not all of 
them possess dignity. Hence dignity is not an intrinsic or inherent value as the 
proponents of the mainstream Kantian thesis argue. Incidentally, nowhere in his 
opus, does Kant mention or imply the intrinsicness or inherentness of dignity. Hence, 
the correct understanding of the Kantian moral concept of human dignity is its 
understanding as an inner value, which simply denotes the fact that dignity belongs 
to the internal domain of morality. That is to say, dignity is the inner value or feeling, 
attributed to or possessed, respectively, only by those who actually exercise their 
moral capacity to fulfill their moral duties treating others as ends. 
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Moreover, another objection to the ͚ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ͛ argument, according to which 
the Kantian notion of human dignity is the foundation of human rights, is that such 
an argument disregards the fact that the Kantian moral concept of human dignity 
does Ŷot ďeloŶg to the ͚eǆteƌŶal doŵaiŶ͛ of laǁ. ‘atheƌ, it is a ŵoƌal ĐoŶĐept 
ďeloŶgiŶg eǆĐlusiǀelǇ to the ͚iŶteƌŶal doŵaiŶ͛ of ŵoƌalitǇ. KaŶt ǁƌites iŶ ϰ:ϰϯϰ-435 in 
the GƌouŶdǁoƌk: ͚… but that which constitutes the condition under which alone 
something can be an end in itself has not merely a relative worth, that is, a price, but 
an inner worth, that is, dignity.͛281 Consequently, if ǁe ƌestƌiĐted ouƌ ͚justifiĐatoƌǇ 
hoƌizoŶs͛ to the ŶotioŶ of ͚huŵaŶ digŶitǇ͛, ǁhiĐh ďeloŶgs to the iŶteƌŶal doŵaiŶ of 
morality, without any recourse to the external domain of law, in which human rights 
typically reside, then their justification would obviously be implausible and 
illegitimate. 
Furthermore, the popular dignity-based Kantian argument for the justification of 
human rights cannot actually be seen as a truly Kantian argument, given that it 
disregards the centrality and priority of the ĐoŶĐept of ͚dutǇ͛ oǀeƌ the ĐoŶĐept of 
͚ƌight͛ ǁithiŶ KaŶtiaŶ duty-based ethics, in general. The new (Kantian) duty-based 
argument for the justification of human and socioeconomic rights, or the new Duty-
Based Approach (DBA), which is developed in chapter 4 of the thesis, has not only 
been formulated upon the general idea that within the context of a truly Kantian 
justification of rights duties must be put first, but it explains why duties have priority 
over rights.   
Last but not least, the ͚ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ͛ KaŶtiaŶ digŶitǇ-based argument for the 
justification of human rights generates problems regarding the so-called ͚hard cases͛ 
in law and medicine, e.g. abortion.282 As has already been mentioned, the notion of 
dignity understood in Catholic terms, as the value attributed indifferently to all 
human beings including embryos from the moment of conception, as Pope John Paul 
II has claimed,283 might lead to unreasonable claims such as that abortion is 
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impermissible. IŶ the saŵe ǀeiŶ, uŶdeƌ the ͚ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ͛ KaŶtiaŶ dignity-based 
argument for the justification of human rights, in a high-risk pregnancy, in which a 
delivery of foetus would be urgent, the physician would seem to have two conflicting 
dignities to deal with, namely the dignity of mother and the dignity of the foetus. 
Apparently, as an unconditional ǀalue, Ŷeitheƌ ŵotheƌ͛s digŶitǇ, Ŷoƌ foetus͛ digŶitǇ 
ĐaŶ ďe ǀiolated. I ƌeĐall heƌe KaŶt͛s Ak. ϰ:ϰϯϲ: ͚But the laǁgiǀiŶg itself, ǁhiĐh 
determines all worth, must for that very reason have dignity, that is, an 
unconditional, iŶĐoŵpaƌaďle ǁoƌth͛.284 [emphasis added].  The physician then would 
come to a well-known dead-end in the literature of medical ethics. Consequently, 
the appliĐatioŶ of the ͚ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ͛ KaŶtiaŶ digŶitǇ-based argument for the 
justification of human rights, as well as the general focus on the concept of human 
dignity, do not seem easily applicable in the practical domain.285 
One could counter here that even if we followed a Kantian duty-based approach, 
such as the one discussed in chapter 4 of the thesis, in the same high-risk pregnancy, 
in which a delivery of a foetus is urgent, the physician would still have to deal with a 
difficult task, namely the balancing –not of dignities, this time, but– of duties: the 
duty to save the life of mother, aŶd the dutǇ to saǀe eŵďƌǇo͛s life. The ƋuestioŶ here 
would arise as to why the duty-based approach proposed in the present thesis is 
more preferable than a dignity-based approach, given that both of them effectively 
require the same difficult task, namely the balancing of duties and dignities, 
respectively –from which rights are afterwards generated. 
As it is clearly shown in chapters 3 and 4, the new Duty-Based Approach 
(DBA) does not suffer from the deficiencies of the dignity-based approach. 
Specifically, the DBA is based (1) on the exact interpretation of the Kantian supreme 
principle of morality, that is, of the autonomy of the will (chapter 3), (2) on the 
precise understanding of the Kantian human dignity, as a notion residing in the 
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internal domain of morality (chapters 3 and 4), (3) on the precise interpretation of 
human rights, as a notion residing in the external domain of law (chapter 4), and, 
finally, (ϰͿ oŶ the less ͚ŵǇsteƌious͛ ŶotioŶ of ͚dutǇ͛, ǁhiĐh is Ŷot oŶlǇ ŵoƌe iŵpoƌtaŶt 
for Kant than the notion of dignity, but also easiest to use in practice (5).  
More specifically, when a physician, in praxis, is dealing with a medical hard 
case, I think it is easier for him to choose between specific duties rather than 
between dignities. The reason is that while dignity is an incomparable value (see Ak. 
4:436 above) that cannot be object of comparison, Kant does not set such a 
constraint for duties, which can legitimately be objects of comparison through the 
exercise of the deliberative capacity of the rational, moral, autonomous agent. 
Surely, this is not an easy task, but, at least, allows for some discretion which, 
contrary to the comparison of dignities, facilitates action. For example, in the case of 
the pregnant mother, after using his judgment, the physician might choose his duty 
to save a ŵotheƌ͛s life oŶ the ďasis of his ŵoƌal dutǇ to ŵake the Đaƌe of his 
patient/mother, not the embryo͛s, his first concern. This would further be 
compatible with the General Medical Council͛s ;GMCͿ ethiĐal guidaŶĐe foƌ doĐtoƌs, 
and good medical practice, according to which a good doctor makes the care of his 
patient his first concern.286 Ultimately, this would be compatible with the (legal) 




In this chapter, I have shown that dignity is a concept with deep historical roots. I 
have also shown that there are effectively two main conceptions of dignity 
thƌoughout histoƌǇ, ŶaŵelǇ the ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of digŶitǇ as a ͚status͛ aŶd the 
ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of digŶitǇ as a ͚ǀalue͛. Thƌough the presentation of four of the most 
significant contemporary accounts on dignity, and their main weaknesses, it is 
claimed that dignity might not be the genuine basis of human rights, as it is very 
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often argued today. Neither the popular legal status, e.g. WaldƌoŶ͛s, aŶd moral 
status, e.g. Tasioulas͛s, Ŷoƌ the fƌeƋueŶtlǇ iŶǀoked CatholiĐ value conceptions of 
dignity, seem to be the genuine grounds of human rights. Finally, I do not regard 
either the mainstream or the correct Kantian conception of human dignity as the 
grounding basis of human rights either. The reason why not even the correct Kantian 
dignity as an inner value is the foundation of rights is that it is not effectively a value 
or a feeling of right-holders in the first place. Rather, it is a value and feeling 
possessed and attributed to duty-bearers. Hence, any violation against the rights of 
right-holders is not to be seen as an offense against their dignity, but as a result of 
the dysfunctional exercise of duty-ďeaƌeƌs͛ ;ƌatioŶal, ŵoƌal, aŶdͿ autoŶoŵous 
capacity, which is the true basis of their own (duty-ďeaƌeƌs͛Ϳ digŶitǇ (more on this in 
the following chapters). Generally, I see the place of human dignity, both in the 
contemporary human rights discourse, and in the Kantian opus, as more modest 
than it is often taken to be.288 This is shown more clearly in the following chapter, 
within the context of the conceptual analysis of the moral concept of autonomy 










                                                          





Can there be a truly Kantian theory of human rights? 
 
1. Introduction 
In the General Introduction of the thesis I have stated the main question, namely: 
͚ǁhat is the philosophiĐal ďasis of huŵaŶ ƌights?͛ IŶ oƌdeƌ to aŶsǁeƌ this question, I 
have examined some important rights-based justifications and, also, examined the 
͚offiĐial͛ justifiĐatioŶ of huŵaŶ ƌights, that is, the ŶotioŶ of huŵaŶ digŶitǇ. I have 
concluded that, because of their flaws, most of them already discussed in the 
relevant literature, neither the former, namely the naturalistic and political human 
rights justificatory accounts, nor the latter, namely the concept of human dignity –
neither in its legal/moral status, nor in its value Catholic/Kantian versions– may 
adequately answer the main question of the thesis. 
 However, I do not think we should abandon a Kantian orientation or 
perspective regarding the philosophical foundations of rights. I am convinced that, 
even though the Kantian moral concept of human dignity is not the genuine basis of 
human rights, and Kant is generally seen as an opponent of rights, there is still room 
for the formulation of a (Kantian) duty-based justification of human and 
socioeconomic rights (chapter 4). Hence, in the present chapter, I examine two more 
Kantian accounts. I have decided to focus on and discuss the two most recent, 
noteworthy ones.289 These are: ϭͿ Aƌthuƌ ‘ipsteiŶ͛s aƌguŵeŶt, according to which 
huŵaŶ ƌights aƌe gƌouŶded iŶ the KaŶtiaŶ ŶotioŶ of the ͚iŶŶate ƌight to fƌeedoŵ͛, in 
the Doctrine of Right, the Rechtslehre, in the Metaphysics of Morals;290 and 2) Katrin 
                                                          
289 Theƌe aƌe of Đouƌse the ĐlassiĐal KaŶtiaŶ aĐĐouŶts foƌ the justifiĐatioŶ of huŵaŶ ƌights, e.g. ‘aǁls͛s 
aŶd Haďeƌŵas͛s aĐĐouŶts. Hoǁeǀeƌ, I haǀe deĐided to foĐus oŶ tǁo ƌeĐeŶt KaŶtiaŶ aĐĐouŶts. Foƌ the 
two aforementioned classical Kantian accounts for the justification of human rights, see: Rawls 
(2001); Habermas (2010), pp. 464-480 
290 Ripstein (2009) 
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FliksĐhuh͛s transcendental approach to the justification of human rights.291 Along 
with the Kantian dignity-based argument for the justification of human rights, these 
accounts are, I think, the three most important contemporary attempts to justify 
rights in a Kantian mode.  
After the discussion of these accounts, I move on to what I see as the ideal 
starting point for the formulation of a new (Kantian) duty-based theory of human 
and socioeconomic rights (chapter 4), that is, to the KaŶtiaŶ ŶotioŶ of ͚autoŶoŵǇ͛. 
Within this context, I attempt a thorough conceptual analysis of the core moral 
concept of autonomy, as it is discussed by Kant in the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, through the Kantian aesthetic category of the sublime.292 
Following this analysis, I focus on two exemplary artworks, namely on Virginia 
Woolf͛s Ŷoǀel Mrs. Dalloway and on Bill Viola͛s ͚fiǀe aŶgels foƌ the ŵilleŶŶiuŵ͛, iŶ 
order to show more clearly 1) the tension between the notions of autonomy and 
heteronomy, and 2) the relation between the aesthetic concept of the sublime and 
the moral notion of autonomy. 
 
Ϯ. Aƌthuƌ ‘ipsteiŶ͛s aĐĐouŶt foƌ the justifiĐatioŶ of huŵaŶ ƌights 
AĐĐoƌdiŶg to Aƌthuƌ ‘ipsteiŶ͛s aƌguŵeŶt, human rights are grounded in the Kantian 
ŶotioŶ of the ͚iŶŶate ƌight to fƌeedoŵ͛ as it appeaƌs iŶ the DoĐtƌiŶe of ‘ight, the 
Rechtslehre, in the Metaphysics of Morals.293 Before the presentation and discussion 
of ‘ipsteiŶ͛s aƌguŵeŶt, as it is deǀeloped iŶ his Force and Freedom,294 I focus on the 
͚iŶŶate ƌight to fƌeedoŵ͛ itself as it is disĐussed ďǇ KaŶt iŶ the Rechtslehre. 
The Metaphysics of Morals is divided into a Doctrine of Right, and a Doctrine of 
Virtue. The Doctrine of Right, the Rechtslehre, which is considered to be the 
ĐoƌŶeƌstoŶe of KaŶt͛s legal aŶd politiĐal philosophǇ, has tǁo paƌts, oŶe oŶ ͚pƌiǀate 
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292 See Gregor (1996), p. 89.  
293 Ripstein (2009) 
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ƌight͛, aŶd oŶe oŶ ͚puďliĐ ƌight͛.295 In the Introduction to the doctrine of right, Kant 
distiŶguishes ďetǁeeŶ ͚iŶŶate͛ aŶd ͚aĐƋuiƌed͛ ƌight. He argues that the former is a 
right belonging to everyone by nature, independently of any act that would establish 
it; ǁhile suĐh aŶ aĐt is ƌeƋuiƌed foƌ the latteƌ. KaŶt theŶ states iŶ ϲ:Ϯϯϳ that ͚theƌe is 
oŶlǇ oŶe iŶŶate ƌight͛. “peĐifiĐallǇ, KaŶt ǁƌites: ͚Theƌe is oŶly oŶe iŶŶate ƌight͛, and 
theŶ: ͚Freedom ;iŶdepeŶdeŶĐe fƌoŵ ďeiŶg ĐoŶstƌaiŶed ďǇ aŶotheƌ͛s ĐhoiĐeͿ, iŶsofaƌ 
as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, 
is the only original right belonging to every maŶ ďǇ ǀiƌtue of his huŵaŶitǇ͛.296 
Ripstein focuses on this KaŶtiaŶ ͚iŶŶate ƌight to fƌeedoŵ͛, ǁhiĐh he sees as the 
individualization of the Kantian Universal Principle of Right in 6:230, according to 
ǁhiĐh ͚aŶǇ aĐtioŶ is right if it ĐaŶ Đoeǆist ǁith eǀeƌǇoŶe͛s fƌeedoŵ iŶ aĐĐoƌdaŶĐe 
with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist 
ǁith eǀeƌǇoŶe͛s fƌeedoŵ iŶ aĐĐoƌdaŶĐe ǁith a uŶiǀeƌsal laǁ͛.297 His goal is effectively 
to formulate upoŶ this KaŶtiaŶ ͚iŶŶate ƌight to fƌeedoŵ͛ a ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ justifiĐatoƌǇ 
account of human rights.298 He begins with describing the Kantian system of equal 
freedom as one in which each person is free to use her own powers, to set her own 
purposes, and no one else to compel her to use her powers in a way designed to 
adǀaŶĐe aŶǇ otheƌ peƌsoŶ͛s puƌposes. That is to say, under the Kantian system of 
equal freedom, each person independently decides which ends she has, and through 
which means to pursue them, without having someone else to decide for her.299 
Ripstein then focuses oŶ the ͚iŶŶate ƌight to fƌeedoŵ͛ oƌ, as he calls it, ͚the ƌight to 
iŶdepeŶdeŶĐe͛.  
More specifically, Ripstein describes the Kantian innate right to freedom as a 
distinctive aspect of our status as persons in relation to other persons, which 
protects our purposiveness and sovereignty, that is, our capacity to choose 
independently the ends and the means to these ends, against the choices of any 
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other person. This innate right allows for freedom and independence from the 
choice of others within the Kantian system of equal freedom as it has been described 
above. For instance, no one is allowed to decide for me even if she knows better 
thaŶ ŵe. EǀeŶtuallǇ, the iŶŶate ƌight to fƌeedoŵ is ideŶtified ǁith oŶe͛s ƌight to ďe 
oŶe͛s own master and have no other, within a system of equal freedom. Ripstein 
adds that this system of equal freedom must be understood as a system of reciprocal 
limits on freedom, that is to say, as a system in which an unconditional constraint, or 
a mutual restriction under law, is imposed on the conduct of all persons. These 
recipƌoĐal liŵits aƌe ultiŵatelǇ gƌouŶded iŶ the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of eaĐh peƌsoŶ͛s 
independence. That is to say, because eaĐh peƌsoŶ͛s iŶdepeŶdeŶĐe ŵatteƌs, all other 
persons have to respect it, adjusting their conduct accordingly.300 
Under this definition of the Kantian innate right to freedom, the idea of freedom 
is fuƌtheƌ ideŶtified ďǇ ‘ipsteiŶ ǁith the idea of fƌeedoŵ as ͚ŶoŶ-doŵiŶatioŶ͛. 
Considering the violation of our freedom as wrongdoing, Ripstein argues that any 
wrongdoing is effectively a form of domination. He then clarifies that the 
wrongdoing, or the violation of our freedom by the deeds of other persons, does not 
consist in the fact that someone does something that causes something bad to us, 
but that someone does something to us through dominating, or interfering with our 
freedom as independence.301 For example, if I break your arm, Ripstein claims, the 
wrongdoing consists of the fact that I am interfering with your person. That is to say, 
by restricting your ability to set your own ends and pursue them as you see fit, I am 
not respecting our respective freedom under universal law.302 
Ultimately, Ripstein argues that the ͚iŶŶate ƌight to fƌeedoŵ͛, oƌ the ƌight to 
independence, is the genuine foundation of the rights persons have against each 
other, as well as of the fundamental constitutional rights which protect political 
freedoms and freedom of religion. Ripstein claims that we all have human rights 
because we all have this innate right to freedom, namely the right to independence 
and the right to non-coercion, which sets limits to other persons regarding the ways 
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force may be used by them against us. Also, Ripstein argues that the innate right to 
freedom does not refer only to the relations between persons, but also it sets limits 
to states͛ aĐtioŶs, as ǁell as the means states use in achieving them.303 Under this 
grounding of human rights, these are eventually considered to be the principles or 
rules which guarantee our equal freedom and independence from coercion.  
Having presented his view, I now provide some criticisms of ‘ipsteiŶ͛s aƌguŵeŶt 
iŶ the ĐuƌƌeŶt liteƌatuƌe. I ďegiŶ ǁith KatƌiŶ FliksĐhuh͛s Đlaiŵ that the iŶŶate ƌight to 
freedom cannot actually be a foundational right because it is just a formalistic right 
from which no substantive legislation of (moral) human rights can be derived.304 That 
is to say, the innate right to freedom cannot be the source of any positive body of 
laws because it is just a purely formal right rather than a substantive concept with 
specific content. The ŵaiŶ ƌeasoŶ ǁhǇ ǁe should see, iŶ FliksĐhuh͛s ǀieǁ, the iŶŶate 
right to freedom as a formalistic right is that there cannot actually be a foundational 
ƌight iŶ the DoĐtƌiŶe of ‘ight, as this ǁould ĐoŶtƌadiĐt KaŶt͛s geŶeƌal philosophiĐal 
non-foundationalism.305 Consequently, although Flikschuh characterizes as 
͚teŵptiŶg͛ the deĐlaƌatioŶ of the iŶŶate ƌight to fƌeedoŵ as a fouŶdatioŶal huŵaŶ 
right, she explicitly says that we should resist this temptation.306 
Although I agƌee ǁith FliksĐhuh͛s iŶitial Đlaiŵ that the innate right to freedom 
cannot actually be a foundational right because it is just a formalistic right, from 
which no substantive legislation of (moral) human rights can be derived, I cannot 
agree with her claim that Kant is generally an anti-foundationalist. To be more 
specific, it is true, in my view, that the innate right to freedom is a formalistic right 
which cannot further justify a particular, substantive body of laws. This is obvious 
after the analysis of the 6:237, in which Kant discusses the innate right to freedom. I 
quote the passage once more: ͚There is oŶly oŶe iŶŶate ƌight͛, aŶd theŶ: ͚Freedom 
;iŶdepeŶdeŶĐe fƌoŵ ďeiŶg ĐoŶstƌaiŶed ďǇ aŶotheƌ͛s ĐhoiĐeͿ, iŶsofaƌ as it ĐaŶ Đoeǆist 
with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only 
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304 Flikschuh makes this claim in: Cruft, Liao, Renzo (2015), pp. 653-670. 
305 Cruft, Liao, Renzo (2015), p. 661 
306 Cruft, Liao, Renzo (2015), p. 661. 
111 
 
oƌigiŶal ƌight ďeloŶgiŶg to eǀeƌǇ ŵaŶ ďǇ ǀiƌtue of his huŵaŶitǇ͛.307 In this passage, 
Kant argues that the innate right to freedom (independence of human beings from 
ďeiŶg ĐoŶstƌaiŶed ďǇ otheƌs͛ ĐhoiĐesͿ is aŶ oƌigiŶal ƌight, that is, a ƌight possessed ďǇ 
huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs iŶ ǀiƌtue of theiƌ huŵaŶitǇ, ǁhiĐh Đoeǆists ǁith otheƌs͛ ƌespeĐtiǀe 
innate rights to freedom in accordance with a universal law.  
What KaŶt ŵeaŶs ďǇ ͚uŶiǀeƌsal laǁ͛ is ͚Ŷatuƌe͛. In 4:421 in the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, KaŶt ǁƌites: ͚“iŶĐe the uŶiǀeƌsalitǇ of laǁ iŶ aĐĐoƌdaŶĐe ǁith 
which effects take place constitutes what is properly called nature in the most 
general sense (as regards its form) – that is, the existence of things insofar as it is 
determined in accordance ǁith uŶiǀeƌsal laǁs…͛.308 IŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ, ďǇ ͚uŶiǀeƌsal laǁ͛, 
KaŶt ŵeaŶs ͚Ŷatuƌe͛ iŶ formalistic terms. Incidentally, Henry Allison says that there 
aƌe tǁo ;KaŶtiaŶͿ ǁaǇs of ĐoŶĐeiǀiŶg ͚Ŷatuƌe͛: foƌŵallǇ aŶd ŵateƌiallǇ. Natuƌe 
conceived formally is the existence of things in accordance with universal laws, while 
nature conceived materially is the sum-total of appearances.309 The former 
understanding of nature, that is, nature conceived in formalistic terms, as the 
existence of things in accordance with universal law, is what actually Kant means 
here. Consequently, the innate right to freedom is an original, or a natural, right that 
Đoeǆists ǁith otheƌ peoples͛ ƌespeĐtiǀe iŶŶate ƌights to fƌeedoŵ iŶ a formalistic way 
(in accordance with a universal law of nature). In 6:380 in the Metaphysics of Morals, 
KaŶt ǀalidates this Đlaiŵ: ͚The doĐtƌiŶe of ƌight dealt oŶlǇ ǁith the formal condition 
of outer freedom (the consistency of outer freedom with itself if its maxim were 
made universal law), that is, with right͛ [bold in the original].310 
Theƌefoƌe, I ĐaŶ haƌdlǇ see a foƌŵalistiĐ ƌight, suĐh as the foƌŵalistiĐ ͚iŶŶate ƌight 
to fƌeedoŵ͛, as the ďasis of aŶǇ suďstaŶtiǀe ďodǇ of laǁs, as ‘ipsteiŶ aƌgues. As has 
already been mentioned (chapter 1), human rights are typically seen as moral rights. 
A justifiĐatoƌǇ aĐĐouŶt ƌestƌiĐted oŶlǇ to a foƌŵalistiĐ ŶotioŶ takeŶ fƌoŵ KaŶt͛s 
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legal/political philosophy lacks to show the moral character of these rights. Hence, 
the Doctrine of Right cannot support, in my view, any argument for the justification 
of substantive (moral) human rights. 
Nevertheless, although I see the innate right to freedom, in particular, as a 
formalistic right, and the Doctrine of Right, in general, as formalistic, I can hardly 
claim, as Flikschuh does, that Kant is generally an anti-foundationalist. The fact that 
the Doctrine of Right, including the innate right to freedom, is a piece of formalistic 
philosophical work, does not mean that the Kantian philosophy in general, and 
KaŶt͛s moral philosophy in particular, is formalistic. In the following chapter, through 
the formulation of the main argument of the thesis, I shoǁ ǁhǇ KaŶt͛s ethiĐs is Ŷot 
merely formal, and how it can actually provide specific and substantial guidance as 
an ethical system with the appropriate resources to do so. More specifically, I show 
how from the autonomy of the will we can move on gradually to the external moral 
duties, in which our human and socioeconomic rights are further grounded. 
Eventually, the kind of moral justification of human and socioeconomic rights 
pƌoǀided iŶ the pƌeseŶt thesis ŵight ďe seeŶ as a ǁaǇ of ĐoŵďatiŶg FliksĐhuh͛s 
͚HegeliaŶ-tǇpe͛ foƌŵalistiĐ ǀieǁ of the KaŶtiaŶ opus iŶ geŶeƌal.311 
AŶotheƌ pƌoďleŵ ǁith the ĐoŶĐept of ͚iŶŶate ƌight to fƌeedoŵ͛ as the ďasis of 
human rights, which has been stressed in the literature, is that we cannot ground 
these rights, which are supposed to belong equally to all human beings, in something 
such as freedom, which lacks any plausible metric. More specifically, O͛Neill asks 
how could we know that we all have the same degree of freedom of expression if 
this right (freedom of expression) is grounded in the concept of (the innate right to) 
fƌeedoŵ ǁhiĐh ďǇ defiŶitioŶ ĐaŶŶot ďe ŵeasuƌed. As O͛Neill Đlaiŵs, ͚ǁithout a 
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of reason. The main argument of the thesis in the following chapter may be seen as one more 
attempt, within the relevant debate between HegeliaŶs aŶd KaŶtiaŶs, to Đoŵďat Hegel͛s, aŶd 
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ŵetƌiĐ foƌ liďeƌtǇ, ǁe ĐaŶŶot kŶoǁ ǁhiĐh set of liďeƌties is laƌgest͛, so that fƌeedoŵ 
ĐaŶŶot ďe used as ͚ďuildiŶg ďloĐk͛ foƌ aŶǇ aĐĐouŶt of justiĐe.312 
Furthermore, in 6:237, Kant explicitly defines freedom as independence from 
being constrained by aŶotheƌ͛s ĐhoiĐe.313 In my view, this type of freedom, that is, 
the freedom to do as one pleases cannot ground, and is no way compatible with, the 
idea of justice in general. Justice is the conditio sine qua non for the existence of a 
society living in harmony. But freedom is by definition a principle that does not entail 
limits, so that free people can hardly coexist in harmony. Apparently, in such a case, 
there would be harsh conflicting exercises of freedoms/liberties, and the balancing 
of them would be an extremely difficult task. 
One could counter here that Kant also talks about the equality between moral 
agents in 6:237-8, and that it is the combination of freedom as independence and 
equality that eventually yields justice.314 My reservations concerning this claim are 
the folloǁiŶg: ϭͿ KaŶt does Ŷot stƌaightfoƌǁaƌdlǇ use the ǁoƌd ͚eƋualitǇ͛ iŶ these 
passages; he just iŵplies it ǁheŶ, foƌ iŶstaŶĐe, ǁƌites ͚freedom (independence from 
ďeiŶg ĐoŶstƌaiŶed ďǇ aŶotheƌ͛s ĐhoiĐeͿ, iŶsofaƌ as it ĐaŶ Đoeǆist ǁith the freedom of 
every other…͛315 [emphasis added]; 2) but even if we take in good part the claim that 
Kant here does invoke the combination of freedom and equality as the cornerstone 
of justice, I cannot still understand how this combination might treat the 
aforementioned problem, namely the problem of the conflicting freedoms/liberties, 
and the balancing of them. Kant does not offer a resolution to this problem; rather 
he remains silent. But it would be extremely difficult for such a system of justice to 
weigh one liberty/freedom against the other and also liberty/freedom against other 
values.316 Consequently, justice, in general, can hardly be seen as a system of 
freedom –even if freedom is combined with equality.317 On the contrary, I believe a 
                                                          
312 O͛Neill ;ϭϵϵϲͿ, pp. ϭϲϭ-2  
313 Gregor (1996), p.393 
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system of autonomy can more effectively be connected with justice given that 
autonomy by definition entails limits, which are necessary for the existence of a 
harmonious society. 
One more issue must be pointed out here: Although Ripstein does not explicitly 
say so, his argument, according to which we have rights because we all have an 
innate right to freedom, might further be understood as a ͚relation of protection͛: 
human rights protect our innate right to freedom. However, this seems to be a 
consequentialist and instrumentalist view, far apart from a truly deontological and 
Kantian perspective. Eventually, such a view cannot actually be distinguished from 
an interest-based approach to law, with a consequentialist character, such as those 
which have been discussed in chapter 1.318 
Last ďut Ŷot least, I ǁould like to ŵeŶtioŶ oŶe ŵoƌe oďjeĐtioŶ agaiŶst ‘ipsteiŶ͛s 
attempt to ground human rights in the innate right to freedom, as it is found in the 
DoĐtƌiŶe of ‘ight. I staƌt ǁith AlleŶ Wood͛s ƌeǀieǁ of ‘ipsteiŶ͛s Force and 
Freedom.319 Wood writes:   
͚One sunny spring day nearly forty years ago, I was sitting in an open-air café 
in Ithaca, New York, having coffee with Hans-Georg Gadamer. He was already 
over 70, and I was still in my twenties, having just published my first book on 
Kant. So, our conversation, which consisted mainly of youth listening to the 
superior wisdom of age, centered on the current state of Kant scholarship. 
Gadamer said that the biggest single lacuna in Kant studies was the absence of a 
really good book on Kant's Rechtslehre. It ought to be a book, he declared, that 
did not start out from Kantian ethics, but instead expounded Kant's theory of 
human rights, law and politics authentically, solely on the ground of Kant's 
concept of Recht: external freedom according to universal law. Gadamer told me 
I should write such a book -- a recommendation I found flattering, but I also 
immediately (and silently) dismissed, partly because my principal interest in Kant 
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ǁas pƌeĐiselǇ iŶ his ethiĐs… UŶtil Ŷoǁ, hoǁeǀeƌ, I haǀe Ŷeǀeƌ fouŶd the ďook 
Gadamer thought so badly needed to be written. But this book finally appears to 
ďe it… ‘ipsteiŶ…͛320 
Similar to Wood, I do recognise as one of the major contributions of Ripstein his 
atteŵpt to gƌouŶd huŵaŶ ƌights iŶdepeŶdeŶtlǇ of KaŶt͛s ethiĐs, iŶ the iŶnate right to 
fƌeedoŵ, iŶ the DoĐtƌiŶe of ‘ight, ǁhiĐh is paƌt of KaŶt͛s legal aŶd politiĐal theoƌǇ. 
Hoǁeǀeƌ, eitheƌ ďeĐause of ŵǇ peƌsoŶal iŶteƌests iŶ KaŶt͛s ethiĐs, oƌ ŵǇ ǀieǁ that 
Kant is, above all, a moral philosopher, it is difficult for me to understaŶd ‘ipsteiŶ͛s 
thesis that theƌe ĐaŶ ďe a KaŶtiaŶ huŵaŶ ƌights͛ – that is ŵoƌal ƌights͛– justificatory 
argument independently of KaŶt͛s ethiĐs aŶd the ŵoƌal laǁ. HeŶĐe, iŶ the ŵaiŶ 
human and socioeconomic justificatory argument of the present thesis, I start from 
KaŶt͛s ethiĐs, aŶd, oŶlǇ afteƌ this, I ŵoǀe oŶ to KaŶt͛s legal aŶd politiĐal theoƌǇ iŶ the 
Doctrine of Right. I expand on this in chapter 4. In the same chapter, I argue in favour 
of the liŶk ďetǁeeŶ KaŶt͛s ethiĐs aŶd legal/politiĐal theoƌǇ, oǀeƌƌidiŶg the ͚ƌiǀalƌǇ͛ 
between the so-called ͚independentists͛ and ͚dependentists͛ scholars, and treating 
the Kantian opus as a work with continuity and coherence. 
 
ϯ. KatƌiŶ FliksĐhuh͛s transcendental argument for the justification of human rights 
IŶ this seĐtioŶ I foĐus oŶ KatƌiŶ FliksĐhuh͛s transcendental approach to the 
justification of human rights.321 To begin with, distinguishing her approach from all 
the practice-based accounts (chapter 1), Flikschuh argues that the confusion 
regarding the use of human rights in several cases322 might be indicative of confusion 
regarding their meaning, so that eventually our starting point in understanding them 
should not be their practice, but the notion of ͚huŵaŶ ƌight͛ itself.323 Within this 
context, Flikschuh claims that the fact that practical concepts, including moral 
concepts, are not restricted to the physical world, renders them more vulnerable to 
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doubt and dispute; hence implying in effect that the determination of the grounds 
and the content of human rights is a hard, yet unavoidable task.324 
Flikschuh then moves on to arguing that she does not understand Kant as 
possessiŶg the ĐoŶĐept of ͚huŵaŶ ƌight͛ iŶ geŶeƌal. IŶ oƌdeƌ to suppoƌt heƌ Đlaiŵ, she 
saǇs that KaŶt does Ŷot sǇsteŵatiĐallǇ deploǇ the teƌŵs ͚das ‘eĐht deƌ MeŶsĐhheit͛, 
oƌ ͚das ƌeĐht deƌ MeŶsĐheŶ͛, iŶto his opus; aŶd, also, he never explicitly develops a 
theory of human rights, at least a theory of individual human rights. Rather the 
teƌŵs ͚das ‘eĐht deƌ MeŶsĐhheit͛ aŶd ͚das ƌeĐht deƌ MeŶsĐheŶ͛ haǀe collective 
character in his philosophical theory. Flikschuh suggests then that we should 
tƌaŶslate the teƌŵs ͚MeŶsĐhheit͛ aŶd ͚MeŶsĐheŶ͛ as ͚huŵaŶitǇ͛, Ŷot ͚huŵaŶ͛; so that 
eǀeŶtuallǇ KaŶt should ďe seeŶ as faǀouƌiŶg the idea of ͚the ƌights of huŵaŶitǇ͛ 
ƌatheƌ thaŶ ͚huŵaŶ ƌights͛ as ǁe uŶdeƌstaŶd theŵ todaǇ.325 
Further, even though she seeŵs Ŷot to ďe suƌe aďout the ͚ŶeĐessitǇ͛ ;must have) 
of a Kantian theory of human rights, or, in particular, of a Kantian account for the 
justification of human rights, Flikschuh says that if we had to construct one, we 
should be very careful, in the sense that we should seek to develop it in absolute 
consistence with KaŶt͛s, and not ours, philosophical thinking. Specifically, we should 
respect the fact that Kantian ethics are in effect duty-based ethics, in which duties 
have priority over rights.326 After these clarifications, Flikschuh develops her own 
argument for the justification of human rights indirectly by first rejecting as a basis of 
human rights the so-Đalled ͚iŶŶate ƌight to fƌeedoŵ͛ iŶ KaŶt͛s DoĐtƌiŶe of ‘ight. As 
has been shown in the previous section, this right is popularly suggested today as a 
kiŶd of ͚pƌe-legal huŵaŶ ƌight͛, oƌ a ͚fouŶdatioŶal fƌeedoŵ ƌight͛, fƌoŵ ǁhiĐh all 
other rights are derived.327  
Flikschuh rejects this innate right to freedom as a contingent basis of human 
rights. Her main objection regarding a foundationalist interpretation (or 
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iŶteƌpƌetatioŶsͿ of the ͚iŶŶate ƌight to fƌeedoŵ͛ is that KaŶt is pƌiŵaƌilǇ ĐoŶsideƌed 
by her as an anti-foundationalist and constructivist philosopher. She claims that Kant 
would never favour such a foundationalist approach to the issue of human rights. 
She also says that even the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals has an anti-
fouŶdatioŶalist ĐhaƌaĐteƌ ͚staƌtiŶg fƌoŵ ouƌ ͞oƌdiŶaƌǇ͟ ĐoŶĐept of dutǇ aŶd 
regressing from there to its necessary presuppositions before attempting their 
ĐƌitiĐal ǀiŶdiĐatioŶ͛.328 The Doctrine of Right, Flikschuh continues, is not excluded 
fƌoŵ KaŶt͛s philosophiĐal aŶti-foundationalism. Here again Kant starts, as Flikschuh 
argues, from the notion of right as it is found in legal practice, and, proceeds, via the 
torturous property argument, to the vindication of the necessary conditions of its 
practical possibility.329 She then argues against any non-formalistic understanding of 
the concept of right, in general.330 Flikschuh invokes 6:230 in the Metaphysics of 
Morals where Kant writes: 
͚The ĐoŶĐept of ƌight, iŶsofaƌ as it is ƌelated to aŶ oďligatioŶ ĐoƌƌespoŶdiŶg to 
it (i.e. the moral concept of right), has to do, first, only with the external and 
indeed practical relation of one person to another, insofar as their actions, as 
deeds, can have (direct or indirect) influence on each other. But, second, it 
does Ŷot sigŶifǇ the ƌelatioŶ of oŶe͛s ĐhoiĐe to the ŵeƌe ǁish ;heŶĐe also to 
the mere need) of the other, as in actions beneficence of callousness, but 
oŶlǇ a ƌelatioŶ to the otheƌ͛s choice. Third, in this reciprocal relation of choice 
no account at all is taken of the matter of choice, that is, of the end each has 
in mind with the object he wants; is not asked for example whether someone 
who buys goods from me for his own commercial use will gain by the 
transaction or not. All that is in question is the form in the relation of choice 
on the part of both…͛ [Bold added].331 
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Apparently, in the above passage, the concept of right, within the Doctrine of 
Right, seems to have a formalistic character that has nothing to do with the matter 
of choice. That is to say, it refers to a formal relation between (two or more) 
persons. Flikschuh claims then that, under this formalistic understanding of the 
KaŶtiaŶ ĐoŶĐept of ƌight iŶ geŶeƌal, the ͚iŶŶate ƌight to fƌeedoŵ͛, iŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ, 
cannot justify human rights as it similarly ͚fuŶĐtioŶs as a foƌŵal a priori necessary 
pƌesuppositioŶ of aŶǇ suďstaŶtiǀe ƌights doĐtƌiŶe͛.332 Consequently, in her view, the 
formalistic innate right to freedom cannot be invoked as the foundation of any 
substantive positive body of laws.  
Finally, Flikschuh presents her own thesis regarding the justification of human 
ƌights, ǁhiĐh she Đalls: a ͚tƌaŶsĐeŶdeŶtal huŵaŶ ƌights ĐoŶĐeptioŶ͛, the ŵaiŶ 
characteristic of which is the recognitioŶ of ͚huŵaŶ ĐogŶitiǀe aŶd ŵoƌal falliďilitǇ͛.333 
Within this context, Flikschuh claims that we cannot help but take ourselves and 
others as right-bearers, so that eventually human rights are to be understood as a 
͚suďjeĐtiǀelǇ ŶeĐessaƌǇ ƌefleĐtiǀe idea͛ –something like the necessary idea of God, 
which makes it possible for human beings to do their duties in this life, believing in a 
kind of reward, or happiness, or the highest good in the afterlife. That is to say, 
Flikschuh sees human rights as an indeterminate idea incapable of any empirical 
kŶoǁledge. “he atteŵpts this paƌallelisŵ ĐlaiŵiŶg, iŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ, that ͚despite ouƌ 
aĐkŶoǁledged laĐk of oďjeĐtiǀelǇ suffiĐieŶt theoƌetiĐal ǁaƌƌaŶt foƌ affiƌŵiŶg God͛s 
existence, we have subjectively sufficient practical warrant for faith iŶ God͛s 
existence as supreme moral being: a warrant that is grounded in our hope 
concerning the non-futility of our moral endeavours, even in the face of a morally 
ofteŶ ƌeĐalĐitƌaŶt eŵpiƌiĐal ǁoƌld͛.334 Flikschuh concludes that God and human 
rights, in the domain of political morality, function similarly, that is in a 
transcendental way. Hence, in her view, human rights are a subjectively necessary 
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regulative idea of reason arising from the acknowledgment of the moral imperative 
to enter with all others into the civil condition.335 
Having presented her view, I now evaluate FliksĐhuh͛s transcendental approach 
to the justification of human rights. To begin with, I must say that I agree with her 
choice to distinguish herself from the human rights practice-based accounts. It is 
true that the confusion regarding the use of human rights in practice is indicative of 
confusion regarding their meaning, so that eventually we should start from the 
notion of human rights, not their practice, in order to deeply understand them. Also, 
as has been discussed, apart from all their particular flaws, most of these –very 
popular during the last decades– political and practice-based accounts, overlook the 
fact that the international practice is ailing today (see chapter 1). The simple 
question then arises as to how a justification of human rights based on ailing 
grounds might be a successful one. 
Further, I agree with Flikschuh that if one had to formulate a truly Kantian 
justification of human rights, one should deeply respect the Kantian opus, avoiding 
to pƌojeĐt oŶe͛s oǁŶ philosophiĐal ͚oďsessioŶs͛ oŶ it. “peĐifiĐallǇ, I agƌee ǁith ďoth 
of her claims that 1) in the Kantian duty-based ethics, duties come first, and 2) Kant 
himself never actually developed a complete theory of human rights. These are 
apparent not only in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, but also in the 
Metaphysics of Morals, in which Kant officially develops his legal theory. Recognising 
these two constrains within the Kantian opus, my claim is that the formulation of a 
Kantian justification of rights is a challenging task in the sense that 1) duties should 
be put first –contrary to most contemporary rights-based justifications which give 
priority to rights over duties, and 2) one should actually work upon an incomplete 
legal theory. The (Kantian) duty-based justification of human and socioeconomic 
rights, in chapter 4, has been built upon these two constrains. 
However, I disagree with Flikschuh͛s Đlaiŵ that Kant does not possess the 
ĐoŶĐept of ͚huŵaŶ ƌight͛. EǀeŶ though his pƌioƌitǇ had ďeeŶ the ŶotioŶ of dutǇ, KaŶt 
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ǁas Ŷot ͚iŶdiffeƌeŶt͛ to huŵaŶ ƌights.336 For instance, in 6:239 in the Metaphysics of 
Morals, KaŶt eǆpliĐitlǇ saǇs that: ͚… the moral imperative, which is a proposition 
commanding duty, from which the capacity for putting others under obligation, that 
is, the concept of a right [emphasis mine] caŶ afteƌǁaƌds ďe eǆpliĐated͛.337 
Consequently, my view is that, even though Kant does not systematically deploy the 
teƌŵs ͚das ‘eĐht deƌ MeŶsĐhheit͛, oƌ ͚das ƌeĐht deƌ MeŶsĐheŶ͛, iŶto his opus, the 
ĐoŶĐept of ͚huŵaŶ ƌight͛ is Ŷot totallǇ aďseŶt fƌoŵ it. This is a crucial point, given 
that it allows for the legitimate formulation of the new theory of rights inspired by 
the original Kantian opus. 
Moƌeoǀeƌ, I agƌee ǁith FliksĐhuh͛s ƌejeĐtioŶ of the ͚iŶŶate ƌight to fƌeedoŵ͛ as 
the foundation of human rights. As has been pointed out in the current literature, 
the iŶŶate ƌight ĐaŶŶot gƌouŶd aŶǇ positiǀe ďodǇ of laǁs as it is just ͚a foƌŵal 
pƌesuppositioŶ of the possiďilitǇ of suďstaŶtiǀe doĐtƌiŶe of aĐƋuiƌed ƌights.͛338 The 
idea of ͚ƌight͛ iŶ the DoĐtƌiŶe of ‘ight, in general, has an undoubtedly formalistic 
character; that is to say, it refers to a formal relation between (two or more) 
peƌsoŶs. The foƌŵalistiĐ ĐhaƌaĐteƌ of the KaŶtiaŶ ͚iŶŶate ƌight to fƌeedoŵ͛ has ďeeŶ 
explained in the previous section, when I discussed ‘ispteiŶ͛s aĐĐouŶt. Heƌe, I ďƌieflǇ 
mention that the innate right to freedom is an original, or a natural, right that 
Đoeǆists ǁith otheƌ peoples͛ ƌespeĐtiǀe iŶŶate ƌights to fƌeedoŵ iŶ a formalistic way 
(in accordance with a universal law of nature). Eventually, in 6:380 in the 
Metaphysics of Morals, Kant validates the aforementioned claim by arguing that: 
͚the doĐtƌiŶe of ƌight dealt oŶlǇ ǁith the formal condition of outer freedom (the 
consistency of outer freedom with itself if its maxim were made universal law), that 
is, with right͛ [ďold iŶ the oƌigiŶal].339 Apparently, under this formalistic 
uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of the KaŶtiaŶ ͚iŶŶate ƌight to fƌeedoŵ͛, oŶe ĐaŶŶot legitiŵatelǇ 
suggest it as the foundation of any substantive positive body of law. 
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Neǀeƌtheless, I disagƌee ǁith FliksĐhuh͛s uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of KaŶt as aŶ anti-
foundationalist, in general. It seems that Flikschuh has been influenced by Rawls and 
O͛Neill, ǁho haǀe geŶeƌallǇ iŶsisted, thƌoughout theiƌ philosophiĐal ǁoƌks, oŶ a 
constructivist iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ of KaŶt͛s aĐĐouŶt of ŵoƌal oďligatioŶ aŶd pƌaĐtiĐal 
reason.340 According to constructivism –which is used here as a synonym for ͚aŶti-
fouŶdatioŶalisŵ͛– there are answers to moral questions not because there are moral 
truths or facts, but because there are correct procedures for arriving at them.341 On 
the contrary, I am closer to Wood͛s ƌealist appƌoaĐh to KaŶt, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to ǁhiĐh 
KaŶt͛s ƌealisŵ opposes the ideŶtifiĐatioŶ of the ŵoƌal tƌuth ǁith aŶǇ ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ.342 
The reasons why I consider Kant as a foundationalist or moral realist, rather than a 
constructivist philosopher, are discussed in chapter 4. 
UltiŵatelǇ, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to FliksĐhuh͛s ͚tƌaŶsĐeŶdeŶtal huŵaŶ ƌights ĐoŶĐeptioŶ͛, 
human rights are things in which we cannot help believing. My principal concern is 
whether such a necessary idea of human rights, resembling the idea of God, as 
Flikschuh claims, could easily be adopted and respected by all people around the 
world. I am afraid that such a task would be understood in most cases as one more 
imposition of Western values to the non-Western world.  
 
4. Towards a new (Kantian) duty-based justification of human rights 
After the examination and the evaluation of the three most popular contemporary 
Kantian accounts for the justification of human rights based on: 1) the notion of 
huŵaŶ digŶitǇ; ϮͿ the ͚iŶŶate ƌight to fƌeedoŵ͛; aŶd ϯͿ a transcendental 
understanding of human rights, I conclude that none of them can legitimately be 
proposed as the genuine basis of human rights. One could argue that there might 
not eventually be a truly Kantian theory of human rights. For instance, Andrea 
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Sangiovanni claims that there cannot be a genuine Kantian theory of human rights or 
a genuine Kantian justificatory theory for them, for three main reasons.343  
First, Sangiovanni claims that the Kantian human dignity cannot be the basis 
of human rights because, within the Kantian system in general, the moral notion of 
huŵaŶ digŶitǇ ͚goǀeƌŶs the ĐhaƌaĐteƌ of ouƌ iŶteƌŶal attitudes, ƌeasoŶs, aŶd aĐtioŶ. 
It does Ŷot goǀeƌŶ the ͞eǆteƌŶal͟ doŵaiŶ of ‘ight ǁhiĐh sets liŵits to ouƌ aĐtioŶs ďut 
remains silent on the character of our reasons or attitudes towards those actions or 
toǁaƌds the laǁ goǀeƌŶiŶg those aĐtioŶs͛.344 Second, Sangiovanni argues that the 
KaŶtiaŶ ͚iŶŶate ƌight to fƌeedoŵ͛ ĐaŶŶot ďe the basis of human rights not only 
because it is a formalistic right, as Flikschuh claims, but also because human rights 
must be directly and externally imposable in a way that the innate right, or the rights 
derived directly from the innate right, cannot be. In sum, Sangiovanni argues that 
the innate right cannot be the basis of human rights since its imposition against 
foreign states would count as a unilateral act.345 Third, Sangiovanni claims that 
FliksĐhuh͛s tƌaŶsĐeŶdeŶtal uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of huŵaŶ ƌights is Ŷot appƌopƌiate, 
basically because of the fact that her idea of human rights, as a transcendental 
ĐoŶĐept, ͚takes us too faƌ aǁaǇ fƌoŵ huŵaŶ ƌights pƌaĐtiĐe͛.346 
 I generally agƌee ǁith “aŶgioǀaŶi͛s Đlaiŵs. More specifically, dignity belongs 
to the internal domain of morality which is indeed distinct from the external domain 
of law. In 4:434-435, Kant eǆpliĐitlǇ saǇs that digŶitǇ is aŶ ͚iŶŶeƌ͛ ǀalue, that is, a 
value belonging to the internal domain of morality. He ǁƌites: ͚… but that which 
constitutes the condition under which alone something can be an end in itself has 
not merely a relative worth, that is, a price, but an inner worth, that is, dignity.347 
Further, it is true that the Kantian notion of the ͚iŶŶate ƌight to fƌeedoŵ͛ ĐaŶŶot ďe 
the basis of human rights not only because of what has already been mentioned 
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above, namely that is a formalistic right, but also because, as Sangiovanni points out, 
the innate right to freedom typically belongs to the state of nature. Kant writes in 
ϲ:Ϯϯϳ iŶ the IŶtƌoduĐtioŶ to the DoĐtƌiŶe of ‘ight: ͚AŶ iŶŶate ƌight is that ǁhiĐh 
belongs to everyone by nature independently of any act that would establish a 
ƌight͛.348 But in the state of nature, wills are permitted to be imposed unilaterally, 
contrary to the rightful civil condition, in which human rights are located, that 
creates and requires an omnilateral will. Finally, I agree with Sangiovanni that 
FliksĐhuh͛s tƌaŶscendental understanding of human rights is not appropriate 
because of the fact that such an idea of human rights is far away from the human 
rights practice. 
 Neǀeƌtheless, eǀeŶ though I geŶeƌallǇ agƌee ǁith “aŶgioǀaŶŶi͛s particular 
claims against the grounding of rights: 1) in the Kantian moral concept of human 
dignity, 2) in the Kantian innate right to freedom, and 3) in Kantian transcendental 
terms, I do not agree with his general claim that there cannot be a truly Kantian 
theory of human rights, or a genuine Kantian justification for them. I am convinced 
that there is still room in the Kantian opus for the formulation of a truly Kantian 
justification of human rights capable of overcoming the obstacles arising from all the 
aforementioned (Kantian and non-Kantian) justificatory accounts which have been 
examined in the first three chapters of the thesis. I epigrammatically mention some 
of the problems of these accounts:  
1. Some accounts for the justification of human rights (e.g. GƌiffiŶ͛s aĐĐouŶt) 
encounter problems with respect to human beings who lack the capacity to 
act as autonomous moral agents, e.g. children. 
2. Also, GƌiffiŶ͛s aĐĐouŶt is focused only on the concept of ͚agency͛, ignoring 
that there are also other factors when judging that an act is a violation of a 
human right, e.g. pain. 
3. The super-pluralist accounts favouring the plurality of elements (e.g. goods 
and interests-based accounts) produce such a broad list of human rights, 
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which might eventually turn into human rights everything I may require for 
my personal well-being, e.g. being friends with Alice Oswald.  
4. On the contrary, the accounts favouring a minimum number of elements to 
be taken into consideration in the construction of a human ƌights͛ 
justificatory theory (e.g. the basic needs accounts) ignore the fact that a 
number of other significant rights, such as civil and political rights, remain 
unsupported within such a constrained justificatory context, e.g. the right to 
a fair trial. 
5. Also, ďǇ usiŶg the laŶguage of ͚fuŶĐtioŶiŶgs͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ the laŶguage of 
͚Đapaďilities͛, the ŵaiŶ pƌoďleŵ of Nussďauŵ͛s aĐĐouŶt–which also appears 
in the agency approach above– is the devaluation of children, the mentally 
disabled, comatose patients, and so on. 
6. Further, soŵe politiĐal aĐĐouŶts, foƌ eǆaŵple ‘aǁls͛s aĐĐouŶt, have been 
formulated exclusively upon the model of Western liberal democracies, 
ignoring the fact that not all countries in the world are liberal democracies. 
7. Some other state-ďased aĐĐouŶts, foƌ eǆaŵple ‘az͛s aĐĐouŶt, ignore the fact 
that in many cases today states do not have the means or the volition to 
protect human rights. 
8. Also, some practice-ďased aĐĐouŶts, foƌ eǆaŵple Beitz͛s aĐĐouŶt, overlook 
the fact that the current deep confusion concerning the use of human rights 
in practice indicates a deeper confusion about their meaning; so that one 
should start from analyzing the concept of human rights, and then move on 
to the examination of their practice.   
9. AdditioŶallǇ, soŵe justifiĐatioŶs, suĐh as Beitz͛s justifiĐatioŶ, haǀe ďeeŶ 
constructed upon the idea that human rights apply only to modern societies; 
but apparently not all people in the world live in societies with modern 
characteristics; for instance, there are still many un-contacted tribes in the 
world.   
10. Also, some other accounts, for example the overlapping consensus 
justifications, ignore the fact that not all people in the world share the same 
idea of human rights, human dignity etc. 
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11. Overall, most of the practice-based accounts for the justification of human 
rights overlook the fact that international practice is ailing today; hence any 
justification based on ailing grounds cannot be a successful one. 
12. Further, some dignity-based accounts have been formulated without a 
previously thorough conceptual analysis of the abstract and vague concept of 
huŵaŶ digŶitǇ ;e.g. WaldƌoŶ͛s aŶd Tasioulas͛s aĐĐouŶtsͿ 
13. Also, the justificatory accounts based on the status concept of dignity with 
ƌefeƌeŶĐes to aƌistoĐƌaĐǇ, foƌ eǆaŵple WaldƌoŶ͛s aĐĐouŶt, cannot be applied 
in the post-Enlightenment world, of which the central ideal and goal is the 
civil, political, social, and economic equality of people. 
14. IŶ additioŶ, WaldƌoŶ͛s legal status concept of the dignity of citizens cannot by 
definition guarantee human rights for all people, e.g. immigrants, refugees, 
the ͚apatƌides͛, those ǁho liǀe iŶ ĐouŶtƌies ǁhiĐh haǀe Ŷot the ĐhaƌaĐteƌistiĐs 
of a democracy, those who live in non-democratic countries, those who still 
live in isolated jungle tribes in the world, and so on. 
15. Moreover, some religious accounts for the justification of human rights, for 
example the traditional Catholic one, ignore the fact that many people are 
atheists, that is, persons who do not share a religious worldview. Also, there 
are many people who are followers of other than the Jewish-Christian 
religious tradition, or who are committed to an approach to human rights 
that favors a multi-faith society. 
16. Also, the religious accounts, according to which the value of dignity is 
indiscriminately accorded to all human beings, including embryos from the 
moment of conception, are also problematic, for example in cases of a high-
risk pregnancy. 
17. Furthermore, the ͚mainstream͛ Kantian argument according to which human 
rights are grounded in the Kantian moral concept of human dignity is flawed 
because Kantian human dignity is mistakenly interpreted as an intrinsic value 
possessed by the right-holders. Rather dignity is an inner value and feeling 
possessed by and attributed to duty-bearers (see further chapter 4). 
18. Also, the ŵaiŶ pƌoďleŵ of the KaŶtiaŶ ŶotioŶ of the ͚iŶŶate ƌight to fƌeedoŵ͛ 
;see foƌ iŶstaŶĐe ‘ipsteiŶ͛s aĐĐouŶtͿ as the foundation of human rights is that 
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this right is too formalistic to guarantee a substantive legislation of (moral) 
human rights. 
19. In addition, the concept of freedom cannot be the basis of human rights, as it 
cannot by definition guarantee a society without conflicts in which all live in 
harmony. 
20. Also, FlikshĐuh͛s transcendental approach based on a constructivist and anti-
foundationalist reading of Kant is mistaken. Even if there are some 
constructivist elements in the Kantian opus, several other passages do not 
leave room for characterizing him as an anti-foundationalist. 
21. Finally, a tƌaŶsĐeŶdeŶtal uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of huŵaŶ ƌights, suĐh as FliksĐhuh͛s, 
overlooks the fact that such an account could hardly be adopted and 
respected by all people around the world.  
All these problems do open up an interesting question for me to investigate the 
philosophical foundations of human (and socioeconomic) rights further. In the 
following chapter, a new (Kantian) duty-based justification is presented, capable of 
overcoming the aforementioned obstacles. More specifically, this new foundation 
aims to provide the basis through which: 
1. All, normal adult human beings, embryos, babies, children, the comatose, the 
ŵeŶtallǇ disaďled, iŵŵigƌaŶts, ƌefugees, the ͚apatƌides͛, the poor, 
homosexuals, bisexuals, transsexuals, those who live in countries which have 
not the characteristics of a democracy, those who live in non-democratic 
countries, those who still live in isolated jungle tribes in the world, possible 
future human beings, animals, plants, the environment, even beings from 
outer space to be protected. 
2. Not only our civil and political, but also our socioeconomic rights can be and 
are protected. 
3. The protection of human rights is not to be constrained to Western liberal 
democracies or to societies which have modern characteristics.  
4. The idea of human rights can be acceptable by all people around the world. 
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5. All people, including those who live in states which do not have the means or 
the volition to protect human rights, can be effectively protected. 
6. A solution for the so-Đalled ͚haƌd Đases͛ iŶ laǁ, e.g. abortion, euthanasia etc., 
can be found. 
7. A substantive positive body of laws can be developed afterwards. 
8. The theory and the practice of human rights can come closer to each other. 
In what follows I turn my attention to what I see as the ideal starting point of this 
new (Kantian) duty-based justification of human and socioeconomic rights, namely 
to the Kantian supreme principle of morality, that is, to the moral concept of 
͚autoŶoŵǇ of the ǁill͛, as it is presented by Kant in 4:440 in the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals.349   
 
5. ͚Autonomy of the will͛: a conceptual analysis 
The Kantian autonomy of the will is officially introduced in 4:440 in the Groundwork 
of the Metaphysics of Morals. KaŶt ǁƌites: ͚AutoŶoŵǇ of the ǁill is the property of 
the will by which it is a law to itself (independently of any property of the objects of 
volition). The principle of autonomy is, therefore: to choose only in such a way that 
the maxims of your choice are also included as universal law in the same 
ǀolitioŶ...͛350 Kant does not only describe (yet not coherently and to its full extent) 
the moral principle of autonomy, as the ͚supƌeŵe pƌiŶĐiple of ŵoƌalitǇ͛, in 4:440, in 
the Groundwork, in which he provides the ͚offiĐial͛ defiŶitioŶ of it. He also mentions 
the supreme principle of morality in 5:33, in the Second Critique. There Kant 
ĐoŶsideƌs autoŶoŵǇ to ďe ͚the only possible principle that is suitable for categorical 
imperatives, i.e., practical laws (which make action duties), and in general for the 
principle of morality both in judging and in applying it to the human will in 
                                                          
349 Gregor (1996), p. 89  
350 Gregor (1996), p. 89  
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deteƌŵiŶiŶg that ǁill͛.351 Kant finally states it in 4:431-2, in which the third version of 
the Categorical Imperative is formulated, namely the Formula of Autonomy (FOA). 
More specifically, in order to specify the Categorical Imperative, that is, the 
absolute requirement of the moral law which is further grounded in reason, Kant 
introduces three Formulas. In 4:421, he first introduces the Formula of Universal Law 
(FUL) according to which we act only in accordance with that maxim through which 
we can at the same time will that it become a universal law.352 He then moves on to 
4:429 in which he states that according to the Formula of Humanity (FOH), we act 
that we use humanity, whether in our own person or in the person of any other 
always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.353 Finally, in 4:431-2, 
Kant introduces the Formula of Autonomy (FOA).  
Concerning the FOA, Kant ǁƌites: ͚… the gƌouŶd of all pƌaĐtiĐal laǁgiǀiŶg lies 
(in accordance with the first principle) objectively in the rule and the form of 
universality which makes it fit to be a law (possibly a law of nature); subjectively, 
however, it lies in the end; but the subject of all ends is every rational being as an 
end in itself (in accordance with the second principle); from this there follows now 
the third practical principle of the will, as supreme condition of its harmony with 
universal practical reason, the idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving 
universal law.͛354 Also, in ϰ:ϰϯϮ, KaŶt desĐƌiďes the FOA as ͚the idea of the ǁill of 
every rational being as a ǁill giǀiŶg uŶiǀeƌsal laǁ͛.355 Apparently, the third version of 
the Categorical Imperative has been introduced by Kant in order to round up the two 
previously stated Formulas, namely the FUL and the FOH.  
One may wonder which one of the three definitions of the Kantian supreme 
principle of morality is prevalent: the one in 4:440, the 5:33 in the Second Critique, 
or the FOA. My view is that through the references to the supreme principle of 
                                                          
351Kant (2002), p.48  
352 Gregor (1996), p. 73 
353 Gregor (1996), p. 80 
354 Gregor (1996), p. 81 
355 Gregor (1996), p. 82 
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morality (autonomy) within the context of the CI, and its reference in the Second 
Critique, Kant tries to give an integrated account of autonomy as it is officially yet 
unsuccessfully defined in 4:440. Hence, it is upon this definition (in 4:440) that Kant 
has formulated the Formula of Autonomy in 4:431-2. Also, it is the definition in the 
4:440 that is further explicated by Kant in 5:33 in the Critique of Practical Reason. 
Consequently, we should not be confused between the two characterizations of 
autonomy as ͚principle͛ in 4:431-2 and 5:33, and ͚property͛ in 4:440. In any case, 
when one decides to investigate the Kantian moral concept of autonomy, her point 
of departure should be the passage in which Kant clearly gives the official, yet 
incomplete, hence unsuccessful, definition of it, that is, the 4:440 in the Groundwork 
of the Metaphysics of Morals.356  
Further, the supreme principle of morality in 4:440 is developed from the 
Categorical Imperative, namely from the imperative that – contrary to an 
hypothetical imperative which tells you what to do in order to achieve a particular 
goal– it commands duty in a categorical way; that is to say, it tells you what to do 
irrespective of an end, or goal, or a desired telos (4:414). Kant explicitly says this in 
6:383 in the Metaphysics, in which he states that autonomy is ͚… a ĐapaĐitǇ ǁhiĐh, 
though not directly perceived, is yet rightly inferred from the moral categorical 
iŵpeƌatiǀe͛.357 Ultimately, the Categorical Imperative, which refers only to beings 
with rationality and inclinations (in tension), expresses the Moral Law (4:413, 4:454-
5).358 Hence the CI may be considered as derived from the Moral Law, which, 
commanded by Pure Practical Reason, refers to all rational beings including God 
(5:31).359 Overall, the justification ͚line͛ here is the following: from pure practical 
reason, through (in this order) the Moral Law and the CI, we are led to the autonomy 
of the will. 
                                                          
356 AllisoŶ has fuƌtheƌ disĐussed the distiŶĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ autoŶoŵǇ as ͚pƌopeƌtǇ͛ aŶd autoŶoŵǇ as 
͚pƌiŶĐiple͛ iŶ AllisoŶ ;ϭϵϵϬͿ, pp. ϵϰ-106.   
357 Gregor (1996), p. 515; see also 4:414, in Gregor (1996), p. 67 
358 Gregor (1996), pp. 66, 67, 100, 101 
359 Gregor (1996), pp. 164-5. 
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Incidentally, I write the ͚Moral Law͛ with capital letters, in order to be 
distinguished from the substantive moral laws. That is to say, while Moral Law is 
developed by Pure Practical Reason, as the ultimate incentive of our moral 
judgments and actions, the moral laws in plural, such as the law according to which 
oŶe ought Ŷot to lie ;͞thou shalt Ŷot lie͟Ϳ iŶ ϰ:ϯϴϵ, aƌe stƌaightfoƌǁaƌdlǇ deƌiǀed 
from the supreme principle of morality, that is, from the autonomy of the will. Kant 
presents the Moral Law as the incentive of our moral judgments and actions in 6:480 
in the Metaphysics, iŶ ǁhiĐh he ǁƌites: ͚… aŶd so iŵplies that the laǁ itself, Ŷot the 
ĐoŶduĐt of otheƌ huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs, ŵust seƌǀe as ouƌ iŶĐeŶtiǀe͛.360 However, this does 
not mean that we must alǁaǇs ǁƌite the ͚ŵoƌal laǁ͛ ;iŶ siŶgulaƌͿ ǁith Đapital letteƌs, 
especially if we really know about what we are talking. 
Moreover, it is the Kantian autonomy of the will, as has been described 
above, which is set, in the following chapter, as the starting point of the new 
(Kantian) duty-based justification of human and socioeconomic rights. The reasons 
why the autonomy of the will, as it is stated in 4:440, in the Groundwork, is set as the 
starting point for the new justification of rights are, in effect, the following two. First, 
Kant is, above all, a moral philosopher, so that, even if there is not an explicit 
justificatory theory of rights in his opus, I am convinced that if he had to formulate 
one, he would consider rights as moral rights, and he would set as the starting point 
of his justification the cornerstone of his ethics, that is, the moral concept of 
autonomy of the will. Second, and most importantly, as it is clearly shown in the 
following chapter, the autonomy of the will allows for the derivation of external 
duties, which are the conditio sine qua non in the case of human (and 
socioeconomic) rights, in the sense that these rights typically belong to the ͚external 
domain of law͛, rather to the ͚internal domain of morality͛. This is further explained 
in chapter 4.  
Now, the fact that the Kantian supreme principle of morality, namely the 
autonomy of the will, is set as the starting point for the justification of rights, does 
Ŷot ŵeaŶ that the ͚justifiĐatoƌǇ liŶe͛ foƌ ƌights stops, or is cut, at the autonomy of the 
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will; in other words, the autonomy of the will is not the ultimate source of rights. 
While the supreme principle of morality may be seen as the starting point for the 
justification of moral rights in Kantian mode, their ultimate source is the pure 
practical reason, given that the autonomy of the will itself is further grounded in the 
CI which is based on the moral law commanded by the pure practical reason (see 
above). 
Prior to setting the autonomy of the will as the starting point of the new 
duty-based account for the justification of human and socioeconomic rights, and 
showing how from the former we are led to the latter (chapter 4), we have to deal 
with two problems: first, there is not an explicit Kantian human rights justificatory 
account and, second, the moral concept of autonomy remains obscure within the 
Kantian opus. The first issue shall be discussed thoroughly in the following chapter, 
iŶ ǁhiĐh a KaŶtiaŶ ;Ŷot KaŶt͛sͿ justifiĐation, or a justification of rights in Kantian 
mode, or a justification inspired by the Kantian opus, is developed. In the present 
chapter, I focus on the second issue, namely on the obscurity and vagueness of the 
Kantian supreme principle of morality. The Kantian autonomy is considered 
problematic by many authors and Kant scholars.361 There are indeed many 
interpretations of it. In what follows, I present the two most dominant conceptions 
of autonomy in the modern literature. 
Fiƌst, a Ŷuŵďeƌ of ŵodeƌŶ sĐholaƌs ĐoŶĐeiǀe of autoŶoŵǇ as iŶdiǀiduals͛ 
freedom to do what they want, or to act as they see fit. In this case, autonomy is 
identified with sheer independence or freedom from coercion. For example, Gerald 
Dworkin has noted that autonomy is equated with liberty, individuality, and 
independence; hence it is a desirable quality to have.362 GƌiffiŶ͛s ŶotioŶ of 
autonomy, as sketched in chapter 1, belongs to this category of interpretations. 
“peĐifiĐallǇ, GƌiffiŶ͛s ŶotioŶ of ͚Ŷoƌŵatiǀe ageŶĐǇ͛ is desĐƌiďed as peoples͛ ĐapaĐitǇ to 
choose and pursue their own conception of a worthwhile life.363 Griffin then argues 
                                                          
361 See for instance Wood (2008) 
362 Dworkin, G. (1988). The Theory and Practice of Autonomy. Cambridge University Press, 6 
363 Griffin (2008), ch. 2 
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that the ƌealizatioŶ of Ŷoƌŵatiǀe ageŶĐǇ depeŶds oŶ ͚peƌsoŶhood͛, oŶe of the ŵain 
ĐhaƌaĐteƌistiĐs of ǁhiĐh is the ŶotioŶ of ͚autoŶoŵǇ͛, that is, oŶe͛s ĐapaĐitǇ to Đhoose 
oŶe͛s oǁŶ path thƌough life.364 
However, and second, there is another conception of autonomy. Whereas 
the first interpretation of autonomy above emphasises the notions of freedom and 
independence, its second interpretation emphasises the moral principles upon which 
soŵeoŶe aĐts. O͛Neill has ƌeĐeŶtlǇ aƌgued iŶ faǀoƌ of the KaŶtiaŶ autoŶoŵǇ.365 
According to her understanding of Kant͛s autonomy, this differs significantly from 
sheer individual independence.366 O͛Neill͛s main objection is that individual 
independence does not necessarily lead to morally valuable actions; rather it may 
lead to good or bad actions, right or wrong actions, and so on.367 Therefore, she 
proposes KaŶt͛s aĐĐouŶt, as she iŶteƌpƌets it, as the tƌue ŵeaŶiŶg of the ŵoƌal 
ĐoŶĐept of autoŶoŵǇ. “peĐifiĐallǇ, she aƌgues that KaŶt ͚pƌediĐates autoŶoŵǇ Ŷot of 
agents or acts, but of the will and determinations of the will, of principles, of 
reason.368 In otheƌ ǁoƌds, O͛Neill does Ŷot see the KaŶtiaŶ autoŶoŵǇ as ƌefeƌƌiŶg to 
agents, but on principles; hence, she never speaks of autonomous agents, but of 
actions based on autonomous principles which take their justification from our own 
rational selves. EventuallǇ, O͛Neill ĐoŶĐludes that the ͚KaŶtiaŶ autoŶoŵǇ ŵust ďe a 
matter of adopting principles with a certain structure and form.͛369 
In spite of these two dominant conceptions of autonomy in the 
contemporary literature, autonomy is still unclear and indeterminate. Consequently, 
if one wanted seriously to propose a new theory of human and socioeconomic 
rights starting from the moral concept of autonomy, one should first clarify its 
                                                          
364 The other two characteristics are 1) liberty and 2) welfare; see chapter 1 of the thesis and Griffin 
(2008), p. 157 
365 O͛Neill, O. (2015), pp. 103-120. Fuƌtheƌ, oŶ the diffeƌeŶĐes ďetǁeeŶ the KaŶtiaŶ aŶd the ͚ŵodeƌŶ͛ 
views of autonomy, see: Hill, T.E. Jr (1992), pp. 76-96.   
366O͛Neill, O. (2015), pp., 104, 109.  
367 O͛Neill, O. (2015), p. 106. 
368 O͛Neill, O. (2015), p. 110. 
369 O͛Neill, O. (2015), p. 115. 
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meaning, and then move on to the formulation of the relevant argument. After the 
conceptual analysis of the Kantian autonomy via the aesthetic notion of the sublime 
below, I define autonomy in a way that differs both from its individualistic and its 
principle-based understandings above. This new understanding of autonomy will be 
the starting point for the formulation of the new (Kantian) duty-based account for 
the justification of human and socioeconomic rights in chapter 4. In what follows, I 
explain the rationale in the background of my conceptual analysis of autonomy via 
the sublime. 
To begin with, it has been noted that Kant has presented the principle of 
autonomy as involving the use of an analogy.370 For instance, Pauline Kleingeld has 
recently argued that if we examine the Kantian notion of the political autonomy in 
Naturrecht Feyerabend Lectures (1784) we will see that the moral legislator is 
actually the analogue of the political legislator who primarily gives laws to the entire 
of people in the political community including herself.371 In spite of the fact that I 
agree with the use of the analogy as a method to clarify the obscure Kantian concept 
of autonomy of the will, I disagree ǁith KleiŶgeld͛s Đlaiŵ that the moral agent, or 
legislator, or politician, or judge primarily gives law to others including herself. 
Rather, I do see the ŵoƌal ageŶt͛s/legislatoƌ͛s/politiĐiaŶ͛s/judge͛s subjective 
autonomy and her maxims, as well as the question ͚ǁhat is the right thiŶg to do?͛, 
as the starting points of her legislation, which, through the notion of ͚sensus 
communis͛, is further universalized. As Kant mentions in 6:480 in the Metaphysics, 
͚… iŶ the subjective autonomy of each huŵaŶ͛s ďeiŶg pƌaĐtiĐal ƌeasoŶ aŶd so iŵplies 
that the law itself, not the conduct of other human beings, must serve as our 
iŶĐeŶtiǀe͛ [italiĐs added].372  
Hoǁeǀeƌ, eǀeŶ though I do Ŷot agƌee ǁith KleiŶgeld͛s staƌtiŶg poiŶt of the 
relevant legislation, I do consider her effort to shed light on Kantian moral autonomy 
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371 See Delfosse, H.P., Hinske, N., Bordoni, G.S. (2014); also, Kleingeld (2018) 
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via an examination of Kantian political autonomy as significant. Her argument is not 
developed and discussed here to its full extent, however I do stress the attention she 
gives to the ŵethod of ͚aŶalogǇ͛. AŶalogǇ is aŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt tool ǁithiŶ the KaŶtiaŶ 
opus in general. The reason why analogy is important for Kant is that for empirical 
concepts, and concepts of understanding, one can give examples and schemas, 
respectively, in order to be understood. For example, when the Aztecs first came 
across a horse, they thought it was a deer (empirical concept). Nevertheless, this 
does not apply to rational ideas of reason, which can be understood only indirectly 
via analogy. Kant writes in A145/B185 in the Critique of Pure Reason that ͚the 
schemata of the concepts of pure understanding are the true and sole condition for 
pƌoǀidiŶg theŵ ǁith a ƌelatioŶ to oďjeĐts͛.373 But rational ideas of reason can be 
grasped only through an analogy, which, Kant says in 4:357-8 in the Prolegomena, 
͚does Ŷot sigŶifǇ, as the ǁoƌd is usuallǇ takeŶ, aŶ iŵpeƌfeĐt siŵilaƌitǇ of tǁo thiŶgs, 
but rather a perfect similarity between two ƌelatioŶs iŶ ǁhollǇ dissiŵilaƌ thiŶgs͛.374 
As an example, Kant there mentions the analogy between the legal relation of 
human actions and the mechanical relation of moving forces, according to which 
nothing can I do to another without giving him the right to do the same to me under 
the same conditions. 
I think such a perfect similarity between two relations in wholly dissimilar 
thiŶgs is sigŶified ďetǁeeŶ KaŶt͛s ŵoƌal ĐoŶĐept of autonomy and his aesthetic 
notion of the sublime. As Kleingeld, I do also favour an analogy, yet not an analogy 
ďetǁeeŶ KaŶt͛s ͚ŵoralitǇ aŶd politiĐs͛, but an analogy between his ͚ŵoralitǇ aŶd 
aesthetiĐs͛, which has further significant legal and political implications (see chapter 
5). Within this context, in order to shed light on the Kantian obscure moral concept 
of the autoŶoŵǇ of the ǁill, I foĐus oŶ KaŶt͛s aesthetiĐ ĐategoƌǇ of the suďliŵe, aŶd 
examine the analogy between them. That is to say, I use the sublime as a tool to 
reveal through its examination the true meaning of autonomy. Consequently, the 
discussion of the sublime in the thesis is not intended as a contribution to the 
debates in the Kantian literature on the sublime, but as more limited to the purposes 
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of the thesis. What also must be stressed at this point is that the analogy between 
the autonomy and the sublime is something that has not yet been investigated by 
Kant scholars. The main reason why this research has not yet been done is that, with 
few exceptions, e.g. Paul Guyer and Henry Allison,375 most Kant scholars today focus 
oŶ KaŶt͛s ŵoƌal, legal, aŶd politiĐal philosophǇ, sidesteppiŶg his aesthetiĐ theoƌǇ. 
But KaŶt͛s aesthetiĐ philosophǇ is, iŶ ŵǇ ǀieǁ, ǀaluaďle iŶ oƌdeƌ to uŶdeƌstaŶd the 
other disciplines in his opus. Thus, I strongly believe that more attention should be 
paid to KaŶt͛s Critique of Judgment. In her LeĐtuƌes oŶ KaŶt͛s PolitiĐal Philosophy, 
Hannah Arendt has argued that:  
͚… the topiĐs of the Critique of Judgment – … the faĐultǇ of judgŵeŶt as the 
faĐultǇ of ŵaŶ͛s ŵiŶd to deal ǁith it; soĐiaďilitǇ of ŵeŶ as the ĐoŶditioŶ of 
the functioning of this faculty, that is, the insight that men are dependent on 
their fellow men not only because of their having a body and physical needs 
but precisely for their mental faculties – these topics, all of them of eminent 
political significant – that is, important for the political – were concerns of 
Kant long before he finally, after finishing the critical business (das kritische 
Geschaft), turned to them when he was old͛.376 
 
What AƌeŶdt has effeĐtiǀelǇ aƌgued is that KaŶt͛s aesthetiĐ theoƌǇ ŵight ďe 
seen as his real political philosophy. This is a strong claim which is discussed in the 
last Đhapteƌ of the thesis. Heƌe I oŶlǇ poiŶt out that AƌeŶdt͛s ǀieǁ ĐoŶĐeƌŶiŶg the 
relation between the Kantian ethics and politics is exaggerated. That is to say, it 
cannot legitimately be claimed that the author of the Metaphysics of Morals and the 
Perpetual Peace has not actually written a genuine political work. However, it is true 
to soŵe eǆteŶt that KaŶt͛s aesthetiĐ theoƌǇ has sigŶifiĐaŶt politiĐal, ŵoƌal, aŶd legal 
connotations. My claim then is ŵoƌe ŵodest thaŶ AƌeŶdt͛s. Moƌe speĐifiĐallǇ, I argue 
that thƌough KaŶt͛s aesthetic theory, and the aesthetic category of the sublime, in 
particular, we can understand in more depth his moral philosophy –especially his 
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obscure and abstract concept of the autonomy of the will. Before the conceptual 
analysis of the Kantian moral concept of autonomy through the Kantian aesthetic 
ĐategoƌǇ of the suďliŵe, I iŶtƌoduĐe KaŶt͛s ͚suďliŵe͛ as it is deǀeloped iŶ the Critique 
of Judgment, in Book II, in the Analytic of the sublime, especially in paragraphs: 23-
29.377 
 
ϱ.ϭ KaŶt͛s aesthetiĐ ĐategoƌǇ of the suďliŵe 
The modern interest in the sublime has been awakened in ϭϲϳϰ ďǇ NiĐolas Boileau͛s 
tƌaŶslatioŶ of LoŶgiŶus͛s tƌeatise Peri Hypsous [On the Sublime].378 Apart from 
LoŶgiŶus͛s tƌeatise aŶd Boileau͛s tƌaŶslatioŶ of it, oŶe of the ŵost iŶflueŶtial teǆts 
ƌegaƌdiŶg the aesthetiĐ ĐategoƌǇ of the suďliŵe ǁas Buƌke͛s, A Philosophical Inquiry 
into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful.379 Burke was the first 
who emphasized the main difference between the beautiful and the sublime; that is 
to say, the fact that, contrary to the former, which involves a calm feeling, the latter 
involves terror as its ruling principle, yet a kind of terror viewed as a delight felt at a 
distance and in safety.380 I will return to this in much greater detail below. Now, I 
focus on Kant who, following Burke, has thoroughly analyzed the sublime.  
While in the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime,381 and 
in some other works,382 Kant only sporadically refers to the sublime, it is, in effect, in 
the Critique of Judgment that he works systematically on it.383 More specifically, 
according to Kant, the aesthetic category of the sublime has the following nine 
characteristics: 1) It is a reflective judgment; 2) it is an aesthetic judgment; 3) it is a 
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disinterested judgment; 4) it concerns not only the form of the object, but it can also 
be found in a formless object; ϱͿ it ĐoŶtaiŶs a ͚high (counter)purposiveness without 
purpose͛; 6) it is a judgment which has universal validity; 7) its universality is based, 
in particular, on the notion of ͚ĐoŵŵoŶ seŶse͛; 8) it is a feeling of pleasure and 
displeasure; 9) in the judgment and feeling of the sublime, the dignity of humanity 
in our own person is reflected. In what follows, I discuss all these nine elements. 
1. Initially, in several passages in the Critique of Judgment, Kant claims that the 
sublime is a reflective judgment.384 Kant describes, in particular, the judgment of 
reflection in the Introduction of the Critique of Judgment, where he writes: 
͚JudgŵeŶt iŶ geŶeƌal is the aďilitǇ to thiŶk the paƌtiĐulaƌ as ĐoŶtaiŶed uŶdeƌ 
the universal. If the universal (the rule, principle, law) is given, then 
judgment, which subsumes the particular under it, is determinate (even 
though [in its role] as transcendental judgment it states a priori the 
conditions that must be met for subsumption under that universal to be 
possible). But if only the particular is given and judgment has to find the 
universal for it, then this power is merely reflective.͛385     
Consequently, contrary to a judgment of sense, or a logically determinate 
judgment, the sublime is, iŶ KaŶt͛s ǀieǁ, a reflective judgment, in which only the 
particular is given, and the relevant judgment has to ͚find͛ the universal for it. That is 
to say, the refleĐtiǀe judgŵeŶt of the suďliŵe ĐoŶsists of a ͚ďottoŵ-up͛ ŵoǀeŵeŶt, 
that is, from a movement from the particular to the universal. As it shall be explained 
in more detail below, this reflective judgment of the sublime consists in the 
autonomy of the subject who, judging about a (simultaneous) feeling of pleasure and 
displeasure in a given (particular) representation, she makes a demand for 
eǀeƌǇoŶe͛s (universal) agreement with her judgment. That is to say, it is the 
autonomous subject who, exercising her lawgiving function of morality, judges 
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about a feeling of pleasure and displeasure in a given representation, and, at the 
same time, makes a deŵaŶd foƌ eǀeƌǇoŶe͛s assent to her judgment.386  
2. In addition, the sublime is according to Kant an aesthetic judgment. That is to say, 
it is not a cognitive, and so a logical judgment, namely a judgment in which the 
subject uses understanding to refer the presentation to the object so as to give rise 
to cognition. Rather, it is a judgmeŶt iŶ ǁhiĐh suďjeĐt͛s likiŶg oƌ adŵiƌiŶg of the 
object does not depend on a determinate concept, but on her free play of 
imagination and reason. Hence the sublime is an aesthetic judgment, or a judgment 
of taste, by which it is meant a judgment whose basis is subjective.387 
3. However, even though the sublime is an aesthetic judgment, whose basis is 
subjective, it is not mingled with the least interest; hence it is a pure disinterested 
judgment of taste, or a merely contemplative, that is, a reflective judgment, 
indifferent to the existence of the object.388 Eventually, similarly to the beautiful, the 
sublime is liked or admired for its own sake.  
4. Further, this liking or admiring by the subject, in the view of the sublime, 
refers, in principle, to a formless object. Kant claims that the sublime does not 
concern only the form of the object, as in the case of the beautiful,389 but it can also 
refer to a formless object, insofar as we present unboundedness; yet adding to this 
unboundedness the thought of its totality. Within this context, the sublime is 
ƌegaƌded as ͚the eǆhiďitioŶ of aŶ iŶdeteƌŵiŶate ĐoŶĐept of ƌeasoŶ͛, that is to say, it is 
not contained in a specific form, but it concerns ideas of reason arising to our minds 
in an inadequate manner, namely in a way that transcends our mental powers.390  
Kant here mentions as an example the vast ocean, which he does not actually 
call sublime, but he does think it is suitable for exhibiting sublimity in our minds.391 
Kant does not seem to pay too much attention to the sublimity in art. However, he 
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does leave room for arguing that the sublime can refer not only to nature, but also 
to aƌtǁoƌks. This is eǀideŶt ďǇ his ƌefeƌeŶĐes to the PǇƌaŵids iŶ EgǇpt aŶd “t. Peteƌ͛s 
Basilica in Rome as characteristic examples of the aesthetic category of the 
sublime.392 Consequently, it cannot be said that the sublime is excluded by Kant from 
the domain of art.393  
Incidentally, based on KaŶt͛s notion of the sublime, Schiller emphasises the 
sublime in art. For Schiller, not only the natural phenomena, but also the artworks 
reveal the sublime to the subject.394 More recently, Adorno has argued that in order 
to analyse every modernist art movement, we must focus on the sublime. Within 
this context, Adorno uses the Kantian language of the sublime when he talks about 
an authentic work of art.395 FiŶallǇ, iŶspiƌed ďǇ KaŶt͛s Critique of Judgment, Lyotard 
has achieved the revival of the interest in the subliŵe iŶ aƌt iŶ the ϴϬ͛s;396 so that, a 
number of post-modern artists, today, e.g. Mike Kelly and Cindy Sherman, have 
extensively used formlessness as a tool for creativity, not to straightforwardly 
elevate art, as in the case of the aesthetic category of the ͚ďeautiful͛, ďut to eleǀate 
it in a different manner, that is, through its derogation or humiliation (sublime).397 
 
5. Even though the aesthetic judgment of the sublime is a disinterested judgment of 
taste, it still gives rise to an interest. Hence, it is considered to be subjectively 
purposive without a presupposed presentation of a purpose (either objective or 
subjective).398 This is so, because, as Kant says, we can explain and grasp the object 
only if we assume that it is based on a causality operating in accordance with 
purpose. However, contrary to the beautiful, the aesthetic judgment of the sublime 
is said by Kant to contain not just a plain ͚purposiveness without purpose͛, but, since 
the judgment refers to a terrifying formless object, the sublime is said to contain a 
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kiŶd of ͚ĐouŶteƌ-puƌposiǀeŶess͛. This is iŶ effeĐt the ƌeasoŶ ǁhǇ KaŶt does Ŷot Đall 
the object itself as sublime, since the counter-purposiveness cannot be liked. But 
only our idea of it is called sublime, which is felt as purposive; hence the object is 
eventually admired.  
This counter-purposiveness without purpose is what Kant calls high 
(counter)purposiveness without purpose, as it is a purposiveness which does not 
consist in the harmony between the imagination and understanding, as in the case 
of ďeautiful, ďut iŶ a ͚sui geŶeƌis͛ haƌŵoŶǇ ďased oŶ a ĐoŶtƌast aŶd ĐoŶfliĐt, that is, 
the harmony between imagination and reason.399 This high purposiveness without 
purpose is the result of the fact that in the sublime, whose sight is horrible, our 
͚ŵiŶd is iŶduĐed to aďaŶdoŶ seŶsiďilitǇ aŶd oĐĐupǇ itself ǁith ideas ĐoŶtaiŶiŶg a 
higheƌ puƌposiǀeŶess͛, that is, ǁith ideas of reason, such as the idea of freely 
realizing our humanité.400 This is particularly the role attributed to the third Critique 
by Kant, namely its ŵediatioŶ to ƌesolǀe the ͚dispute͛ ďetǁeeŶ the ideas of 
͚ŶeĐessitǇ͛ aŶd ͚fƌeedoŵ͛ iŶ the fiƌst aŶd the second Critiques, respectively. In that 
sense, the aesthetic judgment of the sublime resembles a pure moral judgment, that 
is, a judgment about the good –in spite of the fact that the concept of the ͚good͛ 
presupposes an ͚objective purposiveness͛, i.e. it presupposes, as Kant says, that we 
refer the object to a determinate purpose; while what determines the aesthetic 
judgment is not a concept but a feeling (of the inner sense).401 
6. Moreover, when someone consciously and without any interest judges something 
as sublime, then he cannot help judging, or necessarily judges, that the object is also 
judged as sublime by everyone else.402 The sublime has a necessary reference to 
liking or admiring. This kind of necessity has neither a theoretical character allowing 
us to cognize a priori that everyone will feel this liking, nor a practical character 
where the liking is the necessary consequence of an objective law, according to 
which one ought to act in a certain way. Instead, it is an exemplary necessity, that is, 
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a necessity of the agreement of all with an aesthetic judgment which is regarded as 
an example of a universal rule that we are unable to state.403 Here, Kant points out 
that ǁheŶ the suďliŵe aƌises iŶ oŶe͛s ŵiŶd, oŶe Ŷot oŶlǇ presupposes that everyone 
else judges in the same way, but she also requires the same judgment from all 
others. Her judgment is then required to be not only hers, ďut eǀeƌǇoŶe else͛s 
judgment as well. Hence, she speaks of the sublime as if it was a property of things 
themselves, or as something having general validity, or being public –not just a 
private feeling or personal opinion. Thus, one eventually demands that everyone else 
agrees with them.404  
Within this context, Kant argues that a judgment of sublime may be 
converted into a logical judgment based on an aesthetic one. For example, if looking 
at the ocean ǁe do Ŷot siŵplǇ saǇ that ͚this ocean is sublime to me͛ ďut ͚this ocean is 
suďliŵe͛, then our judgment is no longer merely aesthetic but is a logical judgment 
based on an aesthetic judgment, given that, contrary to the first expression, the 
second one is stated in non-subjective terms carrying with it, as Kant says, an 
aesthetic quantity of universality, that is, of validity for everyone. Hence, it 
resembles a judgment about the good in the sense that when the ocean is called 
͚sublime͛ we effectively believe that we have a ͚universal voice͛ claiming to the 
agreement of everyone.405 
This is in effect the KaŶtiaŶ ͚suďjeĐtiǀe uŶiǀeƌsal ĐoŵŵuŶiĐaďilitǇ͛ of the 
aesthetic judgments in general, namely of the aesthetic judgments of the beautiful 
and the aesthetic judgments of the sublime.406 As has been mentioned, in the case of 
the suďliŵe, iŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ, KaŶt defiŶes this ͚suďjeĐtiǀe uŶiǀeƌsal ĐoŵŵuŶiĐaďilitǇ͛ as 
the free play of imagination and reason. This special kind of subjective –not 
objective, because it does not rest on a concept as in the case of a moral 
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judgment407– universality is the ƌesult of the faĐt that oŶe͛s judgŵeŶt is Ŷot ďased 
on private conditions, or interests, or inclinations, or ideologies, and so on; so that it 
can be assumed that everyone else judges in the same way, or that the relevant 
judgment is universally valid for all subjects.408 Here the question arises as to how 
we become conscious of the reciprocal subjective harmony between our cognitive 
powers?  
The reciprocal subjective harmony, as Kant claims, reveals itself through 
sensation only. This sensation, in particular, consists of the free play of imagination 
and reason.409 Hence, when one talks about the relevant object, belonging in the 
aesthetic area of the sublime, one speaks as if the sublime was something accorded 
to the object itself, and oŶe͛s judgment is a logical judgment valid for everyone, not 
an aesthetic judgment; for example, one says that the view from the top of the 
mountain is sublime, not that one considers the view from the top of the mountain 
as sublime. Kant claims that it would be ridiculous if someone who prided himself on 
his taste tried to justify it by saying that the object is sublime for him or her.410  
7. In paƌtiĐulaƌ, KaŶt aƌgues that ͚the ĐoŶditioŶ foƌ the ŶeĐessitǇ alleged ďǇ a 
judgment of taste is the idea of a ĐoŵŵoŶ seŶse͛.411 ͚CoŵŵoŶ seŶse͛, which differs 
fƌoŵ ͚ĐoŵŵoŶ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg͛, iŶ ǁhiĐh the judgment is based on concepts, is a 
subjective principle which determines by feeling only and universal validity the liking 
or admiring. That is to say, it is a ͚shaƌed seŶse͛ ďǇ all, i.e. a judging power that in 
ƌefleĐtiŶg takes aĐĐouŶt of eǀeƌǇoŶe else͛s ǁaǇ of pƌeseŶtiŶg soŵethiŶg, in order as 
it were to compare our own judgment with human reason, so that to escape the 
illusion arising from the ease of mistaking subjective conditions for objective ones.412  
Kant describes in detail how this is done: We compare our judgments not so 
much with the actual, but rather with the possible judgments of others putting 
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ourselves in the position of others by abstracting from the limitations that attach to 
our own judging, that is, by leaving out as much as possible whatever belongs to 
sensation, and focusing more on the formal features of our presentation. Kant 
mentions three crucial elements in achieving this common sense: 1) to think without 
prejudices and superstitions, 2) to think in broad terms overriding the private 
conditions of judgment, and 3) to think repeatedly using 1) and 2).413 Eventually, 
through common or shared sense, the aesthetic judgment becomes universally 
communicable, hence a judgment with exemplary validity, that is, a rule for 
everyone.414 Consequently, whenever we make an aesthetic judgment declaring that 
something is sublime (or beautiful), we presuppose that everyone else holds the 
same opinion, or that everyone else ought to agree with our judgment, even though 
our judgment is based only on our own feeling.  
8. Further, according to Kant, the sublime is not just an aesthetic judgment, but also 
a feeling; Ǉet Ŷot a pƌiǀate feeliŶg of a seŶsatioŶ ĐoŶfiŶed to oŶe͛s oǁŶ peƌsoŶ, ďut a 
feeling arising from the public validity of a judgment. Hence Kant priorities the 
feeling and the judgment accordingly, that is, he puts the judgment first, and the 
feeling derived from it second. Kant, in particular, claims that the universal 
communicability in the given representation underlying the aesthetic judgment of 
the sublime as its subjective condition precedes the feeling derived from the 
sublime. Kant explains why the aesthetic judgment comes first:  
͚If the pleasuƌe iŶ the giǀeŶ oďjeĐt Đaŵe fiƌst, aŶd ouƌ judgŵeŶt of taste ǁeƌe 
to attƌiďute oŶlǇ the pleasuƌe͛s uŶiǀeƌsal ĐoŵŵuŶiĐaďilitǇ to the pƌeseŶtatioŶ 
of the object, then this procedure would be self-contradictory. For that kind 
of pleasure would be none other than mere agreeableness in the sensation, 
so that by its very nature it could have only private validity, because it would 
depend directly on the presentation by which the object is given͛.415 
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Eventually, the universal communicability underlying the aesthetic judgment of the 
sublime not only comes first, but also it is the basis of the feeling, in the sense that 
oŶe͛s aďilitǇ to ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate oŶe͛s mental state carries the feeling of the sublime 
with it. 
 Further, the sublime is not, as the beautiful is, a feeling of furtherance of life. 
Rather, it is an intellectual, or spiritual, mixed feeling of pleasure and displeasure, in 
the sense that the mind is repelled by a disliked object and attracted to it 
simultaneously.416 IŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ, KaŶt saǇs that the suďliŵe is a ͚feeliŶg of a 
momentary inhibition of the vital forces followed immediately by an outpouring of 
theŵ that is all the stƌoŶgeƌ͛.417 On the one hand, the displeasure arises from the 
necessary abandonment of human sensibility, as a result of the inadequacy of 
imagination in the view of a terrifying object to think the totality of sensible 
representation as given. This displeasure arises in us from a safe distance; otherwise 
the judgment can substantially lose its power. On the other hand, the pleasure arises 
from the fact that the aforementioned displeasure is balanced by the simultaneous 
disclosure of 1) our supersensible capacity manifested in the thought of a noumenon 
as supersensible substrate of appearance, and 2) our vocation of the mind to the 
͚ŵoƌal͛, that is, to ideas of ƌeasoŶ suĐh as the idea of freely realizing our humanité.418 
Eventually, becoming absolutely aware of our freedom from the constraints 
of nature, we cross the barriers of sensibility with a practical aim. Ultimately, this 
complex mental state, or feeling, consisting of a negative pleasure arising indirectly, 
resembles admiration and respect. Kant writes at the beginning of paragraph 27 in 
the Critique of Judgment: ͚The feeliŶg of ouƌ iŶĐapaĐitǇ to attaiŶ to aŶ idea that is a 
laǁ foƌ us is ƌespeĐt͛.419 Thus, in the case of the sublime, we say that the object is 
admired, or respected, rather than liked. 
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Furthermore, this mixed feeling is divided by Kant into the mathematically 
and the dynamically sublime.420 In both types of sublime, we find in our mind 
superiority over nature.421 More specifically, on the one hand, the mathematically 
sublime is the feeling arising when we are confronted with something not only large, 
but large absolutely [schlechthin, absolute], in every respect (beyond all 
comparison).422 In this case, our imagination strives to progress towards infinity, 
while our reason demands absolute totality, and so our imagination is inadequate to 
that idea. It is exactly this inadequacy that arises in us a feeling that we have within 
us a supersensible power.423 As examples of the mathematically sublime Kant lists 
the Pyramids in Egypt and “t. Peteƌ͛s BasiliĐa iŶ ‘oŵe; implying that the sublime 
does not refer only to nature, but also to art.424  
On the other hand, the dynamically425 sublime is the feeling arising in us 
when in an aesthetic judgment we consider the might nature (or art) as a power that 
cannot dominate us.426 The dynamically sublime arises in us a gladness involving our 
liďeƌatioŶ fƌoŵ the daŶgeƌ. KaŶt͛s eǆaŵples iŶ the Đase of the dǇŶaŵiĐallǇ suďliŵe 
include overhanging and threatening rocks, volcanoes, hurricanes, the boundless 
ocean, the high waterfall of a river, and so on. Kant points out that in the view of all 
these fearful phenomena of nature, or artworks, we feel attraction provided we are 
in a safe place, otherwise the aesthetic judgment of the sublime would cease to 
exist. 
 Also, oŶe of the ŵost iŵpoƌtaŶt KaŶt͛s Đlaiŵs heƌe is that, ĐoŶtƌaƌǇ to the 
beautiful, the sublime stands in more intimate relation to morality.427 All the fearful 
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objects, both in the case of the mathematically and in the case of the dynamically 
sublime, raise the fortitude of soul above its middle range allowing us to discover in 
us a moral capacity to resist the seeming omnipotence of nature or art. We 
eventually become courageous enough to believe that we are equal to Ŷatuƌe͛s oƌ 
aƌt͛s seeŵing omnipotence.428 For although we realize our own limitation and 
physical/mental impotence in the view of such immensity, at the same time we find 
in our own reason a moral power through which our initial humiliation, in front of 
the objects exceeding our middle human powers, becomes exaltation. That is to say, 
in the view of such power and enormity, we feel humiliated, yet at the same time, 
through the necessary expansion of our imagination, an ethical disposition is 
revealed in us showing our moral capacities and vocation as human beings (our 
humanité). This revealed moral capacity is, as Kant says, what keeps the humanity in 
our own person from being degraded;429 and it is, as he points out, our obligation to 
develop and exercise it further.  
Thus, the aesthetic judgment of the sublime requires cultivation.430 For, as 
Kant claims all possess this capacity. Even a savage, he says, admires a person who, 
against his own interests (of sense), judges without feeling fear and tremble, but 
with vigour and full deliberation. According to Kant, the admiration for the warrior 
has not eclipsed in the civilized society, except that now we demand the 
demonstration of some other virtues by him, such as: gentleness, sympathy, and 
care.431 Ultimately, Kant claims that it is a mistake one to worry that this 
determination, in accordance with the moral law, may result in a cold and lifeless 
approval of the moral law without any moving force or emotion. On the contrary, he 
argues, a feeliŶg of eǆaltatioŶ ƌeseŵďliŶg the feeliŶg of eŶthusiasŵ aƌises iŶ ŵaŶ͛s 
soul inducing eventually an ideal balance between the feeling of pleasure and 
displeasure.432 
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At the end of my discussion, I add one more significant aspect of the 
dynamically sublime, which is not equally stressed by Kant in his theory of the 
mathematically sublime. While the mathematically sublime mostly refers to sense, 
the Kantian dynamically sublime refers also to action. It is not by accident the fact 
that KaŶt hiŵself Đalls it ͚dǇŶaŵiĐallǇ͛ suďliŵe, and he further associates it (yet he 
does not identify it) ǁith the ŵoƌal feeliŶg of ͚ƌespeĐt͛, ǁhiĐh ďǇ definition forces us 
to action and the ƌealizatioŶ of the ͚good͛ toǁaƌds ouƌselǀes aŶd otheƌs.433 In the 
similar vein, “Đhilleƌ Đalls the KaŶtiaŶ dǇŶaŵiĐallǇ suďliŵe ͚pƌaĐtiĐallǇ͛ suďliŵe, 
arguing that this type of sublimity has more active character than the 
mathematically sublime. Through the dynamically sublime, Schiller claims, we do not 
get simply a feeling or sense of our moral autonomy, but we are also forced to the 
realization of it, that is, to the realization of our autonomy of the will, namely to the 
abandonment of our sensibility, and the (autonomously) fulfillment of our moral 
duties to oneself and others.434 Consequently, the sublime does not only provide us 
with the aesthetic awareness of what morality requires of us with respect to duties, 
but also it is an aesthetic feeling with motivating force enabling us to fulfill our moral 
duties. Hence, it could be argued that artworks in the area of the sublime have an 
edificatory role. This point could further be taken into consideration by governments 
within the context of the creation of national curriculum programmes of compulsory 
education.  
9. Finally, as Kant points out in the ͚GeŶeƌal ĐoŵŵeŶt oŶ the eǆpositioŶ of aesthetiĐ 
reflectiǀe judgŵeŶts͛, in the Critique of Judgment, while the beautiful, e.g. in 
romances and maudlin plays, make the heart lethargic and non-sensitive to the 
severe precept of duty, only the sublime makes the heart capable of respect for the 
dignity of humanity in our own person, and for the human rights of others. Kant 
writes:  
͚Every affect of the VIGOROUS KIND (i.e., which makes us conscious that we 
have forces to overcome any resistance, i.e. makes us conscious of our 
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animus strenuous) is aesthetically sublime… But an affect of the LANGUID 
kiŶd… has ŶothiŶg noble about it, though it may classed with the beautiful of 
the seŶsiďle kiŶd… let aloŶe suďliŵitǇ… romances and maudlin plays; insipid 
moral precepts that dally with (falsely) so-called noble attitudes but that in 
fact make the heart languid and insensitive to the stern precept of duty, and 
that hence make the heart incapable of any respect for the dignity of the 
humanity in our own person and for human rights (which are something 
quite different from human happiness) and thus make it incapable of any 
firm prinĐiples iŶ geŶeƌal…͛435  
That is to say, according to Kant, the person who experiences the sublime not 
only feels she is dignified, but she is also considered to be dignified by others, as a 
result of the fact that she respects the rights of other people. Within the context of 
the present thesis, this is an extremely important passage as Kant here explicitly 
associates the judgment and feeling of the sublime with dignity (internally) and 
human rights (externally). In the last two chapters of the thesis, through the new 
(Kantian) duty-based justification of human and socioeconomic rights, more light is 
shed on this association. 
 
ϱ.Ϯ CoŶĐeptual aŶalǇsis of the KaŶtiaŶ ͚autoŶoŵǇ of the ǁill͛ thƌough the KaŶtiaŶ 
aesthetic category of the ͚suďliŵe͛ 
In this section, I analyze the oďsĐuƌe KaŶtiaŶ pƌiŶĐiple of ͚autoŶoŵǇ of the ǁill͛ iŶ the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals through the Kantian aesthetic category of 
the sublime in the Critique of Judgment.436 That is to say, I show how the position of 
the spectator/actor in the view of the sublime mirrors the position of a rational 
moral being that judges and acts autonomously. This is an important task, within 
the context of the present thesis, given that the Kantian moral concept of 
autonomy of the will is the starting point of the new (Kantian) duty-based 
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justification of human and socioeconomic rights in chapter 4. But Kant leaves this 
difficult, yet philosophically important moral concept unaddressed, in spite of the 
fact that in several passages, in the Kantian opus, the autonomy of the will is, either 
implicitly or explicitly, associated with sublimity. For instance, in 4:426 in the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, KaŶt desĐƌiďes the ͚aďsolutelǇ good ǁill͛, 
ŶaŵelǇ the autoŶoŵǇ of the ǁill, as ͚uďeƌ alleŶ Pƌeis eƌhaďeŶe͛, that is, as ͚sublime 
aďoǀe all pƌiĐe͛ [italiĐs ŵiŶe].437 Also, in 5:88, in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant 
claims that the sublimity consists in our recognition of our sensible existence, yet, at 
the same time, in the realization of our supersensible existence; in other words, in 
the actualization of our autonomy of the will.438 
Consequently, in what follows, I atteŵpt the ĐoŶĐeptual aŶalǇsis of KaŶt͛s 
͚autoŶoŵǇ of the ǁill͛ ǀia his aesthetiĐ ŶotioŶ of the ͚suďliŵe͛. I staƌt ďǇ statiŶg once 
more KaŶt͛s official definition of the supreme principle of morality, that is, of the 
autonomy of the will in 4:440 in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Kant 
ǁƌites: ͚AutoŶoŵǇ of the will is the property of the will by which it is a law to itself 
(independently of any property of the objects of volition). The principle of autonomy 
is, therefore: to choose only in such a way that the maxims of your choice are also 
included as universal laǁ iŶ the saŵe ǀolitioŶ...͛439 In this obscure definition of the 
principle of autonomy, Kant gives us effectively three main characteristics of it: The 
autonomy of the will, that is the property of the will by which it is a law to itself (1), 
is the principle through which we choose only in such a way that the maxims of our 
choice are also included as universal law in the same volition (2), and which are 
independent of any property of the objects of volition (3). 
Unluckily, the presentation of these three characteristics by Kant is not 
adequate enough to understand in depth this significant principle in Kantian ethics. 
Not only do these three elements need further development, but also, they are not 
enough to define the Kantian autonomy of the will. Consequently, what is needed, in 
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order to have a full account of the supreme principle of morality, is not only the 
clarification of the three characteristics of the autonomy of the will mentioned by 
Kant, but also their supplementation with some other crucial elements. This can be 
achieved, in my judgment, through the analysis of the Kantian autonomy of the will 
via the Kantian aesthetic category of the sublime.  
I briefly recall here the nine characteristics of aesthetic judgment and the 
feeling of the sublime, as presented previously. The sublime: 1) is a reflective 
judgment; 2) is an aesthetic judgment; 3) is a disinterested judgment; 4) it concerns 
not only the form of the object, but it can also be found in a formless object; 5) it 
ĐoŶtaiŶs a ͚high ;ĐouŶterͿpurposiǀeŶess ǁithout purpose͛; 6) it is a judgment which 
has universal validity; 7) it has universality which is based, in particular, on the 
notion of ͚ĐoŵŵoŶ seŶse͛; 8) it is a feeling of pleasure and displeasure; and 9) in 
this judgment and feeling of the sublime, the dignity of humanity in our own person 
is reflected.  In what follows, I show how these nine characteristics apply to the 
Kantian autonomy of the will. 
1. To begin with, similarly to the reflective judgment of the sublime, we may see the 
Kantian autonomy of the will not analogous to a determinate judgment, but to an 
aesthetic judgment of reflection (reflective judgment). According to this judgment, 
autonomous persons, who are exercising their lawgiving function of morality, as Kant 
points out in the definition of autonomy of the will, in 4:440, start from a particular 
case, in order to find the universal i.e. the principle, the law. What is crucial to be 
clarified at this point is that the exercise of the autonomy of the will here refers to 
particular agents, e.g. ordinary people, politicians and judges, who decide at some 
point and act upon specific moral laws. As Kant mentions in 6:480 in the 
Metaphysics, ͚… iŶ the subjective autonomy of each huŵaŶ͛s ďeiŶg pƌaĐtiĐal ƌeasoŶ 
and so implies that the law itself, not the conduct of other human beings, must serve 
as our iŶĐeŶtiǀe͛ [italics added].440 
Yet, this is not the sole understanding of the autonomy of the will. Other 
authors and Kant scholars insist on the impersonality of the self qua rational 
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being.441 It is true that in 4:440 Kant does not straightforwardly refer to autonomy as 
a property of persons. Rather he describes it as ͚the pƌopeƌtǇ of the ǁill ďǇ ǁhiĐh it is 
a laǁ to itself͛.442 However, iŶ spite of KaŶt͛s uŶsuĐĐessful ǁoƌdiŶg heƌe, I see 
Kantian autonomy as referring to particular selves. It is not accident that, when he 
specifies the moral concept of the autonomy of the will, through the Formula of 
AutoŶoŵǇ iŶ ϰ:ϰϯϭ, KaŶt hiŵself ǁƌites that ͚the thiƌd pƌaĐtiĐal pƌiŶĐiple of the ǁill, 
as supreme condition of its harmony with universal practical reason, the idea of the 
will of every rational being as a will giving universal law.͛443 [Emphasis added].  
Also, the word ͚autonomy͛ Đoŵes fƌoŵ the Gƌeek ǁoƌd ͚αʐʏοʆοʅία͛, that is, 
͚αʐʏός͛ ;selfͿ aŶd ͚ʆόʅος͛ ;laǁͿ. ͚Αʐʏοʆοʅία͛ iŶ Gƌeek ŵeaŶs ͚legislatioŶ ďǇ oŶeself͛, 
oƌ ͚self-legislatioŶ͛ aŶd ͚ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ͛ simultaneously; heŶĐe, ͚autoŶoŵǇ͛ diffeƌs 
fƌoŵ the ŶotioŶ of ͚fƌeedoŵ͛ ǁhiĐh ĐoŶsists iŶ sheer independence and ͚self-
legislatioŶ͛ without the burden of responsibility. Apparently, under this 
understanding of autonomy, heteronomy, which comes from the Greek word 
͚ɸʏɸροʆοʅία͛, that is, ͚έʏɸρος͛ ;otheƌͿ aŶd ͚ʆόʅος͛ ;laǁͿ, deŶotes the legislatioŶ ďǇ 
other(s), as well as a lack of responsibility, and non-independence or coercion. Kant 
writes in 4:441 in the Groundwork that ͚if the ǁill seeks the laǁ that is to deteƌŵiŶe 
it anywhere else than in the fitness of its maxims for its own giving of universal law – 
consequently if, in going beyond itself, it seeks this law in a property of any of its 
objects – heteronomy always results͛. 444   
Ultimately, the ŵeaŶiŶg of autoŶoŵǇ as ͚legislatioŶ ďǇ oŶeself͛ and 
͚ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ͛ is also denoted in 5:185-6 in the Critique of Judgment.445 Yet, there, 
KaŶt does Ŷot use the ǁoƌd ͚autoŶoŵǇ͛, ďut the awkward, nonexistent neologism: 
͚heautoŶoŵǇ͛. But eǀeŶ if KaŶt does Ŷot use the ǁoƌd ͚autoŶoŵǇ͛, this does not 
ŵeaŶ that ďǇ ͚heautoŶoŵǇ͛ he ŵeaŶs soŵethiŶg else. The Ŷeologisŵ ͚heautoŶoŵǇ͛, 
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ǁhiĐh is ŵade of the tǁo Gƌeek ǁoƌds ͚ɸαʐʏός͛ ;selfͿ aŶd ͚ʆόʅος͛ ;laǁͿ, is ideŶtified 
ǁith the ǁoƌd ͚autoŶoŵǇ͛ giǀeŶ that the Gƌeek pƌefiǆ ͚auto͛ is iŶ effeĐt the sǇŶoŶǇŵ 
and shoƌt foƌ the Gƌeek pƌefiǆ ͚heauto͛; they ďoth ŵeaŶ ͚self͛. Theƌefoƌe, as the 
ǁoƌd ͚autoŶoŵǇ͛, the peĐuliaƌ KaŶtiaŶ ͚heautoŶoŵǇ͛ ŵeaŶs a ƌespoŶsiďle legislation 
by oneself. 
Nevertheless, even though I see the Kantian autonomy of the will as a 
judgment of reflection, according to which autonomous persons are exercising their 
lawgiving function of morality iŶ a ͚ďottoŵ-up͛ ŵaŶŶeƌ, I do not agree with Gerald 
Dworkin͛s thesis according to which ͚… autoŶoŵǇ is a featuƌe of peƌsoŶs aŶd that it 
is a desiƌaďle ƋualitǇ to haǀe͛.446 Contrary to DǁoƌkiŶ͛s ͚peƌsoŶal autoŶoŵǇ͛, as ǁell 
as to the ͚… fƌee, iŶdepeŶdeŶt, loŶelǇ, poǁeƌful, aŶd ƌatioŶal…͛ tǁeŶtieth-century 
autonomous person condemned by Iris Murdoch,  the Kantian autonomy of the will 
is neither a property of all persons and a desirable (only) quality to have, nor it has 
an individualistic and atomistic character. Rather, the Kantian autonomous person 1) 
is a moral person, who 2) experiences a mixed feeling of pleasure and displeasure, 
and 3) through her imagined deliberation she aims at and achieves 
intersubjectivity.447 All these characteristics of the Kantian autonomous person are 
explained below. 
2. In the same context, similarly to the aesthetic judgment of the sublime, in which 
suďjeĐt͛s adŵiƌiŶg of the oďjeĐt does Ŷot depeŶd oŶ a determinate concept, but on 
his or her free play of imagination and reason, we may see the subjective moral 
judgment of the autonomous self-legislating person as not based on a determinate 
concept, but, as a judgment in which a particular is given, and the unknown 
determinate concept has further to be found. This can also be applied to the case of 
law and the legal judgment. For example, the legislator has available only a particular 
case for which she has to find a determinate rule, applying to all similar cases. I will 
return to these two crucial issues, that is, to 1) the bottom-up movement of the 
judgment of reflection, as ǁell as to ϮͿ the ͚aesthetiĐallǇ͛ ŵode of judgiŶg, iŶ ǁhiĐh 
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only a particular case is given, and the judging person has to find the appropriate 
determinate concept applying to it, in the final chapter of the thesis, in order to 
stress the political and legal implications of both. 
3. Also, similarly to the sublime which is a subjective judgment, yet a judgment not 
mingled with the least interest, hence a pure disinterested judgment, we may 
understand Kantian autonomy of the will as referring to a moral judgment 
indifferently to the existence of the object. Incidentally, this is explicitly mentioned 
by Kant in the parenthesis in the definition of the autonomy of the will in 4:440. Kant 
claims that the autonomy of the will is the property of the will by which it is a law to 
itself (independently of any property of the objects of volition). Consequently, the 
objects are not taken into consideration by the autonomously judging subject. That 
is to say, in the case of the autonomy of the will, the autonomous person judges and 
furtheƌ does the ͚good͛, that is, her moral dutǇ foƌ dutǇ͛s sake, or for the sake of the 
moral law alone. 
 4. Further, similarly to the sublime, which refers, in principle, to a formless object – 
hence it is regarded as the exhibition of an indeterminate concept of reason, namely 
to an idea of reason arising to our minds in a manner transcending our human 
mental powers– the Kantian concept of autonomy may be seen as referring to the 
idea of moral duty, of which fulfillment transcends our limited human powers. 
5. Moreover, as has been mentioned above, the aesthetic judgment of the sublime 
contains a high (counter)purposiveness without purpose, as a result of the fact that 
in the view of the horrible sublime our mind is induced to abandon sensibility and 
occupy itself with ideas containing a higher purposiveness, that is, with ideas of 
reason, such as the ideas of being capable of humbly and nobly (that is morally) 
resisting fear and trembling arising from the omnipotence of the object of sublime, 
and further acting accordingly.448 In a similar vein, we may regard the moral 
judgment of the autonomous person as containing a kind of high (counter) 
purposiveness without purpose, in the sense that in the view of the moral duty 
commanded by reason, the mind is called to abandon sensibility (Kant calls it 
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͚ǀolitioŶ͛ iŶ ϰ:ϰϰϬͿ, aŶd oĐĐupǇ itself ǁith ideas ĐoŶtaiŶiŶg a higheƌ puƌposiǀeŶess, 
that is, with ideas of reason such as the ideas of freely resisting fear arising from the 
morally demanding duty that has to be fulfilled, and acting accordingly. 
6. Furthermore, similarly to the aesthetic judgment of the sublime which has 
universal validity, as a ƌesult of the faĐt that oŶe͛s judgŵeŶt is Ŷot ďased oŶ private 
conditions, or interests, or inclinations, or ideologies, and so forth, the moral 
judgment of the autonomous person may be considered as universally valid for all 
other subjects as well. Kant explicitly says this iŶ the ϰ:ϰϰϬ: ͚…The pƌiŶĐiple of 
autonomy is, therefore: to choose only in such a way that the maxims of your choice 
are also included as universal law iŶ the saŵe ǀolitioŶ...͛ [ItaliĐs ŵiŶe]. 449 Within this 
context, I see the moral judgment of the autonomous person as a judgment through 
which the judging subject does not only presuppose that everyone else judges in the 
same way, but –similarly to the sublime– she also requires the same judgment from 
all others. Hence, she speaks of the moral duty as if it was something having general 
validity, or as being public –not just a personal opinion. Eventually, it seems that the 
KaŶtiaŶ ͚suďjeĐtiǀe uŶiǀeƌsal ĐoŵŵuŶiĐaďilitǇ͛ of the aesthetiĐ judgŵeŶts applies to 
moral judgments as well. 
7. We may apply the condition for the necessity alleged by a judgment of taste, that 
is, the idea of ͚common sense͛ to the ŵoƌal judgŵeŶt as ǁell. WheŶ ǁe judge 
rationally and morally, and we further consider a subsequent course of action, we 
formulate the appropriate maxim, and decide whether it can be universalized; that is 
to say, whether it can be willed by all others. This is how one of the most prominent 
formulations of the Categorical Imperative, that is, the Formula of Universal Law 
(FUL) [see above] actually works. However, this is not apparent in the Groundwork of 
the Metaphysics of Morals, so that it Đould ďe aƌgued that the ŶotioŶ of ͚seŶsus 
ĐoŵŵuŶis͛, as it is specified by Kant in the third Critique, is important to the 
clarification of the FUL in his moral theory.  
To be more specific, Kant writes in 4:421 in the Groundwork: ͚act only in 
accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it 
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ďeĐoŵe a uŶiǀeƌsal laǁ͛.450 This Đould ďe iŶteƌpƌeted ;ǀia the ͚suďliŵe͛Ϳ as folloǁs: 
The autonomously judging person while reflecting takes account of eǀeƌyoŶe else͛s 
way of presenting something, that is to say, she compares her own judgment not so 
much with the actual but with the possible or contingent judgments of all others 
putting herself in their position. In other words, the deliberation here is not 
necessarily an actual deliberation, but an imagined deliberation. The word 
͚iŵagiŶed͛ sigŶifies the eŶlaƌged ŵeŶtalitǇ of the deliďeƌatoƌ ǁho ŵaŶages to 
escape the constraints of her limited, private thought, and immerse her thinking in 
the grounds of morally judging –which is actually a locus medium between thinking 
and acting.  
In particular, the rational agent asks whether the maxim she wills can also, at 
the same time (zugleich), be willed by all other persons. The term ͚zugleiĐh͛, that is, 
͚siŵultaŶeouslǇ͛ ŵust Ŷot ďe omitted here.451 It is of great importance, the maxim of 
the moral deliberator to be in coordination with the maxims of all others. If her 
maxim cannot be willed at the same time by all others, then it must be rejected. We 
can easily determine whether a certain maxim can be willed by all others: a maxim, 
of which realization contradicts the notion of the universalization itself, cannot ipso 
facto be universalized. For example, even if this maxim is willed by a neo-liberal, the 
extinction of all socialists cannot be universalized because there are at least the 
socialists who do not will the relevant maxim. Of course, instead of the group of 
socialists, the same could be said for any other group, for example, the group of 
Armenians (in relation to genocide perpetrators or murderers). 
Eventually, the autonomous person, similarly to the person who judges 
aesthetically, thinks 1) without prejudices and superstitions, 2) in broad terms 
overriding the private conditions of thinking, and 3) using repeatedly the 1) and 2). 
Through the idea of ͚common sense͛, the moral judgment of the autonomous 
subject becomes universally communicable, hence a judgment with exemplary 
validity, that is, a rule for everyone. Within this context, intersubjectivity means that 
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we are not self-sufficient, or atomistic selves, or individual, or isolated, or separate 
atoms indifferent to the thoughts and feelings of others, but autonomously 
interconnected agents/persons. Ultimately, the idea of universalisability is not a 
chimera, but something absolutely feasible. What must be stressed here is that 
other beings who possibly inhabit a distant planet but they are not communicable 
cannot be taken into (moral) consideration by the judging person. 
Nevertheless, contrary to the above understanding of the Kantian 
autonomously reflective-judging person, as one who does not necessarily interact 
with others in order to formulate her judgment, other prominent Kant scholars do 
insist on an actual interaction with others.452 However, this is not accurate in Kantian 
terms. In 4:438 in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant explicitly 
aƌgues that ͚eǀeƌǇ ƌatioŶal ďeiŶg ŵust aĐt as if he ǁeƌe ďǇ his ŵaǆiŵs at all tiŵe a 
lawgiving member of the uŶiǀeƌsal kiŶgdoŵ of eŶds͛.453 In addition, in 5:36 in the 
Critique of Practical Reason, the scope of the imagined legislation is the entire moral 
community. For instance, Kant writes that the moral law is thought as objectively 
necessary only because it holds for everyone who has reason and autonomous 
will.454  
Therefore, according to the procedure followed by the autonomously 
reflective-judging person, all others are seriously taken into consideration, yet their 
consent is not actually required, but it is primarily imagined. Ultimately, through 
such an imaginative procedure, oƌ aŶ ͚iŵagiŶatiǀe sǇllogisŵ͛, the Kantian moral 
person is not identified with the individual atom; hence the Kantian autonomy is 
eventually rescued from being characterized as an individualistic and atomistic 
neoliberal concept. 
8. Further, similarly to the sublime, we may see the autonomy of the will not only as 
a moral judgment, but also as a moral feeling arising from the public validity of the 
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relevant judgment. Here again, as in the case of the sublime, the feeling is following 
the judgment (see above). The universal communicability underlying the moral 
judgment of the autonomous person not only comes first but also it is the basis of 
the moral feeling, in the sense that oŶe͛s aďilitǇ to ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate her mental state 
carries the relevant moral feeling with it.  
Specifically, the moral feeling arising in the case of the autonomy of the will is 
–similarly to the feeling of the sublime– an intellectual, or spiritual, mixed feeling of 
pleasure and displeasure, in the sense that the mind is, at the same time, repelled 
ďǇ ƌeasoŶ͛s ĐoŵŵaŶd to do what is the right thing to do, or to fulfill a moral duty, 
and attracted by it. On the one hand, the displeasure arises from the necessary 
abandonment of human volition as a ƌesult of the iŶadeƋuaĐǇ of ouƌ ͚iŵagiŶatioŶ͛, iŶ 
the ͚ǀieǁ͛ of a ŵoƌal dutǇ Đommanded by reason, e.g. not to coerce other people 
when it suits us. This feeling of displeasure is identified by Kant in 6:436, in the 
Metaphysics of Morals, with the feeling of humility folloǁiŶg ͚uŶaǀoidaďlǇ fƌoŵ ouƌ 
sincere and exact comparison of ourselves with the moral law (its holiness and 
stƌiĐtŶessͿ͛.455 At the same time, on the other hand, an elevating feeling of pleasure 
arises from the fact that the aforementioned displeasure is balanced by the 
simultaneous disclosure of our supersensible capacity manifested in the thought of a 
noumenon as supersensible substrate of appearance, and our vocation of the mind 
to the moral, that is, to ideas of reason, such as the idea of freely fulfilling our 
relevant moral duty. As Kant writes in 6:436, in the Metaphysics of Morals, ͚… ďut 
fƌoŵ ouƌ ĐapaĐitǇ foƌ iŶteƌŶal laǁgiǀiŶg aŶd fƌoŵ the ;ŶatuƌalͿ huŵaŶ ďeiŶg͛s feeliŶg 
himself compelled to revere the (moral) human being within his own person, at the 
same time there comes exaltation…͛; an exaltation resembling the exaltation in the 
view of the ͚sublime͛.456  
Eventually, the similarity between the two feelings, that is, the mixed feeling 
arising in the view of the ͚sublime͛ and the feeling in the view of what is the right 
thing to do, or our moral duty, is apparent. As in the foƌŵeƌ, iŶ the ͚ǀieǁ͛ of the 
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moral laǁ͛s ĐoŵŵaŶd, the feeliŶg of the autoŶoŵous suďjeĐt is a ŵiǆed feeliŶg of 
humiliation and elevation. In 5:79-80, in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant writes: 
͚… huŵiliatioŶ oŶ the seŶsiďle side – is an elevation of the moral – that is, practical – 
esteeŵ foƌ the laǁ itself oŶ the iŶtelleĐtual side…͛457 More generally, in 5:74 Kant 
Đlaiŵs that the ͚supƌeŵe laǁgiǀiŶg͛, ŶaŵelǇ the laǁgiǀiŶg iŶ the Đase of the supƌeŵe 
principle of morality, that is, the autonomy of the will, consists in both a positive and 
negative effect.458 CoŶǀeƌselǇ, iŶ ϱ:ϴϲ KaŶt͛s ƌefeƌeŶĐe to the suďliŵe ĐleaƌlǇ shoǁs 
its connection with the supreme principle of morality, that is, with the autonomy of 
the ǁill. KaŶt ǁƌites: ͚“uďliŵe… that ƌeƋuiƌes suďŵissioŶ… aŶd Ǉet gaiŶs ƌeluĐtaŶt 
reveƌeŶĐe… a laǁ ďefoƌe ǁhiĐh all iŶĐliŶatioŶs aƌe duŵď, eǀeŶ though theǇ seĐƌetlǇ 
ǁoƌk agaiŶst it͛.459 Consequently, as in the case of the sublime, the Kantian 
autonomous person, becoming absolutely aware of her freedom from the 
constraints of nature, e.g. fear, crosses the barriers of sensibility with a practical aim: 
to resist fear, and do what is the right thing to do, that is to say, to fulfill her duty.460 
This complex mental state, or feeling, consisting of a ͚negative pleasure͛ 
arising indirectly, is further associated by Kant with the feeling of admiration and 
respect. In 5:76 in the Critique of Practical Reason Kant writes that the respect to the 
moral law –which is further directed to persons– is something that comes near to 
the feeling of admiration.461 Kant writes, in 5:74, that when something humiliates us, 
it awakens respect for itself insofar as it is positive as the moral law.462 The same 
applies to the aesthetic experience of the sublime. Overall, the notion of ͚respect͛ to 
the ŵoƌal laǁ iŶ KaŶt͛s ŵoƌal theoƌǇ seeŵs to deƌiǀe fƌoŵ a speĐifiĐ iŶtelleĐtual 
ground, that is, from the complexity characterizing the autonomy of the will.  
Ultimately, I stress the fact that, as exactly in the case of the sublime, the 
autonomy of the will does refer to the action of the autonomous agent. The 
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aforementioned notion of ͚respect͛ enables us to understand better this aspect of 
the Kantian autonomy of the will. Given that the feeling of respect is grounded in the 
autonomy of the will, and also considering the fact that the notion of respect by 
definition forces us to action aŶd the ƌealizatioŶ of the ͚good͛ toǁaƌds ourselves and 
others, one easily concludes that the Kantian autonomy of the will is the supreme 
principle of morality in the sense that it leads us to the realization of our moral 
duties, aŶd the ͚good͛ iŶ geŶeƌal toǁaƌds ouƌselǀes aŶd otheƌs.463 Kant writes in 5:80 
and 5:81, in the Critique of Practical Reason, that the autonomous person is impelled 
to aŶ aĐtiǀitǇ oƌ aĐtioŶ, ǁhiĐh is Đalled ͚dutǇ͛;464 a duty (action) which, according to 
Kant, is fulfilled or performed by someone who, being bound to it, acts not in 
conformity with duty (mere legality), but from duty, that is, for the sake of the moral 
law alone.465  
In other words, the incentive, or the subjective determining ground, of the 
subsequent moral action (fulfillment of duty) is the moral law as it comes from the 
practical pure reason. In particular, Kant writes in 5:78 in the Critique of Practical 
Reason: ͚‘espeĐt foƌ the ŵoƌal laǁ is theƌefoƌe the sole aŶd also the uŶdouďted 
ŵoƌal iŶĐeŶtiǀe͛.466 The similarity between the feeling in the view of the sublime, 
and the feeling arising when one exercises her autonomy of the will, is the reason 
why Kant calls, in 5:85 and 5:86, all actions done with sacrifice and for the sake of 
duty sublime.467 
Finally, it is not by accident the fact that throughout the previous conceptual 
aŶalǇsis, I ƌepeatedlǇ Đall the autoŶoŵous laǁgiǀiŶg ageŶt ͚peƌsoŶ͛. KaŶt ǁƌites iŶ 
5:86-7, in the Critique of Practical Reason:  
͚It is ŶothiŶg otheƌ thaŶ personality, that is, freedom and independence from 
the mechanisms of the whole nature, regarded nevertheless as also a 
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capacity of a being subject to special laws – namely pure practical laws given 
by his own reason, so that the person as belonging to the sensible world is 
subject to his own personality insofar as he also belongs to the intelligible 
ǁoƌld͛.468  
Consequently, it seems that the notion of ͚personality͛ ;also ǀeƌǇ ofteŶ used 
in law) is grounded in the supreme principle of morality, that is, in the autonomy of 
the will. Hence, this idea of personality indicates, as Kant claims, the sublimity of the 
higher self of the autonomous agent.469 
9. Similarly to the aesthetic notion of the sublime, which instills dignity in our own 
person, and respect for the human rights of others, the moral concept of autonomy 
of the will may be seen as not only leading to the respect of the rights of others 
through the fulfillment of our duties, but also to a feeling of dignity towards 
ourselves, as well as to being regarded as dignified by others. Kant writes in 4:394 in 
the Groundwork that the ͚autoŶoŵǇ of the ǁill͛, is the ǁill of the peƌsoŶ ǁho feels 
aŶ ͚iŶŶeƌ ǀalue͛ oƌ ͚digŶitǇ͛ iŶ his oǁŶ person.470 Ultimately, Kant claims that ͚… the 
mere dignity of humanity as rational nature, without any other end or advantage to 
be attained by it – hence respect for a mere idea – is yet to serve as an inflexible 
precept of the will, and that it is just in this independence of maxims from all such 
incentives that their sublimity consists, and the worthiness of every rational subject 
to ďe a laǁgiǀiŶg ŵeŵďeƌ iŶ the kiŶgdoŵ of eŶds͛.471  
After the conceptual analysis of the Kantian moral concept of autonomy of the 
will through the Kantian aesthetic category of the sublime, we can move on to the 
reconstruction of the unsuccessful Kantian definition of the supreme principle of 
morality in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. My own understanding of 
the Kantian incomplete definition of the ͚autoŶoŵǇ of the ǁill͛ in 4:440 is the 
following: Autonomy of the will is both the judgment and feeling of autonomous 
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moral agents who, although they feel humiliated by the omnipotence of the moral 
laǁ, theǇ aďaŶdoŶ ͚ǀolitioŶ͛, that is, their iŶĐliŶatioŶs, ideologies, ǁishes aŶd so 
forth, and, freely self-legislating –yet requiring the same legislation from all 
others– respect the moral ideas of reason, such as the fulfillment of their moral 
duties, realizing their higher self as autonomous moral agents (self-
approbation),472 while feeling (and being regarded by others), at the same time, 
that they are persons with dignity. In what follows, I explain why the Kantian 
͚autoŶoŵǇ of the ǁill͛, as has just ďeeŶ defiŶed, is effeĐtiǀelǇ ideŶtified ǁith the 
KaŶtiaŶ ͚good ǁill͛. 
To begin with, Kant starts the first section of the Groundwork with the claim that: 
͚It is iŵpossiďle to thiŶk of aŶǇthiŶg at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that 
Đould ďe ĐoŶsideƌed good ǁithout liŵitatioŶ eǆĐept a good ǁill͛.473 But what does 
KaŶt aĐtuallǇ ŵeaŶ ďǇ ͚good ǁill͛? As the ͚autoŶoŵǇ of the ǁill͛, the ŶotioŶ of ͚good 
ǁill͛ is Ŷot eǆpliĐitlǇ defined by Kant. However, through a text-based analysis, it is 
ĐlearlǇ shoǁŶ that ďǇ ͚good ǁill͛ KaŶt aĐtuallǇ ŵeaŶs the ͚autoŶoŵǇ of the ǁill͛. 
a. Initially, according to 4:402 of the Groundwork, a morally good will is the will 
of a person who behaves morally, that is to say, a person who does not 
deviate from her duty, or the person who does her duty; that is to say, a 
person who is motivated by duty/moral law alone rather than the good.474  
b. Such a will, according to Kant, differs both from a will which responds directly 
to desiƌes, e.g. ŵost aŶiŵals͛ ǁill, as ǁell as fƌoŵ a diǀiŶe ǁill, that is, a ǁill 
which responds only to rational choices lacking desires, wishes, and so forth. 
A ͚good ǁill͛, iŶ the KaŶtiaŶ seŶse, ďeloŶgs oŶlǇ to ďeiŶgs that aƌe Đapaďle of 
choosing rationally, in spite of being affected by their opposite 
inclinations.475  
c. Fuƌtheƌ, KaŶt Đlaiŵs iŶ ϰ:ϰϭϯ that this good ǁill is deteƌŵiŶed ͚ďǇ ŵeaŶs of 
representations of reason, hence not by subjective causes but objectively, 
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that is, from grounds that are valid for every rational being as suĐh͛.476 Kant 
asks iŶ ϰ:ϰϬϯ: ͚CaŶ Ǉou also ǁill that Ǉouƌ ŵaǆiŵ ďeĐoŵe a uŶiǀeƌsal laǁ? If 
Ŷot, theŶ it is to ďe ƌepudiated… ďeĐause it ĐaŶŶot fit as a pƌiŶĐiple iŶto a 
possible giving of universal law, for which lawgiving reason, however, forces 
fƌoŵ ŵe iŵŵediate ƌespeĐt͛.477 
d. Fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, iŶ KaŶt͛s ǀieǁ, oŶlǇ suĐh a ͚good ǁill͛ is a ǁill possessiŶg ͚iŶŶeƌ 
ǀalue͛ oƌ ͚digŶitǇ͛. Incidentally, in 4:435 in the Groundwork, Kant writes 
͚What is ƌelated to geŶeƌal huŵaŶ inclinations and needs has a market price… 
but that which constitutes the condition under which alone something can be 
an end in itself has not merely a relative worth, that is, a price, but an inner 
worth, that is, dignity͛.478 Hence, in 4:394, Kant claims that: ͚A good ǁill is Ŷot 
good because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to 
attain some proposed end; but only because of its volition, that is, it is good 
iŶ itself, aŶd ƌegaƌded foƌ itself, is to ďe ǀalued iŶĐoŵpaƌaďlǇ higheƌ…͛479 In 
ϰ:ϰϯϵ, KaŶt Đlaiŵs that ͚… the ŵeƌe digŶitǇ of huŵaŶitǇ as ƌatioŶal Ŷatuƌe, 
without any other end or advantage to be attained by it – hence respect for a 
mere idea – is yet to serve as an inflexible precept of the will, and that it is 
just in this independence of maxims from all such incentives that their 
sublimity consists, and the worthiness of every rational subject to be a 
laǁgiǀiŶg ŵeŵďeƌ iŶ the kiŶgdoŵ of eŶds͛.480  
e. Finally, in 4:436, Kant points out that the lawgiving has an unconditional, 
incomparable value, and that respect alone is the expression of what must be 
given by a rational autonomous being.481 
According to this text-ďased aŶalǇsis of the KaŶtiaŶ ͚good ǁill͛, the good 
person seems to be the person who, in spite of her opposite inclinations, and freely 
self-legislating, yet legislating for all others, respects the moral ideas of reason, such 
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as the fulfillment of her duties, while feeling (and being considered by others), at the 
same time, as a person with dignity. But these five elements (in bold letters) are 
found in the definition of the autonomy of the will as well. I recall here the full 
definition of the autonomy of the will:  
Autonomy of the will is both the judgment and feeling of autonomous moral 
agents who, although they feel humiliated by the omnipotence of the moral 
laǁ, they aďaŶdoŶ ͚ǀolitioŶ͛, that is, theiƌ inclinations, ideologies, wishes and 
so forth, and, freely self-legislating –yet requiring the same legislation from 
all others– respect the moral ideas of reason, such as the fulfillment of their 
moral duties, realizing their higher self as autonomous moral agents (self-
approbation482), while feeling (and being regarded by others), at the same 
time, that they are persons with dignity. 
Consequently, following the above text-based analysis, it could be claimed 
that Ŷot oŶlǇ the KaŶtiaŶ ͚good ǁill͛ is ideŶtified ǁith the KaŶtiaŶ ͚autoŶoŵǇ of the 
ǁill͛, ďut also that ͚good ǁill͛ has the ĐhaƌaĐteƌistiĐs of the aesthetiĐ ĐategoƌǇ of the 
sublime given that, after the conceptual analysis of the autonomy via the sublime, 
we concluded that the autonomy of the will resembles the aesthetic judgment and 
feeliŶg of the suďliŵe. EǀeŶtuallǇ, the KaŶtiaŶ ͚autoŶoŵous persoŶ͛ is the Kantian 
͚good persoŶ͛ who judges and feels as a ͚persoŶ ǁho eǆperieŶĐes the suďliŵe͛; that 
is to say, a dignified person who, despite her opposite inclinations, freely self-
legislates, yet requiring the same legislation from all others, and respects the moral 
ideas of reason, such as the fulfillment of her moral duties.  
Ultimately, under this analysis of the ͚autonomy of the will͛, oƌ the ͚good 
ǁill͛, the initial definition of the Kantian ͚heteronomy of the will͛, in 4:441, as the will 
which, for its own universal lawgiving, seeks the law that is to determine it anywhere 
else than in the fitness of its maxims,483 may be formed accordingly as: Heteronomy 
of the will is both the judgment and feeling of agents who, not being capable of 
aďaŶdoŶiŶg ͚ǀolitioŶ͛, that is, their iŶĐliŶatioŶs, ideologies, ǁishes aŶd so forth, 
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freely self-legislate –yet require the same legislation from all others–  in 
aĐĐordaŶĐe ǁith a ͚laǁ͛ fouŶd aŶǇǁhere else than in the moral law.  
Here it must be pointed out that, similarly to the autonomous or good 
peƌsoŶ͛s, the heteƌoŶoŵous peƌsoŶ͛s laǁgiǀiŶg is a universal lawgiving which is 
taking place freely. Hence, what in effect distinguishes the heteronomous from the 
autonomous person is not the lack of her universal lawgiving, or the lack of freedom 
while lawgiving, but her incapacity of aďaŶdoŶiŶg ͚ǀolitioŶ͛, as well as the pursuit of 
law that is to determine her will anywhere else than in the fitness of its maxims. 
Incidentally, the two definitions of autonomy and heteronomy here not only feature 
the difference between the concept of autonomy, as the supreme principle of 
morality, and the concept of freedom or sheer iŶdepeŶdeŶĐe, as siŵplǇ oŶe͛s aďilitǇ 
to initiate an action spontaneously, but also designate the Kantian ethics not as an 
͚ethics of freedom͛ but as an ͚ethics of autonomy͛.  
 
ϱ.ϯ The ŵoƌal ĐoŶĐept of autoŶoŵǇ iŶ ViƌgiŶia Woolf͛s Mrs. Dalloway 
 
The aŶalǇsis of the tǁo ŵaiŶ ĐhaƌaĐteƌs iŶ Woolf͛s Ŷoǀel Mrs. Dalloway, namely of 
Clarissa Dalloway and Septimus Warren Smith, aids our understanding of the Kantian 
autonomy of the will, or good will, as interpreted via the aesthetic concept of the 
sublime. In Mrs. Dalloway, Woolf details a day in the life of a high-society woman, in 
post First World War England (1925).484 In this work, Woolf offers us an alternative 
(Kantian) understanding of the obscure concept of autonomy. That is to say, in this 
novel, autonomy is not presented as sheer independence or freedom from coercion 
;see foƌ iŶstaŶĐe GƌiffiŶ͛s iŶteƌpƌetation in chapter 1), but as a mixed feeling of 
pleasure and displeasure resembling the aesthetic feeling of the sublime. 
To begin with, both his decision to commit suicide (judgment) and his 
deliberate killing of himself by jumping out of the window (action) show that 
Septimus Warren Smith is a free man in the sense that he is independent to judge 
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and act however he likes without guidance or coercion from others, e.g. his wife, or 
his doctors. Even if Septimus suffers from a mental disorder, he is still free to judge 
and act as he likes. Here the question arises as to whether Septimus is an 
autonomous person as well. I recall the Kantian definition of the autonomy of the 
will as it has been formulated after its conceptual analysis through the Kantian 
aesthetic category of the sublime above: 
Autonomy of the will is both the judgment and feeling of autonomous moral 
agents who, although they feel humiliated by the omnipotence of the moral 
laǁ, they aďaŶdoŶ ͚ǀolitioŶ͛, that is, theiƌ iŶĐliŶatioŶs, ideologies, wishes and 
so forth, and, freely self-legislating –yet requiring the same legislation from 
all others– respect the moral ideas of reason, such as the fulfillment of their 
moral duties, realizing their higher self as autonomous moral agents (self-
approbation485), while feeling (and being considered by others), at the same 
time, that they are persons with dignity. 
Apparently, Septimus is not an autonomous person –at least, an autonomous 
person in the Kantian sense. He does not seem to be capable of abandoning his 
volition, that is, his inclinations, e.g. death drive. Also, he does not abandon his 
ideologies. He cannot come to some kind of compromise with the external world, 
e.g. the hypocrisy of the English society. Additionally, he is obsessed with the idea of 
showing courage and bravery without limit, as he once did at war. He also overlooks 
ŵoƌal laǁ͛s ĐoŵŵaŶds to ƌespeĐt hiŵself aŶd others, e.g. his wife and his doctor. 
Eventually, he seems incapable of feeling dignity. Overall, while he is absolutely free, 
Septimus is not an autonomous moral agent in the Kantian sense. Rather he may be 
characterized philosophically as a heteronomous person. According to the Kantian 
definition of heteronomy, Septimus is a person who, not being capable of 
aďaŶdoŶiŶg his ͚ǀolitioŶ͛, that is, his iŶĐliŶatioŶs, ideologies, ǁishes aŶd so foƌth, 
freely self-legislates iŶ aĐĐoƌdaŶĐe ǁith a ͚laǁ͛ fouŶd soŵeǁhere else than in the 
ŵoƌal laǁ: iŶ his oǁŶ iŶteƌŶal, sui geŶeƌis, disoƌdeƌed ͚ŵoƌal kiŶgdoŵ͛. 
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Heƌe, it ŵight ďe aƌgued that “eptiŵus is Claƌissa͛s ͚douďle͛ oƌ ͚alteƌ ego͛. 
Both Septimus and Clarissa act freely. But this is not the whole story. Free action 
does not lead Septimus to a right or moral action in the Kantian sense.486 
Incidentally, we must not ignore the fact that Kant denounces suicide in several 
passages in the Metaphysics of Morals. In particular, Kant regards suicide an 
irrational act that debases humanity in our own person.487 Consequently, if we 
ǁaŶted soŵethiŶg ŵoƌe thaŶ ͚aĐtiŶg fƌeelǇ͛, that is to saǇ, if ǁe ǁaŶted to aĐt 
morally and rightly, I think we should focus on the delicate 51-year-old protagonist 
of the novel, who is not simply free, but may also be characterized as an 
autonomous person. As has been explained above, what distinguishes the 
heteronomous from the autonomous person is not the lack of universal lawgiving, or 
the lack of freedom, independence, and the capacity to initiate an action 
spontaneously. What distinguishes them is the incapacity of the heteronomous 
person to aďaŶdoŶ ͚ǀolitioŶ͛, and to freely self-legislate in accordance with the moral 
law (in singular). Conversely, what distinguishes them is the capacity of the 
autoŶoŵous peƌsoŶ to aďaŶdoŶ ͚ǀolitioŶ͛, and to freely self-legislate in accordance 
with the moral law. The following analysis of the persona of Clarissa Dalloway clearly 
shows the necessary conditions of one to be regarded as a truly autonomous person 
in the Kantian sense. 
Initially, similarly to Septimus, Clarissa is disappointed in life. As Septimus, 
she conceives of the post-war English society as a hypocritical society, and, also, she 
does not seem to be fully satisfied with her personal life. However, contrary to 
Septimus, Mrs. Dalloway is dealing successfully with her existential crisis without 
unexpected outbursts, but with a lot of patience; in spite of her annoyance arising 
either from her personal, or from her social background. I think her stance is the 
result of the exercise of Kantian-type autonomy of the will. 
More specifically, despite her opposite wishes, desires, and so forth, 
throughout her life Clarissa seems to constraining herself and doing her duties in 
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accordance ǁith ŵoƌal laǁ͛s ĐoŵŵaŶds. This stƌuggle is ƌefleĐted, foƌ eǆaŵple, upoŶ 
her rejection of a marriage proposal by her unreliable and erratic friend Peter Walsh, 
despite her strong feelings for him. Also, despite her emotional disconnection with 
heƌ ͚pƌaĐtiĐal͛ husďaŶd, ‘iĐhaƌd DalloǁaǇ, Claƌissa does Ŷot sepaƌate fƌoŵ hiŵ ďut 
she still does her duties as a wife and mother of their daughter. Finally, her struggle 
to be faithful to (Kantian) morality despite her opposite inclinations (death drive) is 
reflected upon the moment when, similarly to Septimus, she seems ready to take ͚a 
flight to fƌeedoŵ͛ thƌough heƌ opeŶ ǁiŶdoǁ, ďut she doesŶ͛t.  
At that particular moment, while she is standing at the window, Clarissa 
seems to get a feeling which is actually higher thaŶ “eptiŵus͛s plaiŶ feeliŶg of 
͚pleasuƌe͛ deƌiǀed fƌoŵ the satisfaĐtioŶ of his desiƌes aŶd ǁishes. Claƌissa͛s feeliŶg is 
a different type of feeling which resembles the feeling of the sublime: a mixed 
feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Kant writes in paragraph 27 in the Critique of 
Judgment: ͚The feeliŶg of the suďliŵe is, theƌefoƌe, at oŶĐe a feeliŶg of displeasuƌe, 
arising from the inadequacy of imagination in the aesthetic estimation of magnitude 
to attain to its estimation by reason, and a simultaneously awakened pleasure, 
arising from this very judgment of the inadequacy of the greatest faculty of sense 
being in accord with the ideas of reason, so far as the effort to attain to these is for 
us a laǁ͛.488 By her free submission of her will to the moral law, despite her opposite 
inclinations, Clarissa experiences this mixed feeling of the sublime. Eventually, her 
feeling of the sublime resembles to her moral feeling of autonomy. In spite of her 
fear deriving from a demanding and challenging moral endeavour, by admitting that 
a life is to be lived to the end (judgment/decision), as she says, Clarissa shows deep 
respect for the moral ideas of reason, such as the fulfillment of her moral duty to 
return to the party (action), realising her higher self as a (Kantian) autonomous 
moral agent with dignity. 
Here, one could argue that simply doing our duties, putting aside our 
opposite inclinations, vulnerabilities, wishes, desires, fears, and so on, is not 
something that can be accomplished by human beings who are empirical beings. 
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Under this view, the Kantian autonomy of the will, or the good will, may be regarded 
as a kiŶd of ͚philosophiĐal ŵistake͛ ĐoŶdeŵŶed oŶlǇ to ďeiŶgs ǁith supeƌhuŵaŶ 
qualities, e.g. God, angels, or characters in novels such as Mrs. Dalloway. 
Contrary to such claims, my view is that although we are empirical beings, we 
are at the same time moral beings with boundless powers. This is apparent, for 
example, in heroes and saints. If only our inclinations, drives, and urges (empirical 
nature) were the decisive factors shaping our judgments and actions, then we would 
still be in a pro-political stage in which there would be no relations between us other 
than the barbarous relations dictated by the primitive phase of humanity. Rather, 
our capacity to fulfilling our moral duties despite our opposite inclinations is, I think, 
the main reason why human beings have made significant political communities and 
civilizations.  
Moreover, by showing the tension between the moral concept of autonomy 
and the notion of heteronomy, Mrs. Dalloway offers us a remarkable paradigm of 
hoǁ ǁe should ƌegaƌd aŶd tƌeat the ͚iŶsaŶe͛. As I see them, the personas of Clarissa 
aŶd “eptiŵus do Ŷot aĐtuallǇ ĐoƌƌespoŶd to the ͚saŶe͛ aŶd the ͚iŶsaŶe͛ iŶ soĐietǇ, ďut 
to the ͚autoŶoŵous͛ aŶd the ͚heteƌoŶoŵous͛ iŶ the KaŶtiaŶ seŶse. If ǁe all ƌegaƌded 
aŶd Đalled the ͚iŶsaŶe͛ Ŷot a ͚ĐƌazǇ͛ ďut a ͚heteƌoŶoŵous͛ peƌsoŶ –not only in verbal 
terms but also in practice– the stigma of mental illness would attenuate. Kant writes 
in 6:315 in the Metaphysics of Morals: ͚these aƌe ŵeƌe uŶdeƌliŶgs... theǇ haǀe to ďe 
uŶdeƌ the diƌeĐtioŶ oƌ pƌoteĐtioŶ of otheƌ iŶdiǀiduals͛.489 Although Kant here, in 
principle, refers to passive citizens in a polis, we could legitimately generalize his 
claim in order to include the mentally disabled persons in a political community, 
aďout ǁhiĐh KaŶt has paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ ǁƌitteŶ: ͚I ĐaŶŶot do good to aŶǇoŶe iŶ aĐĐoƌdaŶĐe 
with my concepts of happiness (except to young children and the insane), thinking to 
benefit him by forcing a gift upon him; rather, I can benefit him only in accordance 
                                                          
489 Gregor (1996), p. 458. 
169 
 
with his ĐoŶĐepts of happiŶess͛ [eŵphasis giǀeŶ].490 IŶĐideŶtallǇ, KaŶt͛s ͚soft 
pateƌŶalisŵ͛ is appaƌeŶt iŶ this passage. 
FinallǇ, aŶd this ďƌiŶgs ŵe to the eŶd of the aŶalǇsis of Woolf͛s Mrs. 
Dalloway, this novel offers us a remarkable paradigm of what might actually be the 
obscure and vague Kantian concept of the autonomy of the will or the good will.491 
Whether I am right or wrong, the preceding interpretation of the Kantian autonomy 
of the ǁill, oƌ the good ǁill, thƌough Woolf͛s pƌotagoŶist iŶ this eǆeŵplaƌǇ ǁoƌk of 
literature, may still be regarded noteworthy given that it offers a new understanding 
of the concept of autonomy as a mixed feeling of pleasure and displeasure which 
resembles the aesthetic feeling of the sublime. I hope this interpretation enriches 
the contemporary literature, in which autonomy is mostly seen as sheer 
independence or freedom from coercion (see for instaŶĐe GƌiffiŶ͛s aƌguŵeŶt iŶ 
chapter 1). But, as has been shown, this is not actually the kind of autonomy which is 
ethically important for Kant. Eventually, as Murdoch argues, if autonomy was just 
oŶe͛s iŶdepeŶdeŶĐe, theŶ ǁe should foƌĐefullǇ ƋuestioŶ its ethical importance.492 
 
5.4 The moral concept of autonomy in contemporary art of the sublime: the case of 
the video artist Bill Viola  
 
The interest in the aesthetic category of the sublime has not ceased to attract 21st 
ĐeŶtuƌǇ͛s artists. Among other subjects, e.g. nature, sexuality, identity, religion, and 
so forth, through the contemporary sublime, is also expressed the moral (as well as 
legal and political) concept of human autonomy. The link between the contemporary 
sublime and the moral concept of autonomy has not yet been on the focus of art 
critics, aestheticians, and philosophers of art. In order to show the association or the 
analogy between the moral concept of autonomy and the contemporary aesthetic 
notion of the sublime, in this section, I focus on the visual artist, Bill Viola. In 
                                                          
490 Gregor (1996), p. 573. 
491 Foƌ fuƌtheƌ eǆploƌatioŶs iŶ the ͚paƌadigŵ͛ of judgŵeŶt see Feƌƌaƌa, A. ;ϮϬϬϴͿ, pp. ϭϲ, ϰϮ.       
492 Murdoch (1970) 
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particular, Viola͛s ͚fiǀe aŶgels foƌ the ŵilleŶŶiuŵ͛ shows the supreme principle of 
Kantian ethics, that is, the moral concept of the autonomy of the will, or good will. 
More specifically, Viola͛s work depends upon electronic, sound, and image 
technology in new media. Through his high-tech microcosms, Viola opens up 
possibilities around the meaning of human nature, and consciousness.493 In 2001, in 
CalifoƌŶia, Viola ŵade aŶ iŶstallatioŶ titled ͚fiǀe aŶgels foƌ the ŵilleŶŶiuŵ͛ ǁhiĐh 
consists of five videos projected at a large scale onto the walls of a dark gallery 
spaĐe. These ǀideos aƌe iŶdiǀiduallǇ titled: ϭͿ the ͚depaƌtiŶg AŶgel͛, 2) the ͚ďiƌth 
AŶgel͛, ϯͿ the ͚fiƌe AŶgel͛, ϰͿ the ͚asĐeŶdiŶg AŶgel͛, and ϱͿ the ͚ĐƌeatioŶ AŶgel͛. Each 
one of them shows a male figure submerging in water or hovering over it. These 
actions occur in a continuous loop, which are enhanced by a soundtrack of water 
noises and colour changes.494 In what follows, I show how through this installation of 
Viola, which aesthetically belongs to the area of the sublime, or it ͚activates͛ the 
sublime, the moral concept of autonomy is visualized or disclosed in an exceptional 
manner.495 
The dispeƌsed settleŵeŶt of Viola͛s ͚fiǀe aŶgels͛ ŵakes the ǁhole iŶstallatioŶ 
formless; hence, the viewer is unable to capture it all. However, on the 
unboundedness of the settlement is reflected the thought of a totality. The five 
videos are effectively one and the same artwork. This is enhanced by the fact that 
the actions in the installation occur in a continuous, slow motion loop which freezes 
the sequences. Hence a feeling of a momentary inhibition of the vital forces is 
followed immediately by an outpouring of them that is all the stronger.496  
More specifically, in the view of the formless video installation of Viola, the 
viewer experiences a mixed feeling of pleasure and displeasure. On the one hand, 
                                                          
493 See further http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artists/bill-viola-2333 [accessed 14 February 2018] 
494 For further technical details regarding the relevant installation see 
http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/viola-five-angels-for-the-millennium-t11805 [accessed 14 
February 2018] 
495 For a thorough analysis of why this particular work of Viola belongs to the aesthetic area of the 
sublime, see further Arya (2013) 
496 Ak 244, Kant (1987), p. 98. 
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the mind is repelled by the disliked fall of the male figures below the water, while on 
the other hand, it is attracted by their rise above it. This ͚Ŷegatiǀe pleasuƌe͛, ŶaŵelǇ 
the sublime, consists effectively in the necessary aďaŶdoŶŵeŶt of ǀieǁeƌ͛s human 
sensibility (her inclinations, fears, desires, and so on), as a result of the inadequacy of 
her imagination in the view of the terrifying drawing figure, and the simultaneous 
discovery of a higher moral ĐapaĐitǇ ŵaŶifested iŶ the ǀieǁ of the ŵale figuƌe͛s 
asĐeŶsioŶ. It is Ŷot aĐĐideŶt that Viola͛s iŶstallatioŶ is titled: ͚fiǀe aŶgels.͛ AŶgels aƌe 
beings which can be both good and evil, and can live both in the human realm (fallen 
angels) as well as in the divine realm (good angels). Incidentally, there is an analogy 
here betweeŶ Viola͛s aŶgels aŶd Blake͛s –the eighteeŶth ĐeŶtuƌǇ͛s ͚suďliŵe aƌtist͛ as 
he used to call himself– ambiguous good and evil angels.497 There is also a further 
aŶalogǇ ďetǁeeŶ Viola͛s fiǀe aŶgels aŶd WeŶdeƌ͛s der Himmel über Berlin or Wings 
of Desire, the romantic fantasy film about the decision of an angel to become 
mortal.498  
Eventually, in spite of the fear arising in the viewer as a result of the horrible 
look of the submerging and hovering figures, at the same time, these figures arise in 
the viewer a gladness/exaltation involving his/her own liberation from the 
constraints of the lower nature, and the barriers of sensibility. Here the experience 
of the aesthetic feeling of the sublime not only stands in intimate relation to the 
experience of the autonomy, but it also visualizes it in an exceptional manner.499 
That is to say, the moral experience of the autonomy of the will is reflected in the 
experience of the aesthetic feeling of the sublime. As in the case of the 
viewer/spectator who feels both helpless in front of the horrible look of the figures, 
and capable of being free from his/her lower nature, similarly, the autonomous 
person experiences both helplessness in front of the demanding and challenging 
moral duty that he/she has to fulfill, and capable of being free from his/her 
inclinations, wishes, desires, fears, and so on. Ultimately, both the viewer and the 
                                                          
497 See http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/blake-the-good-and-evil-angels-n05057 [accessed 16 
February 2018]. 
498 The trailer of this great movie is available here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hAzzR2Uklok 
[Accessed 16 February 2018]. 
499 See also Allison (2001), p. 303. 
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autonomous person discover a higher, non-sensible, moral/practical self. This is, I 
think, the great contribution of the Kantian aesthetic category of the sublime to 
morality. I will return to this in chapter 5. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This Đhapteƌ͛s ŵaiŶ ƋuestioŶ of ǁhetheƌ theƌe ĐaŶ ďe a tƌulǇ KaŶtiaŶ justificatory 
theory of rights has not yet been answered to its full extent. I provide a full answer in 
the following chapter. In the present chapter I have discussed two noteworthy 
ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ KaŶtiaŶ huŵaŶ ƌights justifiĐatoƌǇ aĐĐouŶts: ϭͿ Aƌthuƌ ‘ipsteiŶ͛s 
argument according to which human rights are grounded in the Kantian notion of 
the ͚iŶŶate ƌight to fƌeedoŵ͛ iŶ the DoĐtƌiŶe of ‘ight, the ‘eĐhtslehƌe, iŶ the 
Metaphysics of Morals;500 aŶd ϮͿ KatƌiŶ FliksĐhuh͛s transcendental approach to the 
justification of human rights.501 After the examination and evaluation of these two 
Kantian accounts for the justification of human rights, I have argued that, despite 
their flaws, we should not abandon a Kantian, or a duty-based, or deontological, 
perspective as regards the rights justification issue. 
Following this claim, I have discussed what is set as the ideal starting point for 
a justification for human and socioeconomic rights, namely the Kantian supreme 
principle of morality, that is, the autonomy of the will, in 4:440, in the Groundwork 
of the Metaphysics of Morals. However, given that the Kantian autonomy of the will 
is not fully explained by Kant, I have offered a conceptual analysis of it based on the 
Kantian aesthetic category of the sublime in order to shed more light on the obscure 
Kantian supreme principle of morality. Within this context, in order to show more 
clearly the tension between the concept of autonomy and the notion of 
heteronomy, I have examined ViƌgiŶia Woolf͛s Ŷoǀel Mrs. Dalloway. Further, in order 
to show the relation between the sublime and autonomy, I have focused on Bill 
Viola͛s ͚fiǀe aŶgels foƌ the ŵilleŶŶiuŵ͛. Now, space has opened up for me to show 
                                                          
500 Ripstein (2009) 
501 In: Cruft, R., Liao, S.M., Renzo, M. (2015), pp.653-670.  
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A new (Kantian) duty-based account for the justification of human and 
socioeconomic rights 
 
͚I leaƌŶt fƌoŵ ŵǇ illiterate but wise mother that all rights to be deserved and 




As has been mentioned in the General Introduction, the present thesis addresses a 
question of contemporary philosophical deďate: ͚What is the philosophiĐal ďasis of 
huŵaŶ aŶd soĐioeĐoŶoŵiĐ ƌights?͛ Before I present a new (Kantian) duty-based 
justification of human and socioeconomic rights, and explain how these rights are 
derived from 1) our universal perfect duties of right to others, and 2) our specific 
perfect duties of right to others, respectively, I briefly recall the main issues 
discussed in the previous three chapters of the thesis. This summary is important 
given that all these issues have in effect led me to the formulation of the new DBA. 
In the first chapter I discussed some of the most important modern ͚rights-
based͛ justifications of human rights. More specifically, I focused on: 1) the 
naturalistic, or traditional, or orthodox accounts; and 2) on the political and practice-
based accounts. Following this, in the second chapter of the thesis, I examined four 
popular contemporary ͚dignity-based͛ accounts for the justification of human rights. 
Further, in the first part of chapter 3, I focused on two more significant ͚Kantian-
                                                          
502 GaŶdhi͛s ƌespoŶse to the English evolutionary theorist and director-general of UNESCO, Huxley, 
who, in 1947, wrote to Gandhi to ask him to contribute an essay to a collection of philosophical 
reflections on human rights. See Moyn, S. (2016) 
175 
 
ďased͛ justifications of human rights. Ultimately, after the examination of all these 
accounts, I concluded that, because of their flaws none of them give us an adequate 
aŶsǁeƌ to the Đoƌe ƋuestioŶ of thesis: ͚What is the philosophiĐal fouŶdatioŶ of 
huŵaŶ aŶd soĐioeĐoŶoŵiĐ ƌights?͛  
In the second part of chapter 3, I claimed that we should not abandon a 
Kantian or deontological orientation and perspective regarding the philosophical 
foundations of rights. It is not only commonly argued that the most promising 
grounds on which to build a contemporary theory of human rights are to be found in 
Kant,503 but also I am convinced that, even though the popular Kantian moral 
concept of human dignity is not the basis of human rights, there is still room for the 
formulation of 1) a truly Kantian ;Ǉet Ŷot KaŶt͛sͿ justificatory account for human 
rights, as well as 2) a duty-based justification for socioeconomic rights inspired by 
the Kantian opus. Within this context, I set as the ideal starting point for the 
formulation of these two justifications the Kantian supreme principle of morality, 
that is, the autonomy of the will, or the good will, as discussed by Kant in the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.504 Ultimately, I attempted a conceptual 
analysis of the obscure Kantian moral concept of autonomy via the Kantian aesthetic 
category of the sublime.  
HaǀiŶg Đlaƌified KaŶt͛s supƌeŵe pƌiŶĐiple of ŵoƌalitǇ, iŶ the pƌeǀious Đhapteƌ, 
we can now move on to the presentation of the new justification of rights, which I 
strongly believe it is capable of overcoming most of the obstacles of the popular 
rights-based, dignity-based, and Kantian-based justificatory accounts. This 
justification of rights comprises, or is composed of, two sub-justifications: 1) a truly 
Kantian duty-based justification of human rights, and 2) a duty-based, or 
deontological, justification of socioeconomic rights inspired by the Kantian opus. 
Incidentally, this is the reason why, throughout the thesis, sometimes I put the word 
͚KaŶtiaŶ͛ iŶ a paƌeŶthesis. While the ǁoƌd ͚KaŶtiaŶ͛ ĐaŶ legitiŵatelǇ ďe used iŶ the 
case of human rights, this is not the case for socioeconomic rights. That is to say, 
                                                          
503In: Cruft, R., Liao, S.M., Renzo, M. (2015), p. 671. 
504 See Gregor (1996), p. 89.  
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although the Kantian opus allows for arguing a Kantian justification of human rights, 
it does not similarly allow for a truly Kantian justification of socioeconomic rights, but 
simply a justification inspired by Kant. I think this is something we must always bear 
in mind and respect, as no one has the right to appropriate the work of a 
philosopher for his/her own purposes. I will show this more clearly below. In what 
follows, I recall the main axes upon which the new justificatory account, in its two 
versions, has been built: 
1. All, normal adult human beings, embryos, babies, children, the comatose, the 
ŵeŶtallǇ disaďled, iŵŵigƌaŶts, ƌefugees, the ͚apatƌides͛, the pooƌ, 
homosexuals, bisexuals, transsexuals, those who live in countries which have 
not the characteristics of a democracy, those who live in non-democratic 
countries, those who still live in isolated jungle tribes in the world, possible 
future human beings, animals, plants, environment, even beings from outer 
space must be protected. 
2. Our civil and political rights are distinct from our socioeconomic rights. 
3. Human and socioeconomic rights can and must be protected not only in 
Western liberal democracies, or in societies which have modern 
characteristics, but all over the world.  
4. Given that human and socioeconomic rights are grounded in their true basis, 
not only the Western people, but all people around the world can and should 
accept them. 
5. All people, including those who live in states which do not have the means or 
the volition to protect human rights, can and must be protected. 
6. The so-Đalled ͚haƌd Đases͛ iŶ laǁ, e.g. aďoƌtioŶ, euthaŶasia etĐ., Ŷeed to ďe 
urgently confronted. 
7. The theory and the practice of human rights should eventually be reconciled, 






2. A new (Kantian) duty-based justification of human and socioeconomic rights 
Αs has been mentioned several times throughout the thesis, the new justification of 
rights is a duty-based justification. Within this context, duties do not only have 
priority over rights, but they straightforwardly derive from them. In this section, I 
clearly show this derivation or justification. Thƌoughout I use the teƌŵs: ͚deƌiǀe͛, 
͚gƌouŶded iŶ͛, ͚Đoŵe fƌoŵ͛, ͚ďased oŶ͛, ͚justifiĐatioŶ͛, ͚fouŶdatioŶ͛, aŶd ͚gƌouŶdiŶg͛ 
interchangeably, to show that duties are the source of rights. Hence in the absence 
of the (owed) duties, from which they derive, the relevant (claim) rights alone do 
not/cannot exist. One might ask here whether the duties, from which rights derive, 
are their ultimate source; that is to say, whether there is a deeper justification, or 
not, of duties (and hence rights). My answer to this question is the following. 
The duties, from which (human and socioeconomic) rights derive, are not 
their ultimate basis. Rather, it is theiƌ fiƌst justifiĐatoƌǇ ͚step͛, or their first-level 
source. Yet, although not their ultimate step, this first step is important considering 
that, in the human rights discourse, the relation between rights and duties is not 
clear. As it is shown below, some argue that rights and duties are correlative or 
corresponding ideas, ǁhile soŵe otheƌs, suĐh as O͛Neill, that the fulfillŵeŶt of duties 
or obligations is more basic than the fulfillment of rights.505 But, these claims simply 
indicate a correlation or correspondence without any deeper, morally established, 
connection of rights with duties. Consequently, even though the ultimate 
philosophical foundation of human and socioeconomic rights is in effect the pure 
practical reason, as it is clearly shown below, their first-level source are moral duties. 
In this section, I develop the justificatory line starting from the autonomy of the will 
and, through the moral duties, leads us to rights. 
To begin with, in the previous chapter, I explained how the supreme principle 
of morality, that is, the ͚autoŶoŵǇ of the ǁill͛ is grounded, through the mediation of 
the Categorical Imperative (CI) and the moral law (in singular), in the pure practical 
reason. This is one justificatory line. Now, I show that there is another line of 
justification in the Kantian opus, which has not been discussed by Kant scholars up 
                                                          
505 Foƌ a siŵilaƌ Đlaiŵ see also: O͛Neill ;ϮϬϭϲͿ, p. ϯϱ. 
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until today. This second justificatory line (main argument - original thesis) starts 
froŵ the autoŶoŵǇ of the ǁill ;ĐoŵŵoŶ ͚grouŶd͛ to ďoth justifiĐatorǇ liŶesͿ aŶd, 
through the external moral duties, which are based on it (autonomy), leads us to 
human and socioeconomic rights. Along with the first justificatory line, this second 
line of justification makes up the whole/full justification line for human and 
socioeconomic rights. Specifically, from the pure practical reason (or rationality), 
that is, the ĐoŵŵoŶ to all ƌatioŶal ďeiŶgs͛ geŶetiĐ ďasis foƌ ŵoƌal ageŶĐǇ, ǁe aƌe led, 
through the moral law, the CI, the autonomy of the will (1st line),506 to our moral 
duties, in which rights are grounded (2nd line). Eventually, it could be argued that the 
(Kantian) duty-based justification of human and socioeconomic rights is an account 
typically referring to all rational beings. Hence, moral agency is understood as 
derived from autonomous agency, which is ultimately generated from rational 
agency. But let͛s take thiŶgs sloǁlǇ, in order to see how exactly this second 
justificatory line (main argument – original thesis) is developed. 
The starting point for the new (Kantian) duty-based justification of human 
and socioeconomic rights (from now on: Duty Based Approach or DBA), is the 
Kantian supreme principle of morality, that is, the autonomy of the will. The reason 
why I set the autonomy of the will (and not, for example, the pure practical reason) 
as the starting point for the new DBA is the following: I see Kant, above all, as a 
moral philosopher, so that, even if there is not a complete justificatory theory of 
rights in his opus, if he had to formulate one, I am convinced he would consider 
human rights as moral rights, and he would start his justification from the 
cornerstone of his ethics, that is, the moral concept of autonomy of the will. Also, 
and most importantly, the autonomy of the will itself allows for the derivation of 
external duties, which are a conditio sine qua non in the case of human (and 
socioeconomic) rights, which typically belong to the external domain of law, rather 
                                                          
506 Rationality, which is developed in all normal human and other (rational) beings according to a fairly 
pƌediĐtaďle sĐhedule, has uŶĐoŶtƌoǀeƌsial geŶetiĐ ďasis. BǇ ͚geŶetiĐ ďasis͛, I ŵeaŶ aŶ ͚iŶtƌiŶsiĐ 
ĐapaĐitǇ͛, that is, a ĐapaĐitǇ that ĐaŶŶot ďe lost. ‘apid advances in genomic technologies may lead to 
the discovery of the particular set of genes which are necessary and sufficient for the genetic basis of 
autonomous and moral agency; see also Liao (2015), pp. 18, 19 
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than to the internal domain of morality, in which the pure practical reason resides; 
hence any attempt to ground rights straightforwardly in the pure practical reason or 
rationality, that is, the genetic basis for moral agency, which is common to all 
rational beings,507 would not only be unsuccessful, but also philosophically 
illegitimate. What remains to be shown is how from the autonomy, through the 
mediation of the external moral duties, which are based on it, we are led to rights 
grounded in external moral duties. 
In his incomplete definition of the supreme principle of morality in 4:440, 
KaŶt Đlaiŵs that ͚AutoŶoŵǇ of the ǁill is the pƌopeƌtǇ of the ǁill ďǇ ǁhiĐh it is a laǁ 
to itself͛.508 Heƌe aŶotheƌ ƋuestioŶ aƌises as to ǁhat eǆaĐtlǇ is ŵeaŶt ďǇ ͚self-
legislatioŶ͛, ͚laǁ to itself͛, oƌ ͚laǁgiǀiŶg fuŶĐtioŶ of ŵoƌalitǇ͛. KaŶt does Ŷot answer 
this question in full in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. However, he 
explains it in the Introduction of the Metaphysics of Morals.509 Consequently, what 
must be pointed out here is that the Kantian supreme principle of morality, that is, 
the autonomy of the will, or the good will, does also appear in the Metaphysics of 
Morals. Kant still persists in considering it, either explicitly or implicitly, as the 
supreme principle of morality. 
More specifically, in 6:383 Kant explicitly mentions the moral concept of 
autonomy. In particular, he argues that for finite holy beings, that is to say, for sage 
or wise beings, such as those human beings who manage to realize their higher self 
as moral beings, there is a doctrine of morals, that is, the autonomy of practical 
reason. This doctrine involves consciousness of their moral capacity to master their 
inclinations whenever they rebel against the moral law –a capacity which is derived 
from the third formulation of the categorical imperative, that is, from the Formula of 
Autonomy in 4:431 in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.510 Eventually, 
this is the Kantian pure human morality in its highest stage, that is, in the area 
between the divinity of God(s) and human immorality. Incidentally, the passage 
                                                          
507 see Liao (2015), pp. 18, 19 
508 Gregor (1996), p. 89. 
509 Gregor (1996), pp. 383-385. 
510 Gregor (1996), pp. 515, 81 
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6:383 is crucial given that, by explicitly referring to human morality as the 
continuous effort of finite human beings to approximate a moral ideal by freeing 
themselves from any incentives other than the moral duty, Kant actually evidences 
the results of the attempted, in chapter 3, conceptual analysis of the obscure 
autonomy of the will. 
Additionally, in 6:480, in the Metaphysics, Kant does once more explicitly 
mention the supreme principle of morality, that is, the autonomy of the will as 
pƌaĐtiĐal ƌeasoŶ͛s pƌopeƌtǇ of ďeiŶg the souƌĐe of moral laws independently of any 
otheƌ iŶĐliŶatioŶ. KaŶt ǁƌites: ͚… autonomy of eaĐh huŵaŶ ďeiŶg͛s pƌaĐtiĐal ƌeasoŶ… 
implies that the law itself, not the conduct of other human beings, must serve as our 
iŶĐeŶtiǀe… A good eǆaŵple… should Ŷot seƌǀe as a ŵodel…͛511 That is, even 
exemplary conduct should not be admired or wished, hence serve as our incentive. 
Finally –and this is of great importance within the context of the present thesis– 
in the Metaphysics of Morals, KaŶt also iŵpliĐitlǇ, oƌ sileŶtlǇ, ͚ŵeŶtioŶs͛ autoŶoŵǇ 
by further specifying –admittedly in a quite abstract manner– its main function 
which is omitted in the official definition of it in 4:440 in the Groundwork.512 To be 
more specific, the main function of autoŶoŵǇ, ǁhiĐh liteƌallǇ ŵeaŶs ͚self-moral-law-
giǀiŶg͛, is the ͚ethiĐal laǁgiǀiŶg͛ that is disĐussed ďǇ KaŶt iŶ ϲ:Ϯϭϵ-221 in the 
Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals.513   
Specifically, Kant starts in 6:218 by generally claiming that there are two 
elements in lawgiving: first, a law representing objectively an action that has to be 
done, that is, a law which makes the action a duty; and second, an incentive, of 
which role is to connect subjectively a ground for determining choice to the action 
with laǁ͛s ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ.514 Kant further distinguishes between two types of 
                                                          
511 Gregor (1996), p. 593. 
512 Gregor (1996), p. 89. 
513 Gregor (1996), pp. 383-385; also, recently Oliver Sensen has argued that in the Metaphysics of 
Morals Kant simply fails to mention the supreme principle of morality; although he silently implies it, 
see: Sensen (2013) 
514 Gregor, (1996), p. 383. 
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laǁgiǀiŶg ǁith ƌespeĐt to the iŶĐeŶtiǀe. He ǁƌites: ͚All laǁgiǀiŶg ĐaŶ theƌefoƌe ďe 
distiŶguished ǁith ƌespeĐt to the iŶĐeŶtiǀe… That laǁgiǀiŶg ǁhiĐh ŵakes aŶ aĐtioŶ a 
duty, and also makes this duty the incentive is ethical. But that lawgiving which does 
not include the incentive of duty in the law, and so admits an incentive other than 
the idea of dutǇ itself is juƌidiĐal͛.515  
Apparently, the exercise of the lawgiving function of morality by the morally 
autoŶoŵous peƌsoŶ is ideŶtified Ŷot ǁith the ͚juƌidiĐal͛ ďut ǁith the ͚ethiĐal͛ 
lawgiving, according to which an action is made a duty, and this duty is also made 
the incentive of the action. Eventually, the Kantian autonomous or good person is 
the person who is ethically lawgiving, yet she does not just presuppose that everyone 
else gives the same law, but she requires the giving of the same law from all others, 
according to the Formula of Universal Law.516 As has already been explained in detail 
in the previous chapter, the idea of ͚uŶiǀeƌsalisaďilitǇ͛ heƌe is Ŷot a Đhiŵeƌa, ďut 
something absolutely feasible. 
Further, the autonomy of the person, who exercises her ethical lawgiving directly 
refers to the idea of moral duty, of which fulfillment transcends her limited human 
powers. As Kant writes in 5:80 and 5:81, in the Critique of Practical Reason, the 
autoŶoŵous peƌsoŶ is iŵpelled to aŶ aĐtiǀitǇ oƌ aĐtioŶ, ǁhiĐh is Đalled ͚dutǇ͛;517 a 
duty (action) which, according to Kant, is fulfilled, or performed, by someone who, 
being bound to it, acts not in conformity with duty (mere legality), but from duty, 
that is, for the sake of the moral law alone, or because it (the duty/action) is the 
right thing to do.518 Eventually, the Kantian autonomy of the will leads one to the 
realizatioŶ of oŶe͛s ŵoral duties, aŶd the ͚good͛ iŶ geŶeral, toǁards oŶeself aŶd 
others.519 The question here arises as to what kind of duties the autonomous 
person, who is exercising her ethical lawgiving, is impelled to act upon.  
                                                          
515 Gregor (1996), p. 383. 
516 See 4:421, in Gregor (1996), p. 73.  
517 See 5:80, in Gregor (1996), p. 205. 
518 See 5:81, Gregor (1996), p. 205; also 6:222, Gregor (1996), p. 377.  
519 Ak 261, 262, 267, Kant (1987), pp. 120-121, 127. 
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According to Kant, on the one hand, duties in accordance with the juridical 
lawgiving are external duties; as this type of lawgiving does not require the idea of 
dutǇ to ďe the deteƌŵiŶiŶg gƌouŶd of the ageŶt͛s ĐhoiĐe, ďut it Ŷeeds aŶ iŶĐeŶtiǀe 
suited to the law (external incentive).520 On the other hand, from 6:219 to 6:221, 
Kant explicitly argues that the ethical lawgiving refers both to internal and external 
duties. IŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ, KaŶt ǁƌites: ͚ethiĐal laǁgiǀiŶg, ǁhile it also ŵakes iŶteƌŶal 
actions duties, does not exclude external actions but applies to everything that is a 
dutǇ iŶ geŶeƌal… ethiĐal laǁgiǀiŶg… does take up duties ǁhiĐh ƌest oŶ… aŶ eǆteƌŶal 
lawgiving by making them, as duties, iŶĐeŶtiǀes iŶ its laǁgiǀiŶg… theƌe aƌe eǆteƌŶal 
duties in ethiĐs… EthiĐs has… duties iŶ ĐoŵŵoŶ ǁith ƌight͛.521 522 This is a crucial 
distinction by Kant, given that only in external moral duties, rights can be grounded, 
given ƌights͛ position to the external domain of law, rather than to the internal 
domain of morality. 
Consequently, the autonomous person, who is exercising her ethical lawgiving, is 
impelled not only to internal, but also to external actions and duties, or to 
enforceable duties. HeŶĐe, KaŶt Đlaiŵs iŶ ϲ:Ϯϭϵ that ͚all duties, just ďeĐause theǇ aƌe 
duties, belong to ethics.͛523 Apparently, even if they derive from the ethical 
lawgiving, there can be external moral duties. Here the question arises as to which 
are, exactly, these external moral duties deriving from the aforementioned ethical 
                                                          
520 See 6:219, in Gregor (1996), pp. 383-384. 
521 Gregor (1996), pp. 384-385. 
522 IŶ spite of the faĐt that the LatiŶ ǁoƌd ͚ŵoƌalitǇ͛ is fƌeƋueŶtlǇ distinguished today from the Greek 
ǁoƌd ͚ethiĐs͛, iŶ the pƌeseŶt thesis I use these tǁo teƌŵs as eƋuiǀaleŶt. HeŶĐe, ĐoŶtƌaƌǇ to 
EŶlighteŶŵeŶt thiŶkeƌs͛ aǀeƌsioŶ to the ǁoƌd ͚ŵoƌal͛, as a ǁoƌd used foƌ ĐeŶtuƌies ďǇ ChƌistiaŶ 
theologians, and the preference instead to the ǁoƌd ͚ethiĐal͛, as a ǁoƌd deŶotiŶg the diseŶgageŵeŶt 
from the Christian tradition, I still use the two words as they are used at the start, that is, as if there is 
no difference between them. I effectively use the two terms interchangeably because I do not think 
there is a substantial difference between them; rather, their tension is grounded in superficial 
grounds, that is, the controversy between the Christian and the Enlightenment tradition.  Apparently, 
Kant follows the Enlightenment traditioŶ usiŶg the ǁoƌd ͚ethiĐal͛ to deŶote this tǇpe of laǁgiǀiŶg. 
However, his stance, for the reason which has just been mentioned, does not distinguish, in my view, 
the teƌŵ ͚ethiĐal laǁgiǀiŶg͛ fƌoŵ the teƌŵ ͚ŵoƌal laǁgiǀiŶg ͚. See further Sproul (2013). 
523 Gregor (1996), p. 384. 
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laǁgiǀiŶg. IŶ oƌdeƌ to aŶsǁeƌ this ƋuestioŶ, oŶe Ŷeeds fiƌst to ƌeĐall KaŶt͛s oǁŶ 
division of moral duties in the Metaphysics of Morals.524 
More specifically, in 6:239-240 in the Metaphysics of Morals, KaŶt Đlaiŵs that ͚all 
duties are either duties of right (official iuris), that is, duties for which external 
lawgiving is possible, or duties of virtue (official virtutis s. ethica), for which external 
laǁgiǀiŶg is Ŷot possiďle͛.525 On the one hand, duties of right are claimable by those 
who possess the right not to wrongdoing, or to positive action; hence they are 
externally enforceable, e.g. by public authorities. On the other hand, duties of virtue 
are non-claimable; thus, in this case, there are no right-holders. Yet, even though 
duties of virtue are non-claimable, hence non-externally enforceable (by public 
authorities), this does not mean that they are less demanding than the claimable 
duties of right. This is more clearly shown below when I am referring to specific 
examples. Eventually, given that in the Introduction of the Metaphysics of Morals 
Kant has explicitly argued that all duties, including the external duties of right, or 
juridical duties, just because they are duties, belong to ethics, one can conclude that 
both duties of right and duties of virtue are in effect moral duties. Incidentally, in the 
Doctrine of Virtue, in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant similarly argues that even in 
the case in which law lays down a duty of right, the action or duty springing from it 
can be moral.526  
Overall, ǁe ŵaǇ diǀide the KaŶtiaŶ duties to ͚ŵoƌal duties of ƌight͛ aŶd ͚ŵoƌal 
duties of ǀiƌtue͛. This is the fiƌst KaŶtiaŶ geŶeƌal division of duties. In addition, at the 
eŶd of ϲ:Ϯϯϵ aŶd the ďegiŶŶiŶg of ϲ:ϮϰϬ, KaŶt distiŶguishes ďetǁeeŶ ϭͿ ͚ŵoƌal duties 
to oŶeself͛, e.g. Ŷot to Đoŵŵit suiĐide,527 aŶd ͚ŵoƌal duties to otheƌs͛, e.g. pƌoŵise 
keepiŶg, as ǁell as ϮͿ ďetǁeeŶ ŵoƌal ͚peƌfeĐt͛ aŶd ŵoƌal ͚iŵpeƌfeĐt͛ duties. OŶ the 
one hand, perfect duties, e.g. duties of promise keeping, are owed without 
exception, they cannot be overridden, and require certain actions or omissions. On 
                                                          
524 Gregor (1996), pp. 394-395. 
525 Gregor (1996), p. 394. 
526 Gregor (1996), p. 525. 
527 I see these duties (to oneself) as not duties about self-interest, but as duties leading one to the 
ƌealizatioŶ of oŶe͛s humanité  
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the other hand, imperfect duties, e.g. duties of beneficence, loyalty, decency, civility, 
and so on, typically require only the setting of ends, and leave agents discretion on 
when and how to act.528 Here is the schema depicting all the aforementioned 
Kantian divisions of moral duties [bold letters mine]:529 
 
Division 
In Accordance with the Objective Relation of Law to Duty 
  Perfect Duty   
 The right of 
humanity in 
our own 
person                      




Oneself                    
 (of right)  
   Duty 
(of virtue)                
 Duty    to 
Others                      




                                   
 The end of 
human beings        
 





                                                          
528 See Gregor (1996), p. 395; also, Wood (2002); also, it must be noted that there is a debate among 
Kantians on whether or not imperfect rights do leave latitude for the agents as to how and when to 
act on them. However, although significant, I do not think it is necessary for the purpose of the 
present thesis to engage with this discussion. See, for instance: Workshop (2014). ͚‘ights aŶd 
iŵpeƌfeĐt duties iŶ politiĐal philosophǇ͛. ECP‘ ‘eseaƌĐh “essioŶs. UŶiǀeƌsitǇ of Esseǆ, at: 
https://ecpr.eu/Events/PanelDetails.aspx?PanelID=3492&EventID=91 [Accessed 8 December 2018] 
529 “ee KaŶt͛s sĐheŵa iŶ ϲ:ϮϰϬ, iŶ Gƌegoƌ ;ϭϵϵϲͿ, p. ϯϵϱ. 
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Here is another schema of the Kantian division of duties: 
Perfect duties of right: 
• DutǇ to oŶeself → The right of humanity in our own person • DutǇ to others → The right of huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs 
 
Imperfect duties of virtue: 
• DutǇ to oŶeself → The eŶd of huŵaŶitǇ iŶ our oǁŶ persoŶ • DutǇ to others → The eŶd of huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs 
 
Overall, the Kantian external moral duties deriving from the ethical lawgiving, as 
has been described above, are divided into three main categories: First, into duties 
of right and duties of virtue; second into duties to oneself and duties to others; and 
third, into perfect and imperfect duties. The main goal of the present section (and of 
the thesis as a whole) is to show how, in particular, human and socioeconomic rights 
are generated from these duties. The Kantian duties of right, the Kantian duties 
towards others, and the Kantian perfect duties are of great importance, given that 
human and socioeconomic rights are: 1) rights 2) towards others, which 3) refer to 
duties that cannot be overridden.  
To this triple Kantian division of duties, I add a fourth division, namely the 
division between universal and specific duties; that is to say, between duties which 
require actions or omissions by all, and duties requiring actions or omissions by 
specific duty bearers, respectively. This diǀisioŶ has Ŷot ďeeŶ oŶ KaŶt͛s foĐus, but is 
added by the author of the thesis. It is an important division in view of the distinction 
between human and socioeconomic rights which is suggested by the present thesis. 
That is to say, contrary to human rights, which are considered to be universal rights, 
socioeconomic rights are specific rights in the sense that they are not owed to 
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someone by all others. Rather, they are owed to someone by specific others, either 
individuals or states, or institutions. I will return to this issue below.530 
At this point, the fundamental question of the thesis arises as to how exactly 
from the aforementioned duties, namely the Kantian duties of right, the duties to 
others, and the perfect duties, as well as the universal and specific duties, our 
human and socioeconomic rights are further developed. Before I show the precise 
contours of this derivation, I organize here the aforementioned types of duties into 
two categories, so that they can be seen to correspond to the two main distinctions 
of rights, that is, to human and socioeconomic rights, which are on the focus of the 
present thesis. These two categories of duties are: 1) the moral universal perfect 
duties of right to others; and 2) the moral specific perfect duties of right to others. 
After the categorization of duties into these two main categories, in what follows, I 
show how our human and socioeconomic rights are generated from them. 
It is generally true that a Kantian derivation of rights from duties is a difficult 
task. As Katrin Flikschuh has stressed, the derivation of rights from duties remains 
obscure within the Kantian opus.531 However, in spite of its difficulty, Flikschuh does 
not exclude such possibility. My own view is that it is not only worth considering, but 
also a challenge the derivation of rights from duties within the context of a 
philosophical work of a philosopheƌ of dutǇ dediĐated to the idea of ͚dutǇ͛ ƌatheƌ 
thaŶ to the idea of ͚ƌight͛; hence the initial goal of the present thesis is to shed light 
                                                          
530 What should be added here is that the new justification does not refer only to our moral duties 
towards other human beings, but also, by extension, towards all other beings, e.g. animals and the 
natural world. Of course, Kant argues in 6:442, in the Metaphysics of Morals, that we can have no 
duties to beings other than human beings. In particular, Kant claims that we have duties only to 
human beings because our duties to any subject are generally moral constraints by that suďjeĐt͛s will 
[see Gregor (1996), p. 563; see also Wood (2009), p. 244] However, I think Kant is wrong here. 
According to the conceptual analysis of the Kantian supreme principle of morality, that is, the 
autonomy of the will, or the good will, in the previous chapter, we concluded that our duties to any 
subject are moral constraints by our own (autonomous, good) will. Therefore, the new (Kantian) duty-
based account for the justification of human and socioeconomic rights cannot refer only to the 
fulfillment of moral duties towards human beings, but towards all other beings.  
531 In Cruft R., Liao S.M., Renzo M. (2015), p. 657, note 14. 
187 
 
oŶ this oďsĐuƌe ͚deƌiǀatioŶ͛, oƌ ͚deǀelopŵeŶt͛, oƌ ͚geŶeƌatioŶ͛ of ouƌ huŵaŶ aŶd 
socioeconomic rights from the Kantian external moral duties. As shown below, this 
derivation is feasible. I start with the crucial Kantian passage that enables us to argue 
accordingly. More specifically, in 6:239 in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues:532 
 ͚Waruŵ ǁird aďer die SitteŶlehre ;MoralͿ geǁöhŶliĐh ;ŶaŵeŶtliĐh ǀoŵ 
Cicero) die Lehre von den Pflichten und nicht auch von den Rechten 
betitelt? da doch die einen sich auf die andern beziehen. – Der Grund ist 
dieser: Wir kennen unsere eigene Freiheit (von der alle moralische Gesetze, 
mithin auch alle Rechte sowohl als Pflichten ausgehen) nur durch den 
moralischen Imperativ, welcher ein pflichtgebieten der Satz ist, aus 
welchem nachher das Vermögen, andere zu verpflichten, d.i. der Begriff des 
‘eĐhts, eŶtǁiĐkelt ǁerdeŶ kaŶŶ͛. [Bold ŵiŶe] 
And here is the above Kantian passage in English:533  
But why is the doctrine of morals usually called (especially by Cicero) a 
doctrine of duties and not also a doctrine of rights, even though rights have 
reference to duties? – The reason is that we know our own freedom (from 
which all moral laws, and so all rights as well as duties proceed) only 
through the moral imperative, that is, the proposition which commands 
duty, from which the capacity for putting others under obligation, that is, 
the concept of right can afterwards be generated.    
In the above passage, Kant initially argues that we experience our freedom 
only through a moral imperative which commands the fulfillment of our duties. Allen 
Wood ǁƌites: ͚… the moral imperative whose command gives us the concept of dutǇ͛ 
[emphasis added]534 Incidentally, nowhere here does Kant mention the concept of 
͚ƌight͛ oƌ ͚ƌights͛. What he effeĐtiǀelǇ offeƌs to the ƌeadeƌ is the thesis that it is iŶ a 
moral imperative, namely the CI, via the free exercise of our autonomous will, that 
                                                          
532See Kant (2013), p. 346 
533 The passage is translated by the author of the thesis. 
534 Wood (2002), p. 6 
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our moral duties are grounded. Incidentally, light has been shed on the derivation of 
duties from the CI in the previous analysis.535 What remains is to shed light on the 
(crucial) derivation of rights from these duties. 
“peĐifiĐallǇ, iŶ the pƌopositioŶ that ͚ǁe kŶoǁ ouƌ oǁŶ fƌeedoŵ ;…Ϳ oŶlǇ 
thƌough the ŵoƌal iŵpeƌatiǀe, that is, the pƌopositioŶ ǁhiĐh ĐoŵŵaŶds dutǇ͛ KaŶt 
inserts a remarkable parenthesis which cannot be overlooked. The content of the 
parenthesis is the folloǁiŶg: ͚;fƌoŵ ǁhiĐh all ŵoƌal laǁs, aŶd so all ƌights as ǁell as 
duties pƌoĐeedͿ͛. De-contextualizing the aforementioned parenthesis, one can –not 
at all unreasonably– argue that from the free exercise of our autonomous will both 
rights and duties proceed, in no particular order. It is true indeed that from the free 
exercise of our autonomous will both our duties and our rights proceed. However, 
my claim is that this does take place in specific order. The question here arises as to 
the order in which duties and rights come. Even though Kant mentions both rights 
and duties in the above parenthesis, without explicitly prioritizing one over another, 
there are in effect two reasons why normative priority must be given to duties over 
rights here and elsewhere in the Kantian opus.536 
First, in 6:239, Kant himself mentions that duty is grounded in the CI. He 
ǁƌites: ͚… the ŵoƌal iŵpeƌatiǀe, that is, the pƌopositioŶ ǁhiĐh ĐoŵŵaŶds dutǇ͛.537 
GuǇeƌ tƌaŶslates it as: ͚… the moral imperative, which is a proposition commanding 
dutǇ.͛538 I am sure that if Kant believed that both duties and rights are of equal 
normative weight, he would have certainly added the notion of right here too; but 
he hasŶ͛t. IŶstead he has aƌgued that dutǇ ;only) comes directly from the CI. 
                                                          
535 Apart from the derivation of duties by the CI in the present thesis, I must say that there is 
considerable literature on the derivation of specific duties from the Categorical Imperative, and the 
question is at issue in literature; see for instance, Herman, B. (1993). The Practice of Moral Judgment, 
Cambridge University Press. 
536 This is Ŷot oŶlǇ ŵǇ thesis, ďut also the thesis of ŵaŶǇ otheƌ KaŶtiaŶ sĐholaƌs, e.g. OŶoƌa O͛Neill, 
from whose understanding of the Kantian duty-based ethics I have been influenced. More on this 
issue in section 3 below 
537 Gregor (1996), p. 395 
538 Guyer, P. (2002), p. 24 
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Consequently, the notion of right can be seen as only indirectly coming from the CI, 
via the notions of duty and the autonomy of the will.  
Second, in the same passage Kant explicitly says that it is from the notion of 
duty that the concept of right can afterwards be generated (entwickelt werden 
kannͿ. He ǁƌites: ͚… dutǇ, fƌoŵ ǁhiĐh the ĐapaĐitǇ foƌ puttiŶg otheƌs uŶdeƌ 
oďligatioŶ, that is, the ĐoŶĐept of ƌight ĐaŶ afteƌǁaƌds ďe geŶeƌated.͛ Given that the 
GeƌŵaŶ ǁoƌd ͚eŶtǁiĐkelt͛ ŵeaŶs ͚geŶeƌate͛ oƌ ͚deǀelop͛, that is to saǇ, deŶotes 
soŵethiŶg ͚ĐoŵiŶg iŶto ďeiŶg afteƌ soŵethiŶg else͛, I thiŶk MaƌǇ Gƌegoƌ ĐoƌƌeĐtlǇ 
here renders the German word ͚ǁeƌdeŶ͛ iŶto ͚afteƌǁaƌds͛, iŶ oƌdeƌ to shoǁ that 
something is taking place in the future. Also, we must not ignore the fact that one of 
the uses of the GeƌŵaŶ ǁoƌd ͚WeƌdeŶ͛ is to ďuild the futuƌe teŶse, aŶd GeƌŵaŶs do 
often use this word to talk about the future.  
Hoǁeǀeƌ, I do Ŷot thiŶk Gƌegoƌ has ĐoƌƌeĐtlǇ tƌaŶslated the ǁoƌd ͚eŶtǁiĐkelt͛ 
as ͚eǆpliĐate͛.539 IŶ ŵǇ tƌaŶslatioŶ, I ƌeŶdeƌ the GeƌŵaŶ ǁoƌd ͚eŶtǁiĐkelt͛ iŶto 
͚geŶeƌate͛. Soŵe sǇŶoŶǇŵs of the EŶglish ǁoƌd ͚geŶeƌate͛ ĐaŶ also legitiŵatelǇ ďe 
used. For instaŶĐe, GuǇeƌ uses the EŶglish ǁoƌd ͚deǀelop͛, ǁhiĐh is also, I thiŶk, aŶ 
aĐĐuƌate tƌaŶslatioŶ of the GeƌŵaŶ ǁoƌd ͚eŶtǁiĐkelt͛. He ǁƌites: ͚… dutǇ, fƌoŵ ǁhiĐh 
the capacity for putting others under obligations, that is, the concept of a right, can 
afterwards be developed [entwickelt].540 Guyer adds an important footnote in the 
ƌeleǀaŶt disĐussioŶ, iŶ ǁhiĐh he ĐoŶfiƌŵs ŵǇ tƌaŶslatioŶ of the ǁoƌd ͚eŶtǁiĐkelt͛: 
͚The ǁoƌd eŶtǁiĐkelt͛, GuǇeƌ ǁƌites, ͚ǁhiĐh Gƌegoƌ tƌaŶslates as ͚eǆpliĐated͛, is oŶe 
of those words that ŵakes KaŶt͛s aƌguŵeŶts iŶ this late ǁoƌk so oďsĐuƌe͛. I ƌeĐall 
heƌe FliksĐhuh͛s stateŵeŶt, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to ǁhiĐh the deƌiǀatioŶ of ƌights fƌoŵ duties 
remains obscure within the Kantian opus. I believe the reason of this obscurity is the 
mistaken translation of the ǁoƌd ͚eŶtǁiĐkelt͛ ďǇ Gƌegoƌ as ͚eǆpliĐate͛ iŶstead of 
͚geŶeƌate͛, oƌ ͚deǀelop͛, oƌ ͚deƌiǀe͛.  
Consequently, although there does not seem to be a priority of duties over 
rights within the Kantian parenthesis, in 6:239, Kant actually does give priority to 
                                                          
539 Gregor (1996), p. 395 
540 Guyer (2002), p. 24 
190 
 
duties over rights by writing that 1) duties are directly grounded in the CI, and 2) 
from the notion of duty the notion of right can afterwards be generated, or 
developed, or derived. Ultimately, I think this is the reason why the doctrine of 
virtue, as Kant says in 6:239, is called a doctrine of duties, and not, also, a doctrine of 
rights.541 I think my conclusion does not only shed light on the admittedly ambiguous 
6:239 passage in the Metaphysics of Morals, but it is also justified from Kantian 
pƌeŵises, iŶ the seŶse that KaŶt͛s ethiĐs is tǇpiĐallǇ seeŶ as dutǇ-based ethics, and 
Kant himself is, above all, a philosopher of duty rather than a philosopher of right. I 
am convinced that if Kant was asked nowadays in the so-called human rights era, in 
which we give priority to rights over duties, to prioritize the one concept over the 
other, he would still put duties first rather than rights, steadily abstaining from the 
work of many 20th century thinkers who do exactly the opposite.542 In addition, if I 
have understood him well, I think he would never argue that duties and rights are 
normatively equivalent, or of mutual dependence. The fact that nowadays the 
eŵphasis is iŶdeed oŶ the idea of ͚ƌights͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ the idea of ͚duties͛, should Ŷot 
affect us, aŶd ǁe ŶeedŶ͛t adjust the Kantian text to contemporary standards. 
I return now to the initial question of this section, that is, the question of how 
exactly from 1) the Kantian duties of right, 2) the duties to others, 3) the perfect 
duties, and 4) the universal and specific duties, our human and socioeconomic rights 
are further developed. That which in the beginning seemed obscure is now clear. My 
analysis starting from the admittedly non-well-established by Kant, yet in many 
respects significant, 6:239 passage in the Metaphysics of Morals, according to which 
duties have priority over rights,543 has contributed to a better understanding of the 
uneasy Kantian derivation of rights from duties. Specifically, it has contributed to a 
better understanding of the derivation of human and socioeconomic rights from 1) 
                                                          
541 Gregor (1996), p. 395 
542 For example, John Rawls 
543 A normative priority of duties over rights is necessary to be established and highlighted for the 
argument of the thesis. Apparently, without showing the normative priority of duties over rights, we 
cannot further argue in favour of the grounding of the latter in the former.  
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the moral universal perfect duties of right to others, and 2) the moral specific perfect 
duties of right to others, respectively. 
More specifically, I first aƌgue that fƌoŵ ouƌ ͚uŶiǀeƌsal peƌfeĐt duties of ƌight 
to otheƌs͛, thƌough ǁhat KaŶt disĐusses aŶd shoǁs iŶ ϲ:Ϯϯϵ aŶd ϲ:ϮϰϬ, ouƌ ͚uŶiǀeƌsal 
huŵaŶ ƌights͛ aƌe generated or developed. It is not by accident the fact that Kant 
himself, in the right-haŶd side of his ϲ:ϮϰϬ sĐheŵa, iŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ ďetǁeeŶ the ͚dutǇ of 
ƌight͛ aŶd the ͚peƌfeĐt dutǇ͛, as ǁell as the ͚dutǇ to otheƌs͛, he ǁƌites the phƌase: ͚the 
ƌight of huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs͛. I aŵ ĐoŶǀiŶĐed that, eǀeŶ if KaŶt was not aware of the 
modern specific body of human rights (in plural), ͚the ƌight of huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs͛ (in 
singular) seems to me to reflect the modern idea of human rights. Second, I argue 
that, thƌough the saŵe KaŶtiaŶ passages, the ͚speĐifiĐ peƌfeĐt duties of ƌight to 
otheƌs͛ ĐaŶ gƌouŶd ouƌ ͚soĐioeĐoŶoŵiĐ ƌights͛. Of Đouƌse, this ĐategoƌǇ of ƌights is 
not shown in the Kantian 6:240 schema. It could then legitimately be argued that 
there cannot be a truly Kantian justification of socioeconomic rights. I totally agree 
with this statement. However, this does not mean that the modern concept of 
socioeconomic rights cannot legitimately be justified in broad deontological or 
Kantian terms. This is exactly the reason why, throughout the thesis, the word 
͚KaŶtiaŶ͛ iŶ the phƌase: ͚a Ŷeǁ ;KaŶtiaŶͿ dutǇ-based account for the justification of 
huŵaŶ aŶd soĐioeĐoŶoŵiĐ ƌights͛ is plaĐed iŶ paƌeŶtheses. 
After the presentation of the (Kantian) duty-based justification of human and 
socioeconomic rights, or the justification of human and socioeconomic rights in 
Kantian mode, or simply the Duty-Based Approach, I focus on two more issues:  
First, as has been mentioned above, my justification is based on and inspired 
by the right-hand side of the Kantian schema in 6:240; in particular on the top of it, 
ǁheƌe KaŶt ƌefeƌs to ͚duties of ƌight͛, ͚peƌfeĐt duties͛, ͚duties to otheƌs͛, aŶd ͚the 
ƌight of huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs͛. Neǀeƌtheless, the ďottoŵ of the ƌight-hand side of the same 
Kantian schema is not of less iŵpoƌtaŶĐe. Theƌe, KaŶt ƌefeƌs to ͚duties of ǀiƌtue͛, 
͚iŵpeƌfeĐt duties͛, ͚duties to otheƌs͛ ;oŶĐe ŵoƌeͿ, aŶd ͚the eŶd of huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs.͛ 
Following the above organization of the duties of right into two categories, namely 
into: 1) moral universal perfect duties of right to others, and 2) moral specific 
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perfect duties of right to others, one could further categorize duties of virtue into: 
1) moral universal imperfect duties of virtue to others, and 2) moral specific 
imperfect duties of virtue to others. What should be stressed here is that contrary 
to the former categorization of duties (of right), from the latter categorization of 
duties (of virtue) no rights can be derived. It is not by accident the fact that at the 
bottom of the right-hand side of the schema in 6:240, between the phrases 1) duty 
of virtue, 2) imperfect duty, and 3) duty to others, Kant does not mention the phrase 
͚the right of huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs͛ as he does pƌeǀiouslǇ, ďut the phƌase ͚the end of human 
ďeiŶgs͛ ;eŵphasis addedͿ. 
The second issue on which I focus here is the Kantian moral concept of 
human dignity and its role and place within a justification of human and 
socioeconomic rights. What most Kantian (as well as non-Kantian) scholars argue is 
that from our autonomy, interpreted as our capacity to make our own decisions 
independently, without guidance or coercion from others, our dignity is derived. It is 
this dignity, through the Formula of Humanity (4:429), in which our human rights are 
grounded.544 However, such arguments are not correct. Their fundamental problem 
is the mistaken interpretations, by many scholars and legal practitioners, of the 
grounding basis of human dignity, namely the moral concept of autonomy; and, 
subsequently, of the inner (not intrinsic or inherent)545 value and moral feeling of 
dignity itself. Contrary to the mistaken interpretations of autonomy and dignity, my 
own understanding of them, according to the conceptual analysis of autonomy via 
the sublime (chapter 3), is that the Kantian autonomous person is not the person 
who does as she pleases. Rather, the Kantian autonomous person is the person who, 
although she feels humiliated by the omnipotence of the moral law, abandons 
͚ǀolitioŶ͛, that is, heƌ iŶĐliŶatioŶs, ideologies, ǁishes aŶd so foƌth. The abandonment 
of the ͚ǀolitioŶ͛ is aĐĐoŵpaŶied ďǇ a free self-legislation, yet a legislation required 
from all others. Eventually, the autonomous person respects the moral ideas of 
reason, such as the fulfillment of her moral duties, realizing her higher self as 
                                                          
544 See for instance, Habermas (2010), pp. 464-480; Griffin (2008), p. 50; McCrudden (2013), pp. 313-
325; Bennett (2015). pp. 76-77.  
545 See also previous chapters 
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autonomous moral agent (self-approbation),546 while feeling (and being considered 
by others), at the same time, that she is a person with dignity.  
What must be added here is that it is not by accident the fact that Kant writes 
in 4:394 in the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals that the good will, namely 
the autonomy of the will, is the will of the person who feels aŶ ͚iŶŶeƌ ǀalue͛ oƌ 
͚digŶitǇ͛ iŶ his oǁŶ peƌsoŶ.547 Eventually, the Kantian dignified person is not a person 
who is simply independent and free from external coercion, but a person who can do 
heƌ dutǇ iŶ aĐĐoƌdaŶĐe ǁith the ŵoƌal laǁ͛s ĐoŵŵaŶds. CoŶseƋueŶtlǇ, the Kantian 
human dignity is not actually a feeling and value possessed by the right-holders. 
Rather it is a feeling and value attributed to the (autonomous) duty-bearers, who 
are capable of fulfilling their external moral duties, from which our human and 
socioeconomic rights are afterwards generated or developed.  
Overall, we may represent the new (Kantian) duty-based justification of 
human and socioeconomic rights, or the Duty-Based Approach (DBA), including the 
division between universal imperfect and specific imperfect duties, as well as the 
place of the moral concept (value/feeling) of human dignity, in the following 
diagram: 
                   Autonomy of the will   >   ethical lawgiving 
                    ↓                                                                    ↓ 
     Dignity (internally)                                 Moral duties (externally) 
                                                                                          ↓ 
1. UŶiǀersal perfeĐt duties of right to others → HuŵaŶ rights  
2. SpeĐifiĐ perfeĐt duties of right to others → SoĐioeĐoŶoŵiĐ rights 
3. UŶiǀersal iŵperfeĐt duties of ǀirtue to others → No rights 
4. SpeĐifiĐ iŵperfeĐt duties of ǀirtue to others → No rights        
                                                          
546 See 5:81, in Gregor (1996), p. 205 
547 Gregor (1996), p. 50. 
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Eventually, the new philosophical justification of human and socioeconomic 
rights provides the grounds for the clarification of the concept of these rights 
revealing their true nature as moral rights. Apparently, both human and 
soĐioeĐoŶoŵiĐ ƌights͛ ultiŵate souƌĐes aƌe the ŵoƌal laǁ aŶd the pƌaĐtiĐal ƌeasoŶ. 
Also, it clearly shows why only human rights can legitimately be considered as 
universal rights.548 In addition, through the new philosophical justification we can 
explain many of the rights found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For 
example, we can explain why we have the human right to life, liberty, and security 
(article 3, UDHR), the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law 
(article 6, UDHR), the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (article 
18, UDHR), the right to freedom of opinion and expression (article 19, UDHR), and so 
forth. Apparently, all these rights are owed to all people by all others. Further, the 
new justification shows why some rights are not genuine moral human rights. For 
example, the right to paid holidays (article 24, UDHR) is not actually a moral right; 
although this can be a legal right.549 Also, the new justificatory account offers the 
grounds for considering some new rights as genuine human or socioeconomic rights. 
For instance, the right of children to freedom from extreme poverty can be seen as a 
genuine socioeconomic right (chapter 5). Last but not least, the new Duty-Based 
Approach brings philosophy, in particular the Kantian duty-based ethics, at the heart 
of human rights law connecting the two disciplines.  
In order to shed more light on the above diagram, in what follows I offer an 
example of the Duty-Based AppƌoaĐh to the deteƌŵiŶatioŶ of a daughteƌ͛s ;CeliaͿ 
human and socioeconomic rights: 1) not to be injured and 2) to be taken care by her 
mother (Matina). These two rights are mentioned in article 19 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.550 Specifically, as an autonomous moral agent, 
                                                          
548 For a more detailed analysis of these two issues, see section 4 below, and chapter 5. 
549 See the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
550 See the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Available online from: 
https://downloads.unicef.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2010/05/UNCRC_united_nations_convention_on_the_rights_of_the_child.pdf?_ga=
2.103049216.1428236091.1516953269-181085288.1516953269 [accessed 26 January 2018]    
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the mother (MatinaͿ eǆeƌĐises heƌ ethiĐal laǁgiǀiŶg fuŶĐtioŶ of ŵoƌalitǇ. MatiŶa͛s 
external moral duties are grounded in her ethical lawgiving as has been described 
above. These external moral duties of the mother are further consisting of 1) her 
universal perfect duty of right, for example, not to injure her daughter (Celia), 2) her 
specific perfect duty of right, for example, to provide care to her Celia, 3) her 
universal imperfect duty of virtue, for example, to show concern to Celia, and, 
finally, 4) her specific imperfect duty of virtue, for example, to entertain Celia. If 
MatiŶa͛s fouƌ duties did Ŷot eǆist, theŶ Celia͛s ƌights deƌiǀed fƌoŵ theŵ ǁould Ŷot 
exist either.  
To be more specific, Celia has the right, for example, not to be injured by her 
mother (see article 19 of the UNCRC)551 only because her mother has the duty not to 
injure her. The priority of the duties over the rights is further established in the 
following section. In the same vein, Celia has the right, for example, to be taken care 
by her mother (see article 19 of the UNCRC) because her mother has the specific 
perfect duty of right to provide care to her. However, Celia does not seem to have 
the right, for example, to be subject of concern by her mother, as Matina has only a 
universal imperfect duty of virtue to show concern to her daughter. Similarly, Celia 
does not her the right, for example, to be entertained by her mother, as Matina has 
only a specific imperfect duty of virtue to entertain her daughter.  
Eventually, given that the mother, in this case, fulfils all her external moral 
duties, or at least the first two external moral duties, namely her duty not to injure 
and to provide care to her daughter, she feels internally that she is dignified. This 
internal or inner feeling or value of dignity must not be confused with an intrinsic or 
inherent value, namely a value that cannot ďe lost. MatiŶa͛s iŶŶeƌ feeliŶg of digŶitǇ 
                                                          
551 According to article 19 of the UNCRC: ͚ϭͿ “tates Paƌties shall take all appƌopƌiate legislatiǀe, 
administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or 
mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, 
including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person who has 
the Đaƌe of the Đhild.͛ Aǀailaďle fƌoŵ: https://doǁŶloads.uŶiĐef.oƌg.uk/ǁp-
content/uploads/2010/05/UNCRC_united_nations_convention_on_the_rights_of_the_child.pdf?_ga=
2.103049216.1428236091.1516953269-181085288.1516953269 [accessed 26 January 2018]    
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can indeed be lost, if, for example, she does not fuflill her relevant duties towards 
her daughter. At the same time, this value (dignity) is also one attributed to Matina 
by others. This example of the relationship between a mother and daughter is 
application of what has already been argued at theoretical level in this and the 
previous chapter. Here is a schema representing my thoughts: 
          MatiŶa͛s autoŶoŵǇ of the ǁill   >   MatiŶa͛s ethiĐal laǁgiǀiŶg 
                    ↓                                                                       ↓ 
  MatiŶa͛s digŶitǇ ;iŶterŶallǇͿ                              MatiŶa͛s ŵoral duties ;eǆterŶallǇͿ 
                                                                                               ↓ 
1. MatiŶa͛s uŶiǀersal perfeĐt dutǇ of right Ŷot to iŶjure Celia→ Celia͛s huŵaŶ 
right not to be injured by her mother (see article 19 of the UNCRC552)  
2. MatiŶa͛s speĐifiĐ perfeĐt dutǇ of right to proǀide Đare to her Celia → Celia͛s 
socioeconomic right to be taken care by her mother (see article 19 of the 
UNCRC) 
3. MatiŶa͛s uŶiǀersal iŵperfeĐt dutǇ of ǀirtue to shoǁ ĐoŶĐerŶ to Celia→ No 
Celia͛s right to ďe suďjeĐt of concern by her mother 
4. MatiŶa͛s speĐifiĐ iŵperfeĐt dutǇ of ǀirtue to eŶtertaiŶ Celia→ No Celia͛s 
right to be entertained by her mother        
At this point, it might be argued that theƌe ĐaŶ also ďe a ͚speĐifiĐ iŵpeƌfeĐt dutǇ 
of ǀiƌtue͛ of MatiŶa ;ŵotheƌͿ to love Celia (her daughter). Incidentally, the right to 
be loved and its corresponding duty are very popular today.553 However, in the 
Metaphysics of Morals Kant explicitly argues that there is not a duty to love (e.g. 
oŶe͛s Ŷeighďour) because love is not a judgment that can be commanded by reason; 
rather it is a feeling that cannot be commanded.554 AĐĐoƌdiŶg to the ͚ĐoŵŵaŶdiďilitǇ 
oďjeĐtioŶ͛, to haǀe a dutǇ to do soŵethiŶg, the aĐtioŶ ŵust ďe ĐoŵŵaŶdaďle. Foƌ 
                                                          
552 See article 19 of the UNCRC 
553 See for instance, Liao (2015) 
554 Gregor (1996), p. 528. 
197 
 
iŶstaŶĐe, TaǇloƌ aƌgues that ͚loǀe, as a feeliŶg, cannot be commanded, even by God, 
simply because it is not up to anyone at any given moment how he feels about his 
Ŷeighďouƌ oƌ aŶǇthiŶg else͛.555 Consequently, if there is not a duty to love, it follows 
that there cannot conceptually be a right to be loved.  
Nevertheless, as has been shown in the previous chapter, the sublime is a public 
feeling arising from the public validity of a judgment. Kant prioritizes the feeling and 
the judgment accordingly, that is, he puts the judgment first, and the feeling derived 
from it second. He claims that the universal communicability in the given 
representation underlying the aesthetic judgment of the sublime, as its subjective 
condition, precedes the feeling derived from the sublime.556 As has been stressed 
(chapter 3), the universal communicability underlying the aesthetic judgment of the 
sublime not only comes first but also it is to a great extent the basis of the feeling, in 
the seŶse that oŶe͛s aďilitǇ to ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate oŶe͛s ŵeŶtal state Đaƌƌies the ƌeleǀaŶt 
feeling with it.  
Here it might be claimed –of course not in strictly Kantian terms– that, similarly 
to the sublime, the feeling of love is a public feeling arising from the public validity of 
the judgment about love. That is to say, the universal communicability underlying 
the moral judgment of love, as its subjective condition, is the basis of the feeling of 
loǀe, iŶ the seŶse that oŶe͛s aďilitǇ to ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate oŶe͛s ŵeŶtal state of loǀe 
carries the feeling of love with it. Hence, a mother can genuinely feel that she loves 
her unborn baby even from the very first moment she learns she is pregnant. 
Apparently, the moment she learns she is pregnant mother does not love the foetus 
that she has not even seen yet.557 But, a (public) feeling of love to her unborn baby is 
deƌiǀed afteƌ she ͚uŶiǀeƌsallǇ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐates͛ the uŶdeƌlǇiŶg ŵoƌal judgŵeŶt 
according to which it is the right or moral thing to love her unborn baby. That is to 
say, in giving her this reason to love her child, there is a good chance that she will 
love the child.558 Of course, the same applies not only to biological parents, but also 
                                                          
555 Taylor (1970), pp. 252-253. 
556 Ak 217, Kant (1987), p. 61. 
557 For a similar view see Liao (2015), p. 106. 
558 Liao (2015), p. 106. 
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to same sex couples, step-parents, grandparents, even members of local authorities 
which can acquire the parental responsibility when all others are unavailable. Yet, 
this does not apply to all others, given that it would be impractical if everyone tried 
to fulfill the duty to love a child at the same time.559 
One could counter here that by loving the child because this is the right or moral 
thiŶg to do, oƌ foƌ dutǇ͛s sake, or for the sake of moral law, mother is not actually 
ŵotiǀated to loǀe the Đhild foƌ Đhild͛s sake.560 However, this is not always true. The 
taxi driver may bring me to the University because it is his duty, and not because he 
is doing it for my sake, e.g. in order to meet my supervisor. But many times, the two 
motives are identified. For example, a mother loves her child both because this is the 
ƌight oƌ ŵoƌal thiŶg to do, aŶd foƌ heƌ Đhild͛s sake. Also, ŵǇ fƌieŶd Joel, who is a 
professional cook, is motivated to prepare a delicious cheeseburger for me, when I 
visit him at the pub, not only because this is his duty, but also because he wants to 
do it for me. By cooking for me as well, Joel does not violate a normative 
requirement according to which in personal relationships we have the duty to do 
things only for one thing, that is, for the otheƌ peƌsoŶ͛s sake.561 Even in this case, 
there is not one reason only. By respecting his duty to cook for me only, Joel is 
actually acting from two motives, namely from the motive of duty and from the 
motive of cooking for me. Apparently, such an argument would be self-defeating. As 
Liao suggests, impartiality is important in personal relationships. In particular, Liao 
mentions the example of one whose wife is injured and another man is drowning. 
Obviously, the husband has to rescue the man who is drowning instead of his wife.562 
Ultimately, even Kant himself writes in the Metaphysics of Morals ͚… ǁe haǀe 
brought a person into the world without his consent and on our own initiative, for 
which deed the parents incur an obligation to make the child content with his 
ĐoŶditioŶ so faƌ as theǇ ĐaŶ͛.563 
                                                          
559 Liao suggests four criteria: responsibility, proximity, ability, and motivation; see Liao (2015), p. 135. 
560 Williams (1981), p. 18. 
561 Williams (1981), p. 18. 
562 Liao (2015), pp. 127-128. 
563 Gregor (1996), p. 64. 
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In addition, apart from the Kantian aesthetic theory, in the cognitive theory of 
emotions, it is clearly stated that all feelings and emotions are based on judgments. 
Under this view, it might similarly be argued that love involves a moral judgment 
from which the feeling of love is afterwards generated.564 Of course, that is not the 
case with other feelings, such as the feelings of lust, infatuation, Eros, which typically 
do Ŷot iŶǀolǀe the eǆeƌĐise of oŶe͛s judgŵeŶt, ďut theǇ all ƌefeƌ to oŶe͛s iŶstiŶĐts, 
inclinations, desires, and so forth. Finally, by arguing that cultivation does involve 
reflection, Aristotle leads us to the same conclusion, namely that a rational, 
autonomous, moral judgment may be the source of a genuine emotional capacity 
or/and feeling, such as the feeling of love.565  
Eventually it can be argued that from the judgment of love which is commanded 
by pure practical reason, and precedes the relevant feeling of love, a commendable 
duty to love a child, or a neighbour and so forth, is legitimately derived. Here I must 
point out that my argumentation concerning the demandable character of the duty 
to loǀe diffeƌs fƌoŵ ‘az͛s Đlaiŵ that loǀe ĐaŶ ďe ĐoŵŵaŶded ďeĐause it is aŶ 
attitude.566 This is a misguided view. There might be a person A having all the 
external attitudes typically associated with love for a person B, yet it does not follow 
that A loǀes B. Foƌ eǆaŵple, B ŵaǇ ďe A͛s eǆ-boyfriend whom A had loved once but 
not anymore.567 Ultimately, it is up to someone, for example to a mother, to love her 
foetus or baby, or child.  
Consequently, although Kant explicitly says that there cannot be a duty to love 
because love is not a judgment commanded by reason, his aesthetic theory, in 
particular his definition of the sublime, both as a judgment and a feeling following 
this judgment, allows for arguing that there can indeed be a duty to love (e.g. a child) 
                                                          
564 See for instance, Solomon (1977), pp. 28-30 
565 Aristotle (1980) 
566 Raz (1994), p. 11. 
567 ‘eĐeŶtlǇ Liao has aƌgued that theƌe ĐaŶ ďe ďoth a dutǇ to loǀe a Đhild, aŶd a Đhild͛s ƌight to ďe 
loved as a fundamental condition for her to pursue a good life, see Liao (2015), pp. 4-5, 99-100. I am 
discussing this issue thoƌoughlǇ iŶ as sepaƌate papeƌ titled ͚Ex nihilo nihil: the case of the duty and the 
ƌight to loǀe͛ ;Woƌk iŶ pƌogƌessͿ 
200 
 
arising from the judgment preceding the (subsequent) feeling of love. This duty to 
love to, e.g. a Đhild, is iŶ ŵǇ ǀieǁ a ͚speĐifiĐ iŵpeƌfeĐt dutǇ of ǀiƌtue͛. Fiƌst, it is a 
͚speĐifiĐ͛ dutǇ ďeĐause it ĐaŶŶot ďe oǁed to soŵeoŶe ďǇ all otheƌs; ƌatheƌ it ĐaŶ oŶlǇ 
ďe oǁed to soŵeoŶe ďǇ speĐifiĐ otheƌs. “eĐoŶd, it is aŶ ͚iŵpeƌfeĐt͛ dutǇ ďeĐause it 
requires only the setting of ends, leaving agents discretion on when and how to act. 
Thiƌd, it is a dutǇ of ͚ǀiƌtue͛ ďeĐause it is ŶoŶ-claimable, hence non-externally 
enforceable. Ultimately, this specific imperfect duty of virtue cannot conceptually 
ground a right of a child, or a neighbour, and so on, to be loved. 
This brings me to the end of this section, in which the Duty-Based Account has 
been presented. The new (Kantian) duty-based justification of human and 
socioeconomic rights applies to the rights of all beings: normal adult human beings, 
iŵŵigƌaŶts, ƌefugees, the ͚apatƌides͛, the pooƌ, hoŵoseǆuals, ďiseǆuals, 
transsexuals, those who live in countries which have not the characteristics of a 
democracy, those who live in non-democratic countries, those who still live in 
isolated jungle tribes in the world, embryos, babies, children, the comatose, the 
mentally disabled, animals, plants, possible future human beings, beings from outer 
space, and so forth. In all these cases: 1) the duty-bearers are all rational beings; 2) 
the content of the duties owed corresponds to the two fundamental categories of 
rights, namely to civil/political and socioeconomic rights; and 3) the right-holders are 
those to whom the relevant duties are owed –in spite of the fact that there might be 
other people appointed to represent them in certain circumstances. Only the case of 
non-living human beings is slightly different; hence, it is discussed separately below. 
To conclude, in this section, I have presented the new Kantian justification for 
human rights, as well as the new duty-based justificatory account for socioeconomic 
rights. What effectively characterizes the new Duty-Based Approach is: 1) the 
priority of the concept of duties over the concept of rights, and 2) the distinction 
between human and socioeconomic rights. Now regarding the first issue, the 
question here arises as to why duties are more fundamental than rights. Regarding 
the second issue, the question arises as to why human rights are distinct from 
socioeconomic rights. In the following section, these two issues are the first to be 
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discussed within the context of responding to possible objections against the new 
Duty Based Approach. 
 
3. Possible objections against the new Duty-Based Approach 
In this section, I respond to four possible objections against the new Duty-Based 
Approach. Within this context, I first establish the moral priority of duties over rights; 
second, I explain why socioeconomic rights are not actually human rights; third, I 
shed light on the relation ďetǁeeŶ KaŶt͛s ŵoƌal philosophǇ aŶd his legal aŶd politiĐal 
theory; and, fourth, I explain the reasons why Kant is not a moral constructivist. 
 
ϯ.ϭ ͚A paƌadigŵ shift͛ – from rights to duties 
͚To speak of a uŶiǀeƌsal ƌight is to speak of a uŶiǀeƌsal dutǇ…  
Indeed, if this universal duty were not imposed,  
ǁhat seŶse Đould ďe ŵade of the ĐoŶĐept of a uŶiǀeƌsal huŵaŶ ƌight?͛  
Maurice Cranston568 
 
Here I respond to the first possible objection against the new Duty-Based Approach, 
namely that by putting duties first, the new (Kantian) duty-based justification of 
human and socioeconomic rights degrades the notion of rights. 
As has been mentioned in chapter 1, since 1948, the moral, legal, and 
political concept of human rights has been widely accepted, and the relevant rights 
have further been ratified by most of the countries. The world has been dominated 
by the concept of human rights for more than five decades, that is, from the end of 
the Second World War until the beginning of the 21st century. However, during the 
                                                          
568 Cranston (1973), p. 69.  
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last two decades the dominance of the idea of human rights seems to have been 
weakened, and the general dominance of the concept of human rights has been 
gƌeatlǇ ĐhalleŶged. This ǁas laƌgelǇ the ƌesult of the ͚iŶsisteŶĐe͛ of a gƌeat Ŷuŵďeƌ of 
rights violations in the world, despite the rich legal framework and the international 
political initiative for the promotion and protection of human rights. One need only 
read the weekly ͚HuŵaŶ ‘ights WatĐh͛ ƌepoƌts to see hoǁ ŵaŶǇ iŶfƌiŶgeŵeŶts oĐĐuƌ 
on a daily basis.569 As has already been mentioned, the two main problems of human 
rights are basically: 1) their indeterminacy, abstractness, and vagueness; and 2) their 
difficulty to be universally accepted. Hence, mainly because of the numerous 
violations which still persist, as well as these two problems, human rights have 
recently come under increasing attack. The opponents of human rights argue that 
human rights have failed to accomplish their objectives, that there may not be such 
things as human rights, and, eventually, that we should reject the idea of human 
rights. The critique against human rights comes not only from ordinary people, 
journalists, politicians, and legal practitioners, but also from a number of political 
theorists, legal scholars, and moral philosophers.  
Among the contemporary thinkers who have vehemently attacked the 
concept of human rights is Alasdair MacIntyre. In his After Virtue: A Study in Moral 
Theory, MacIntyre claims that the concept of rights has generally a prominent role 
ǁithiŶ the ŵodeƌŶ ŵoƌal sĐheŵe. BǇ ͚ƌights͛, MaĐIŶtǇƌe does not mean the rights 
conferred upon us by positive law or custom, but the rights possessed by human 
ďeiŶgs iŶ ǀiƌtue of theiƌ huŵaŶitǇ, that is, ͚huŵaŶ ƌights͛. HeŶĐe, huŵaŶ ƌights, 
MacIntyre claims, are rights which are supposed to attach equally to all human 
beings independently of their sex, race, religion, talents, deserts and so forth.570 
Theƌe is ĐleaƌlǇ Ŷo ƌeasoŶ to ĐouŶteƌ MaĐIŶtǇƌe͛s Đlaiŵs aďout huŵaŶ ƌights so faƌ. It 
turns out to be his following claims about human rights which are questionable. 
Specifically, MacIntyre argues that it would be odd one to think that there could be 
rights attached to human beings as such, that is, simply qua human beings. Until the 
middle ages, he claims, there is actually no expression in any ancient or medieval 
                                                          
569 Available from: https://www.hrw.org/publications [accessed 1 November 2017] 
570 MacIntyre (2007), pp. 68-69.  
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laŶguage that Đould ďe tƌaŶslated as ͚ƌight͛. MaĐIŶtǇƌe eǆpliĐitlǇ deĐlaƌes that ͚theƌe 
aƌe Ŷo suĐh ƌights, aŶd ďelief iŶ theŵ is oŶe ǁith ďelief iŶ ǁitĐhes aŶd iŶ uŶiĐoƌŶs͛, 
as ǁell as that ͚...eǀeƌǇ atteŵpt to giǀe good ƌeasoŶs foƌ ďelieǀiŶg that theƌe are 
suĐh ƌights has failed͛.571 He then argues that we consider human rights to be self-
evident truths or intuitions; but we know very well, he continues, that there are 
neither self-evident truths, nor intuitions arising from good arguments. MacIntyre 
eventually concludes that human rights are just fictions.572 In what follows I evaluate 
his stance towards the idea of human rights. 
I do not agree with MacIntyre that the concept of human rights did not exist 
before the middle ages. Even before, say, the Magna Carta (1225), that is the English 
Charter of Liberties which influenced the development of the English Bill of Rights 
(1689) and, later, the United States Constitution (1789, year effective), the idea of 
rights did exist.573 For instance, under the Constitution of Medina drawn up in 622, 
non-Muslims had the same political and cultural rights as Muslims; they had 
autonomy and freedom of religion.574 Also, it is argued that some principles of 
human rights were established in the 6th century BC under Cyrus the Great.575 In any 
case, contrary to MacIntyre, I argue that from the fact that a concept has not (yet) 
been clearly expressed, it does not follow that it does not exist. That is to say, from 
every weakness or lack regarding the use of words, it does not follow that there is 
also weakness or lack concerning the meaning of words. Hence, from the fact that 
human rights were clearly expressed late in the history of humanity, it does not 
follow that their idea did not exist. 
                                                          
571 MacIntyre (2007), p. 69.  
572 MacIntyre (2007), pp. 69-70. 
573 For the Magna Carta, the United States Constitution, and the Bill of Rights, see online 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-human/ [accessed 20 January 2019] 
574 Of Đouƌse, oŶ the ĐoŶditioŶ theǇ ͚folloǁed͛ Musliŵs; see LeĐkeƌ ;ϮϬϬϰͿ; also, AƌtiĐle Ϯϱ, as Ƌuoted 
in Ahmad (1979), pp. 46-47. 
575 “ee foƌ iŶstaŶĐe, the CǇƌus CǇliŶdeƌ oƌ CǇƌus Chaƌteƌ, ǁhiĐh is ƌegaƌded as the ǁoƌld͛s fiƌst Chaƌteƌ 
of human rights; see MacGregor, N. (2004) 
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Further, through MaĐIŶtǇƌe͛s ĐƌitiƋue aŶd oďjeĐtioŶ to the idea of huŵaŶ 
rights, in particular his claim that ͚theƌe aƌe Ŷo suĐh ƌights͛, I aŵ afƌaid that he 
seriously tends to nihilism. Through such statement, the contemporary discussion 
about human rights can only be led to the abyss of nothingness. But such a nihilistic 
stance would have little to offer to the world today, in which numerous violations of 
human rights take place on a daily basis, and we have the duty to react upon them in 
an urgent and decisive way. In the same vein, MaĐIŶtǇƌe͛s Đlaiŵ that ͚huŵaŶ ƌights 
aƌe fiĐtioŶs͛, could be countered (yet in non-deontological or Kantian terms) through 
the claim that eǀeŶ if huŵaŶ ƌights aƌe just ͚fiĐtioŶs͛, theƌe aƌe iŶdeed fiĐtioŶs ǁhiĐh 
are very ͚useful͛. Also, the Đlaiŵ that huŵaŶ ƌights aƌe just fiĐtioŶs is iŶ effeĐt 
ideŶtified ǁith the Đlaiŵ that ƌights aƌe the oďjeĐts of ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ ;O͛NeillͿ oƌ 
procedure (Rawls).576 But in neither a fictional right, nor in a right which is object of 
construction or procedure, can one believe more than in an existing right. 
Apparently, the normative force of a fictional right, or a right which has been 
logically constructed, or is the result of a certain procedure, is limited because 
rational beings, including human beings, by nature, believe in and show respect to 
what exists rather than what has just been constructed or created. For example, if 
both Heidegger and some of his greatest works were in danger, e.g. the former was 
drowning and the latter were to be burned, we would give more priority to the living 
human being (Heidegger) rather than the non-living things (his books). 
Consequently, Đlaiŵs, suĐh as that ͚there are no human rights, and that 
͚huŵaŶ ƌights aƌe fiĐtioŶs͛, should ďe aǀoided ǁithiŶ the ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ huŵaŶ ƌights 
discourse. The main goal of the present thesis is to show that human rights, as well 
as socioeconomic rights, are neither fictions/constructions/objects of procedure, nor 
͚useful͛ fiĐtioŶs/ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶs/oďjeĐts of pƌoĐeduƌe, ďut theǇ do exist, they can be 
discovered, and they are real. Specifically, because rights are grounded in moral 
duties, which are real –if one is inclined at least to accept that the moral is real in 
some way and to some extent– they (rights) are real too. Eventually, the moral 
existence of human and socioeconomic rights which has been established in the 
                                                          
576 Foƌ iŶstaŶĐe, ďoth O͛Neill aŶd ‘aǁls ďelieǀe that justiĐe ŵaǇ ǁell ďe the ƌesult of a speĐifiĐ 
construction and procedure, respectively. 
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pƌeǀious seĐtioŶ diƌeĐtlǇ opposes MaĐIŶtǇƌe͛s aŶd otheƌs͛ ŶihilistiĐ stateŵeŶts that 
rights are just self-evident truths or intuitions based on bad arguments. Rather, it is 
obvious that there are actually some moral or good reasons for believing in and 
respecting both human and socioeconomic rights. 
Nevertheless, in spite of the significance of human rights, we must not 
overlook the fact that numerous rights violations still occur worldwide, that human 
and socioeconomic rights still remain an indeterminate, vague concept, and finally 
that they have not been accepted by all people and states around the world. The 
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Raad al-Hussein, a strong advocate 
for human rights, in a recent email to his staff announced that he will step down 
after his term ends in summer 2018. He explained that the climate for human rights 
has gotten too bad, and that a second four-year term would require compromises 
contradicting his own moral judgments. Such a decision shows that even the UN 
human rights system cannot function effectively anymore within the current 
geopolitical context.577 All these obstacles are actually the main reasons why, during 
the last decade, a great number of rights-based justifications have been proposed by 
moral, legal, and political thinkers, in order to show more clearly the grounds and 
the nature of these rights. However, as has previously been shown (chapters 1, 2, 
and 3) most of these justificatory accounts suffer from serious flaws; hence the 
formulation of the new (Kantian) duty-based account proposed in the present 
chapter. 
More specifically, contrary to the discussed rights-based, dignity-based, and 
the two Kantian-based justificatory accounts, which have been built on the basis of 
the priority of rights/dignity over duties, the account, in section two above, has been 
built on the general ideas that 1) we must not afraid of questioning our established 
truths, such as the truth of rights/dignity; and 2) that what eventually gives meaning 
to our lives is not ourselves, but our concern for others through the fulfilment of our 
external moral duties. Hence, the justification in the present thesis is a duty-based 
                                                          
577 See Erickson (2017) 
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justification aimed to give precedence to the duties that have to be met to secure 
rights. Here, it could be argued that, for instance, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) do actually assign to the signatory states the duties which 
have to be met, in order to secure the rights in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR). My counter-argument is that what they actually do, both the ICCPR 
and the ICE“C‘, is to assigŶ to states oŶlǇ ͚seĐoŶd-oƌdeƌ͛ duties to alloĐate aŶd 
enforce some duties that simply ensure respect, or support the realization of the 
rights in the two Covenants. For example, in article 2 of the ICESCR, is written that 
͚each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by 
all appƌopƌiate ŵeaŶs, iŶĐludiŶg paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ the adoptioŶ of legislatiǀe ŵeasuƌes͛.578  
Nevertheless, takiŶg iŶto ĐoŶsideƌatioŶ oŶlǇ ͚seĐoŶd-oƌdeƌ͛ duties does Ŷot 
effectively reassure rights.579 Thus, within the context of the international justice 
todaǇ, ŵoƌe eŵphasis has to ďe giǀeŶ to ͚fiƌst-oƌdeƌ͛ duties as ǁell. MǇ Đlaiŵ theŶ is 
that through the elaboration and development of the first-order duties, we would 
more effectively secure the rights in the declarations, conventions, and treaties. My 
further claim is that these first-order duties are morally more significant than rights. 
The reasons why duties have in effect moral priority over rights is answered in the 
following section.   
 
                                                          
578 Available from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx [accessed 2 
March 2018].  
579This crucial point was thoroughly discussed by Onora O͛Neill oŶ ϮϮ FeďƌuaƌǇ ϮϬϭϴ iŶ QUB 
“Ǉŵposiuŵ ǁith C. MĐCƌuddeŶ aŶd O. O͛Neill, https://ǁǁǁ.Ƌuď.aĐ.uk/IŶteƌŶatioŶal/gloďal-
challenge-debates/human-rights-age-trump-brexit/ [accessed 1 March 2018]  
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3.1.1 Taking duties seriously580 
͚The ŶotioŶ of oďligatioŶs Đoŵes ďefoƌe that of ƌights, ǁhiĐh is 
subordinate and relative to the former. A right is not effectual by 
itself, but only in relation to the obligation to which it corresponds, 
the effective exercise of a right springing not from the individual who 
possesses it, but from other men who consider themselves as being 
uŶdeƌ a ĐeƌtaiŶ oďligatioŶ toǁaƌds hiŵ.͛ 
Simone Weil581 
Before I explain why I think duties take moral precedence over rights within the 
context of an autonomous society, I provide a brief overview of the history of the 
ĐoŶĐept of ͚dutǇ͛, ǁhiĐh shoǁs that the ĐoŶĐept of ͚ƌight͛ ǁas Ŷot alǁaǇs iŶ the fƌoŶt 
line as it is today. On the contrary, duties were considered as more important than 
rights in the past; and many thinkers believed that we can enjoy the latter only if we 
exercise the former. Hence, the new Duty-Based Account for the justification of 
human and socioeconomic rights, may be unfamiliar for most of the 20th century 
thinkers, yet absolutely familiar, even favorable, for other thinkers in the past. 
Within this context, I go back to Cicero, Aquinas, Kant, and Hohfeld, who are 
considered to be the prominent contributors to the literatures that take duties 
seriously. 
 To ďegiŶ ǁith, the ĐoŶĐept of ͚dutǇ͛ aŶd its pƌioƌitǇ oǀeƌ the ĐoŶĐept of ͚ƌight͛ 
were both central ideas in the philosophical work of Cicero. In his last treatise De 
Officiis (On Duties), Cicero expands his notion on moral duties emphasizing the 
meaning of them in relation to ourselves and our communities.582 More specifically, 
CiĐeƌo distiŶguishes ďetǁeeŶ ͚ŵiddle͛ aŶd ͚Đoŵplete͛ duties. OŶ the oŶe haŶd, a 
middle duty is a duty for which a convincing reason must be given as to why it has to 
                                                          
580 For the development of this section, I am grateful to Onoƌa O͛Neill foƌ all ouƌ disĐussioŶs duƌiŶg 
the last three years. 
581 Weil (1952), p. 3. 
582 Cicero (1991) 
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be done; and, oŶ the otheƌ haŶd, a Đoŵplete dutǇ is ǁhat is ͚ƌight͛.583 CiĐeƌo͛s 
distiŶĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ͚ŵiddle͛ aŶd ͚Đoŵplete͛ duties ƌeseŵďles KaŶt͛s distiŶĐtioŶ 
ďetǁeeŶ ͚iŵpeƌfeĐt͛ aŶd ͚peƌfeĐt͛ duties, ƌespeĐtiǀelǇ. That is to saǇ, ǁhile a ŵiddle 
or imperfect duty is a more flexible duty that can be overridden, a complete or 
perfect duty is a duty that must be fulfilled under any circumstances. Also, of all 
duties, Cicero emphasizes the significance of the duties of justice which, looking to 
the flourishing of mankind, should be seen as sacred. To this, Cicero adds that when 
one has to choose between duties, he or she must give priority to the duties which 
are associated with the human fellowship.584 Ultimately, what must be stressed is 
that according to Cicero all duties are grounded in human reason. Contrary to 
animals, says Cicero, men do not just respond to senses, but their reason drives 
them to devote themselves to providing whatever may comfort themselves and 
others.585 
In the same vein, Thomas Aquinas emphasizes the significance of the concept 
of ͚dutǇ͛. Moƌe speĐifiĐallǇ, the Summa Theologiae is a work through which men are 
Đalled to do theiƌ duties foƌ dutǇ͛s sake puttiŶg aside theiƌ egoistiĐ ĐoŶsideƌatioŶs, iŶ 
order to serve not only the collective good, but also the bonum universal, which is 
God.586 Similarly to Cicero, Aquinas here seems to adopt not just a purely 
deontological perspective regarding the concept of duty, and its role in morality, but 
a mixed perspective, that is, one that combines deontological and utilitarian 
elements. Through this perspective is eventually stressed that people who do their 
duty flourish themselves and their communities (Cicero and Aquinas), and are led to 
the highest pleasure, that is, to the enjoyment of the transcendent good, that is, God 
(Aquinas).  
Aquinas also claims that only by doing voluntarily, that is, by own free will, 
our duty, or what we ought to do, we acquire value as human beings.587 Aquinas 
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argues that such a will is a good will which is grounded in God, who directly inclines 
our wills to good, and does not hinder them (our wills) from evil.588 By implying that 
our own free will is what locates good and evil within the realm of human morality, 
AƋuiŶas effeĐtiǀelǇ aĐĐepts ŵeŶ͛s ŵoƌal ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ iŶ the ƌealŵ of huŵaŶ affaiƌs; 
hence, he does not exclude punishment as a result of crime being committed.589 
WithiŶ this ĐoŶteǆt, he eǆpliĐitlǇ saǇs: ͚‘easoŶ aŶd eteƌŶal laǁ aƌe iŶtƌoduĐed iŶto 
the explanation of sin, not to substitute external obligation for inner finality, but 
because of the proper and formal way in which man is subject to his own inner 
fiŶalizatioŶ͛.590 EǀeŶtuallǇ, AƋuiŶas does Ŷot seeŵ to ƌeĐogŶize oŶlǇ God͛s 
contribution to good aŶd eǀil iŶ huŵaŶitǇ, ďut also ouƌ oǁŶ ƌeasoŶ͛s ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ to 
it, bridging the gap between the principles of Christianity and Humanity.   
Moƌeoǀeƌ, iŶ KaŶt͛s deoŶtologiĐal theoƌǇ duties aƌe displaǇed pƌoŵiŶeŶtlǇ. 
Duty or what is owed is at the centre of the Kantian ethics. Kant writes in 5:82 in the 
Critique of Practical Reason: ͚DutǇ aŶd ǁhat is oǁed aƌe the oŶlǇ Ŷaŵes that ǁe 
ŵust giǀe to ouƌ ƌelatioŶ to the ŵoƌal laǁ͛.591 Kant does not present a full system of 
duties in the Groundwork. Yet, he does present a system of duties in the 
Metaphysics of Morals, which is typically seen as the Kantian work directed at the 
͚eŵpiƌiĐal͛. Moƌe speĐifiĐallǇ, KaŶt distiŶguishes ďetǁeeŶ duties of ƌight aŶd duties 
of virtue. In 6:239, in the Metaphysics of Morals, KaŶt ǁƌites: ͚All duties aƌe eitheƌ 
duties of right (officia iuris), that is duties for which external lawgiving is possible, or 
duties of virtue (officia virtutis s. ethica), for which external lawgiving is not 
possiďle͛.592 Kant further divides duties into duties to oneself and duties to respect 
others, as well as into perfect and imperfect duties, namely duties which cannot be 
overridden, and duties which allow for freedom concerning their fulfillment. The 
Kantian divisions of moral duties have analytically been shown in the previous 
section. 
                                                          
588 Aquinas (1969), p. 207 
589 Aquinas (1974), p. 10, note a. 
590 Aquinas (1974), p. 101, 103 
591 Gregor (1996), p. 206. 
592 Gregor (1996), pp. 394-395 
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Ultimately, the Kantian supreme principle of morality, that is, the autonomy 
of the will, or the good will, is the basis of all Kantian moral duties (see section two). 
Here I recall the full definition of the Kantian autonomy of the will, after its 
conceptual analysis through the aesthetic judgment and feeling of the sublime in the 
previous chapter:  
Autonomy of the will is both the judgment and feeling of autonomous moral 
agents who, although they feel humiliated by the omnipotence of the moral 
laǁ, they aďaŶdoŶ ͚ǀolitioŶ͛, that is, theiƌ iŶĐliŶatioŶs, ideologies, ǁishes aŶd 
so forth, and, freely self-legislating –yet requiring the same legislation from 
all others– respect the moral ideas of reason, such as the fulfillment of their 
moral duties, realizing their higher self as autonomous moral agents (self-
approbation593). 
FiŶallǇ, WesleǇ NeǁĐoŵď Hohfeld aƌgues that the ĐoŶĐepts of ͚ƌights͛ aŶd 
͚duties͛ aƌe Đoƌƌelatiǀe ĐoŶĐepts, i.e. the one must always be matched by the 
other.594 HeŶĐe, Hohfeld uses the teƌŵ ͚Đlaiŵ-ƌight͛ to deŶote a ƌight ǁhiĐh is 
correlated with the duties of another or others. These duties typically refer to either 
refraining from actions impeding the right-holder in her exercise of the right, or 
performing actions through which the duty-bearer gives the right-holder the thing 
she has a right to, or helps her to have, or does the thing the right-holder has a right 
to. That is to say, a claim right refers to the idea that a person has a moral or legal 
claim to something; and this right is correlated with a duty of others (duty-bearers) 
to refrain from the enjoyment, or to perform acts leading to the enjoyment of the 
relevant thing by the right-holder.  
Following Cicero, Aquinas, Kant, and Hohfeld, I generally argue that duties or 
obligations are more fundamental than rights, and that, contrary to the twentieth 
century ethical approach according to which rights have priority over duties, it is 
actually a mistake for one to emphasize rights overlooking duties or obligations. As 
                                                          
593 See 5:81, in Gregor (1996), p. 205 
594 Hohfeld (1917), pp. 710-770 
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O͛Neill has ƌeĐeŶtlǇ aƌgued, a shift is ŶeĐessaƌǇ todaǇ fƌoŵ the peƌspeĐtiǀe of 
ƌeĐipieŶĐe foĐused oŶ the ƋuestioŶ of ͚ǁhat ought ǁe to ƌeĐeiǀe?͛ to the peƌspeĐtiǀe 
of agency focused on the fundamental questioŶ of ͚ǁhat ought ǁe to do?͛595 
Incidentally, although the teƌŵ ͚oďligatioŶ͛ is ŵoƌe ofteŶ assoĐiated ǁith laǁ, ǁhile 
the teƌŵ ͚dutǇ͛ is tǇpiĐallǇ ƌelated to ŵoƌalitǇ, iŶ the pƌeseŶt thesis the teƌŵs ͚dutǇ͛ 
aŶd ͚oďligatioŶ͛ aƌe used iŶteƌĐhaŶgeaďlǇ as approximate synonyms.596 Hence, I use 
ďoth the ǁoƌds ͚dutǇ͛ aŶd ͚oďligatioŶ͛ to deŶote the ͚ought͛, that is, soŵethiŶg that 
has to be done by someone. 
However, even though I agree with all the aforementioned thinkers that 
duties are more basic or fundamental than rights, I do not think they have 
thoroughly shown why the former are more fundamental than the latter. Simply to 
argue that duties are more basic than rights does not automatically render the latter 
less morally important than the former. Through the passages 6:239 and 6:240 in the 
Metaphysics of Morals, a moral priority of duties over human rights can be justified. I 
briefly repeat here the relevant Kantian claims.597 In 6:239 in the Metaphysics of 
Morals, KaŶt aƌgues: ͚… Ŷuƌ duƌĐh deŶ moralischen Imperativ, welcher ein 
pflichtgebieten der Satz ist, aus welchem nachher das Vermögen, andere zu 
                                                          
595 Fƌoŵ OŶoƌa O͛Neill͛s talk on 22 February 2018 in QUB Symposium with C. McCrudden and O. 
O͛Neill, https://ǁǁǁ.Ƌuď.aĐ.uk/IŶteƌŶatioŶal/gloďal-challenge-debates/human-rights-age-trump-
brexit/ [accessed 1 March 2018] 
596 However, to be more precise, it must be pointed out that the relevant text, in the Metaphysics of 
Morals, which defines ͚obligation͛ (Verpflictung, obligatio) is 6:222-223. Obligation is defined as ͚the 
necessity of a free action under a categorical imperative of reason.͛ Then Kant defines ͚duty͛ (Pflicht) 
as 'that action to which someone is bound'. I understand this 'binding' as rational necessitation under 
a categorical imperative. Eventually, one could argue that the Kantian obligation generates duty, in 
the sense that an obligation, being necessitated by a CI, when it applies to a particular action, counts 
as duty. Ultimately, responsibilities are discussed right after obligation and duty, at Metaphysics of 
Morals 6:223-224. Responsibilities are different, since they are not generated directly by moral law, 
but ratheƌ ďǇ that ĐoŵďiŶed ǁith oŶe͛s ƌoles. I am grateful to Allen Wood and Christine Korsgaard for 
our discussions on the meaning of these three crucial terms. 
597 The establishment of the priority of duties over rights is provided in section two above 
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verpflichten, d.i. der Begriff des Rechts, entwickelt ǁeƌdeŶ kaŶŶ͛. [Bold ŵiŶe] 598 
That is to saǇ, ͚… oŶlǇ thƌough the ŵoƌal iŵpeƌatiǀe, that is, the pƌopositioŶ ǁhiĐh 
commands duty, from which the capacity for putting others under obligation, that is, 
the concept of right can afterwards be generated͛.  
IŶ additioŶ, iŶ ϲ:ϮϰϬ, KaŶt ĐleaƌlǇ shoǁs that the ͚ƌight of huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs͛, oƌ 
͚huŵaŶ ƌights͛, aƌe geŶeƌated, oƌ deǀeloped, fƌoŵ ouƌ ŵoƌal peƌfeĐt duties of ƌight 
to others. Consequently, in the Kantian opus a moral priority of duties over claim-
rights is actually vindicated. Kant does not mention socioeconomic rights. Thus, my 
claim is that only the moral priority of our (universal) perfect duties of right to others 
over human rights is truly justified in strictly Kantian terms. As regards 
socioeconomic rights, we can only speak of a moral priority of specific perfect duties 
of right to others over them (socioeconomic rights) simply inspired by the Kantian 
opus.     
Apparently, my claim regarding the relation between our perfect duties of 
ƌight to otheƌs aŶd huŵaŶ/soĐioeĐoŶoŵiĐ ƌights is stƌoŶgeƌ thaŶ Hohfeld͛s aŶd ŵaŶǇ 
otheƌ thiŶkeƌs͛ thesis that ƌights aŶd duties aƌe correlative or corresponding ideas. 
Also, it is stronger thaŶ O͛Neill͛s aƌguŵeŶt aĐĐoƌdiŶg to ǁhiĐh the fulfillŵeŶt of 
duties or obligations is more basic than the fulfillment of rights, because of the fact 
that aŶǇ ƌights͛ Đlaiŵ is iŶ effeĐt Ŷo ŵoƌe thaŶ ƌhetoƌiĐ uŶless the counterpart duties 
or obligations are allocated accordingly to individuals and institutions.599 All these 
claims simply indicate a correlation or correspondence without any deeper, morally 
established, connection of rights with duties. Further, my claim is stronger than the 
claim that rights and duties go together in the usual sense of the phrase that right-
holders are at the same time duty-bearers. If we considered rights and duties as 
siŵplǇ ͚goiŶg togetheƌ͛, theŶ, ďeĐause of theiƌ phǇsiĐal oƌ ŵeŶtal iŵŵatuƌitǇ, 
children would not actually be protected given that the attribution of rights to them 
would be vindicated only under the condition of the fulfillment by them of certain 
duties. Eventually, my thesis shows that in Kantian terms what is meant by the 
                                                          
598See Kant (2013), p. 346 
599 Foƌ a siŵilaƌ Đlaiŵ see also: O͛Neill ;ϮϬϭϲͿ, p. ϯϱ. 
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statement that duties are more fundamental than rights is not that rights do not 
matter, but that duties are their source. Hence in the absence of the (owed) duties, 
from which they actually derive, the relevant rights alone do not exist. 
 
3.2 Human and socioeconomic rights600  
In this section, I focus on another possible objection against the new Duty-Based 
Account, namely that socioeconomic rights are human rights. Initially, it is true that 
not all authors distinguish between these two types of moral rights. Thus, I explain 
why, even though both types of rights are moral rights, the socioeconomic rights are 
not actually human rights. This is an important clarification which is reflected in the 
new (Kantian) duty-based argument concerning the philosophical foundations of 
human and socioeconomic rights. Additionally, through this clarification, it becomes 
Đleaƌ ǁhǇ the ǁoƌd ͚KaŶtiaŶ͛ aďoǀe is plaĐed iŶ a paƌeŶthesis; hence why a truly 
Kantian justification can be argued only for human rights, while in the case of 
socioeconomic rights we can only speak of a justification simply inspired from the 
Kantian opus.  
One the one hand, human rights are typically seen as moral rights (with political 
connotations, further protected by law) owed to all human beings by all others: 
individuals, states, institutions, organizations, and corporations. What must be 
stressed here is that human rights exist prior to any political recognition and prior to 
                                                          
600 I do not think it is necessary this section, and the thesis in general, to engage with the debates 
ĐoŶĐeƌŶiŶg the topiĐ of ͚ǁelfaƌe͛ iŶ KaŶt; although, this is adŵittedlǇ a topiĐ oŶ ǁhiĐh theƌe is gƌoǁiŶg 
literature. See, for instance [in chronological order]: Pinheiro Walla, Alice (2015). When the strictest 
right is the greatest wrong: Kant on Fairness. In: Estudos Kantianos. Vol. 3 (1); Baiasu, “. ;ϮϬϭϰͿ. KaŶt͛s 
Justification of welfare. In: An Online Journal of Philosophy Diametros, (39): 128; Varden, H. (2006). 
Kant and dependency relations: Kant on the state's right to redistribute resources to protect the 
rights of dependents. In: Dialogue. Vol. 45: 257–284; Weinrib, E. (2003). Poverty and property in 
KaŶt͛s system of rights. In: Notre Dame Law Review. Vol. 78: 795–828 Kaufman, A. (1999). Welfare in 
the Kantian State. Oxford University Press; LeBar, M. (1999). Kant on Welfare. In: Canadian Journal of 




any codification and ratification of them by law. Through the philosophical 
foundation of rights in the present chapter, it is clearly shown that it is moral and 
rational all others to respect them, independently of their political recognition, as 
well as codification and ratification within the context of international, regional, and 
domestic law. For example, all have the duty not to kill someone not because this is 
proclaimed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; but because killing other 
people is immoral and irrational. Under this definition of moral human rights, it 
seems that, even though these rights exist independently of their political 
recognition, and codification and ratification by law, they still cannot strictly be seen 
as natural rights, namely as entitlements independent of the existence of duties.601 
That is to say, human rights are effectively rights, which are valid against all those 
with the duties or obligations to respect them. A theory of human rights should not 
treat them as innate powers that give others reason to act or not act in certain ways; 
rather they should be seen as the result of otheƌs͛ eǆteƌŶal, ŵoƌal duties, ǁhiĐh 
derive from their moral and rational reason, to act or not act in a certain way. In 
other words, human rights are non-existent unless all duty-bearers, individuals, 
states, institutions, and so on, fulfill their respective moral duties. Ultimately, to this 
category of human rights, only our civil and political rights (not our socioeconomic) 
belong, which exist independently of any institutionalization. 
On the other hand, socioeconomic rights (for example, the right to work, the 
right of everyone to form trade unions, the right of everyone to social security 
including social insurance) generally provide the conditions necessary for our 
prosperity and wellbeing.602 Similarly to human rights, socioeconomic rights are 
moral rights, with political connotations potentially protected by law. Also, as human 
rights, socioeconomic rights cannot strictly be seen as natural rights, namely as 
eŶtitleŵeŶts iŶdepeŶdeŶt of the eǆisteŶĐe of otheƌ͛s duties. Fuƌtheƌ, soĐioeĐoŶoŵiĐ 
rights are understood and treated as rights which derive from the duties of 
individuals, states, and institutions. These duties of others derive from their moral 
                                                          
601 In: Cruft, R., Liao, S.M., Renzo, M. (2015), p. 657. 
602 See articles 6, 8, 9 in the ICESCR, available from 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx [accessed 5 February 2018] 
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aŶd ƌatioŶal ƌeasoŶ, ǁhiĐh ͚ĐoŵŵaŶds͛ theŵ to act or not act in a certain way. 
However, even though, as moral rights, socioeconomic rights exist prior to any 
political recognition, and codification and ratification by law, they still cannot be 
considered as human rights, because they are not owed to all people by all others. 
Instead, they are owed to specific others by specific duty-bearers, either individuals, 
or states and institutions, which are responsible for their fulfillment and 
enforcement.603 Thus, even though we can speak of universal human rights and 
duties, we cannot similarly speak of universal socioeconomic rights and their 
grounding duties. What must be stressed here is the fact that even in the case of civil 
and political rights, in which the first-order obligations to respect them are universal, 
the second-order obligations, that is, the obligations to ensure that the first-order 
obligations are respected, still have to be allocated.604  
Here are some examples. The rights in the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), e.g. the right to food in article 11, are not 
actually universal human rights, as they often presented to be by the advocates of 
human rights, but specific moral rights. That is to say, even though it is moral and 
rational one to respect the socioeconomic right to food, this is not a burden to all, 
but only to some individuals and institutions. For example, not all have the duty to 
feed each hungry child in the world; and, prior to its allocation, the issue of who 
bears the relevant duty remains indeterminate. Hence the relevant duty, which must 
be properly allocated, is carried only by specified persons and institutions, rather 
than by all individuals and institutions in the world.605 In the case in which these 
persons and institutions are not specified, the socioeconomic rights fall under the 
category of the so-Đalled ͚ŵaŶifesto͛ ƌights iŶ FeiŶďeƌg͛s seŶse. That is to saǇ, iŶ the 
absence of the specified duty-bearers, socioeconomic rights are just rhetoric.606 
                                                          
603 O͛Neill ;ϭϵϵϲͿ, pp. 130, 131, 134 
604 O͛Neill ;ϮϬϬϱͿ, pp. ϰϮϳ-439. 
605 O͛Neill ;ϮϬϭϲͿ, pp. ϭϯϭ, ϭϰϱ 
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Unfortunately the Declarations and the Covenants do not actually provide a concrete 
allocation account. For example, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it is 
not clear whether the relevant obligations refer to individuals or states.607 Hence, a 
state can violate a socioeconomic right, and yet escape the unwelcome implications 
of its violation. 
Ultimately, I would like to stress the fact that the aforementioned distinction 
between human and socioeconomic rights does not render the second category of 
rights less important than the first one. It is only in the respect of the allocation of 
duties to specified duty-bearers, and its importance in the practical domain, that 
these rights differ from the so-called human ƌights, e.g. oŶe͛s ƌight Ŷot to ďe 
tortured. While the violators of human rights can easily be identified, the violators of 
socioeconomic rights can hardly be identified. For example, who is responsible in a 
distant part of the world for a child lacking food, health, and education? In such 
cases, it is argued that if there is no appropriate allocation of the duties, these seem 
to lie with nobody.608 Someone could claim here that the fault lies with 
governments. In the face of the 2017 Grenfell Tower fire in London, I recall the first 
paragraph of article 11 of the ICESCR: 
͚The “tates Paƌties to the pƌeseŶt CoǀeŶaŶt ƌeĐogŶize the ƌight of eǀeƌǇoŶe to an 
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. 
The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this 
right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-
opeƌatioŶ ďased oŶ fƌee ĐoŶseŶt.͛609 
It seems that in the case of the UK, the relevant duty was fulfilled to some extent 
by the State. But, unfortunately, there are many cases in which governments cannot 
                                                          
607 Foƌ fuƌtheƌ ĐoŵŵeŶts oŶ ĐoŶfusioŶs aďout oďligatioŶs iŶ the UDH‘, see O͛Neill ;ϮϬϬϭͿ, pp. ϭϴϴ-
203. 
608In: Cruft, R., Liao, S.M., Renzo, M. (2015), p. 77. 




fulfill the relevant duties. There are many poor countries around the world. For 
instance, if such a tragedy had happened in Greece, I doubt whether the Greek 
Government would be able to fulfill its obligations, given the current Greek debt 
crisis. It is no accident that the Greek Government has been criticized for its 
treatment of refugees and asylum seekers in the Greek territory during the last five 
years. In many cases the Governments of poor countries easily claim no 
responsibility in view of their failure to fulfill their relevant duties. Consequently, the 
allocation of the duties, especially in the case of socioeconomic rights, must always 
be accurate and determinate, so that the accusations not to be gestured towards 
violators in imprecise terms. 
 
3.3 The reasons why Kant is not a moral constructivist 
In this section, I focus on and respond to another possible objection against the new 
Duty-Based Approach. It could be argued that Kant, from which the aforementioned 
justification is inspired, is not actually a foundationalist, but a constructivist, who 
would oppose my idea of a foundation for human and socioeconomic rights based on 
his opus. There are indeed some significant Kant scholars who argue in favour of 
KaŶt͛s constructivism. In their view, a Kantian foundation of human (and 
socioeconomic) rights cannot plausibly be supported and proposed.610 In this 
seĐtioŶ, I disĐuss speĐifiĐallǇ OŶoƌa O͛Neill͛s ĐoŶstƌuĐtiǀisŵ oŶ ƌeasoŶ, ethiĐs, 
politics, and justice. At the same time, more light is shed on my claim, in chapter 3, 
that FliksĐhuh͛s ƌeadiŶg of KaŶt as a ĐoŶstƌuĐtiǀist is ŵistakeŶ. My aim is to show 
that Kant is not actually a moral constructivist, but there is room in his opus for 
legitimately arguing that he is a foundationalist. 
To begin with, I agƌee ǁith O͛Neill͛s appƌoaĐh ƌegaƌdiŶg the issue of huŵaŶ 
rights in general, namely her thesis that the fulfillment of duties or obligations is 
ŵoƌe ďasiĐ thaŶ the fulfillŵeŶt of ƌights; aŶd that aŶǇ ƌights͛ Đlaiŵ is Ŷo ŵoƌe thaŶ 
rhetoric, unless the counterpart duties or obligations are justified and allocated 
                                                          
610 O͛Neill, O. ;ϮϬϭϱďͿ; also, FliksĐhuh ;ϮϬϭϱͿ 
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accordingly to individuals and institutions.611 That is to say, we cannot actually know 
what a right amounts to until we know: 1) who is the duty-bearer, 2) what exactly is 
the content of his or her obligation, and 3) to whom (right-holder) the fulfillment of 
the ƌeleǀaŶt oďligatioŶ is oǁed. As O͛Neill aƌgues, if ǁe take ƌights seriously, we 
must take the counterpart duties or obligations even more seriously; otherwise, 
rights remain only aspiration claims with high cost. That is to say, when rights are 
violated, there is no way one to see who has infringed the relevant right, and who 
owes redress.612  
Although I geŶeƌallǇ agƌee ǁith O͛Neill͛s Đlaiŵ that duties haǀe pƌioƌitǇ oǀeƌ 
rights within the context of a moral, autonomous society, I disagree with her 
constructivist approach to reason, ethics, politics, and justice. More specifically, one 
of the ŵost ǁeightǇ ĐoŶstƌuĐtiǀist Đlaiŵs of O͛Neill is that, recognizing that a 
plurality of agents may lack antecedent principles of coordination, Kant eventually 
builds an account of reason, ethics, politics, and justice on this basis.613 Hence, in her 
view, Kant introduces the Formula of Universal Law, according to which there is a 
ĐategoƌiĐal iŵpeƌatiǀe, ŶaŵelǇ to ͚act only in accordance with that maxim through 
which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law͛.614 That is to say, 
given the plurality of agents, and the need of an agreement of all with some 
pƌiŶĐiples, O͛Neill Đlaiŵs that KaŶt iŶtƌoduĐes, oƌ constructs, or builds the Formula of 
Universal Law through which he eventually aims the principles adopted not be ones 
that Đould Ŷot ďe ǁilled ďǇ all ageŶts. EǀeŶtuallǇ, O͛Neill ĐhaƌaĐteƌizes the Foƌŵula 
of UŶiǀeƌsal Laǁ as ͚the ďest-kŶoǁŶ ǀeƌsioŶ of KaŶt͛s pƌoĐeduƌe of ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ͛, 
aŶd KaŶt͛s aĐĐouŶts oŶ ƌeasoŶ, ethiĐs, politiĐs, aŶd justiĐe as puƌe ĐoŶstƌuĐtiǀist 
accounts without foundations.615 In what follows, I discuss her anti-foundationalist 
reading of Kant. 
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612 O͛Neill ;ϮϬϭϲͿ, pp. ϭϵϲ-197. 
613 O͛Neill ;ϮϬϭϱͿ, pp. ϳϳ, ϴϰ 
614 Gregor, (1996), p. 73. 
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Initially, what should be pointed out is that eǀeŶ if O͛Neill uŶdeƌstaŶds 
correctly the Kantian Formula of Universal Law as a construction, still a constructivist 
account in reason, ethics, politics, and justice needs foundation. How can it be 
possible a construction without foundations? A foundation or base is the most 
crucial element of an architectural structure that connects it to the ground. There 
are either shallow or deep foundations, but, in any case, the crucial point is that all 
building structures should not lack a specific foundation. This is a pragmatic claim 
that diƌeĐtlǇ opposes O͛Neill͛s ŵoƌal ĐoŶstƌuĐtiǀist thesis that theƌe ĐaŶ ďe 
constructions without foundations.616 Consequently, even if it is indeed a Kantian 
construction, the Formula of Universal Law needs a deeper foundation. As has been 
shown in the previous chapter, as one of the three formulations of the Categorical 
Imperative (CI), the Formula of Universal Law (FUL) is grounded in the Moral Law 
commanded by Pure Practical Reason.617 Consequently, I do not actually read Kant 
as O͛Neill does, ŶaŵelǇ as a constructivist or anti-foundationalist philosopher. 
Instead, concerning his alleged constructivism, or anti-foundationalism, my claim is 
that, throughout his opus, Kant does not essentially show anything about the 
construction of reason, ethics, politics, and justice. Rather he directly points to 
foundationalism.  
More specifically, we should focus on passages such as the passage 4:439, in 
the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in light of which Kant cannot be read 
as a ĐoŶstƌuĐtiǀist oƌ aŶtiƌealist. KaŶt ǁƌites: ͚The esseŶĐe of thiŶgs is Ŷot ĐhaŶged ďǇ 
their external relations; and that which, without taking account of such relations, 
alone constitutes the worth of a human being is that in terms of which he must also 
ďe appƌaised ďǇ ǁhoeǀeƌ does it, eǀeŶ ďǇ the supƌeŵe ďeiŶg͛.618 Further, one must 
consider the notorious passage in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in 
which Kant describes the moral concept of human dignity. As already mentioned in 
chapters 1 and 2 above, Kant writes in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 
Morals: ͚that ǁhiĐh ĐoŶstitutes the condition under which alone something can be 
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an end in itself has not merely a relative worth, that is, a price, but an inner worth, 
that is, dignity͛ ;ϰ:ϰϯϰ-ϱͿ. He theŶ aƌgues that ͚Autonomy is therefore the ground of 
the dignity of human nature aŶd of eǀeƌǇ ƌatioŶal Ŷatuƌe͛ ;ϰ:ϰϯϲͿ.619 Apparently, 
here the role of the fundamental moral principle of autonomy as the foundation of 
the dignity of human beings does not allow for attributing to Kant the 
characterization of the constructivist, or non-foundationalist, philosopher. 
Additionally, one must also take into consideration the 5:47 passage in the Critique 
of Practical Reason, iŶ ǁhiĐh KaŶt aƌgues that ͚… the ŵoƌal laǁ… as a fact of pure 
ƌeasoŶ of ǁhiĐh ǁe aƌe a pƌioƌi ĐoŶsĐious͛.620 Here again, Kant expresses his 
foundationalism or moral realism. Consequently, because of these passages, and 
many other ones, I cannot see Kant, as O͛Neill does, namely as a constructivist or 
antirealist philosopher.  
Apparently, O͛Neill has ďeeŶ iŶflueŶĐed ďǇ the writings of her mentor, John 
Rawls; especially those in which Rawls argues that Kant is a contractualist.621 O͛Neill 
admits that, although Ŷot ideŶtiĐal, ‘aǁls͛s Đlassical Kantian contractualism has 
much in common with her own Kantian constructivism.622 While the former 
indicates the grounding of ethical, political, and legal justification in an agreement, 
the latter indicates the grounding of ethical, political, and legal justification in some 
conception of reason. That is to say, a contractualist focuses on a specific agreement 
which is supposed to provide further the basis for reasons; while a constructivist 
focuses on a specific reasoning, or reason, or conception of reason, which is 
supposed to provide further a way of achieving agreement.623 Contrary to Rawls and 
O͛Neill, I argue that there is indeed something deeper in the Kantian opus, than plain 
͚ƌeasoŶs͛ or ͚agƌeeŵeŶts͛ oŶ ǁhiĐh a sǇsteŵ of ethiĐs, politiĐs, aŶd justiĐe ĐaŶ ďe 
based. This deeper ground is our reason (in singular), of ǁhiĐh ͚ǀoiĐe͛ is heaƌd ďǇ all 
rational, autonomous beings, including human beings. 
                                                          
619 Gregor (1996), pp. 84-85 
620 Gregor (1996), p. 177 
621 See Rawls (1980), pp. 515-572; also, Rawls, J. (1993) 
622 O͛Neill ;ϮϬϬϯͿ, pp. ϯϭϵ-331 
623 O͛Neill ;ϮϬϬϯͿ, pp. ϯϭϵ-331 
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To be more specific, first, I do not see plain reasons, or some conceptions of 
reason, as a truly Kantian justification of our ethical, political, and legal systems 
because a commitment to them would illegitimately mix Kantianism with 
consequentialism. Parfit is one of the most vehement proponents of this move.624 
But I am afraid that Kant himself would hardly mix his duty-based ethics with 
consequentialism. Of course, this does not mean that reasons, or conceptions of 
reason, are meaningless. What is claimed is that our primary concern must be our 
responsiveness to our inner reason (in singular) that tells us what is the right/wrong 
thing to do, or what we must/must not do in certain circumstances. Effectively, I 
agƌee ǁith “usaŶ Wolf ǁho saǇs that Paƌfit͛s focus on reasons introduces a concern 
for optimific results.625 
Second, I do not see some sort of agreement, or contract, or consent, as the 
genuine basis of our ethical, political, and legal systems. As has been explained in the 
previous chapter, although significant and central to Kant, the agreement, or the 
contract, or the consent is not the primary concern of the rational, autonomous 
person of whose autonomy and reason are actually the grounds of our ethical, 
political, and legal systems. Instead, the primary concern of the Kantian 
autonomously reflective-judging person is gettiŶg iŶ touĐh ǁith heƌ iŶŶeƌ, ͚ǀoiĐe͛ of 
reason (in singular), that is to say, her authentic moral self. 
Within this context, it could be argued that we should resist killing the innocent 
passengers, in the German Airliner Case,626 not because they are innocent, or 
because we must not kill innocent people (reasons<Kantian constructivism). Also, we 
should resist killing them not because we can imagine some sort of agreement 
against their killing (consent<Kantian contractualism).627 Rather, we should not kill 
them as a result of our respect to pure practical reason that reveals that killing them 
                                                          
624 Parfit (2011), p. xxviii 
625 Parfit (2011), p. xxviii; also, Kirchin (2017), pp. 10-26 
626 The German Airliner Case (2006), BVerfGE 115, 118 / 15 
627 Also, not because the passengers have dignity (see chapter 2) 
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is the wrong thing to do, or that not killing them is the right thing to do (negative 
duty).  
Ultimately, through the (Kantian) duty-based justification of human and 
socioeconomic rights, in the present thesis, is offered a ͚foundationalist͛, or ͚moral 
ƌealist͛ aĐĐouŶt. The phrase ͚moral realism͛ heƌe is Ŷot assoĐiated ǁith aŶǇ kiŶd of 
metaphysical realism, such as the metaphysical realism often invoked in the 
Christian ethics; but with a kind of human realism, according to which rights and 
duties are not objects of a constructivist or contractualist task. Instead, they do exist 
and can be discovered through ͚listening͛ for/to our reason (in singular).628    
 
ϯ.ϰ The ƌelatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ KaŶt͛s ŵoƌal philosophǇ aŶd his legal aŶd politiĐal theoƌǇ 
Finally, the fourth possible objection against the new Duty-Based Approach might be 
that the new justification is not correct, because it is based on the mistaken idea that 
–in spite of the Kantian sharp distinction and tension between the internal domain of 
morality and the external domain of law– there is some degree of continuity within 
the Kantian opus. But this continuity, might be said, does not actually exist. In what 
folloǁs I thoƌoughlǇ disĐuss the ƌelatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ KaŶt͛s ŵoƌal philosophǇ and his 
system of justice and politics, in order to show that there is some coherence 
between the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Metaphysics of 
Morals. Incidentally, this is one of the most controversial issues within the modern 
Kantian literature. 
Initially, it must be pointed out that in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant 
himself explicitly argues that there is no relation between the domain of morality 
and the domain of justice in the strict sense. More specifically, in 6:232, Kant writes: 
͚… stƌiĐt ƌight, ŶaŵelǇ that which is not mingled with anything ethical, requires only 
external grounds for determining choice; for only then is it pure and not mixed with 
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aŶǇ pƌeĐepts of ǀiƌtue͛.629 Kant continues mentioning the example of a creditor who 
has the right to require his debtor to pay his debt. This does not mean, Kant claims, 
that the creditor can remind the debtor that his reason puts him under obligation to 
perform this, since the coercion constraining the debtor to pay his debt coexists with 
the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal external law. That is to say, 
Kant claims here that a right in the strict sense has nothing to do with morality since 
it refers only to the external domain of law which is not related to the internal 
domain of morality. Hence, the fulfillment of the relevant duty is not grounded in 
duty-ďeaƌeƌ͛s ;internal) reason, rather the coercion comes from outside, that is, from 
an external law. Eventually, Kant seems to argue that in the case of morality the 
authority that has power over us, namely over the autonomous persons, is our 
internal reasoŶ, ǁhiĐh ͚ĐoŵŵaŶds͛ ƌespeĐt to the moral Law; while, on the contrary, 
in the case of legality, it is an external legal law which we have to obey, 
independently of whether we are autonomous persons in the Kantian sense.630 The 
ƌelatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ KaŶt͛s ŵoƌalitǇ aŶd legalitǇ has ďoƌŶ a ͚ƌiǀalƌǇ͛ ďetǁeeŶ those KaŶt 
scholars who interpret Kant as claiming that the two domains are distinct from each 
other and those other Kant scholars who insist that KaŶt͛s pƌiŶĐiple of ƌight is 
straightforwardly derived from his moral philosophy. In what follows, I first present 
this ͚ƌiǀalƌǇ͛, ďefoƌe I ĐoŶĐlude that a ŵoƌe ŵodest staŶĐe is preferable.631 
To begin with, following the above Kantian passage, in particular focusing on 
KaŶt͛s phƌase that ͚…ƌight, ŶaŵelǇ that ǁhiĐh is Ŷot ŵiŶgled ǁith aŶǇthiŶg ethiĐal͛, 
soŵe KaŶt sĐholaƌs, suĐh as AlleŶ Wood, aƌgue that KaŶt͛s ŵoƌal philosophǇ is 
completely divorced from his legal theory. Wood claims that there are indeed some 
                                                          
629 Gregor (1996), p. 389 
630 For the full definition of the Kantian autonomous person, see chapter 3. 
631 Foƌ the deǀelopŵeŶt of ŵǇ opiŶioŶ ƌegaƌdiŶg the ƌelatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ KaŶt͛s ŵoƌalitǇ aŶd 
legality/politics, very helpful were the two following papers of Sorin Baiasu: Baiasu (2016a), pp. 2 -33; 
and Baiasu (2016b), pp.59-76. In these papers, Baiasu discusses thoroughly the three main positions 
on the relation in Kant between ethical and politico-juridical principles, upon which the structure of 
this section is based. Also, I am grateful to Paul Guyer and Howard Williams who helped me to 
consolidate my soft dependentist position. 
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points in the Metaphysics of Morals that show that the principle of right may be 
deƌiǀed fƌoŵ the fuŶdaŵeŶtal pƌiŶĐiple of ŵoƌalitǇ, e.g. KaŶt͛s ƌeŵaƌk iŶ ϲ:Ϯϯϳ that 
the innate right to freedom belongs to human beings by virtue of their humanity.632 
Also, Wood ŵeŶtioŶs KaŶt͛s ϲ:Ϯϭϵ, iŶ ǁhiĐh it is Đlaiŵed that legal duties ĐaŶ also be 
considered as ethical duties.633 Here Wood claims that insofar as legal duties can 
also be considered as moral duties, then they may be brought under the principle of 
morals, so that it Đould legitiŵatelǇ ďe aƌgued that, to soŵe eǆteŶt, KaŶt͛s theoƌǇ of 
right falls under the principle of morality.634 Nevertheless, Wood generally disagrees 
with the association of the principle of morality with the principle of right. He says 
that Kant explicitly discredits the idea that the principle of right is derived from the 
fundamental principle of morality by declaring in 6:396 in the Metaphysics of Morals 
that, unlike the doctrine of virtue, which is synthetic, the principle of right is analytic; 
hence it would be nonsense one to derive an analytic proposition from a synthetic 
one.635 
Not all Kant scholars agree with the above understanding of the (non-) 
ƌelatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ KaŶt͛s ŵoƌal aŶd legal theoƌǇ. Foƌ iŶstaŶĐe, JuƌgeŶ Haďeƌŵas 
aƌgues that KaŶt͛s legal aŶd politiĐal theoƌǇ is stƌaightfoƌǁaƌdlǇ deƌiǀed fƌoŵ KaŶt͛s 
moral philosophy. That is to say, legal laws derive from the moral law by limitation, 
namely by limiting the application of the CI to actions characterised by externality.636 
HeŶĐe, Haďeƌŵas seeŵs to uŶdeƌstaŶd KaŶt͛s ŵoƌal philosophǇ, iŶ the Groundwork 
of the Metaphysics of Morals, and his system of justice, as it is developed in the 
Metaphysics of Morals, as two interconnected domains. Habermas writes: 
                                                          
632 Gregor (1996), p. 393; see also Wood (2002), p. 6. 
633 Gregor (1996), p. 383. 
634 Wood (2002), p. 9. 
635 Gregor (1996), p. 526; see also Wood (2002), p. 7. Also, Willascheck has argued in favor of the 
independentist position in: Willascheck (1997), pp. 205-227 
636 Baiasu, S. (2016): 2 -33 
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͚… staƌts ǁith the ďasiĐ ĐoŶĐept of the ŵoƌal laǁ aŶd oďtaiŶs juƌidiĐal laǁs 
from it by way of limitation. Moral theory supplies the overarching concepts: 
will and free choice, action and incentive, duty and inclination, law and 
legislation serve in the first place to characterize moral judgment and action. 
In the legal theory, these basic moral concepts undergo liŵitatioŶs… 
According to Kant, the concept of law does not refer primarily to free will, 
ďut… it peƌtaiŶs to the external relations of one person to another; finally it is 
furnished with the coercive power that one person is entitled to exercise with 
respeĐt to aŶotheƌ iŶ the Đase of iŶfƌiŶgeŵeŶt… Thus liŵited, ŵoƌal 
legislation is reflected in juridical legislation, morality in legality, duties of 
virtue in legal duties, and so forth. This construction is guided by the Platonic 
intuition that the legal oƌdeƌ iŵitates the ŶouŵeŶal oƌdeƌ of a ͚kiŶgdoŵ of 
eŶds͛ aŶd at the saŵe tiŵe eŵďodies it iŶ the pheŶoŵeŶal ǁoƌld͛.637 
Finally, there are some Kant scholars who do not follow either a strict or pure 
independentist (e.g. Wood), or a dependentist (e.g. Habermas) view regarding the 
ƌelatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ KaŶt͛s ŵoƌal aŶd legal theoƌǇ. Foƌ iŶstaŶĐe, Paul GaǇeƌ ǁƌites: 
͚“tƌiĐtlǇ ĐoŶstƌued, the Đlaiŵ that KaŶt͛s uŶiǀeƌsal pƌiŶĐiple of ƌight is Ŷot deƌiǀed 
from the Categorical Imperative, understood as the requirement to act only on 
maxims that can also serve as universal law, is correct because the principle of 
ƌight… does Ŷot ĐoŶĐeƌŶ ouƌ ŵaǆiŵs at all, a foƌtioƌi theiƌ uŶiǀeƌsalitǇ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, aŶǇ 
broader claim that the principle of right is not derived from the fundamental 
principle of morality, in the sense of the fundamental concept of morality, is surely 
iŵplausiďle͛.638 That is to saǇ, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to GuǇeƌ, KaŶt͛s legalitǇ ĐaŶŶot typically be 
seen as derived from his morality, given that the latter refers to our maxims, namely 
to our subjective principles of volition, while the former does not concern our 
maxims at all, rather it refers only to practical law.639 However, Guyer does not 
                                                          
637 Habermas (1996), pp. 105-106 
638 Guyer (2002), pp. 25-26 
639 For the distinction between the subjective principle of volition, and practical law, see 4:400 in the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in Gregor (1996), p. 55. 
226 
 
exclude the possibility of such a derivation in the case in which the principle of right 
is ĐoŶsideƌed to ďe deƌiǀed fƌoŵ the ͚fuŶdaŵeŶtal ĐoŶĐept of ŵoƌalitǇ͛. 
Considering the three approaches to the relation between the Kantian 
ŵoƌalitǇ aŶd legalitǇ aďoǀe, I ĐaŶŶot aĐĐept Wood͛s shaƌp iŶdepeŶdeŶtist thesis 
concerning KaŶt͛s ŵoƌalitǇ aŶd legality; and, of course, the possible subsequent 
Đlaiŵ that ďeĐause of the shaƌp iŶdepeŶdeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ KaŶt͛s ŵoƌality and legality, 
the new Duty-Based Approach, which is based on their dependence, is not correct. 
This does not seem to be plausible, given that Wood actually misunderstands the 
ĐoŶĐept of ͚ƌight͛ iŶ the KaŶtiaŶ passage he iŶǀokes. IŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ, ǁheŶ KaŶt ǁƌites 
that ͚…ƌight, ŶaŵelǇ that ǁhiĐh is Ŷot ŵiŶgled ǁith aŶǇthiŶg ethiĐal͛, KaŶt ŵeaŶs 
only the right in the strict or narrow sense, for eǆaŵple, a Đƌeditoƌ͛s ƌight to ƌeƋuiƌe 
his debtor to pay his debt.640 Kant explicitly says in 6:232, both in the title of the 
ƌeleǀaŶt seĐtioŶ aŶd the ŵaiŶ teǆt, that ďǇ this ͚ƌight͛ he ŵeaŶs only a strict right, or 
a right in a narrow sense, namely a pure legal right with practical scope that simply 
makes transactions more efficient.641 Apparently, this does not exclude the 
possibility of a right in a broad sense, for example, a human right, as we understand 
it today, or as Kant himself understands and states it in the diagram of 6:340.642 Even 
if Kant has not fully developed such an argument, a thorough examination of his 
opus does leave room for arguing that a right in a broad sense, or a moral right, or a 
non-strictly legal right, such as a human right, can indeed be derived from the 
principle of morality.  
Also, Wood͛s Đlaiŵ that KaŶt͛s eǆpliĐit disĐƌetion of the possibility that the 
principle of Right is derived from the fundamental principle of Morality in 6:396, 
based on the idea that the principle of Right, unlike the doctrine of virtue, is analytic, 
refers only to legal rights corresponding to legal duties. However, as Wood himself 
mentions, in 6:219 Kant claims that legal duties can also be considered as moral 
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duties.643 Hence, insofar as a legal duty, which typically belongs to the external 
domain of Right, can also be considered as a moral duty, which typically belongs to 
the internal domain of Morality, the possibility of a right in the broad sense, that is a 
moral right, or a non-strictly legal right, or a human (and socioeconomic) right to be 
derived from morality is plausible. Eventually, contradicting himself, Wood admits 
that it Đould legitiŵatelǇ ďe aƌgued that KaŶt͛s theoƌǇ of ƌight falls uŶdeƌ the 
principle of morality in this case.644 
Further, a dependentist thesis suĐh as JuƌgeŶ Haďeƌŵas͛s seeŵs to ďe, iŶ 
pƌiŶĐiple, iŵplausiďle as ǁell. It ĐaŶŶot siŵplǇ ďe aƌgued that KaŶt͛s legal aŶd 
politiĐal theoƌǇ is stƌaightfoƌǁaƌdlǇ deƌiǀed fƌoŵ KaŶt͛s ŵoƌal philosophǇ. AĐĐoƌdiŶg 
to Kant, the domain of morality is, in principle, distinct from the domain of law in the 
strict sense, or of legal law. As has been mentioned above, Kant claims in 6:232 that 
ďǇ ͚ƌight͛ he ŵeaŶs only a strict right, or a right in a narrow sense, namely a pure 
legal right with practical scope that just makes transactions more efficient;645 for 
eǆaŵple, the ƌight of the selleƌ of a pƌopeƌtǇ iŶ EŶglaŶd to use the ďuǇeƌ͛s deposit 
between exchange of contracts and completion, in order to purchase another 
property.646 Apparently, such a right cannot belong to the moral realm. 
Consequently, Haďeƌŵas͛s ǀieǁ is a geŶeƌiĐ ǀieǁ, thƌough ǁhiĐh it is igŶoƌed KaŶt͛s 
original distinction between the internal domain of morality and the external domain 
of legal laǁ. Haďeƌŵas͛s ǀieǁ ŵight ďe plausiďle oŶlǇ iŶ the Đase of a right in a broad 
sense, or a moral (human and socioeconomic) right. As has been mentioned, insofar 
as a legal duty can also be considered as a moral duty, the possibility of a right in the 
broad sense, that is a moral right, or a non-strictly legal right, to be derived from 
morality is plausible within the Kantian opus.  
                                                          
643 Gregor (1996), p. 383. 
644 Wood (2002), p. 9. 
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For my part, a soďeƌ appƌoaĐh is the thiƌd oŶe, that is, GuǇeƌ͛s ǀieǁ.647 To be 
more specific, it is true that legality cannot, in principle, be derived from morality, 
given that in the case of morality the person has to act on certain internal maxims, 
while this is not the case for legality in the strict or narrow sense. For example, when 
one is not lying because this is the right thing to do, she acts on certain maxims; 
while when she is not lying, because she considers the consequences of lying, e.g. a 
certain penalty, she does not act on internal maxims. However, as Guyer says (yet he 
does not fully argue), any broader claim that the Kantian principle of right in general 
is not derived from the fundamental principle of morality, in the sense of the 
fundamental concept of morality, is implausible.648 Otherwise, how can a principle of 
distributive justice, for example a principle of distribution of the World Health 
Organization, which serves as a standard for distributing qualitative, safe, and 
effective pharmaceutical products to the market, be seen as non-derivable from 
ŵoƌalitǇ? IŶ the folloǁiŶg tǁo paƌagƌaphs, I tƌǇ to fill iŶ the gap iŶ GuǇeƌ͛s 
argumentation by showing that theƌe is iŶdeed ĐoheƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ KaŶt͛s ŵoƌalitǇ 
and legality. 
More specifically, the KaŶtiaŶ pƌiŶĐiple of ƌight, oƌ legalitǇ, ͚iŶ a ďƌoad seŶse͛, 
does Ŷot ƌefeƌ to ƌights iŶ the ͚stƌiĐt oƌ Ŷaƌƌoǁ seŶse͛, ďut to human rights (as well as 
to socioeconomic rights by extension). While in 6:232 in the Metaphysics, Kant 
aƌgues that ͚stƌiĐt ƌight… is Ŷot ŵiŶgled ǁith aŶǇthiŶg ethiĐal͛, iŶ ϲ:Ϯϯϵ, as ǁell as iŶ 
his ϲ:ϮϰϬ diagƌaŵ, he ĐleaƌlǇ shoǁs that ͚the ƌight of huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs͛, oƌ ͚huŵaŶ 
ƌights͛, aƌe actually derived from morality, namely from moral duties. Therefore, 
while the claim that strict rights, or rights in the narrow sense, cannot be derived 
from morality seems to be correct in Kantian terms, this is not the case for rights in a 
broad sense, that is, human rights, oƌ ͚the ƌight of huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs͛ ;iŶ KaŶt͛s ϭϴth 
century terminology). 
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Further, it must not be ignored the fact that the supreme principle of 
morality, that is, the autonomy of the will, or the good will, as it is defined in 4:440, 
in the Groundwork, does not actually disappear in the Metaphysics of Morals. 
Recently Oliver Sensen has argued that Kant is still committed to autonomy while 
writing the metaphysics of morals, although he fails to mention it.649 I think “eŶseŶ͛s 
point is correct. Thus, contrary to other authors who argue that the autonomy of the 
will disappears in the Metaphysics of Morals, 650 my claim is that Kant still persists in 
considering it the supreme principle of morality in his legal and political theory. It is 
no accident that in 6:219-221, in the Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant 
specifies it through the analysis –admittedly in an obscure and abstract manner– of 
its two main functions, namely the ethical and the juridical lawgiving.651 Ultimately, 
the Kantian moral autonomy is discussed in 6:383 and 6:480 as the property of 
practical reason to being the source of moral laws independently of inclinations.652 
Finally, given that human and socioeconomic rights are deƌiǀed fƌoŵ KaŶt͛s 
ethics, hence they are moral rights, even in the case in which they have become law 
through codification and ratification, their normativity cannot be divorced from 
ethical normativity. Hence, when they are invoked by the relevant parties, either by 
the right-holders, or by the duty-bearers, human and socioeconomic rights should 
not be considered just as pure legal norms,653 but primarily as moral laws (in plural), 
of which normativity is derived from the moral law (in singular).654 Overall, in the 
case of human and socioeconomic rights, in particular, legality cannot remove 
morality. Ultimately, the (Kantian) duty-based philosophical foundation of human 
and socioeconomic rights, in the present thesis, shows that we can override the 
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650 See for instance Kleingeld (2018) 
651 Gregor (1996), pp. 383-385. 
652 Gregor (1996), pp. 515, 593 
653 See Kelsen, H. (1967) 
654 For a similar view, see Demiray and Baiasu. (2016), pp. 11-20  
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disĐussed ͚ƌiǀalƌǇ͛, ďetǁeeŶ the iŶdepedeŶtists aŶd the depeŶdeŶtists scholars 
above, treating the Kantian opus as a philosophical work with at least some degree 
of continuity and coherence, in spite of numerous antinomies and contradictions. 
 
4. Why we have the duty to treat the dead with dignity? 
͚Apƌil is the Đƌuellest month, breeding 
Lilacs out of the dead land, mixing 
Memory and desire, stirring 
Dull ƌoots ǁith spƌiŶg ƌaiŶ...͛ 
T.S. Eliot, The Burial of the dead, The Waste Land 
 
In this last section, I discuss an intriguing issue that has been only mentioned above. 
As has previously been indicated, within the context of rights discourse, the case of 
non-living human beings differs from other cases, such as the case of a normal adult 
human being, an embryo, a baby, a child, a comatose patient, a mentally disabled, 
aŶ iŵŵigƌaŶt, a ƌefugee, aŶ ͚apatƌis͛, a pooƌ, a hoŵoseǆual, aŶd so foƌth. Obviously, 
in the case of a non-living human being we cannot speak of a rights-holder. 
Additionally, although it still has the genetic basis for moral agency (DNA), a corpse 
cannot realize this intrinsic capacity anymore. Thus, it cannot be considered as a 
duty-bearer.655 It might be argued then that the new Duty-Based Approach could 
hardly be applied to the case of non-living human beings. However, such a claim is 
too hasty. The new Duty-Based Approach has its place even in this difficult case. 
                                                          
655 I think the same could be claimed for androids and humanoids robots (AHR). Although AHR may 
acquire the genetic basis for moral agency (DNA), e.g. through infusion, they cannot actually realize it, 
given that the realization of moral agency presupposes the exercise of autonomous agency. But AHR 
cannot exercise their autonomous agency, as, by definition, they lack one of its basic elements, that 
is, the freedom to self-legislate. AHR are doomed to remain machines in the hands of software 
programmers and developers, who shall (and should) always set the standards of their operation, and 
control their development properly (duty-bearers) in favour of all others (right-holders). 
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More specifically, in what follows, I develop an argument for the justification of our 
duty to treat the dead with dignity. 
The daǇ ďefoƌe ŵǇ fatheƌ͛s fuŶeƌal, I ƌeŵeŵďeƌ ŵǇ ŵotheƌ saǇiŶg that ǁe 
have a duty to treat my father with dignity. Recently, I read in the Guardian that, 
among all other indignities Syrians have endured during the last 7 years, from poor 
treatment at the border and residency offices to humiliation and abandonment by 
immigration hostile countries, they have also faced the indignity to finding a place 
for those who have died. For weeks or months corpses are left in morgues, 
cardboard boxes, even in the backs of taxis. The problem does not only consist in the 
lack of space to bury the dead bodies, but also in the fact that most Syrians cannot 
afford the cost of burial.656 Finally, about a week ago, I noticed that the name of one 
of the fiŶest fuŶeƌal diƌeĐtoƌs thƌoughout the UK is ͚DigŶitǇ͛.657 The question then 
arises as to why we have the duty to treat the dead with dignity? For those of us who 
believe that intuitions, or universally held beliefs, are not adequate enough to 
explain why things should happen in a certain way, deeper reasons must be found to 
support these intuitions or universal beliefs. In the following analysis some 
explanations are given as to why we have the duty to treat the dead with dignity. 
To begin with, it could be argued that it is a violation of the dignity of the 
dead if, for example, we leave their bodies unburied to be eaten by animals, because 
the dead had human dignity while they were alive. Additionally, it can be argued that 
we have to treat them with dignity because they still have dignity. Further, it could 
be claimed that the dead have to be treated with dignity because, through such a 
treatment, we, in effect, show reverence toward God who has created us all. 
Moreover, it could be claimed that the dead have to be treated with dignity not 
because they have dignity, but because this is a virtuous act that benefits the 
                                                          
656 For further information regarding this issue, read the Guardian, available from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/30/lebanon-no-space-syrian-refugees-graves-bury-
dead [accessed 27 February 2018] 




virtuous agent herself. For instance, it could be said that the fulfillment of the 
relevant duty by relatives and/or friends of the dead, makes them feel contentment, 
which further promotes the flourishing of their own lives. Recently, inspired by the 
Kantian Formula of Humanity, according to which we must act so that we use 
humanity whether in our own person, or in the person of any other, always at the 
same time as an end never merely as a means, Michael Rosen concluded that a 
dignified treatment of the dead eventually denotes honor or respect of humanity in 
our own person.658 In what follows, I show why all the aforementioned reasons are 
inadequate to explain why we actually have the duty to treat the dead with dignity. 
1. Initially, concerning the claim that it is a violation of the dignity of the dead if, for 
example, we leave their bodies unburied to be eaten by animals, either because they 
had human dignity in the past, or because they still have dignity, it could be argued 
that, even though the dead could have had dignity while they were alive, they can no 
longer possess it, given that, as has previously been analyzed, dignity is, in Kantian 
terms, effectively an inner value and feeling arising from the realization 
(consciousness)  that one has done a morally good act.659 But, apparently, the dead 
lack any cognitive and emotional capacities.  
2. Further, treating the dead with dignity as an expression of reverence towards God 
who has created us has nothing to do with the dead him/herself. Rather it is a 
symbolic act which simply refers to our personal relationship with God. Incidentally, 
not all people are religious believers; there are indeed many atheists in the world. 
Hence such a claim cannot apply to them.  
3. Moreover, virtue ethicists argue that treating the dead with dignity benefits the 
agent herself. This is, in my view, an egoist claim, which actually annihilates the 
moral value of the treatment of the dead with dignity.  
4. Finally, ĐoŶĐeƌŶiŶg ‘oseŶ͛s thesis, this Đould ďe ĐouŶteƌ-argued by the clear 
Kantian distinction at 6:240 in the Doctrine of Right, between moral duties to oneself 
and moral duties to others.660 Considering this distinction, it can hardly be argued 
                                                          
658 ‘oseŶ ;ϮϬϭϮͿ, p. ϭϱϳ; see also KaŶt͛s Foƌŵula of HuŵaŶitǇ iŶ ϰ:ϰϮϵ, iŶ Gƌegoƌ ;ϭϵϵϲͿ, p. ϴϬ. 
659 See also 4:394 in Gregor (1996), p. 50. 
660 Gregor (1996), p. 395. 
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that the fulfillment of a duty towards others, e.g. the dead, is identified with the 
fulfillment of a duty towards oneself. 
Contrary to all previous claims, my deontological view is that we have a duty 
derived from our good/autonomous will to treat the dead with dignity because 
this is the right thing to do, independently of any other religious, consequentialist, 
and virtue ethicist considerations. Through the application of the new Duty-Based 
Approach, four issues are specified: 1) the grounds of the moral duty to treat the 
dead with dignity, 2) who the duty-bearers are, 3) the content of this moral duty, 
and finally 4) the consequences of its non-fulfillment. I start with the determination 
of the grounding basis of our moral duty to treat the dead with dignity. 
1. Our moral duty to treat the dead with dignity, namely our duty to bury the dead 
body, or cremate the corpse, is grounded in our good will. That is to say, the burial 
of the dead body, or the cremation of the corpse, by us, is the result of our positive 
ƌespoŶse, as ƌatioŶal huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs, to the ĐategoƌiĐal ͚ǀoiĐe͛ of ƌeasoŶ, oƌ the 
common to all rational human ďeiŶgs͛ genetic basis/intrinsic capacity661 for moral 
ageŶĐǇ ;ƌatioŶalitǇͿ. This ͚ǀoiĐe͛ of ƌeasoŶ iŶ us ͚ĐoŵŵaŶds͛ ĐoŵpliaŶĐe ǁith the 
moral law, according to which we must bury the dead body or cremate the corpse 
because this is our moral duty, or because this is the right thing to do, or for the sake 
of moral law alone, independently of any other concerns related to ourselves, or the 
dead, or any other.662 All rational human beings can listen for/to the same inner 
͚ǀoiĐe͛, if theǇ paǇ atteŶtioŶ to theiƌ iŶŶeƌ self, aŶd leaƌŶ to Ƌuite their minds.663 
Ultimately, it must be pointed out that the ƌeasoŶ ͚ĐoŵŵaŶdiŶg͛ compliance with 
the moral law is not an absolute ruler, or despot. If reason was a tyrant, then there 
ǁouldŶ͛t ďe ŵillioŶs of people ǁho do Ŷot ƌespeĐt it. Foƌ eǆaŵple, Hazel MaddoĐk 
would not have left the corpse of her mother unburied for up to six months, in order 
to keep her benefits.664 Rather, reason is understood in Aristotelian terms as the 
                                                          
661 See further Liao (2015), pp. 18, 19 
662 Gregor (1996), p. 89. 
663 See 4:421, in Gregor (1996), p. 73  
664 Hazel Maddock pleaded guilty at Liverpool Crown Court to unlawful prevention of burial and 
benefit fraud, see further: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-merseyside-13987322 [Accessed 
6 May 2018] 
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͚ƌight ƌeasoŶ͛ ;orthos logos), or rational iŶŶeƌ ͚ǀoiĐe͛ ǁhiĐh ĐaŶ oŶlǇ ďe ͚listeŶed͛ 
for/to ďǇ those ǁhose opposite ͚ǀoiĐes͛ of Ŷatuƌal iŶĐliŶatioŶs, peƌsoŶal iŶteƌests, 
wishes, desires, and so on, aƌe Ŷot ͚sĐƌeaŵiŶg͛. 
2. The dutǇ to tƌeat the dead ǁith digŶitǇ is a ͚speĐifiĐ͛ duty.665 More specifically, it is 
not a duty of all others, but a duty of specific others, e.g. the relatives or/and the 
friends of the dead, and local authorities. For instance, not all others had the duty to 
bury the dead body of my father. It was only the duty of his relatives, friends, and 
the local authority to bury him. Apparently the same applies to the example of the 
Syrian corpses above. Eventually, the duty to treat the dead with dignity does not 
require actions or omissions by all, but only by specific duty-bearers. 
3. The duty to treat the dead with dignity consists, in principle, only in the duty of 
relatives or/and friends, as well as the local authority, to bury the dead body, or 
cremate the corpse. This duty cannot also be extended to the duty of individuals and 
the local authority to carry out all other ceremonies held in commemoration of the 
dead. Apparently, all these commemorations are related to specific religious 
dogmas, or philosophical worldviews, that cannot be generally compelled or 
enforced. 
4. The duty to treat the dead with dignity, that is to say, the duty to bury or cremate 
the dead body is a specific perfect duty of right, that is, a duty which cannot be 
overridden, with further legal consequences arising from its non-fulfillment. 
Apparently, contrary to the duty to bury or cremate the corpse, any other rituals 
related to specific religious dogmas or philosophical worldviews, of which omission 
may only lead to cognitive or emotional experiences, e.g. the feeling of guilt of 
relatives or/aŶd fƌieŶds of the dead ŵaŶ, aƌe siŵplǇ ƌegaƌded ͚iŵpeƌfeĐt duties of 
ǀiƌtue͛, ǁhiĐh ĐaŶ ďe oǀeƌƌiddeŶ, ǁithout aŶǇ legal ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes. It is Ŷot aĐĐideŶt 
that only the burial and the cremation of the dead are mentioned in the Public 
Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984.666 
                                                          
665 “ee KaŶt͛s diǀisioŶ of duties iŶ the Metaphysics of Morals, in Gregor (1996), p. 395. 
666 See https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/22/part/III/crossheading/disposal-of-dead-bodies 
[accessed 20 February 2018]. 
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Overall, because the duty to treat the dead with dignity, in the form of the 
duty to bury or cremate the corpse, (1) is grounded in the moral concept of the good 
will, (2) refers to specific individuals and local authorities, (3) is a perfect duty of right 
which cannot be overridden, and (4) has legal consequences, is regarded eventually 
as a moral specific perfect duty of right.667 At this point, three significant issues must 
be clarified: first, who has the right (if there is such a right) to the fulfillment of the 
aforementioned duty; second, how this right is specifically derived from the duty to 
treat the dead with dignity; and third, to whom the inner value of human dignity, in 
the phƌase ͚to tƌeat the dead ǁith digŶitǇ͛, is ultiŵatelǇ attƌiďuted. 
Regarding the first issue, apparently the dead body cannot claim such a right. 
Only the living human beings, whose hygiene and health are in danger in the case of 
the non-fulfillment of the relevant duty, can claim it. Further, given that duty-bearers 
are not all, individuals, states and institutions, but only specific others, namely the 
relatives and friends of the dead, as well as the local authorities, the aforementioned 
right to hygiene and health is not regarded as a human, but as a socioeconomic right, 
which is typically entailed in the socioeconomic right to health, as it is stated in 
article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.668 
Ultimately, this claim-right is effectively grounded in the moral specific perfect duty 
of right of relatives, friends, and the local authorities to bury or cremate the corpse. 
Moving on to the second issue, that is, the issue of how this socioeconomic 
right is specifically derived from our specific perfect duty of right to treat the dead 
with dignity, once again I invoke the 6:239 passage, in the Metaphysics of Morals, in 
ǁhiĐh KaŶt aƌgues that ͚… ǁelĐheƌ eiŶ pfliĐhtgeďieteŶ deƌ “atz ist, aus ǁelĐheŵ 
nachher das Vermögen, andere zu verpflichten, d.i. der Begriff des Rechts, 
entwickelt ǁeƌdeŶ kaŶŶ͛;669 oƌ ͚… the pƌopositioŶ ǁhiĐh ĐoŵŵaŶds dutǇ, fƌoŵ 
which the capacity for putting others under obligation, that is, the concept of right 
                                                          
667 “ee also KaŶt͛s diǀisioŶ of duties iŶ the Metaphysics of Morals, in Gregor (1996), p. 395. 
668 See http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx [accessed 22 February 
2018] 
669See Kant (2013), p. 346 
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can afterwards be generated.670 Eventually, it could be claimed that without the 
moral specific perfect duty of right to treat the dead with dignity, that is to say, to 
bury or cremate them, the right to hygiene and health of other living human beings 
would not even exist. The living human beings, whose health is in danger, have the 
(socioeconomic) right to claim the burial, or the cremation, of the dead body by the 
relevant duty-bearers because these duty-bearers have a specific duty to fulfill a 
moral duty arising from their good or autonomous will, independently of any other 
considerations or concerns. 
Finally, concerning the third issue, that is, the issue of dignity, it can be 
Đlaiŵed that digŶitǇ, iŶ the stateŵeŶt ͚ǁe haǀe the dutǇ to tƌeat the dead ǁith 
digŶitǇ͛, does Ŷot refer, or attributed, either to the dead himself, as it is often 
mistakenly thought, or to those other living human beings who have the right to 
claim the burial or the cremation of the dead body. Instead, it is attributed or refers 
to the autonomous duty-bearers, who have the capacity to respect the moral idea of 
reason, such as the idea of the fulfillment of their moral duty to treat the dead with 
dignity. Eventually, the dignity of duty-ďeaƌeƌs heƌe is ideŶtified ǁith aŶ ͚iŶŶeƌ ǀalue͛ 
attƌiďuted to theŵ ďǇ otheƌs, as ǁell as aŶ ͚iŶŶeƌ feeliŶg͛ of theiƌ oǁŶ ǀalue ƌesultiŶg 
from the realization, through the treatment of the dead with dignity, of their higher 
self as autonomous or good persons in the Kantian sense.671  
Overall, we may represent this intriguing duty to treat the dead with dignity, 
as well as the subsequent socioeconomic right of the living human beings to claim 





                                                          
670 The passage is translated by the author of the present thesis. 
671 Gregor (1996), p. 50. 
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                        (Kantian) good or autonomous will  
                    ↓                                                                    ↓ 
     Dignity (inner feeling)                                 (External) moral duties 
                                                                                          ↓ 
1. Specific perfect duty of right to treat the dead with digŶitǇ → SoĐioeĐoŶoŵiĐ 
(claim) right of living human beings 
2. Specific imperfect duty of virtue to carry out commeŵoratiǀe ĐereŵoŶies → No 
right  
 
Ultimately, the relatives and friends, as well as the local authorities, wherever 
Syrians die, either in Lebanon or in Greece, have the specific perfect duty of right to 
bury or cremate them. Apparently, I had myself, along with all our relatives and 
friends, as well as the local authority in Athens, exactly the same duty to bury the 
dead body of my father. However, my duty to carry out all other commemorative 
ceremonies is just a specific imperfect duty of virtue, which can be overridden –
although, ŶoŶe of ŵǇ ͚uŶďuƌied͛ ŵeŵoƌies ĐaŶ aĐtuallǇ ďe oǀeƌƌiddeŶ. 
What must be pointed out here, before I move on to the conclusion of the 
present chapter, is that my focus in the previous analysis was on those who have 
died; and not those who, for example, because of a terminal illness, claim their 
alleged ƌight ͚to die ǁith digŶitǇ͛, hence they often call on organizations, such as the 
“ǁiss oƌgaŶizatioŶ ͚DigŶitas͛, for support and assistance to die.672 These, i.e. 
euthanasia and assisted suicide, are two controversial issues, a (Kantian) concrete 
negative response to which is given through the analysis of the moral concept of 
human dignity in chapter 2, as well as through the main argument of the thesis in the 
                                                          
672 See: http://www.dignitas.ch/?lang=en [accessed 29 November 2017] 
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present chapter.673 As has been shown, human dignity is not actually possessed by 
the right-holders. That is to say, dignity is not the grounding basis of our rights, as it 
is often argued. Rather dignity is a feeling possessed by, as well as a value accorded 
to the (autonomous) duty-bearers, who fulfill their external moral duties, from which 
our human and socioeconomic rights are further derived. Consequently, those (right-
holders) who claim that they have the right to die with dignity because they have 
dignity cannot legitimately invoke this reason in order to claim their alleged right to 
assisted suicide. This thesis may also be considered along with the popular Kantian 
Đlaiŵ that suiĐide is aŶ iƌƌatioŶal aĐt ďeĐause it deďases huŵaŶitǇ iŶ oŶe͛s peƌsoŶ.674  
In addition, it cannot legitimately be claimed that doctors, relatives, and 
friends have the specific duty to assist those who, suffering from a chronic and 
irreversible illness, wish to commit suicide. My Kantian counter-argument here is 
that, through such an act (crime, killing, murdering), doctors, relatives, and friends 
intentionally transgress or disobey their moral perfect duty to respect the right to 
life of the terminally ill, independently of whether they (the terminally ill) are 
enjoying their life.675 Ultimately, this reasoning applies not only to the assisted 
suicide, but also to all other hard cases in law today, such as euthanasia, abortion, 




In this chapter I presented the new (Kantian) duty-based account for the justification 
of human and socioeconomic rights, or the Duty-Based Approach (DBA). Within this 
context, it became clear why a truly Kantian justification can actually be supported 
and proposed for human rights only; while for socioeconomic rights we can speak of 
                                                          
673 According to the NHS definitions, while euthanasia is the act of deliberately ending oŶe͛s life, 
assisted suicide is the act of deliberately assisting or encouraging another person to kill themselves; 
see https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/euthanasia-and-assisted-suicide/ [accessed 10/2/2019] 
674 See 6:240 and 6:422-423, in Gregor (1996), pp. 395, 546-547. 
675 See 4:430 and 6:239, in Gregor (1996), pp. 80, 395.  
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a duty-based justificatory account simply inspired by the Kantian opus. This 
distinction is important given that the Kantian, as well as any other philosophical text 
from the past, has to be respected by contemporary thinkers, whose primary duty is 
not to project their own thoughts or obsessions onto it. After this, I responded to 
four possible objections against it, namely that the Duty- Based Approach: 1) 
degrades the idea of rights, 2) wrongly distinguishes between human and 
socioeconomic rights, 3) is not correct because it is based on the idea that Kant was 
a moral foundationalist; while he was actually a moral constructivist, and 4) is not 
correct because it considers the Kantian moral and legal/political philosophy as two 
domains with at least some degree of continuity and coherence. Finally, I focused on 
and discussed a case which differs from other cases (e.g. the case of a normal adult 
human being, an embryo, a baby, a child, a comatose patient, a mentally disabled, 
aŶ iŵŵigƌaŶt, a ƌefugee, aŶ ͚apatƌis͛, a pooƌ, a hoŵosexual, and so forth), namely 
the case of non-living human beings. Ultimately, having answered the main question 
of the thesis, ŶaŵelǇ ͚ǁhat is the philosophical basis of human and socioeconomic 
rights?͛, I ĐaŶ ŵoǀe oŶ to the fiŶal Đhapteƌ ;Summary and Implications), in which, 
along with the summary of the main points of the thesis, I provide some significant 
practical implications, especially in the areas of law and politics. In addition, I discuss 
the DBA in relation to one of the most urgent problems in the world today, that is, 
the problem of ͚extreme child poverty͛. Finally, I take a step further arguing that the 
DBA may be seen as the starting point for the formulation of a future duty-based 











Summary and implications 
 
1. Introduction  
In the previous chapter I have presented and analyzed the new (Kantian) duty-based 
justification of human and socioeconomic rights, or the Duty-Based Approach. 
Having answered the main question of the thesis, ŶaŵelǇ ͚ǁhat the philosophiĐal 
fouŶdatioŶ of huŵaŶ aŶd soĐioeĐoŶoŵiĐ ƌights is͛, it is now clear why the word 
͚KaŶtiaŶ͛ is iŶ paƌeŶtheses. The reason is that, as has been shown, one can 
legitimately argue in favour of a truly Kantian philosophical foundation of human 
rights; yet the same cannot legitimately be claimed for socioeconomic rights, for 
which a duty-based justificatory account can be formulated simply inspired by the 
Kantian opus.  
My purpose in this chapter is twofold: first, to review the findings presented 
in chapters 1 to 4 and, second, to discuss some further implications of them, 
especially in the areas of law and politics. In section three I shall attempt the 
application of the new duty-based justificatory account to one of the most urgent, 
yet still unstated, rights today, namely the right of children to freedom from extreme 
poverty. Finally, I shall take a step further arguing that the new duty-based 
justification for human and socioeconomic rights may be seen as the starting point 
for the formulation of a future duty-based account of international justice, in the 
form of a new Bill of duties in international level. A hasty reader could find in this 
final chapter all the core concepts of the dissertation, and the way in which they are 
interconnected. However, the patient reader has to pass through all the preceding 






2. Thesis summary and implications 
In the first chapter of the thesis I have provided a concise account of the historical 
development of the idea of human rights. It has been stressed that after the end of 
World War II the concept of human rights has been widely accepted. Relevant rights 
have further been ratified by most of the countries, contributing to a great extent to 
the establishment not only of our contemporary international and regional legal 
orders, but also of our constitutional institutions. However, as has been pointed out, 
the domination of the idea of human rights for more than five decades, that is, from 
the end of the Second World War until the beginning of the 21st century, seems to 
have been weakened during the last two decades, in which human rights have been 
challenged a lot. The opponents of human rights now argue that these rights have 
failed to accomplish their objectives, that there may not be such things as human 
rights, and, eventually, that we should reject the idea of human rights. The critique 
against human rights comes not only from ordinary people, journalists, politicians, 
and legal practitioners, but also from a number of political theorists, legal scholars, 
and moral philosophers.676 In chapter 1, I have focused on and discussed the two 
main problems, because of which human rights have come under increasing attack in 
recent years. 
 First, I have argued that the core human rights documents, which have been 
mentioned above, have actually been described in extremely abstract terms. But, for 
human rights to be respected, they have first to be understood. This is helped only if 
the expression of such rights is clear and specific. Also, a non-clarified human right 
cannot easily be interpreted in courts, hence to be properly enforced. Finally, an 
abstract concept, in general, cannot further be implemented by political institutions. 
Second, I have claimed that because of the fact that human rights are typically seen 
as a western product, imposed top-down by western circles unto the rest of the 
world, it is difficult to be universally accepted and respected. 
Recognizing the weight and urgency of these two problems, yet insisting on 
the value of human rights, I have further argued that we should avoid a nihilistic 
                                                          
676 See for instance, MacIntyre (2007), pp. 68-69 
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stance towards them. Hence, I have proposed a new philosophical foundation for 
them aiming to contribute to the resolution of the aforementioned problems, as well 
as to the enhancement and restoration of our confidence to them. Thus, contrary to 
legal positivists, who claim that we do not need to know what the nature of law is, 
and whether it applies universally, I have argued in favour of a deeper philosophical 
justification of the standards that are set out in the documents. Within this context, 
in the first three chapters of the thesis, I have discussed some noteworthy 
contemporary rights-based, dignity-based, and Kantian-based justifications. In what 
follows, I focus on their deficiencies, and their treatment through the DBA. 
 
2.1 Naturalistic and political justifications  
Initially, as has been pointed out, according to the ͚ƌights-ďased͛ naturalistic, or 
traditional, or orthodox accounts, human rights are moral rights, which are 
possessed by all people in all times and all places simply in virtue of their humanity. 
In spite of the popularity of these justifications, in the first chapter of the thesis, it 
has been claimed that these accounts face a number of problems. 
More specifically, by focusing only on the actual normative agency of human 
ďeiŶgs, GƌiffiŶ͛s ageŶĐǇ-based justificatory account encounters problems with 
respect to human beings who lack the capacity to act as autonomous moral agents, 
e.g. children, the severely mentally disabled, the dementia sufferers, and so forth. 
Siŵilaƌ pƌoďleŵs appeaƌ iŶ Nussďauŵ͛s Đapaďilities appƌoaĐh. HeŶĐe, Đontrary to 
GƌiffiŶ͛s justifiĐatioŶ, the Duty-Based Approach in the present thesis avoids the 
relevant flaw. To be more precise, ǁhile GƌiffiŶ͛s ageŶĐǇ-based account presents the 
relation agency-rights in such a way that the attribution of human rights to 
individuals is the result of their normative agency, according to the new duty-based 
justificatory account, the attribution of human and socioeconomic rights, 
respectively, is not the result of a distinguishing feature of right-holders, but of the 
commitment of autonomous, rational duty-bearers to their universal perfect duties 
of right to others, as well as to their specific perfect duties of right to others.  
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Consequently, within the context of the new Duty-Based Approach, all human 
beings, including embryos, children, the mentally disabled, coma patients, even 
criminals, are protected, not because they have normative agency, but as a result of 
the fact that there are others (duty-bearers), from whose dutiful judgments and 
actions, their human and socioeconomic rights originate. One could invoke here the 
6:314-315 in the Metaphysics of Morals, in which Kant makes the distinction 
between active and passive ĐitizeŶs. KaŶt ǁƌites: ͚… these aƌe ŵeƌe uŶdeƌliŶgs 
(Handlanger) of the commonwealth because they have to be under the direction or 
protection of other individuals, and so do not possess civil iŶdepeŶdeŶĐe͛.677 One 
could easily conclude that, given their lack of rationality, children, the mentally 
disabled, the coma patients, and so forth, should also be protected and directed by 
those who fully exercise their rational capacities, and fulfill their duties; hence, the 
former acquire human and socioeconomic rights, as a result of the fact that the 
latter fulfill their universal perfect and specific perfect duties of right towards them.  
Moreover, in chapter 1, I haǀe disĐussed FiŶŶis͛s seǀeŶ fuŶdaŵental goods, 
as ǁell as ‘az͛s iŶteƌest-based accounts for the justification of human rights. Within 
this context, I have argued that one might legitimately object to these theories that 
what distinguishes rights from goods and interests is the fact that, in contrast to the 
former, the latter do not involve duties, so that they can be impaired without any 
ǁƌoŶg ďeiŶg Đoŵŵitted. Foƌ eǆaŵple, ŵǇ iŶteƌest iŶ ďeiŶg soŵeoŶe͛s loǀeƌ ĐaŶ ďe 
uŶsatisfied oƌ ͚ǀiolated͛ ǁithout aŶǇ ǁƌoŶgdoiŶg. But this is Ŷot the Đase for rights, 
which are typically seen as closely connected with duties. Hence, contrary to these 
goods/interests-based accounts for the justification of rights, the Duty-Based 
Approach does not simply presuppose that duties are connected with rights, or that 
duties and rights correspond to each other, or that those who have rights have also 
duties, and vice versa; but that our human and socioeconomic rights are generated 
or developed from moral duties. 
Furthermore, as has been pointed out in the first chapter of the thesis, 
through the ͚ďasiĐ Ŷeeds͛ justifiĐatoƌǇ aĐĐouŶts, a Ŷuŵďeƌ of sigŶifiĐaŶt ƌights, suĐh 
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as the civil and political rights, remain unsupported within the constrained context of 
this type of justificatory approaches. That is to say, within the context of a basic 
needs account, the real source of civil and political rights is not determined. For 
example, there is no room left for the justification of the right to fair trial.678 But civil 
and political rights are a significant part of the International Bill of Rights. 
Incidentally, given the aforementioned distinction between human and 
socioeconomic rights, civil and political rights are identified with human rights. An 
account through which our civil and political rights, that is, our human rights are not 
effectively protected is implausible. Contrary to the ͚basic needs͛ accounts, the new 
Duty-Based Approach gives special attention to these rights: in particular, it is clearly 
shown that they derive from our universal perfect duties of right to others. 
Further, apart from the naturalistic, or traditional, or orthodox justifications 
of human rights, in chapter 1, I have also discussed some significant political and 
practice-based accounts, according to which human rights are considered to be legal 
and political rights generated within the international political practice. The 
definition of rights within the context of this family of justifications directly clashes 
with the Duty-Based Approach. Contrary to the former, the latter clearly shows that 
human and socioeconomic rights derive from morality, hence they are moral rights. 
In what follows, I explain why the Duty-Based Approach is more preferable than the 
political and practice-based accounts discussed in chapter 1. 
As has been pointed out, ‘aǁls͛s The Law of Peoples was developed within 
the narrow horizon of the political system of liberalism, and it is strictly restricted to 
it. But not all countries in the world are liberal democracies. Thus, one could argue 
that human rights should be based on a wider, or more universal, basis than a liberal 
democracy, which would be able to guarantee their protection all over the world. 
CoŶtƌaƌǇ to ‘aǁls͛s liberal account for the justification of human rights, the Duty-
Based Approach is indeed broader, as it originates from our common practical 
reason, so that by definition it refers to all human beings. That is to say, the duty-
bearers, from whose fulfilment of duties our human rights derive, are, in principle, 
                                                          
678 Cruft, R., Liao, S.M., Renzo, M. (2015), pp. 14-15 
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all rational (human) beings. Only in the case of socioeconomic rights the burden falls 
under specific duty-bearers, so that it could be said that the horizon here is narrower 
than the horizon in the case of human rights which are typically seen as universal 
rights. 
Moreover, as has been stressed in chapter 1, I do not actually understand 
‘az͛s Đlaiŵ that huŵaŶ ƌights aƌe moral rights, yet they exist only when the 
institutional structures favour their fulfilment. As it is clearly shown in chapter 4, 
only socioeconomic rights are moral rights which need specific institutional 
structures in order to be fulfilled. But this is not the case for human rights, which are, 
by definition, institution-iŶdepeŶdeŶt. HeŶĐe, ‘az͛s Đlaiŵ is a kiŶd of sĐheŵa 
oxymoron. It seems to me that Raz confuses here human rights with the so-called 
socioeconomic rights which are institution-dependent. 
The same counter-aƌguŵeŶt applies to Beitz͛s Đlaiŵ that huŵaŶ ƌights eǆist 
aŶd aƌe gƌouŶded oŶlǇ iŶ ͚ŵodeƌŶ͛ soĐieties ǁhiĐh haǀe ďeeŶ stƌuĐtuƌed iŶ a ǁaǇ 
that faǀouƌs theiƌ fulfilŵeŶt. CoŶtƌaƌǇ to Beitz͛s aĐĐouŶt, the new Duty-Based 
Approach allows for the fulfilment of duties and the protection of the relevant rights, 
not only in modern societies, but in every society, even in the most isolated societies 
on earth. Also, through the new duty-based justification, not only states, as Beitz 
argues, but all, individuals, states, and institutions are responsible for the fulfilment 
of duties, from which rights are afterwards generated. Consequently, the Duty-Based 
Approach is Đoŵpatiďle ǁith the Pƌeaŵďle of the UN͛s DeĐlaƌatioŶ of HuŵaŶ ‘ights, 
aĐĐoƌdiŶg to ǁhiĐh: ͚eǀery individual and every organ of society, keeping this 
Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote 
respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and 
international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, 
both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of 
teƌƌitoƌies uŶdeƌ theiƌ juƌisdiĐtioŶ͛.679 
                                                          




Furthermore, as has been stressed in chapter 1, the ͚oǀeƌlappiŶg ĐoŶseŶsus͛ 
appƌoaĐhes haǀe ďasiĐallǇ to deal ǁith the pƌoďleŵ that the idea of ͚ƌight͛ does Ŷot 
look at all familiar to the non-western world. What Michael Ignatieff has found in his 
recent micro-ethnographic research is that while rights are the language of the 
states and liberal elites, yet this language is not shared by ordinary people all over 
the world.680 Consequently, I do not consider as successful arguments such as 
Maƌtha Nussďauŵ͛s ǁhiĐh aƌe ďased oŶ the idea of aŶ ͚oǀeƌlappiŶg ĐoŶseŶsus͛. 
Eventually, as has been previously explained, a duty-based approach may be more 
successful given the fact that, contrary to the idea of rights, which is mostly 
ƌeĐogŶized ǁithiŶ the ǁesteƌŶ soĐieties, the old ĐategoƌǇ of ͚dutǇ͛ is ƌeĐogŶized all 
over the world. 
Ultimately, these intercultural agreements, which have been built upon a 
contracturalist base, without any other moral considerations, cannot effectively be 
respected by individuals given that they are mostly seen as technical products 
without any deeper moral background. But deeper moral considerations are 
necessary given that by nature human beings respect only what they actually 
understand in depth. Besides, ǁheŶeǀeƌ a huŵaŶ ƌight is ǀiolated, e.g. a ĐhildƌeŶ͛s 
human right, no one claims that the relevant act consists a violation because there is 
a relevant provision in a human rights document or treaty which has been signed by 
soŵe ŶatioŶs, e.g. the UN͛s CoŶǀeŶtioŶ oŶ the ‘ights of the Child. IŶstead, ǁhat it is 
actually argued is that a childƌeŶ͛s huŵaŶ ƌight has indeed been violated. 
Finally, and that brings me to the end of the review of the justificatory 
accounts discussed in chapter 1, by giving emphasis solely to the legal character of 
international human rights, Buchanan seems to disregard the fact that not all human 
rights are legal. Ultimately, as has been discussed in chapter 1, Buchanan does not 
adequately support his justificatory pluralism, as well as the association of morality 
and legality. 
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2.2 Dignity-based accounts for the justification of human rights  
Following the examination of the naturalistic and political accounts for the 
justification of human rights, in chapter 2, I haǀe disĐussed the ͚offiĐial͛ justifiĐatioŶ 
of human rights, that is, the concept of human dignity. Initially, I have provided a 
concise account of the historical development of the notion of dignity, from archaic 
societies until the 21st century, aiming to show its deep legal, philosophical, and 
theological roots. In addition, I have discussed some critiques against dignity 
throughout history arising from the fact that dignity is not actually expressed 
precisely in documents; so that it still remains an abstract concept, which does not 
allow us to say with certainty that it is the genuine basis of human rights. In 
particular, I have focused on the attacks against dignity by Arthur Schopenhauer, 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Oscar Schachter, Ruth Macklin, David Albert Jones, Costas 
Douzinas, and Michael Rosen. 
 Moreover, I have stressed the fact that dignity is today on the focus of the 
human rights discourse. Despite all criticisms, dignity is still claimed to be the 
genuine basis of human rights. Within this context, I have discussed four of the most 
important contemporary dignity-based accounts for the justification of human 
rights: ϭͿ WaldƌoŶ͛s legal status ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of digŶitǇ as the ďasis of huŵaŶ ƌights, ϮͿ 
Tasioulas͛s ŵoƌal status ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of digŶitǇ as the fouŶdatioŶ of huŵaŶ ƌights, ϯͿ 
the Catholic value conception of dignity as the basis of human rights, and 4) the 
popular Kantian value conception of dignity as the justification of human rights.  
Apart from the particular problems of these four dignity-based accounts, 
which have thoroughly been discussed in chapter 2, here I focus on what appear as 
the basic flaws of all these justifications of human rights. To be more specific, in 
these dignity-based accounts, a foundationalist claim regarding dignity and rights, 
that is, a claim that we all have rights because we are all persons with dignity, cannot 
be legitimately defended. Here are the reasons why such a claim is implausible. 
 Initially, the moral concept of human dignity is not, as it is popularly argued, 
an intrinsic or inherent value possessed by the right-holders, but an inner value, as 
well as a moral feeling, acquired by the duty-bearers after the fulfillment of their 
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(external) moral duties. The main problem here is in effect the mistaken 
interpretation by scholars and legal practitioners of the moral concept of human 
dignity. As I have argued in chapter 3, through the conceptual analysis of the moral 
concept of autonomy via the Kantian aesthetic category of the sublime, human 
dignity appears to be an inner value attributed to human beings who fulfill their 
duties, and, at the same time, a feeling of those persons who judge and act in 
accordance with moral laws commands, namely of persons who do their duties 
(duty-bearers). Here is the true meaning of dignity as it has been stated in chapter 3 
of the thesis:  
Autonomy of the will is both the judgment and feeling of autonomous moral 
agents who, although they feel humiliated by the omnipotence of the moral 
laǁ, they aďaŶdoŶ ͚ǀolitioŶ͛, that is, theiƌ iŶĐliŶatioŶs, ideologies, wishes and 
so forth, and, freely self-legislating –yet requiring the same legislation from 
all others– respect the moral ideas of reason, such as the fulfillment of their 
moral duties, realizing their higher self as autonomous moral agents (self-
approbation681), while feeling (and being considered by others), at the same 
time, that they are persons with dignity. 
Hence, it is no accident that not only in the Critique of Judgment (e.g. Ak. 
273), but also in many other parts of his opus, Kant explicitly associates (yet not 
identifies) the moral feeling of dignity with the aesthetic feeling of the sublime. For 
instance, in 4:426 in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant wƌites: ͚… 
the sublimity and inner dignity of the ĐoŵŵaŶd iŶ a dutǇ…͛682 Also, in 4:439, Kant 
ǁƌites: ͚… the ŵeƌe dignity of huŵaŶitǇ as ƌatioŶal Ŷatuƌe… is Ǉet to seƌǀe as aŶ 
inflexible precept of the will, and that it is just in this independence of maxims from 
all such incentives that their sublimity consists and the worthiness of every rational 
suďjeĐt to ďe a laǁgiǀiŶg ŵeŵďeƌ iŶ the kiŶgdoŵ of eŶds͛.683 Further, in 4:439-440, 
KaŶt ǁƌites: ͚… ǁe theƌeďǇ ƌepƌeseŶt a ĐeƌtaiŶ sublimity and dignity in the person 
                                                          
681 See 5:81, in the Critique of Practical Reason, in: Gregor (1996), p. 205 
682 Gregor (1996), p. 77. 
683 Gregor (1996), p. 88. 
249 
 
ǁho fulfills all his duties…͛684 Finally, in 6:435 in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant 
describes the person who does her duty without disavowing her dignity, but with 
consciousness of her sublime moral predisposition.685 [Bold letters mine]. Ultimately, 
what must be stressed is that in spite of the fact that dignity is mentioned several 
times, it has obviously a secondary role within the Kantian opus. Instead, the 
ĐoŶĐepts of ͚autoŶoŵǇ͛ aŶd ͚dutǇ͛ seeŵ to ďe KaŶt͛s pƌiŵaƌǇ ĐoŶĐeƌŶs. 
What must also be pointed out here is that dignity is actually an inner, not an 
intrinsic, e.g. in the Catholic sense686, value; that is to say, dignity is a moral capacity, 
the realization of which truly takes place only after the actual fulfillment of the 
relevant moral duties. This is the correct interpretation of the Kantian moral concept 
of human dignity. Nowhere does KaŶt ŵeŶtioŶ the ǁoƌd ͚iŶtƌiŶsiĐ͛ oƌ ͚iŶtƌiŶsiĐallǇ͛. 
In 4:436 in the Groundwork, ĐhaƌaĐteƌizes digŶitǇ as ͚aŶ uŶĐoŶditioŶal, iŶĐoŵpaƌaďle 
ǁoƌth͛;687 and in 4:434-ϰϯϱ, he ǁƌites that ͚…ŵoƌalitǇ, aŶd huŵaŶitǇ insofar as it is 
Đapaďle of ŵoƌalitǇ, is that ǁhiĐh aloŶe has digŶitǇ͛ [italiĐs ŵiŶe].688 Consequently, 
the ĐhaƌaĐteƌizatioŶ of digŶitǇ as aŶ ͚iŶtƌiŶsiĐ͛ oƌ ͚iŶheƌeŶt͛ value, either by Catholics, 
or by Kantians, and others is incorrect. 
Further, dignity cannot be the foundation of human rights as it belongs to the 
internal domain of morality, while human and socioeconomic rights typically belong 
to the external domain of law. Here I agree with Andrea Sangiovanni. As has been 
ŵeŶtioŶed pƌeǀiouslǇ, “aŶgioǀaŶŶi aƌgues that digŶitǇ is ͚… a ŵoƌal ŶotioŶ that 
governs the character of our internal attitudes, reasons, and action. It does not 
goǀeƌŶ the ͞eǆteƌŶal͟ doŵaiŶ of ‘ight ǁhiĐh sets liŵits to ouƌ aĐtioŶs but remains 
silent on the character of our reasons or attitudes towards those actions or towards 
the laǁ goǀeƌŶiŶg those aĐtioŶs͛.689  
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686 See chapter 2 of the thesis. 
687 Gregor (1996), p. 85. 
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In the similar vein, according to the Duty-Based Approach, dignity seems to 
be the internal value and feeling resulting from the fulfillment of our external moral 
duties, from which our human and socioeconomic rights are afterwards generated or 
developed. Eventually, dignity does not straightforwardly appear on the external 
domain of law and justice. Hence it has a secondary role within the contemporary 
human rights discourse. The fact that dignity cannot be the foundation of human 
(and socioeconomic) rights is clearly shown in the schema depicting the new duty-
based justification of human and socioeconomic rights in chapter 4: 
 
                    Autonomy of the will   >   ethical lawgiving 
                    ↓                                                                    ↓ 
Dignity (internal domain of morality)        Moral duties (external domain of law) 
                                                                                          ↓ 
1. UŶiǀeƌsal peƌfeĐt duties of ƌight to otheƌs → HuŵaŶ ƌights  
2. “peĐifiĐ peƌfeĐt duties of ƌight to otheƌs → “oĐioeĐoŶoŵiĐ ƌights 
3. UŶiǀeƌsal iŵpeƌfeĐt duties of ǀiƌtue to otheƌs → No ƌights 
4. “peĐifiĐ iŵpeƌfeĐt duties of ǀiƌtue to otheƌs → No ƌights        
 
Overall, under the understanding of the moral concept of human dignity as an 
inner value and feeling which belongs to the internal domain of morality, and is 
possessed by the duty-bearers, the four popular dignitarian accounts for the 
justification of human rights, which are discussed in chapter 2 of the thesis, seem to 
be flawed as they are based on tenuous grounds, that is, on a mistaken 
interpretation of the concept of dignity itself. Eventually, human beings are 
respected not because they (right-holders) have dignity, but because others (duty-
bearers), by showing respect on them, have dignity. Ultimately, dignity and duties –
from which rights are afterwards developed– are coordinate ideas. Incidentally, this 
claim opposes WaldƌoŶ͛s iŵpƌessioŶ –originating from the formulation of the first 
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aƌtiĐle of the UŶiǀeƌsal DeĐlaƌatioŶ of HuŵaŶ ‘ights, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to ǁhiĐh: ͚All huŵaŶ 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and ƌights͛ [ďold letteƌs ŵiŶe]– that dignity 
and rights seem to be coordinate ideas.690 
Afteƌ the disĐussioŶ of the ƌeasoŶs ǁhǇ the Đlaiŵ that ͚ǁe all haǀe ƌights ďeĐause 
ǁe aƌe all peƌsoŶs ǁith digŶitǇ͛ ĐaŶŶot ďe defeŶded, iŶ ǁhat folloǁs, I point out 
some further implications of the research on the concept of human dignity in the 
present thesis.  
Initially, in the practical domain of law there are many cases where the mistaken 
conception of dignity is popularly argued as the foundation of human rights. These 
cases are not only the so-called paradigmatic cases of offence against human dignity, 
e.g. torture, but also some of the most controversial cases in justice today, e.g. the 
dignity of the embryo and the pregnant mother in the case of abortion, the dignity of 
children, the dignity of the mentally disabled or patients in coma, the dignity of 
those who wish to commit an assisted suicide in a case of a chronic, non-reversible 
illness, the dignity of plants and animals, even the dignity of the dead people. As has 
already been mentioned in chapter 2, according to the correct interpretation of 
human dignity, slavery or torture, or any other paradigmatic case of offence against 
human dignity, is not wrong because it is incompatible with the idea that slaves or 
the tortured woman, and so on, have to be treated as ends, that is, as dignified 
persons. Rather, they are wrong because they are irrational acts performed by non-
dignified persons (duty-bearers) who actually fail to do their duties towards others 
(right-holders). In the following analysis, I focus on the so-called hard legal cases, 
which are of great concern today.  
According to the mistaken interpretation of the concept of human dignity, it 
might be wrongly claimed that the embryo, young children, the mentally disabled, 
patients in coma, those who wish to or commit an assisted suicide, animals, plants, 
dead people, and so forth, have rights because they have dignity. However, as has 
been discussed above, such a justificatory claim is implausible not only because 
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dignity belongs to the internal domain of morality, which is not associated with the 
external domain of law, but also because dignity is possessed not by the 
aforementioned beings-right-holders, but by the duty-bearers. Consequently, 
according to my interpretation of dignity, all these beings-right-holders are fully 
respected not because they have dignity, but because other persons (duty-bearers), 
who show (externally) respect on them, by fulfilling their external moral duties to 
them, have dignity. For example, a person who wishes to commit an assisted suicide 
cannot legitimately invoke her dignity in order to justify her right to this kind of 
suicide.691 Therefore, the legal decisions, according to which a suicide act breaches 
oŶe͛s huŵaŶ ƌight to digŶitǇ, are profoundly wrong.692 Besides, what would happen 
if all terminally ill made court claims for assisted suicide?  
In addition, dead people must be buried not because they have dignity. 
Apparently, they do not have dignity any more as a result of the fact that death 
ceases any kind of autonomous judgment and action (on which dignity is based). 
Rather, they must be buried because other dignified living human beings have the 
duty to bury them. According to ‘ees ǀ Hughes: ͚Theƌe is aŶ oďligatioŶ at ĐoŵŵoŶ 
law, in the nature of a public duty, which rests on certain persons in whose 
possession a dead body may be — a husband being one — to ďuƌǇ it … [W]heƌe a 
man dies possessed of personal property, the duty of burying his body falls primarily 
oŶ his peƌsoŶal ƌepƌeseŶtatiǀes … aŶd this dutǇ eŶtitles the peƌsoŶal ƌepƌeseŶtatiǀe 
to absolute priority of ƌeiŵďuƌseŵeŶt out of the estate͛.693  
                                                          
691 See Jones (2013) and Kass (2008); also, majority opinion in Rodriguez v British Colombia (Attorney 
General), 1993, 3 S.C.R. 519 [1993] S.C.J. No 94. para. 129. 
692 See for instance the recent case of the terminally ill Noel Conway. Available from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/jul/17/assisted-dying-suicide-act-high-court-challenge-
royal-courts-of-justice [accessed in 30 January 2018]. 
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Generally, in the so-Đalled ͚hard͛ cases in law, the concept of human dignity 
should be understood as a value possessed by the duty-bearers who have the duty 
to engage in autonomous rational practice, in order to fulfill their duties towards all 
the aforementioned beings-right-holders. 
 
2.3 Two more Kantian accounts for the justification of human rights  
After the evaluation of the status-based and value-based dignitarian accounts for the 
justification of human rights, including the popular Kantian value conception of 
dignity as the basis of rights, with the intention of not abandoning a Kantian 
orientation or perspective regarding the philosophical foundations of human rights, 
in chapter 3, I have discussed two noteworthy contemporary Kantian philosophical 
foundations of human rights. These are: ϭͿ Aƌthuƌ ‘ipsteiŶ͛s aƌguŵeŶt aĐĐoƌdiŶg to 
which huŵaŶ ƌights aƌe gƌouŶded iŶ the KaŶtiaŶ ŶotioŶ of the ͚iŶŶate ƌight to 
fƌeedoŵ͛ iŶ the DoĐtƌiŶe of ‘ight, the ‘eĐhtslehƌe, iŶ the Metaphysics of Morals;694 
aŶd ϮͿ KatƌiŶ FliksĐhuh͛s transcendental approach to the justification of human 
rights.695 Along with the Kantian dignity-based argument for the justification of 
human rights, these accounts are considered to be three of the most important 
contemporary Kantian justificatory approaches to human rights today. In what 
follows, I provide some furtheƌ iŵpliĐatioŶs of ‘ipsteiŶ͛s aŶd FliksĐhuh͛s aĐĐouŶts. 
 Initially, after the development of the new Duty-Based Approach in chapter 
4, and the new reading of the notion of the ͚ethiĐal laǁgiǀiŶg͛, it can further be 
stressed that autonomy, that is, the moral principle which by definition (see chapter 
3) entails limits, and not freedom, as Ripstein argues, through which no restrictions 
are imposed, is the protagonist in rights discourse. In spite of the tension between 
KaŶt͛s ŵoƌal aŶd legal philosophǇ, the ŶotioŶ of the ͚ethiĐal laǁgiǀiŶg͛, that is, the 
iŶteƌfaĐe ďetǁeeŶ KaŶt͛s ŵoƌalitǇ aŶd legalitǇ, leads to the ĐoŶĐlusioŶ that KaŶt͛s 
legal/political philosophy is actually consistent with his ethics –at least in the case of 
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human and socioeconomic rights. That is to say, if we want to justify human and 
socioeconomic rights in a Kantian way, we have to read the Metaphysics of Morals in 
light of the Groundwork. Thus, contrary to most of recent Kantian work on human 
rights of liberal orientation, which is focused on the idea of freedom, without any 
otheƌ ŵoƌal ĐoŶsideƌatioŶs, it Đould geŶeƌallǇ ďe Đlaiŵed that KaŶt͛s pƌaĐtiĐal 
philosophy –and a Kantian philosophy of human and socioeconomic rights, in 
particular– is in effect a philosophy of autonomy.696  
Also, concerning Flikschuh͛s aĐĐouŶt, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to ǁhiĐh we cannot help but 
take ourselves and others as right-bearers, apart from the criticisms which have 
already been discussed in chapter 3, it can further be argued that, by insisting on her 
transcendental argument for the justification of human rights, Flikschuh seems to 
ignore the fact that we now live in a post-post-modern, or meta-modern, era, in 
which, even though the Enlightenment ideals have been weakened, we still cannot 
return to the pre-Enlightenment unexamined metaphysical world. That is to say, 
although the Enlightenment, or modernist rationalism, seems to have been in 
decline during the last decades, the reformulation of our meta-modern world 
according to the dogmas and unexamined beliefs of the pre-Enlightenment period is 
not plausible either, given that all these belong irrevocably to the past. 
Consequently, as regards the fouŶdatioŶ of huŵaŶ ƌights iŶ todaǇ͛s ŵeta-
modern world, I do not see as successful either a purely metaphysical, e.g. 
FliksĐhuh͛s, oƌ a purely ŵodeƌŶist, e.g. ‘aǁls͛s, aƌguŵeŶt. OŶe the oŶe haŶd, a 
purely metaphysical argument cannot be really fathomed by most people; while, on 
the other hand, a typical modernist argument contradicts the recent tendency to 
overcoming rationalism, originating from the Enlightenment tradition, which has 
further led to the disenchantment of the world. My view then is that only a 
foundation that avoids both the purity of a metaphysical account, and the purity of a 
secularist account, creatively combining elements from both traditions, ĐaŶ ͚speak͛ 
to people today. Such a foundation happens to be the one attempted in chapter 4 of 
the thesis.  
                                                          
696 For the opposite claim, see Varden (2015), pp. 213-237  
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Specifically, in this chapter, I have turned my attention to the Kantian moral 
and legal/political philosophy, of which mixed, metaphysical and secular character, 
may enable us to move from the Enlightenment, modernity, and post-modernity to 
our contemporary post-postmodern or meta-modern world. The mixed character of 
the Kantian moral and legal/political philosophy is apparent in the Duty-Based 
Approach in the present thesis. As has already been shown and explained in chapter 
4, although the new justificatory account starts from the notioŶ of the ͚autoŶoŵǇ of 
the ǁill͛, ǁhiĐh tǇpiĐallǇ ƌesides iŶ the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 
hence it is undoubtedly a transcendental concept, yet, through the notion of the 
͚ethiĐal laǁgiǀiŶg͛, it aĐtuallǇ alloǁs foƌ the derivation of human and socioeconomic 
rights, which dwell in the external, secular domain of law and justice, and generally 
in the empirical sociability.697 Eventually, it could be argued that through the new 
Duty-Based Approach a kiŶd of ͚de-transcendentalizatioŶ͛ of the KaŶtiaŶ ŵoral aŶd 
legal/political theory is taken place; yet one deeply respecting the transcendental 
ĐhaƌaĐteƌ of KaŶt͛s opus iŶ geŶeƌal. 
 
2.4 The conceptual analysis of the autonomy of the will via the Kantian aesthetic 
category of the sublime 
After the review and the reference to some further implications of the discussed in 
the first three chapters of the thesis philosophical foundations of human rights, I 
now move on to the second part of chapter 3 (the bridging part of the thesis), in 
which I have: 1) argued in favour of a Kantian perspective concerning the 
justification of human and socioeconomic rights, and 2) analyzed the starting point 
of the new Duty-Based Approach, namely the moral concept of autonomy, through 
the aesthetic notion of the sublime. 
Contrary to those who argue that there cannot be a truly Kantian theory of 
human rights, e.g. Andrea Sangiovanni, I have claimed that there is still room in 
KaŶt͛s opus foƌ the foƌŵulatioŶ of a tƌulǇ KaŶtiaŶ justifiĐatioŶ. I have argued that the 
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ideal starting point of this new account should be the Kantian supreme principle of 
morality, that is, the moral concept of autonomy of the will. The reason is that the 
ethical lawgiving, within the context of the supreme principle of morality, allows for 
the justification of rights which typically reside in the external domain of law rather 
in the internal domain of morality. Further, my academic interest in the Kantian 
autonomy of the will, in general, is not the result of a Kantian, or deontological, 
orientation in philosophy, but comes basically from the realization that the concept 
of autonomy is meant to play significant role in future. For instance, autonomy is the 
protagonist today in the lethal autonomous weapon (LAWs) discourse. Recently, it 
has been claimed that AI-empowered robots pose new dangers, possibly of an 
existential kind.698 Also, in March 2018, a statement on artificial intelligence, 
robotics, and autonomous systems was released by the European Group on Ethics in 
Science and New Technologies (EGE) aiming at a wide-ranging process of public 
deliberation.699  
However, the notion of autonomy, both in the Kantian opus and in the 
contemporary discourses, still remains indeterminate and abstract. Hence, what I 
have suggested, in the third chapter of the thesis, is its conceptual analysis. Only 
then it could legitimately be used as the starting point of the new DBA. In particular, 
I have proposed the analysis of the Kantian moral concept of autonomy via the 
Kantian aesthetic notion of the sublime, as it is developed by Kant in the Critique of 
Judgment, in Book II, in the Analytic of the sublime, especially in paragraphs: 23-
29.700 Specifically, I have argued in favour of an analogy (yet not absolute identity) 
between the moral concept of autonomy and the aesthetic notion of the sublime. 
On the one hand, by arguing that both the autonomy and the sublime are 
judgments, I have pointed out the ͚struĐtural͛ siŵilaritǇ or analogy between them. 
                                                          
698 “ee foƌ iŶstaŶĐe: Ϯϱ JaŶuaƌǇ ϮϬϭϴ, ͚AutoŶoŵous ǁeapoŶs aƌe a gaŵe-ĐhaŶgeƌ͛ iŶ The Economist, 
available from: https://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21735472-ai-empowered-robots-
pose-entirely-new-dangers-possibly-existential-kind-autonomous [accessed in 13 March 2018].  
699 See http://designforvalues.tudelft.nl/2018/ethics-of-ai-statement-european-expert-group-
released/ [accessed 13 March 2018]. 
700 Kant (1987), pp. 97-140  
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On the other hand, by arguing that both the autonomy and the sublime refer to 
ageŶts͛ feelings, I haǀe poiŶted out theiƌ ͚ĐoŶteǆtual͛ siŵilaritǇ or analogy. 
Generally, by stressing the similarities between these two areas, namely the 
moral and aesthetic reasoning, I have engaged with an interdisciplinary task, 
through which it has been aimed the vindication of the coherence between the 
domain of morality and the domain of aesthetics. Given that the concept of 
autonomy is a concept not only used in the context of morality, but also widely used 
in politics and law, the new Duty-Based Approach effectively restores an account of 
justice and politics in which ethics are not abandoned. Also, because of the fact that 
the moral concept of autonomy is interpreted through the aesthetic category of the 
sublime, the present thesis is generally considered to be an integrated, 
interdisciplinary project embracing the consilience701 between four independent 
disciplines and domains of activity: morality, law, politics, and aesthetics.  
In particular, the position of the spectator/actor in the view of the sublime 
does not only mirror the position of one who judges and acts morally, but also of 
those who judge/act legally and politically. That is to say, the moral agent, the legal 
judge, the political ruler, and the aesthetic spectator/actor are ĐoŶsideƌed as ͚perfect 
similarities͛ of three relations between entirely dissimilar things. Eventually, these 
four domains could be viewed in a unified perspective indicating, or expressing, the 
uŶitǇ of the KaŶtiaŶ ͚ƌeasoŶ͛, as ǁell as the uŶitǇ of ŵoƌal, legal, political, and 
aesthetic value judgments.702 The core idea and purpose behind the task of bridging 
these four disciplines together was that the relevant dialogue across them may 
contribute to the debates arising within the contemporary moral, legal, political, and 
aesthetic discourses. For instance, within the context of the present thesis, the 
interpretation of the moral concept of autonomy through the aesthetic judgment 
and feeling of the sublime has contributed to the formulation of the new duty-based 
                                                          
701 The teƌŵ ͚ĐoŶsilieŶĐe͛ has ďeeŶ ǁidelǇ disĐussed ďǇ philosopheƌs of sĐieŶĐe; hoǁeǀeƌ, it ďeĐaŵe 
broadly known after the publication of the Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge by the humanist 
biologist Edward Wilson. See Wilson (1999) 
702 For the unity of reason see further Neiman (1994); for the unity of moral and political values, see in 
paƌtiĐulaƌ DǁoƌkiŶ͛s argument in Dworkin, R. (2013) 
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account for the justification of human and socioeconomic rights, that is, an issue of 
great moral, legal, and political concern today.  
In order to show the fruitful dialogue between these four domains of human 
activity and inquiry, that is, the domains of morality, law, politics, and aesthetics, and 
also to better explain the starting point of the new duty-based justification of human 
and socioeconomic rights, that is, the concept of autonomy, in chapter 3, I have 
turned my attention to the Kantian opus, in particular to the Critique of Judgment. 
HeŶĐe, folloǁiŶg ‘iĐoeuƌ͛s ;uŶdeǀelopedͿ iŶtuitioŶ aŶd suggestioŶ that ͚the theoƌǇ 
of justice could be taken up in another way within a broadly Kantian problematic, if 
we were to shift our angle of attack from the Critique of Practical Reason to that of 
the Critique of Judgment͛,703 I have set as my starting point of the formulation of a 
new justification of human and socioeconomic rights the moral concept of autonomy 
–yet interpreted via the Kantian aesthetic category of the sublime.  
Incidentally, most Kantian legal and political scholars today do not pay too 
ŵuĐh atteŶtioŶ to KaŶt͛s aesthetiĐ theoƌǇ. But, as has ďeeŶ argued in chapters 3 and 
4, KaŶt͛s aesthetiĐ philosophy is valuable in order for one to understand other 
Kantian abstract and vague concepts originating from his moral, legal, and political 
theory (e.g. autonomy and dignity). Here, it could be argued that my approach 
ƌeseŵďles HaŶŶah AƌeŶdt͛s perspective.704 In other words, it could be said that 
siŵilaƌlǇ to AƌeŶdt ǁho has iŶsisted that KaŶt͛s thiƌd Critique is actually the true 
Kantian unwritten politics ŵǇ Đlaiŵ is that KaŶt͛s aesthetiĐ ŶotioŶ of the suďliŵe is 
the key-notion in the understandiŶg of KaŶt͛s uŶǁƌitteŶ legal theory. However, this 
is not the case. It is tƌue that siŵilaƌlǇ to AƌeŶdt I haǀe tuƌŶed to KaŶt͛s thiƌd Critique, 
in order to clarify the obscure moral concept of autonomy, of which meaning is 
misunderstood today, especially in the context of legal and political discourses (see 
foƌ eǆaŵple GƌiffiŶ͛s aĐĐouŶt iŶ Đhapteƌ 1). Also, it is true that there is not a 
Đoŵplete legal theoƌǇ iŶ KaŶt͛s opus. As has alƌeadǇ ďeeŶ shoǁŶ, the DoĐtƌiŶe of 
Right is basically focused on rights in the strict or narrow sense, not on human and 
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socioeconomic rights as we understand them today. Incidentally, this can be 
explained as a result of the fact that Kant has lived in an era in which the idea of 
human rights had not yet been developed.  
Nevertheless, the turning of my poiŶt of ǀieǁ to KaŶt͛s thiƌd Critique does not 
mean either that I ƌejeĐt KaŶt͛s existing legal and political philosophy –even if they 
are both incomplete in a sense–, or that I argue that the Critique of Judgment is 
KaŶt͛s tƌue legal aŶd politiĐal theoƌǇ. HeŶĐe, I geŶeƌallǇ disagƌee ǁith AƌeŶdt͛s 
innovative, yet mistaken, argument in her 10th LeĐtuƌe, iŶ ǁhiĐh she desĐƌiďes KaŶt͛s 
third Critique as his true politics.705 In spite of the significance of the notions of 
͚seŶsus ĐoŵŵuŶis͛, eŶlaƌged ŵeŶtalitǇ, disiŶteƌestedŶess, aŶd KaŶt͛s oǁŶ Đlaiŵ that 
beauty is the symbol of morality,706 as well as (conversely) the weaknesses and 
iŶĐoŵpleteŶess of KaŶt͛s legal aŶd politiĐal theoƌǇ, oŶe ĐaŶŶot igŶoƌe, or discard, 
either the Perpetual Peace, or the Doctrine of Right, in which Kant effectively 
develops his legal and political theory.707 EǀeŶtuallǇ, I aŵ afƌaid that AƌeŶdt͛s pƌojeĐt 
to eǆpƌess a politiĐs fƌoŵ aesthetiĐ judgŵeŶt leads to Walteƌ BeŶjaŵiŶ͛s idea of 
͚aestheticization of politiĐs͛, which is often found in fascist regimes.708 
CoŶseƋueŶtlǇ, ĐoŶtƌaƌǇ to AƌeŶdt͛s ͚peƌpetƌatioŶ͛ (if I may) of KaŶt͛s Critique 
of Judgment (obviously for her own purposes),709 my more modest claim is that 
KaŶt͛s aesthetiĐ ŶotioŶ of the suďliŵe, in the third Critique, is the key-notion in 
understanding KaŶt͛s oďsĐure ĐoŶĐept of the autoŶoŵǇ, ǁhiĐh is further the 
starting point of the formulation of a contemporary justificatory account for 
human and socioeconomic rights. In that respect, it can be aƌgued that KaŶt͛s 
practical philosophy and his aesthetics are shaped by the same moral ideal, that is, 
by the supreme principle of morality (autonomy). UŶdeƌ this idea, ŶaŵelǇ that KaŶt͛s 
aesthetic sublime is the key-notion in understanding the obscure concept of 
                                                          
705 Arendt (1989); also Riley (1992), pp. 305-319; and Beiner (2001), pp. 91-101 
706 See for instance Guyer (1979), pp. 348-349. 
707 See respectively, Kant (1983), pp. 386-397. 
708 Jay (1992), pp. 41-61. 
709 For a similar claim see Riley (1992), pp. 305-319.  
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autonomy I have examined the aesthetic category of the sublime, as it is presented 
by Kant in the Critique of Judgment.710 In particular, I have focused on the nine core 
characteristics of the sublime: 1) It is a reflective judgment; 2) it is an aesthetic 
judgment; 3) it is a disinterested judgment, 4) it concerns not only the form of the 
object, but it can also be found in a formless object, ϱͿ it ĐoŶtaiŶs a ͚high 
;ĐouŶterͿpurposiǀeŶess ǁithout purpose͛; 6) it is a judgment which has universal 
validity; 7) its universality is based, in particular, on the notion of ͚ĐoŵŵoŶ seŶse͛; 
8) it is a feeling of pleasure and displeasure; 9) in the judgment and feeling of the 
sublime, the dignity of humanity in our own person is reflected. 
After the examination of the Kantian sublime, I have shown how these nine 
characteristics supplement the Kantian incomplete definition of the autonomy of the 
will as: 1) the property of the will by which it is a law to itself; 2) the principle 
through which we choose only in such a way that the maxims of our choice are also 
included as universal law in the same volition; and 3) the principle through which we 
choose independently of any property of the objects of volition. Eventually, I have 
given the full definition of the autonomy of the will, or the good will, as: the 
judgment and feeling of autonomous moral agents who, although they feel 
humiliated by the oŵŶipoteŶĐe of the ŵoral laǁ, theǇ aďaŶdoŶ ͚ǀolitioŶ͛, that is, 
their inclinations, ideologies, wishes and so forth, and, freely self-legislating –yet 
requiring the same legislation from all others– respect the moral ideas of reason, 
such as the fulfillment of their moral duties, realizing their higher self as 
autonomous moral agents (self-approbation711), while feeling (and being regarded 
by others), at the same time, that they are persons with dignity. Ultimately, the 
aforementioned definition of autonomy has been supplemented by the analyses of 
Virginia Woolf͛s Mrs. Dalloway and Bill Viola͛s Five Angels.  
It must further be pointed out here that the principle of autonomy is not only 
a moral principle well-described in aesthetic terms, but also a concept which is used 
extensively in law and politics. Hence, we are not only talking about moral 
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711 See 5:81, in the Critique of Practical Reason, in: Gregor (1996), p. 205 
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autonomy, but also about legal and political autonomy in the respective fields. In 
order to show the ͚direct mirroring͛ of the position of the spectator/actor in the view 
of the sublime to the position of those who judge/act in the legal and political 
sphere, in what follows, I focus on five significant practical implications of the 
preceding conceptual analysis, particularly in these two areas, that is, in the areas of 
law and politics.  
First, as has already been mentioned, similarly to the sublime, the autonomy 
of the will is a reflective judgment, according to which the autonomous person (e.g. 
the judge, the politiĐiaŶ etĐ.Ϳ staƌts fƌoŵ a ͚paƌtiĐulaƌ͛ ;e.g. a paƌtiĐulaƌ ĐaseͿ iŶ oƌdeƌ 
to fiŶd a ͚uŶiǀeƌsal͛ ;e.g. a laǁ, a pƌiŶĐiple etĐ.Ϳ. AppaƌeŶtlǇ, this ͚ďottoŵ-up͛ 
understanding of the autonomy of the will, inspired by the sublime is of great 
iŵpoƌtaŶĐe ďoth iŶ politiĐs aŶd laǁ. IŶ the eƌa of gloďalizatioŶ, a ͚top-doǁŶ͛ 
appƌoaĐh, faǀouƌiŶg the ͚uŶiǀeƌsal͛, ŵaǇ lead to the eǆtiŶĐtioŶ of the ͚paƌtiĐulaƌ͛ iŶ 
our contemporary multicultural societies. But it is only through the respect to the 
͚paƌtiĐulaƌ͛ that the ͚uŶiǀeƌsal͛ ŵakes seŶse; so that a ͚ďottoŵ-up͛ ŵoǀeŵeŶt is 
favorable in politics. Also, in the so-Đalled ͚haƌd Đases͛ iŶ laǁ, e.g. euthaŶasia, 
infanticide,712 for which the judge has not a ͚pƌeĐedeŶt͛, that is, a pƌiŶĐiple oƌ ƌule 
estaďlished iŶ a pƌeǀious legal Đase, staƌtiŶg fƌoŵ the ͚paƌtiĐulaƌ͛ ;legal ĐaseͿ, iŶ 
order to find the universal (principle, rule), is equally important. 
Second, as has been claimed, similarly to the sublime, which is a subjective 
judgment, yet a judgment not mingled with the least interest, hence a pure 
disinterested judgment, the autonomy of the will refers to a moral judgment 
indifferently to the existence of the object. Now, the concept of disinterestedness 
applies not only to aesthetic, but also to practical matters including the legal and 
politiĐal ŵatteƌs. Foƌ eǆaŵple, iŶ laǁ theƌe is the ĐategoƌǇ of the ͚disiŶteƌested 
ǁitŶess͛, ŶaŵelǇ of oŶe ǁho is iŵpaƌtial aŶd Ŷot ďiased; heŶĐe, oŶe ǁho is laǁfullǇ 
competent to testify.713 Also, the concepts of disinterestedness and impartiality are 
two of the most important values of a judge. Finally, in the political sphere, the 
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concept of disinterestedness, along with the notions of objectiveness and 
impartiality, are traditionally considered to be some of the greatest virtues of 
politicians. 
One could argue here that from a transcendental category, e.g. the 
͚disiŶteƌestedŶess͛ as it appeaƌs iŶ the thiƌd Critique, we cannot move on to the 
empirical sociability (e.g. justice, politics).714 I counter this claim through the new 
duty-based justification of human and socioeconomic rights, in chapter 4 of the 
thesis. As has ďeeŶ ĐleaƌlǇ shoǁŶ, thƌough the ŶotioŶ of the ͚ethiĐal laǁgiǀiŶg͛, the 
autonomous, and disinterested person can actually fulfill her external, secular, moral 
duties, from which our human and socioeconomic rights (of legal and political 
character) are afterwards generated. 
Third, the KaŶtiaŶ ͚suďjeĐtiǀe uŶiǀeƌsal ĐoŵŵuŶiĐaďilitǇ͛, oƌ the 
universalizability of the aesthetic judgments, which applies to moral judgments, as 
ǁell as the idea of ͚seŶsus ĐoŵŵuŶis͛, aƌe Ƌuite iŵpoƌtaŶt ŶotioŶs ďoth iŶ politiĐs 
and law. The comparison of the judgment of the politician or the judge with the 
judgments of all others, putting herself in the position of them, is apparently of great 
importance in both domains, in which agents must be judging and acting: 1) without 
prejudices and superstitions, and 2) in broad terms overriding the private conditions 
of their judgments. Here it must be pointed out that the deliberation of the judge or 
the politician is not necessarily an actual deliberation in a literal sense; for example, 
through elections or referendum. Rather, it is an imagined legal or public 
deliberation, of which characteristics, e.g. the disinterestedness and the enlarged 
mentality, guarantee the processes of inclusiveness and interaction, that is, the 
conditions sine qua non for a fair system of justice and a fair democratic system. 
More specifically, the judge is giving law (judgment) for a particular case in 
court. Also, in accordance with the democratic system, the legislator is giving law (a 
statute or an act) in the presence of an empirical evidence, or political pressure, or 
social situation, and so forth. Both the legal and the policy formulation, in principle, 
rely upon a particular case or situation. However, judges and legislators do not 
                                                          
714 “ee foƌ iŶstaŶĐe BeiŶeƌ͛s aƌguŵeŶt iŶ BeiŶeƌ ;ϮϬϬϭͿ, pp. ϵϭ-101. 
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judge, or act, considering only a particular case or situation. Rather, when they are 
giving law, ideally, they are moving ;iŶ aesthetiĐ teƌŵsͿ ͚ďottoŵ-up͛; that is to saǇ, 
even though they start from a particular, their judgment, or statute, or act refers to 
all, including those who are not (yet or anymore) involved, and themselves as well. 
Hence their legal or political judgments, just like the aesthetic judgments, may be 
seeŶ as haǀiŶg ͚suďjeĐtiǀe uŶiǀeƌsalitǇ͛ oƌ ͚uŶiǀeƌsal ǀaliditǇ͛.715 
For instance, in the case in which the legislation of judge concerns an alleged 
violated human or socioeconomic right, the judge must first identify the relevant 
duty of right and the duty bearer, following the (aesthetic) procedure, as it has been 
described in chapters 3 and 4. That is to say, she must exercise her lawgiving 
function of morality conceiving of herself as autonomy requires, namely as a moral 
judge legislating for herself and others, without hierarchical considerations. The 
same applies to the case of the politician who is called to formulate policy relying 
upon a particular situation. Similar to the judge, the politician must exercise her 
lawgiving function of morality conceiving of herself as autonomy requires, namely as 
a moral politician legislating for herself and others simultaneously. I therefore think 
PauliŶe KleiŶgeld͛s Đlaiŵ that the legislatioŶ iŶ suĐh Đases ƌefeƌs primarily to others, 
or to others in the first instance, is incorrect.716 Rather, the legislation refers to the 
legislator and all others simultaneously. 
Within this context, any political or legal principle that cannot be willed by 
everyone is not justifiable as universal; hence it must be rejected. For example, 
coercion and deception cannot be adopted by all, given that the victims of those 
who adopt such principles cannot themselves act upon the same principles.717 This is 
an important claim that further responds to the argument according to which the 
Kantian universalizability may offer the grounds for the adoption of pernicious 
                                                          
715 Ak 244, Kant (1987), p. 97; see also chapter 3 of the thesis. 
716 Kleingeld (2018) 
717 Heƌe I aŵ aƌguiŶg aloŶg the saŵe liŶes as has OŶoƌa O͛Neill aƌgued oŶ ϮϮ FeďƌuaƌǇ ϮϬϭϴ iŶ QUB 
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pƌiŶĐiples ďǇ ĐoŶtiŶgeŶt ͚oppoŶeŶts of huŵaŶitǇ͛. Foƌ eǆaŵple, Adolf Hitleƌ͛s 
ĐoŵŵaŶd that all Jeǁs, oƌ hoŵoseǆuals, oƌ aŶǇ ͚ǆ͛ gƌoup of people, have to be killed 
is not universalizable because at least the Jeǁs, oƌ hoŵoseǆuals, oƌ the ͚ǆ͛ gƌoup, 
that is, the victims of those who adopt the relevant principle, apparently cannot 
adopt and act upon the same principle.718 Consequently, such a command must be 
rejected either by the deliberator him/herself, or by all others in the case in which 
the deliďeƌatoƌ is aŶ ͚oppoŶeŶt of huŵaŶitǇ͛ oƌ a ŵeŶtallǇ disoƌdeƌed ŵaŶ oƌ 
ǁoŵaŶ. EǀeŶtuallǇ, uŶdeƌ the ͚suďjeĐtiǀe uŶiǀeƌsal ĐoŵŵuŶiĐaďilitǇ͛, oƌ 
͚uŶiǀeƌsalizaďilitǇ͛, it Đould fuƌtheƌ ďe aƌgued that aŶ idea of a ͚ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶ͛ of 
humanity is feasible. Incidentally, other beings who possibly inhabit a distant planet, 
hence they are not communicable, they are not taken into (moral) consideration by 
the judging person –not even in the case in which those other beings are discernible, 
or detectable, yet not communicable (the crucial criterion).  
Fourth, the ŶotioŶ of ͚autoŶoŵǇ͛ is tǇpiĐallǇ assoĐiated ǁith the 
Enlightenment and the liberal tradition. However, under the new understanding of it 
in the present thesis, arising from the conceptual analysis of autonomy via the 
aesthetic category of the sublime, autonomy is actually disconnected from the 
Enlightenment and the liberal thought, according to which it is ideŶtified ǁith oŶe͛s 
sheer independence or freedom from coercion. AutoŶoŵǇ deŶotes oŶe͛s ĐapaĐitǇ to 
fulfill oŶe͛s moral, political, and legal duties, realizing oŶe͛s higher self. Apparently, 
this new interpretation of the concept of autonomy destigmatizes it both in the area 
of politics and law. 
Fifth, todaǇ͛s gloďal eĐoŶoŵiĐ Đƌisis ;e.g. “outheƌŶ Euƌope͛s eĐoŶoŵiĐ ĐƌisisͿ, 
soĐial Đƌisis ;e.g. Gƌeek͛s soĐial aŶd ƌefugee ĐƌisisͿ, aŶd politiĐal Đƌisis ;e.g. the ƌise of 
far-right and populism, e.g. Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage, and Donald Trump), which 
are linked to a long-running capitalist crisis, arising in effect fƌoŵ Ŷeoliďeƌalisŵ͛s 
demand many governments to shrinking themselves via austerity and 
privatization,719 has led to the enhancement of the practices of solidarity, charity, 
                                                          
718 I am thankful to Jens Timmermann for this example 
719 WithiŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of the pƌeseŶt disĐussioŶ, the teƌŵ ͚Ŷeoliďeƌalisŵ͛ is Ŷot assoĐiated ǁith the 
teƌŵ ͚liďeƌalisŵ͛, oƌ ͚ĐlassiĐal liďeƌalisŵ͛, ǁhiĐh is tƌaditioŶallǇ ĐoŶŶeĐted ǁith ͚soĐial liďeƌalisŵ͛. 
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and benevolence for the love of humanity. According to Kant the proper motive for 
benefiting others can have nothing to do with any sort of affective involvement with 
them. In 6:402 in the Metaphysics of Morals Kant writes: ͚To do good to other 
huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs iŶsofaƌ as ǁe ĐaŶ is a dutǇ, ǁhetheƌ oŶe loǀes theŵ oƌ Ŷot͛.720 Yet, 
this does not mean that a feeling of love is excluded for those who are benefited. 
KaŶt eǆpliĐitlǇ aƌgues iŶ ϲ:ϯϵϵ that ͚… it is ďǇ ǀiƌtue of theŵ ;e.g. a feeling of love) 
that he (the duty-ďeaƌeƌͿ ĐaŶ ďe put uŶdeƌ oďligatioŶ͛ [paƌeŶtheses ŵiŶe].721 
Hoǁeǀeƌ, KaŶt͛s foĐus ƌeŵaiŶs oŶ the ŶotioŶ of ͚dutǇ͛. The enhancement of 
the notion of duty would be very important within the contemporary global crisis. 
The dominance of the notions of charity, solidarity during the last decades has led to 
the weakening of the idea of duty, and further to the absolving of states and 
institutions from their responsibilities and obligations. But this apparently is not a 
welcome consequence within the international, regional, and domestic politics. 
Hence, the enhancement of the concept of duty would positively contribute to 
tackling the global crisis at all levels. In what follows, I focus on two significant 
implications of the conceptual analysis of autonomy via the sublime specifically on 
the Kantian philosophy. 
First, according to the definition of the autonomy of the will, or the good will, 
the autonomous moral agent respects the moral ideas of reason. One could argue 
here that the Kantian moral agent is actually commanded by reason to fulfill his 
moral duties. However, this is not true. In my view, the Kantian reason is not our 
absolute ruler, or despot; hence, I pƌefeƌ Ŷot to ǁƌite the ǁoƌd ͚ƌeasoŶ͛ ǁith Đapital 
͚‘͛. AppaƌeŶtlǇ, if ƌeasoŶ ǁas a tǇƌaŶt, theŶ theƌe ǁouldŶ͛t ďe ŵillioŶs of people ǁho 
do Ŷot ƌespeĐt it. Also, theƌe ǁouldŶ͛t ďe huŵaŶ ƌights ǀiolatioŶs iŶ the ǁoƌld. Even 
the present thesis, of which the main topic is the protection of our human and 
socioeconomic rights, would be superfluous. The Kantian reason is –to speak in 
Aristotelian terms–722 the ͚ƌight ƌeasoŶ͛ ;orthos logosͿ iŶside us. ‘easoŶ͛s authoƌitǇ 
can be seen only in relation to the (autonomous) willingness of the rational agent to 
                                                          
720 Gregor (1996), p. 530. 
721 Gregor (1996), p. 528. 
722 I think we must not overlook the Aristotelian background of the Kantian philosophy, in general 
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fƌeelǇ ƌespeĐt it oƌ Ŷot. EǀeŶtuallǇ, ƌeasoŶ͛s authoƌitǇ is ideŶtified ǁith peƌsoŶs͛ 
authority. As Gadamer says, authority is earned, not bestowed.723 To this, I would 
add that authority is earned by the autonomous or good person. Thus, the external 
moral duties of the person, who exercises her autonomous or good will, do not 
resemble to external rules. Rather, they are principles which derive from the (inner) 
will of the autonomous or good person herself. 
Second, the Kantian autonomous, or good will, is typically seen as a steely 
will. However, through the conceptual analysis of it via the aesthetic judgment and 
(the mixed) feeling of the sublime, in chapter 3, it seems that the Kantian 
autonomous/good will is not actually a holy will, but an ordinary rational (and 
huŵaŶͿ ǁill, ĐoŶsistiŶg Ŷot oŶlǇ of oŶe͛s stƌeŶgth to aĐĐoŵplish a ƌatioŶal task, suĐh 
as the fulfillŵeŶt of a ;ŵoƌal, legal, politiĐalͿ dutǇ, ďut also of oŶe͛s desiƌes, 
iŶĐliŶatioŶs, aŶd ǁishes ĐoŶtƌadiĐtiŶg oŶe͛s strength. Under this understanding of 
the Kantian autonomous will, resulted from the engagement with the philosophy of 
the psychology of an agent who does her duty despite her opposite inclinations, Kant 
cannot be seen as the typical Enlightenment philosopher. Contrary to Descartes, 
who typically favours our freedom from passions, the blind obedience to reason, and 
the instrumentalization of all our desires and wishes, Kant admires and respects only 
those who, in spite of their simultaneous opposite inclinations, they fulfill their 
duties, without condemning their weaknesses and passions.724  
Consequently, the appraisal for the fulfillment of our duties is not grounded 
in the victory of our reason and the extermination of our opposite inclinations, but in 
the victory of our reason in the face of our opposite and authentically recognisable 
(as part of our nature) passions, inclinations, emotions, and feelings. It is not an 
accident that in 6:241 and 4:397 Kant argues that duties and obligations do not 
actually apply to God, or other holy entities, e.g. the angels, but only to ordinary 
rational (and human) beings with passions.725 This Kantian moral psychology is 
                                                          
723 See Gadamer (1975) 
724 Taylor (1989), p. 149; also Critique of Practical Reason, 5:72 – 5:89 in Gregor (1996), pp. 198-211.  
725 In Gregor (1996), pp. 396, 52-53 
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something disregarded by the opponents of Kant; hence, the Kantian autonomy or 
good will, interpreted via the sublime, is I think important in shedding light on this 
crucial ontological issue.  
 
2.5 The new (Kantian) duty-based justification for human and socioeconomic rights 
After the conceptual analysis of the Kantian autonomy of the will, as well as the 
eǆaŵiŶatioŶ of ViƌgiŶia Woolf͛s Mrs. Dalloway aŶd Bill Viola͛s ͚fiǀe aŶgels foƌ the 
ŵilleŶŶiuŵ͛ ;Đhapteƌ 3), I have moved on to chapter 4, in which I have presented and 
explained the new Duty-Based Approach (DBA). More specifically, the new 
philosophical foundation of human and socioeconomic rights has been built 
indirectly, that is, by justifying duties first, and then explaining how human and 
socioeconomic rights can afterwards be generated or developed from them.  
To be more specific, I have started from the notions of autonomy and the 
͚ethical lawgiving͛, namely the lawgiving, which makes an action a duty, and also 
makes this duty the incentive of the action. In particular, I have argued that the 
autonomous or good person, through the exercise of her ethical lawgiving function 
of morality, is gradually led to the fulfillment of her external moral duties. After this, 
I have shown the distinction between: 1) the moral universal perfect duties of right 
to others, and 2) the moral specific perfect duties of right to others. Following the 
aforementioned distinction, I have argued that from our moral universal perfect 
duties of right to others, our human rights are derived; while from our moral specific 
perfect duties of right to others, our socioeconomic rights are further generated. 
Additionally, I have focused on and analyzed the categorization of duties into: 1) 
moral universal imperfect duties of virtue to others, and 2) moral specific imperfect 
duties of virtue to others. Finally, I have shown the place and role of the moral 
concept of human dignity within the new duty-based justification. Here is the 
schema depicting my thoughts concerning the new (Kantian) duty-based 




                Autonomy of the will   >   ethical lawgiving 
                    ↓                                                                    ↓ 
     Dignity (internally)                                 Moral duties (externally) 
                                                                                          ↓ 
1. UŶiǀersal perfeĐt duties of right to others → HuŵaŶ rights  
2. SpeĐifiĐ perfeĐt duties of right to others → SoĐioeĐoŶoŵiĐ rights 
3. UŶiǀersal iŵperfeĐt duties of ǀirtue to others → No rights 
4. SpeĐifiĐ iŵperfeĐt duties of ǀirtue to others → No rights        
 
What must be stressed at this point is that my argument for the justification of 
human and socioeconomic rights refers to all rational beings (duty-bearers). That is 
to say, a specific characteristic, namely our rationality, which is expressed in the 
autonomous agency, allows for the fulfillment of our moral duties, in spite of any 
other opposite inclinations we might have. Apparently, under this understanding of 
the source of duties, the justificatory account in the present thesis cannot actually be 
constrained only to human beings, but can be legitimately extended to all rational 
beings that can equally be considered as duty-bearers in certain circumstances. 
Having reviewed the new Duty-Based Approach, it is now time to answer, in 
more detail, the question posed from the beginning of the thesis, that is, the 
question of how the proposed, in chapter 4, philosophical foundation of human and 
socioeconomic rights confronts the main problems of human rights today. 
1. As has already been shown, the new philosophical justification of human and 
socioeconomic rights provides the grounds for the clarification of the concept of 
these rights revealing their true nature as moral rights (interpretation problem). 
Incidentally, the resolution of the human rights interpretation problem, contributes 
to the resolution of four other particular problems of rights derive, namely: 1) the 
non-intelligibility of human rights, 2) the non-respect of human rights, 3) the non-
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enforceability of human rights, and 4) the non-implementation of human rights.726 
For instance, the specification of the duty bearer, the content of his or her 
obligation, and the right-holder in the case of an imprecise or indeterminate right, 
such as the right of children to freedom from severe poverty contributes to a better 
understanding of the relevant right in practice, e.g. in a legal case in court, as well as 
to its strengthening, that is, to be respected, to be enforced, and to be implemented 
by the relevant institutions. 
2. Also, the new Duty-Based Approach shows why only human rights can legitimately 
be considered as universal rights (problem of the universal validity of rights).727 
Hence, the emphasis on a theory of duties or obligations, from which rights are 
afterwards generated or developed, does help us regarding the second main 
problem of human rights today, that is, the problem of their universal validity. As has 
already been stressed, the idea of duties in general is more easily acceptable in the 
non-western world, given that it is deeply rooted in the core of human nature. It is 
not accident that to his negative response to the English evolutionary theorist and 
director-general of UNESCO, Huxley, who asked him to contribute an essay to a 
collection of philosophical reflections on human rights, Gandhi pointed out that all 
rights to be deserved and preserved come from duty well done.728 
3. In addition, through the new philosophical justification we can explain many of 
the rights found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For example, we can 
explain why we have the human right to life, liberty, and security (article 3, UDHR), 
the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law (article 6, UDHR), the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (article 18, UDHR), the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression (article 19, UDHR), and so forth. Apparently, all 
these rights are owed to all people by all others.  
                                                          
726 “ee also O͛Neill ;ϮϬϭϲͿ, pp. ϭϯϬ, ϭϰϱ.  
727 The debate between Universalists and cultural Relativists has been intense throughout the 20th 
century, and it is still intense at the beginning of the 21st century; see further Huntington (1996); 
Velleman (2013); Rorty (1993), pp. 111-34. 
728 See Moyn (2016) 
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4. Further, the new justification shows why some rights are not genuine moral 
human rights. For example, the right to paid holidays (article 24, UDHR) is not 
actually a moral right; although this can be a legal right.729  
5. Moreover, the new justificatory account offers the grounds for considering some 
new rights as genuine human or socioeconomic rights. For instance, the right of 
children to freedom from extreme poverty can be seen as a genuine socioeconomic 
right (see below).  
6. Finally, it is obvious that the new Duty-Based Approach brings philosophy, in 
particular the Kantian duty-based ethics, at the heart of human rights law.  
It could be claimed that because of their nature as moral rights –as the result 
of their grounding in moral duties, of which enforcement by means of legal coercion 
is unacceptable, because it is considered as a wrongful violation of our autonomy of 
the will– both human and socioeconomic rights are not, in principle, legally binding; 
hence they cannot typically be enforced. Surely, this does not apply to some human 
and socioeconomic rights which have already become law. For example, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International 
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the international human 
rights law which is typically made up of treaties, the decisions of the European Court 
of Human Rights, and also the national legislations concerning human rights after the 
relevant ratifications, are all legally binding and enforceable. 
In the case in which (moral) human and socioeconomic rights have become 
law, the agent still does her duty because it is the right thing to do. Yet, this does not 
mean that no other external motives cannot be present, e.g. her fear of punishment. 
It does only mean that in the absence of the external motives, the moral imperative 
is sufficient to motivate compliance.730 For example, if a homeless woman is not 
afraid of prison, she may still do her duty, e.g. not to steal, out of respect for the 
                                                          
729 See the Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
730 See further Baiasu (2016a), pp. 2 -33; and Baiasu (2016b), pp.59-76 
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moral law. Incidentally, this is the reason why I insist on emphasizing the moral 
nature and character of all human and socioeconomic rights.     
Nevertheless, contrary to documents such as the ICCPR and the ICESCR, the 
rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), as well as in the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), although politically powerful, they 
are considered to be just moral rights, lacking any legal bindingness and 
enforceability; hence their failures in practice in several cases. Incidentally, this is the 
reason why the UDHR and the ECHR are not seen as functioning within a normal 
legal system. The question then arises as to what is eventually the purpose of 
these two major documents if they are not legally binding and enforceable. In my 
view, both documents were made to serve political rather than legal purposes. 
Consequently, although many of their principles have become legally binding and 
enforceable, they themselves have not. 
However, in spite of the fact that human rights in the above two major 
documents (UDHR, ECHR), lack legal bindingness and enforceability, they still have 
theiƌ oǁŶ ͚sui geŶeƌis͛ ŶoƌŵatiǀitǇ thƌough ǁhiĐh theǇ eǀeŶtuallǇ ďeĐoŵe ďiŶdiŶg 
and enforceable in an alternative way. The exceptional normativity of human rights, 
from which their bindingness and enforceability are generated, is not derived from 
the external domain of law, or from their arrangement into law (codification), but 
from the internal domain of morality from which they actually derive. That is to say, 
the compliance with human rights in the UDHR and the ECHR requires, or demands, 
not a legal, but a moral attitude. This has to be explained in more depth. 
As has been shown in the previous chapter, human rights derive from universal 
perfect duties of right to others, namely from external moral duties, which are 
grounded in the autonomy of the will interpreted via the aesthetic judgment of the 
sublime. In chapter 3, it has been said that the aesthetic judgment of the sublime 
raises a normative claim which is valid for all; hence it is considered to be a 
universally valid judgment.731 This is apparent even in grammatical terms: We do not 
                                                          
731 For the normativity of the aesthetic judgment see further: Ferrara (2008), pp. 16, 42.       
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saǇ ͚this oĐeaŶ seeŵs to ďe suďliŵe to me͛; ƌatheƌ ǁe ĐategoƌiĐallǇ state that ͚this 
oĐeaŶ is suďliŵe!͛ As the aesthetic judgment, the moral judgment of the 
autonomous or good person requires the same judgment from all others. Hence, the 
autonomous or good person speaks of the moral duty as if it was something having 
general validity, or as being public –not just a personal opinion.  
Consequently, the moral judgment of the autonomous or good person raises a 
normative claim which is valid for all (normativity). Given that human rights derive 
from external moral duties grounded in the judgment of the autonomous or good 
person which entails the aforementioned normativity, one easily concludes that, 
although human rights lack external, or in the form of law, bindingness and 
enforceability, they still have their own ͚sui geŶeƌis͛ iŶteƌŶal ŶoƌŵatiǀitǇ oƌigiŶatiŶg 
from or depending on the judgment of the autonomous or good person who 
ultimately does her duty. 
Here the question arises as to whether socioeconomic rights, which are also 
stated in the UDHR and in the ECHR, have the same normativity as human rights. As 
has been shown in the previous chapter, socioeconomic rights derive from specific 
perfect duties of right to others. These duties are, similarly to the universal perfect 
duties of right to others (in the case of human rights), external moral duties which 
are grounded in the autonomy of the will interpreted via the aesthetic judgment of 
the sublime. Consequently, similarly to human rights, socioeconomic rights have 
their own internal normativity originating from, or depending on the judgment of 
the autonomous or good person who ultimately does her (socioeconomic) duty. 
However, contrary to human rights, in which the moral judgment of the autonomous 
or good person raises a normative claim which is valid for all, in the case of 
socioeconomic rights, the judgment of the autonomous person must be interpreted 
as a judgment which raises a normative claim which is valid not for all individuals, 
states, and institutions, but only for all specific, or for all of the relevant kind 
individuals, states, and institutions.  
In particular, as stated iŶ aƌtiĐle Ϯϱ of the UDH‘, ͚eǀeƌǇoŶe has the ƌight to a 
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, 
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iŶĐludiŶg food…͛732 Regarding the aforementioned socioeconomic right (to food), the 
judgment of the autonomous person must be interpreted as one which raises a 
normative claim valid not for all individuals, states, and institutions, but only for all 
specific or for all of the relevant kind individuals, states, and institutions. For 
example, according to the moral judgment of the autonomous or good person, in 
this case, all parents have the duty to feed their children, or all states have the duty 
to provide an adequate standard of living, including food, for children who live in 
their territories. Under this understanding of the judgment of the autonomous 
person in the case of socioeconomic rights, which are stated in the UDHR and in the 
ECHR, not all people, or states, or institutions have the duty to feed each hungry 
child in the world. Incidentally, this is explained or justified by the distinction 
between human and socioeconomic rights which, as has been stressed in the 
previous chapter, is necessary in order to safeguard socioeconomic rights from 
falliŶg uŶdeƌ the ĐategoƌǇ of ͚ŵaŶifesto͛ ƌights.733 
Ultimately, after the presentation of the new Duty-Based Approach, in chapter 
4, I have responded to four possible objections against it, namely that the Duty-
Based Approach: 1) degrades the idea of rights, 2) wrongly distinguishes between 
human and socioeconomic rights, 3) is not correct because it is based on the idea 
that Kant was a moral foundationalist; while he was actually a moral constructivist, 
and 4) is not correct because it considers the Kantian moral and legal/political 
philosophy as two domains with at least some degree of continuity and coherence. 
In what follows, I focus on the main goals of the DBA, as they have been set in 
chapter 3, and examine whether eventually they have been achieved or not: 
1. The new Duty-Based Approach is effectively a justification through which all 
beings, including embryos, babies, children, the mentally disabled, those who live in 
countries which have not the characteristics of a democracy, those who live in non-
democratic countries, those who still live in isolated jungle tribes in the world and so 
forth, are protected. To be more specific, under the Duty-Based Approach, all the 
                                                          
732 Available online from http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ [accessed 9 
February 2018]. 
733 Feinberg (2016), p. 153; also, Beitz (2009), p. 121 
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above right-holders are fully respected not because they have a particular 
characteristic, e.g. rationality, or because they live in a state with certain 
characteristics, e.g. a modern, liberal state, but because others: individuals, states, 
institutions, and so on (duty-bearers), respect their human and socioeconomic 
rights, as a result of their rational capacity of fulfilling their relevant external moral 
duties towards them. 
2. Also, within the context of the Duty-Based Approach, not only our civil and 
political, that is, our human rights, but also our socioeconomic rights are protected. 
This is apparent in the schema depicting the derivation of human and socioeconomic 
rights from the external duties, which are grounded in the ethical lawgiving function 
of morality and, further, in the autonomy of the will. Incidentally, in spite of the fact 
that socioeconomic rights are not mentioned by Kant, the Kantian opus allows for 
such derivation as has been shown in chapter 4. 
3. Further, a Duty-Based Approach, such as the one in the present thesis, may be 
more easily acceptable by the majority of people around the world given that the 
ŵaiŶ idea oŶ ǁhiĐh it is ďased is Ŷot the idea of ͚ƌight͛, ǁhiĐh is ofteŶ understood as 
a western product, hence it can hardly be aĐĐepted, ďut the idea of ͚dutǇ͛, ǁhiĐh is 
an idea deeply rooted in the core of human nature. We must not ignore the fact that 
even a cruel suicide bomber thinks that he fulfills an alleged ͚divine͛ duty.   
4. Additionally, the Duty-Based Approach does not refer only to the duties of 
individuals, but also to the duties of states, institutions, GOs, NGOs, and MNEs. We 
do not only speak of the moral autonomy of individuals, but also of the political 
autonomy of states and any other self-governing group of persons. Under this 
reading of autonomy, this may offer more effective protection of the rights of all 
people, even of those who live in corrupted states, or work in corrupted MNEs, in 
the sense that not only individuals but any other established group of persons can 
eventually be considered as a duty-bearer. 
5. Also, given that the new Duty-Based Approach is not based, as, for example, 
‘ipsteiŶ͛s aĐĐouŶt, oŶ a foƌŵalistiĐ ĐoŶĐept, a substantive positive body of laws can 
be developed afterwards. To be more specific, the new justification leaves room for 
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the improvement of the existing body of human and socioeconomic rights. It is true 
that there are numerous human and socioeconomic rights, and to speak of the 
development of more of them, would probably be superfluous. However, the 
existing body of rights has to be improved in the sense that in many cases the 
corresponding duties are not clarified or clearly presented. Additionally, the Duty-
Based Approach leaves room for the development of a new body of duties from 
which human and socioeconomic rights are generated. This is an important task 
given that duties are actually more fundamental than rights within the context of a 
moral, autonomous society. 
6. Ultimately, the Duty-Based Approach is important as it brings the theory and the 
practice of human rights closer to each other. That is to say, contrary to 
ŵetaphǇsiĐal aĐĐouŶts, e.g. FliksĐhuh͛s justifiĐatoƌǇ aĐĐouŶt, ǁhiĐh ĐaŶ haƌdlǇ ďe 
applied to human rights practice, the justification in the present thesis is a 
justification which, although it originates from a transcendental concept (autonomy), 
yet, it eventually finds its way/avenue –thƌough the ŶotioŶ of ͚ethiĐal laǁgiǀiŶg– to 
the practical/external domain of law and justice (rights).  
7. Finally, it might be argued that the new Duty-Based Approach has a mixed 
character in the sense that it combines elements of both types of rights 
justifications. To be more specific, the naturalistic accounts typically focus on what is 
the grounding basis of rights, while the political accounts seem to be concerned with 
the issue of who is the duty-bearer. Since the philosophical foundation of human and 
socioeconomic rights in the thesis does respond to both issues, namely to what is 
the ground of rights (moral duties), as well as to who is the duty-bearer in certain 
circumstances, it can legitimately be claimed that it is a mixed justification, or a 
justification which bridges the gap between the two typically contradicting families 
of human and socioeconomic rights justifications.734  
 
                                                          




3. Application: A duty-ďased appƌoaĐh to ĐhildƌeŶ͛s ƌight to fƌeedoŵ fƌoŵ eǆtƌeŵe 
poverty 
 
After the presentation of the Duty-Based Approach, and the discussion of four 
possible objections against it, at the end of chapter 4, I have attempted the 
application of my duty-based justificatory account to the case of non-living human 
beings. In particular, it has been argued that we have the duty to treat the dead with 
dignity because, to speak in Kantian terms, this is the moral/right thing (act) to do. 
Specifically, I have indicated: 1) the grounds of the moral duty to treat the dead with 
dignity (autonomy ← CI ← ŵoƌal laǁ ← pƌaĐtiĐal ƌeasoŶͿ; ϮͿ who the duty-bearers 
are (relatives, friends, and the local community); 3) the content of this moral duty (to 
bury the dead body or cremate the corpse); and 4) the (moral and legal) 
consequences of its non-fulfillment.  
This attempt indicates that the new Duty-Based Approach is not only a 
formal, but also a substantive account of rights. As Liao states, ͚a foƌŵal aĐĐouŶt 
provides criteria for distinguishing human rights claims from those that are not 
human rights claims. A substantive account, by contrast, provides criteria for 
geŶeƌatiŶg the ĐoŶteŶt of huŵaŶ ƌights͛.735 Foƌ eǆaŵple, Nussďauŵ͛s aĐĐouŶt of 
ƌights is a suďstaŶtiǀe aĐĐouŶt, ǁhile ‘az͛s aĐĐouŶt is a foƌŵalistiĐ aĐĐouŶt.736 Given 
that the application of the Duty-Based Approach to the case of the dead body 
provides criteria not only for distinguishing human rights claims from those that are 
not genuine human rights claims, but also for specifying the content of the 
generated rights, it can legitimately be considered both as a formal and substantive 
account of rights. Eventually, in spite of the plethora of human and socioeconomic 
rights today, the Duty-Based Approach does not exclude the creation of new rights; 
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of course, under the condition of their derivation from specific duties generated 
from Practical Reason through the autonomy of the will, the CI, and the moral law.737 
Similar to the application of the new duty-based justificatory account to the 
case of non-living human beings, one could apply it to the case of severe or extreme 
child poverty. The extreme poverty of children is one of the most severe problems in 
the world today, as well as one of the most urgent ethical issues. Globally, almost 
385 million children are living in extreme poverty (World Bank Group and UNICEF 
2016). Extreme or sever or absolute poverty differs from poverty. According to the 
World Bank, the global extreme poverty line is about US $1.90 a day per person.738 
This kind of poverty is when one cannot sustain even a basic acceptable standard of 
living. HeŶĐe, ĐoŶtƌaƌǇ to ĐhildƌeŶ͛s poǀeƌtǇ, ĐhildƌeŶ͛s extreme poverty is a direct 
life-threatening situation. It is not only in developing countries, such as Ghana, that 
children suffer from extreme poverty, but also in developed countries, such as the 
US and the UK (United Nations Human Rights, Office of the Higher Commissioner 
2018). The situation is not better in other European countries today; for instance, in 
Greece, especially after the migration crisis. The conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, 
and Kosovo have led to high growth in immigration, which has further increased 
ĐhildƌeŶ͛s eǆtƌeŵe poǀeƌtǇ ƌates iŶ the CoŶtiŶeŶt. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to the ϮϬϭϳ AŶŶie E. 
Casey Foundation report, children of immigrants are more likely to live in extreme 
poverty.739 
However, despite the urgency, the extreme or severe child poverty is only 
tacitly addressed within the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
;UNC‘CͿ. “peĐifiĐallǇ, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to the UNC‘C, a Đhild is defiŶed as a ͚huŵaŶ ďeiŶg 
below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the child, 
ŵajoƌitǇ is attaiŶed eaƌlieƌ͛ ;UŶited NatioŶs HuŵaŶ ‘ights, OffiĐe of the Higheƌ 
Commissioner 1989). Within the UNCRC special attention is paid to the right of 
children to survival and physical development. For instance, in article 6 of the 
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738 Revenga 2016 
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UNCRC, it is mentioned that States parties have the duty to ensure to the maximum 
extent possible the survival of the child. Also, in article 19 it is written that States 
parties shall take all appropriate measures to protect the child from all forms of 
neglect or negligent treatment. Additionally, according to article 24, States parties 
have the duty to combat malnutrition through the provision of adequate nutritious 
foods and clean drinking-water. Finally, according to article 27, States parties must 
ƌeĐogŶize the ƌight of eǀeƌǇ Đhild to a staŶdaƌd adeƋuate foƌ the Đhild͛s phǇsiĐal 
development. In the same article, it is also stated that States parties must in case of 
need provide material assistance and support programs, particularly with regard to 
nutrition, clothing and housing. 
IŶ spite of the faĐt that atteŶtioŶ has ďeeŶ paid to ĐhildƌeŶ͛s ƌight to suƌǀiǀal 
and physical development, nowhere, within the UNCRC, is clearly stated a right to 
ĐhildƌeŶ͛s fƌeedoŵ fƌoŵ eǆtreme poverty. All the aforementioned articles do not 
aĐtuallǇ tƌaŶslate speĐifiĐallǇ iŶto ͚fƌeedoŵ fƌoŵ eǆtƌeŵe poǀeƌtǇ͛. HeŶĐe, eǀeŶ 
though ĐhildƌeŶ͛s fƌeedoŵ fƌoŵ eǆtƌeŵe poǀeƌtǇ is a geŶeƌal ĐoŶĐeƌŶ ďoth iŶ 
political practice and legal structures, the relevant right: 1) is not explicitly declared; 
2) its content and grounds are not delineated; and 3) the allocation of the relevant 
duties, either to individuals, or to states, institutions, and organizations is not at all 
clear. Therefore, a more comprehensive analysis is required. It is imperative that we 
formulate specifically a clear and unambiguous right of children to freedom from 
extreme poverty as soon as possible. Even though there are many other rights 
whose compound might be seen as equating to freedom from extreme poverty, e.g. 
the right to water, food, shelter, and so forth, only the right of children to be free 
from severe, or extreme, or absolute poverty can protect their life in all its aspects 
simultaneously.  
Consequently, in this section, I philosophically examine 1) the grounds of 
ĐhildƌeŶ͛s ƌight to fƌeedoŵ fƌoŵ eǆtƌeŵe poǀeƌtǇ, ϮͿ its ĐoŶteŶt, aŶd ϯͿ ǁho the 
duty-bearers are. Surely, philosophical discussion cannot be in the agenda of 
everyday law and politics. When a kid dies in circumstances of extreme poverty 
somewhere in the world, there is no time for philosophizing. Nevertheless, this does 
not mean that the philosophical questions and investigations are legally and 
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politically meaningless. I suggest then that, although independent, justice and 
politics should be supplemented and enhanced by their philosophical justification. I 
first provide a new objective, duty-based, grounding of the indeterminate and 
unstated right of children to freedom from extreme poverty; and, second, I respond 
to three possible objections against the proposed philosophical foundation. 
To begin with, the new duty-ďased justifiĐatioŶ of ĐhildƌeŶ͛s ƌight to fƌeedoŵ 
from extreme poverty, which is proposed in this section, is formulated indirectly, 
that is, by the justification of the relevant duties first, and then the derivation of the 
right of children to freedom from extreme poverty, from these duties. The starting 
point of this duty-based account is the Kantian supreme principle of morality, that is, 
the autonomy of the will, or the good will. According to the Kantian definition of 
autonomy in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, one of the basic 
characteristics of the autonomous or good person is that she freely self-legislates, 
yet requires the same legislation from all others. Kant writes in 4:440, in the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, that ͚autoŶoŵǇ of the ǁill is the pƌopeƌtǇ 
of the ǁill ďǇ ǁhiĐh it is a laǁ to itself͛.740 Here the question arises as to what exactly 
is ŵeaŶt ďǇ ͚self-legislatioŶ͛, ͚laǁ to itself͛, oƌ ͚laǁgiǀiŶg fuŶĐtioŶ of ŵoƌalitǇ͛. KaŶt 
does not answer this question, in full, in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 
Morals; yet he does explain it in the Metaphysics of Morals.741 
More specifically, Kant starts in 6:218 by generally claiming that there are 
two elements in lawgiving: first, a law representing objectively an action that has to 
be done, that is, a law which makes the action a duty; and, second, an incentive, 
whose role is to connect subjectively a ground for determining choice to the action 
ǁith laǁ͛s ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ.742 Kant then distinguishes between two types of lawgiving 
with respect to the incentive. He writes: ͚All laǁgiǀiŶg ĐaŶ theƌefoƌe ďe distiŶguished 
ǁith ƌespeĐt to the iŶĐeŶtiǀe… That laǁgiǀiŶg which makes an action a duty, and also 
makes this duty the incentive is ethical. But that lawgiving which does not include 
                                                          
740 Gregor (1996), p. 89 
741 Gregor (1996), pp. 383-385 




the incentive of duty in law, and so admits an incentive other than the idea of duty 
itself is juƌidiĐal͛.743 Apparently, the exercise of the lawgiving function by the morally 
autoŶoŵous peƌsoŶ is ideŶtified Ŷot ǁith the ͚juƌidiĐal͛ ďut ǁith the ͚ethiĐal͛ 
lawgiving, according to which an action is made a duty, and this duty is also made 
the incentive of the action. Eventually, the Kantian autonomous or good person is 
the ethically lawgiving person, who does not simply presuppose that everyone else 
gives the same law, but also requires the giving of the same law from all others, 
according to the Formula of Universal Law.744 
Moreover, the autonomy of the person, who exercises her ethical lawgiving, 
directly refers to the idea of moral duty, whose fulfilment transcends her limited 
human powers. As Kant writes in 5:80 and 5:81, in the Critique of Practical Reason, 
the autonomous person is impelled to aŶ aĐtiǀitǇ oƌ aĐtioŶ, ǁhiĐh is Đalled ͚dutǇ͛;745 
a duty (action) which, according to Kant, is fulfilled or performed by someone who, 
being bound to it, acts not in conformity with duty (mere legality), but from duty, 
that is, for the sake of the moral law alone.746 Eventually, the Kantian autonomy of 
the ǁill leads to the ƌealizatioŶ of oŶe͛s ŵoƌal duties, aŶd the ͚good͛ iŶ geŶeƌal, 
towards oneself and others. Now the question arises as to what kind of duties the 
autonomous person, who is exercising her ethical lawgiving, is impelled to. 
According to Kant, on the one hand, duties in accordance with the juridical 
lawgiving are external duties, as this type of lawgiving does not require the idea of 
dutǇ to ďe the deteƌŵiŶiŶg gƌouŶd of the ageŶt͛s ĐhoiĐe, ďut it needs an incentive 
suited to the law (external incentive).747 On the other hand, from 6:219 to 6:221, 
Kant explicitly argues that the ethical lawgiving refers both to internal and external 
duties. In particular, he says that ethical lawgiving does not exclude external actions, 
but applies to everything that is a duty in general.748 Within this context, the 
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autonomous person, who is exercising her ethical lawgiving, is impelled not only to 
internal, but also to external actions and duties, or to enforceable duties. The 
question here arises as to which are, iŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ, these ͚eǆteƌŶal ŵoƌal duties͛ that 
derive from the aforementioned ethical lawgiving. In order to answer this question, 
oŶe Ŷeeds fiƌst to ƌeĐall KaŶt͛s geŶeƌal diǀisioŶ of duties iŶ the Metaphysics of 
Morals.749 
More specifically, in 6:239-240, in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant claims 
that ͚all duties aƌe eitheƌ duties of right (official iuris), that is, duties for which 
external lawgiving is possible, or duties of virtue (official virtutis s. ethica), for which 
eǆteƌŶal laǁgiǀiŶg is Ŷot possiďle͛.750 On the one hand, duties of right are claimable 
by those who have the right to ďe pƌoteĐted ďǇ otheƌs͛ ǁƌoŶgdoiŶg agaiŶst theŵ, oƌ 
the right to positive action by the duty-bearers; hence these are externally 
enforceable. On the other hand, duties of virtue are non-claimable; thus, in this case, 
there are no right-holders. Eventually, given that in the Introduction of the 
Metaphysics of Morals Kant has explicitly argued that all duties, including the 
external duties of right or juridical duties, just because they are duties, belong to 
ethics, one can conclude that both duties of right and duties of virtue are in effect 
moral duties. Incidentally, in the Doctrine of Virtue in the Metaphysics of Morals, 
Kant similarly argues that even in the case in which law lays down a duty of right, the 
action or duty springing from it can be moral.751 
CoŶseƋueŶtlǇ, ǁe ŵaǇ diǀide the KaŶtiaŶ duties, iŶ geŶeƌal, to ͚ŵoƌal duties 
of ƌight͛ aŶd ͚ŵoƌal duties of ǀiƌtue͛. This is the first Kantian general division of 
duties. IŶ additioŶ, KaŶt distiŶguishes ďetǁeeŶ ͚ŵoƌal duties to oŶeself͛ aŶd ͚ŵoƌal 
duties to otheƌs͛; as ǁell as ďetǁeeŶ ͚ŵoƌal peƌfeĐt͛ aŶd ͚ŵoƌal iŵpeƌfeĐt͛ duties, 
that is, duties which cannot be overridden and require actions or omissions, and 
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duties which require only the setting of ends allowing for freedom concerning their 
fulfilment. Here are the Kantian divisions of moral duties:752 
 
Perfect duties of right: 
• DutǇ to oŶeself → The right of humanity in our own person • DutǇ to others → The right of huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs 
 
Imperfect duties of virtue: 
• DutǇ to oŶeself → The eŶd of huŵaŶitǇ iŶ our oǁŶ persoŶ • DutǇ to others → The eŶd of huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs 
 
Overall, the Kantian moral external duties deriving from the ethical lawgiving, 
as it has been described above, are divided into three main categories: First, into 
duties of right and duties of virtue; second into duties to oneself and duties to 
others; and third, into perfect and imperfect duties. Now, the Kantian duties of right, 
the duties towards others, and the perfect duties are of great importance here, given 
that socioeconomic rights –including the right of children to freedom from extreme 
poverty– are grounded in them. To the above triple Kantian division of duties, I add a 
fourth division, namely the division between universal and specific duties; that is to 
say, between duties which require actions or omissions by all, and duties requiring 
actions or omissions by specific duty bearers, respectively.  
CleaƌlǇ, this diǀisioŶ has Ŷot ďeeŶ oŶ KaŶt͛s foĐus. Hoǁeǀeƌ, it is iŵpoƌtaŶt iŶ 
view of the distinction between human and socioeconomic rights which is suggested 
in the present section. That is to say, contrary to human rights, I see socioeconomic 
rights, including the right of children to be free from extreme poverty, as not owed 
to someone by all others; rather, they are owed to someone by specific others: 
individuals, or/and states, or/and institutions, or/and organizations. The reasons why 
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the relevant right is, and should be seen, as a socioeconomic right, are thoroughly 
explained below. Here the fundamental question arises as to how from specific 
duties towards children, the socioeconomic right of children to be free from severe 
poverty is eventually developed or justified in Kantian or deontological terms. 
IŶitiallǇ, I aƌgue that theƌe is aŶ ͚eǆteƌŶal, ŵoƌal, speĐifiĐ, peƌfeĐt dutǇ of ƌight 
to pƌoteĐt ĐhildƌeŶ fƌoŵ eǆtƌeŵe poǀeƌtǇ͛. This dutǇ is deƌiǀed fƌoŵ the ethiĐal 
lawgiving function of morality. That is to say, the fulfilment of the aforementioned 
duty is, to speak in Kantian terms, the result of the positive response of rational 
huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs, to the ĐategoƌiĐal ͚ǀoiĐe͛ of ƌeasoŶ, oƌ the ĐoŵŵoŶ to all ƌatioŶal 
huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs͛ genetic basis, or intrinsic capacity, for moral agency (rationality). This 
͚ǀoiĐe͛ of ƌeasoŶ ͚ĐoŵŵaŶds͛ ĐoŵpliaŶĐe ǁith the ŵoƌal laǁ, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to ǁhiĐh 
children must be protected from severe poverty because this is a moral duty, or for 
the sake of moral law alone, independently of any other concerns.  
IŶĐideŶtallǇ, the puƌe pƌaĐtiĐal ƌeasoŶ ͚ĐoŵŵaŶdiŶg͛ ĐoŵpliaŶĐe ǁith the 
moral law is not an absolute ruler, or despot. If reason was a tyrant, then there 
ǁouldŶ͛t ďe ŵillioŶs of people ǁho do Ŷot ƌespeĐt it. Foƌ eǆaŵple, theƌe ǁouldŶ͛t ďe 
children living in cramped, polluted, and diseased conditions in Old Fadama, an 
informal settlement in Accra.753 Hence, the pure practical reason is better 
uŶdeƌstood iŶ AƌistoteliaŶ teƌŵs as the ͚ƌight ƌeasoŶ͛ ;orthos logos), or rational inner 
͚ǀoiĐe͛, ǁhiĐh ĐaŶ oŶlǇ ďe ͚listeŶed to͛ ďǇ those ǁhose opposite ͚ǀoiĐes͛ of Ŷatuƌal 
iŶĐliŶatioŶs, peƌsoŶal iŶteƌests, ǁishes, desiƌes, aŶd so foƌth, aƌe Ŷot ͚sĐƌeaŵiŶg͛ ;Ǉet 
they do exist). 
Fuƌtheƌ, I Đlaiŵ that the afoƌeŵeŶtioŶed dutǇ, ŶaŵelǇ ouƌ ͚eǆteƌŶal, ŵoƌal, 
speĐifiĐ, peƌfeĐt dutǇ of ƌight to pƌoteĐt ĐhildƌeŶ fƌoŵ eǆtƌeŵe poǀeƌtǇ͛, is diǀided 
into our duties to: 1) abstain fƌoŵ aŶǇ aĐtioŶ that pƌohiďits ĐhildƌeŶ͛s fƌeedoŵ fƌoŵ 
extreme poverty, and 2) secure through intentional act(s) ĐhildƌeŶ͛s ƌight to fƌeedoŵ 
from extreme poverty. From these two (negative and positive, respectively) duties, 
thƌough KaŶt͛s thesis iŶ ϲ:Ϯϯϵ iŶ the Metaphysics of Morals, the socioeconomic right 
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of children to be free from extreme poverty is afterwards generated or developed 
(entwickelt). More specifically, in 6:239 in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues: 
͚But ǁhǇ is the doĐtƌiŶe of ŵoƌals usuallǇ Đalled ;espeĐiallǇ ďǇ CiĐeƌoͿ a doĐtƌiŶe 
of duties and not also a doctrine of rights, even though rights have reference to 
duties? – The reason is that we know our own freedom (from which all moral 
laws, and so all rights as well as duties proceed) only through the moral 
imperative, which is, the proposition commanding duty, from which the 
capacity for putting others under obligation, that is, the concept of right can 
afteƌǁaƌds ďe [eǆpliĐated]͛.754  
What Kant argues here is in effect that we experience our freedom through a 
moral imperative which commands the fulfilment of our duties. Specifically, we 
experience our freedom as autonomous or good persons when we freely self-
legislate. In the same passage, Kant claims that moral duties and rights proceed 
from, or are grounded in the ethical lawgiving which is freely conducted by the 
autonomous person. However, this derivation of duties and rights from the ethical 
lawgiving does take place in a particular order. Kant argues that rights, namely the 
capacity one has to put others under obligations, do not have just reference to 
duties, but they are straightforwardly generated (entwickelt) from them. In other 
words, Kant seems to argue that our moral duties, as well as those rights, which are 
fuƌtheƌ geŶeƌated oƌ deǀeloped fƌoŵ theŵ, aƌe gƌouŶded iŶ the ͚ethiĐal laǁgiǀiŶg͛ 
function of morality which is freely conducted by the autonomous person. 
Therefore, rights do not simply correspond to duties, but their relation to duties is 
much stronger, in the sense that they are generated, or developed, or originate 
(entwickelt) from duties. That is to say, without duties, Kant implies that there can be 
no rights, or that rights do not exist. Overall, duties have (foundational) priority over 
rights. 
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285 
 
Consequently, our awareness of the right of children to freedom from 
eǆtƌeŵe poǀeƌtǇ, eitheƌ iŶ the foƌŵ of ϭͿ ĐhildƌeŶ͛s ƌight to Đlaiŵ the absence of any 
action that restricts their freedom from extreme poverty, or in the form of 2) 
ĐhildƌeŶ͛s ƌight to Đlaiŵ the protection of their freedom from extreme poverty, does 
not actually exist without the moral imperative commanding us to protect children 
from extƌeŵe poǀeƌtǇ ;͚speĐifiĐ peƌfeĐt dutǇ of ƌight to pƌoteĐt ĐhildƌeŶ͛Ϳ. We ŵaǇ 
represent the proposed duty-based justifiĐatioŶ of ĐhildƌeŶ͛s ƌight to ďe fƌee fƌoŵ 
extreme poverty in the following list: 
Specific perfect duties of right to protect children from extreme poverty: 
• Specific perfect duty of right to abstain from any action that prohibits 
ĐhildƌeŶ͛s fƌeedoŵ fƌoŵ eǆtƌeŵe poǀeƌtǇ → The right of children to claim the 
absence of any action that restricts their freedom from extreme poverty 
 
• “peĐifiĐ peƌfeĐt dutǇ of ƌight to seĐuƌe ĐhildƌeŶ͛s ƌight to fƌeedoŵ fƌoŵ 
extreme poverty → The right of children to claim the protection of their 
freedom from extreme poverty 
 
Overall, the (socioeconomic) right of children to freedom from extreme 
poverty:  
• is gƌouŶded iŶ the ͚eǆteƌŶal, ŵoƌal, speĐifiĐ peƌfeĐt dutǇ of ƌight to pƌoteĐt 
ĐhildƌeŶ fƌoŵ eǆtƌeŵe poǀeƌtǇ͛ ;gƌouŶdsͿ, • ĐoŶsists of the ƌight to Đlaiŵ the oŵissioŶ of aŶǇ aĐtioŶ that ƌestƌiĐts ĐhildƌeŶ͛s 
freedom from extreme poverty (negatively); as well as the right to claim the 
peƌfoƌŵiŶg of iŶteŶtioŶal aĐt;sͿ that guaƌaŶtees ĐhildƌeŶ͛s fƌeedoŵ fƌoŵ 
extreme poverty (positively) [content]; and  • is based on a duty which is not of all others, but of specific others, e.g. the 
relatives or/and the friends of the child, the local authorities, states, and 




In what follows, I respond to possible objections against the new Duty-Based 
Approach. Within this context, I first show the moral priority of duties over rights; 
second, I explain why the socioeconomic right of children to be free from extreme 
poverty is not a human right; and third, I explain the reasons why Kant is not a moral 
constructivist. 
A possible objection against the proposed justificatory account in the present 
section ŵight ďe that, thƌough the pƌioƌitǇ giǀeŶ to the ŶotioŶ of ͚dutǇ͛ oǀeƌ the 
ŶotioŶ of ͚ƌight͛, the ŶotioŶ of ͚ƌight͛ is degƌaded. Also, it Đould ďe asked ǁhǇ duties 
are more fundamental than rights, or why duties must be seen as more basic than 
rights in the case of the right of children to be free from extreme poverty. In this 
section, I respond to these claims. 
Initially, contrary to the prevailing twentieth century ethical approach, 
according to which rights have priority over duties, and similarly to some prominent 
KaŶt sĐholaƌs, suĐh as O͛Neill, I aƌgue that it is a ŵistake to eŵphasize ƌights ǁithout 
integrating them with duties or obligations.755 Incidentally, although the term 
͚oďligatioŶ͛ is ŵoƌe ofteŶ assoĐiated ǁith laǁ, ǁhile the teƌŵ ͚dutǇ͛ is tǇpiĐallǇ 
related to morality, here the teƌŵs ͚dutǇ͛ aŶd ͚oďligatioŶ͛ aƌe used iŶteƌĐhaŶgeaďlǇ 
as appƌoǆiŵate sǇŶoŶǇŵs. HeŶĐe, I use ďoth the ǁoƌds ͚dutǇ͛ aŶd ͚oďligatioŶ͛ to 
deŶote the ͚ought͛, that is, soŵethiŶg that has to be done by someone.  
Now, simply to argue that duties are more basic or fundamental than rights 
does not automatically render the latter less morally important than the former. 
Only within the Kantian duty-based ethics a moral priority of duties over rights is 
justified; specifically, through the passage 6:239 in the Metaphysics of Morals. Based 
on the aforementioned passage, my claim concerning the relation between duties 
and rights is stronger than the claim that rights have correlative obligations.756 
Through the justification of the right of children to freedom from extreme poverty, is 
ĐleaƌlǇ shoǁŶ that ǁhat is effeĐtiǀelǇ ŵeaŶt ďǇ the stateŵeŶt that ͚duties aƌe ŵoƌe 
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fundamental thaŶ ƌights͛ is that iŶ the aďseŶĐe of the foƌŵeƌ, the latteƌ aloŶe do not 
exist. 
Further, a duty-based justificatory approach, such as the one suggested in the 
present chapter, is absolutely necessary especially in the case of children, given that, 
by reason of their physical and mental immaturity, they depend on others. That is to 
say, their incapacities, in particular their lack of reason and agency, make it 
extremely difficult for them to claim a right. Schweiger and Graf argue that the 
particular condition of children as developing beings imposes relevant duties to 
protect them and ensure that they are not harmed.757 Thus, in my view, the 
laŶguage of ͚duties of otheƌs toǁaƌds ĐhildƌeŶ͛ is ŵoƌe esseŶtial thaŶ the laŶguage 
of ͚ƌights of ĐhildƌeŶ͛.  
ConsequentlǇ, I suggest ĐhaŶgiŶg ouƌ ǁaǇ of dealiŶg ǁith ĐhildƌeŶ͛s ƌight to 
freedom from extreme poverty. Instead of focusing on the right itself, I think we 
should foĐus oŶ iŶdiǀiduals͛, states͛, iŶstitutioŶs͛, aŶd oƌgaŶizatioŶs͛ oďligatioŶs to 
protect children from a state of extreme poverty either by preventing it, or by 
suppressing it. I am convinced that a duty-based approach, such as the one 
suggested above, does ensure better than a rights-based approach the relevant 
objective, that is, the protection of children from extreme poverty. What also must 
be stressed is that the UNCRC is actually a duty-based treaty rather than a rights-
based one. It is true that most of its articles are framed in the form of duties that the 
State or guardians have towards children, rather than as rights that children have 
themselves. However, the problem of the UNCRC is that it does not explicitly 
ŵeŶtioŶ the ƌight iŶ ƋuestioŶ, that is, ĐhildƌeŶ͛s ƌight to ďe fƌee fƌoŵ eǆtƌeŵe 
poverty. 
Of course, my approach does not mean or imply that we should ignore the 
right of children to be free from severe poverty. I only suggest that, because of the 
particular condition of children, as incapable enforcers of rights, we should put their 
right to be free from severe poverty aside for a while, in order to see the issue of 
their protection from extreme poverty today from another angle, that is, from 
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duties͛ poiŶt of ǀieǁ; fƌoŵ ǁhiĐh ;dutiesͿ the ƌeleǀaŶt ƌight is afteƌǁaƌds geŶeƌated, 
or developed, in Kantian or in broad deontological terms. Eventually, the objection 
according to which, through the priority given to the ŶotioŶ of ͚dutǇ͛ oǀeƌ the ŶotioŶ 
of ͚ƌight͛, the pƌoposed justifiĐatioŶ degƌades the populaƌ ĐoŶĐept of ƌights is Ŷot 
correct. Under the new justificatory account, rights are not rejected or degraded. 
Rather, they are put aside for a while, in order to strengthen the old category of 
duties, so that eventually both rights and duties could be seen as equal parts in a 
contemporary account of international justice. 
Another possible objection against my account is that the right of children to 
be free from extreme poverty is mistakenly considered as a socioeconomic right. 
Rather, it might be argued that the aforementioned right is actually a human right. In 
what follows I explain the distinction between these two categories of rights. 
Initially, my own view is that human rights, for example the right to life, are 
moral rights (with political connotations, further protected by law) owed to human 
beings by all others: individuals, states, institutions, organizations, and corporations. 
Contrary to human rights, I understand socioeconomic rights, for example the right 
to work, as rights which generally provide the conditions necessary for our 
prosperity and wellbeing. Similar to human rights, socioeconomic rights are moral 
rights, with political connotations potentially protected by law. Also, as human 
rights, socioeconomic rights cannot strictly be seen as natural rights, namely as 
eŶtitleŵeŶts iŶdepeŶdeŶt of the eǆisteŶĐe of otheƌ͛s duties. Fuƌtheƌ, soĐioeĐoŶoŵiĐ 
rights are understood and treated as rights which derive from the duties of 
individuals, states, and institutions. Incidentally, these duties of others derive from 
theiƌ ŵoƌal aŶd ƌatioŶal ƌeasoŶ, ǁhiĐh ͚ĐoŵŵaŶds͛ theŵ to aĐt oƌ Ŷot aĐt iŶ a 
certain way. 
Nevertheless, contrary to human rights, I do not see socioeconomic rights as 
human rights in the above sense. This is a strong claim that must further be 
explained. Initially, even though, as moral rights, socioeconomic rights exist prior to 
any political recognition, and codification and ratification by law, they still cannot be 
considered as human rights, because they are not owed generically to people by all 
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others. Instead, they are owed to people by specific duty-bearers, either individuals, 
or states and institutions, which are responsible for their fulfilment and 
enforcement.758 Thus, I am not responsible for feeding each hungry child in the 
world. Understanding socioeconomic rights as rights owed to people by specific 
duty-bearers, I think, would render their protection more effective. 
For example, the right to health care of a child in a poor country can better be 
protected if it is understood or declared as a right owed by specific others rather 
than a right owed by all others. In the last case, the Government, or any other 
specific OƌgaŶizatioŶ ƌespoŶsiďle foƌ the pƌoteĐtioŶ of the ƌight to ĐhildƌeŶ͛s 
healthcare in that country, could easily refuse their duties on the pretext of the 
universality of the relevant duty, and ascribe their own responsibilities to all others in 
the world who can actually do nothing in praxis to protect the health of children in 
that particular country. Consequently, because of the nature of the so-called 
socioeconomic rights, as rights presupposing social and economic support that in 
principle cannot be given by everyone, we cannot speak of universal duties in this 
case. What must also be stressed is the fact that even in the case of civil and political 
rights, in which the first-order obligations to respect them are universal, the second-
order obligations, that is, the obligations to ensure that the first-order obligations 
are respected, still have to be allocated.759 IŶ ǁhat folloǁs, I foĐus oŶ ĐhildƌeŶ͛s ƌight 
to freedom from extreme poverty in particular. 
To ďegiŶ ǁith, ĐoŶtƌaƌǇ to the Đlaiŵ that ĐhildƌeŶ͛s ƌight to fƌeedoŵ fƌoŵ 
extreme poverty is a human right, I regard it, or I suggest we should treat it, as a 
socioeconomic right. Surely, children are human beings with human rights, e.g. the 
ƌight Ŷot to ďe toƌtuƌed. Hoǁeǀeƌ, ĐhildƌeŶ͛s ƌight to ďe fƌee fƌoŵ seǀeƌe poǀeƌtǇ is 
not a typical human right, but a right specifically belonging to socioeconomic justice. 
One reason why the right of children to be free from extreme poverty is a 
socioeconomic right is that the relevant duties, from which this right is effectively 
                                                          
758 In the same vein, Onora O͛Neill Đlaiŵs that ͚ǁelfaƌe ƌights ŵust haǀe ŶeĐessaƌilǇ speĐifiĐ dutǇ-
ďeaƌeƌs; see, foƌ iŶstaŶĐe, O͛Neill ;ϭϵϵϲͿ, pp. 130, 131, 134 
759 O͛Neill ;ϮϬϬϱͿ: ϰϮϳ-439 
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derived, are not owed to children by all others, as in the case of human rights.760 
Instead, following an agent-ĐeŶteƌed appƌoaĐh, I see ĐhildƌeŶ͛s ƌight to fƌeedoŵ 
from extreme poverty as a right derived from specific –and not universal– duties of 
specific actors-duty-bearers, either individuals, or states, institutions, and 
organizations, which are responsible, either to action or omission. It would be 
implausible, non-feasible, and non-practical all others, individuals, states, 
institutions, and organizations to have the duty to protect (action), or being accused 
of abstaining from the protection of each child in the world from extreme poverty 
(omission). Instead, the allocation of duties to specific others leads eventually to 
more effective protection of children. Therefore, as a UK resident, I do not typically 
have the duty either to feed each child living in extreme poverty in Ghana (praxis), or 
abstain from any act (omission), e.g. enjoying all my meal, in order to offer half of it 
to that child in Ghana.761 That may sound a bit harsh. Yet, I am convinced that the 
allocation of duties (positive, negative) to specific others, either individuals, or states 
aŶd iŶstitutioŶs, iŶ the Đase of the soĐioeĐoŶoŵiĐ ƌight to ĐhildƌeŶ͛s fƌeedoŵ fƌoŵ 
extreme poverty, leads eventually to more effective protection of children.762  
Moreover, I am afraid that the non-identification of specific duty-bearers, the 
non-determination of their duties, and the non-specification of the content of these 
duties as well as the consequences of their non-fulfilment, would render the right of 
children to freedom from extreme poverty itself aŶ iŶdeteƌŵiŶate ͚ŵaŶifesto͛ ƌight, 
for which no one would actually take the responsibility of its infringement in certain 
circumstances. But this apparently must be avoided –especially in the case of 
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761 However, I still have the duty not to act against the fulfilment of the relevant right in some way, 
e.g. to prevent those who are willing to provide food to the children in Ghana from doing so. 
762 Incidentally, this might also apply to some human rights which typically straddle the division 
ďetǁeeŶ ͚Điǀil aŶd politiĐal͛ aŶd ͚soĐioeĐoŶoŵiĐ͛ ƌights, e.g. the ƌight foƌ fƌeedoŵ of assoĐiatioŶ. Foƌ 
example, as a UK resident, I do not have a duty (negative, positive) to provide, or abstain from 
providing the Ghanaian with the resources required for freedom of association, e.g. by providing (or 
not providing) a public arena, or organising meetings for them. However, I still have the duty not to 




children who are not able to fully protect themselves. It could also be argued here 
that the lack of precise determination of duty-bearers in the case of human rights 
too is one of the reasons why these rights are poorly observed.  
Furthermore, what must be stressed is that the characterization of some 
rights, iŶĐludiŶg ĐhildƌeŶ͛s ƌight to fƌeedoŵ fƌoŵ eǆtƌeŵe poǀeƌtǇ, as socioeconomic 
rights, does not render them less important than human rights. It is only in the 
respect of the allocation of specific duties to specified duty-bearers, that is, the 
requirement which is a condition sine qua non for a more effective protection of 
ĐhildƌeŶ fƌoŵ eǆtƌeŵe poǀeƌtǇ that this ƌight diffeƌs fƌoŵ tǇpiĐal ĐhildƌeŶ͛s huŵaŶ 
rights, e.g. the right of children not to be tortured by all others. 
Further, it could be counterargued that my approach is not purely Kantian in 
the sense that ͚effectiveness arguments͛, such as the one developed in this chapter, 
do not seem Kantian. That is true. Kant and effectiveness do not typically go 
together. Hence, from the very beginning, I have stressed the fact that it was my 
deĐisioŶ, aŶd Ŷot KaŶt͛s, to add to the KaŶtiaŶ tƌiple diǀisioŶ of duties a fouƌth 
division between universal and specific duties. The question here arises as to 
whether my decision renders the whole argument less Kantian. Apparently, the 
decision to add the fourth division renders my argument less Kantian. However, it 
does not render my argument for children less deontological; hence, the title of the 
section is Ŷot a ͚KaŶtiaŶ AppƌoaĐh to ChildƌeŶ͛s ‘ight to Freedom from Extreme 
PoǀeƌtǇ͛. Although the pƌoposed justifiĐatioŶ is iŶspiƌed ďǇ the KaŶtiaŶ opus, it 
cannot be seen as a purely Kantian justification. Instead, it is clearly a deontological 
justification. Why? Because I think a deviation from a strictly Kantian approach and 
an inclination to a broader deontological approach inspired by the Kantian opus is 
preferable in the case of children, towards which we have the duty to offer more 
pragmatic and effective rather than idealistic and non-effective solutions.  
Moreover, in the following analysis, I focus on and respond to another possible 
objection against my account. It could be argued that Kant, from whom the 
aforementioned justification is inspired, is not actually a foundationalist, but a 
constructivist, who would oppose my idea of a foundation for rights, including the 
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rights of children to freedom from extreme poverty. There are indeed some 
significant Kant scholars who argue in favour of constructivism. In their view, a 
Kantian foundation of rights cannot plausibly be supported and proposed.763 My aim 
here is to show that Kant is not actually a moral constructivist, but there is room in 
his opus for legitimately arguing that he is a foundationalist. 
To begin with, a prominent constructivist Kant sĐholaƌ is OŶoƌa O͛Neill. 
O͛Neill has ǁoƌked a lot oŶ duties aŶd ƌights fƌoŵ a KaŶtiaŶ poiŶt of ǀieǁ. GeŶeƌallǇ, 
I agree with her approach regarding the issue of human rights in general, namely her 
thesis that the fulfilment of duties or obligations is more basic than the fulfilment of 
ƌights; aŶd that aŶǇ ƌights͛ Đlaiŵ is Ŷo ŵoƌe thaŶ ƌhetoƌiĐ, uŶless the ĐouŶteƌpaƌt 
duties or obligations are justified and allocated accordingly to individuals and 
institutions.764 That is to say, we cannot actually know what a right amounts to until 
we know: 1) who is the duty-bearer, 2) what exactly is the content of his or her 
obligation, and 3) to whom (right-holder) the fulfilment of the relevant obligation is 
oǁed. As O͛Neill aƌgues, if ǁe take ƌights seƌiouslǇ, ǁe ŵust take the counterpart 
duties or obligations even more seriously; otherwise, rights remain only aspiration 
claims with high cost. That is to say, when rights are violated, there is no way one to 
see who has infringed the relevant right, and who owes redress.765 However, 
although I geŶeƌallǇ agƌee ǁith O͛Neill͛s Đlaiŵ that duties haǀe pƌioƌitǇ oǀeƌ ƌights, I 
disagree with her constructivist reading of Kant.  
Moƌe speĐifiĐallǇ, oŶe of the ǁeightǇ Đlaiŵs of O͛Neill is that, ƌeĐogŶiziŶg that 
a plurality of agents may lack antecedent principles of coordination, Kant eventually 
builds an account of reason, ethics, politics, and justice on this basis.766 Hence, in her 
view, Kant introduces the Formula of Universal Law, according to which there is a 
ĐategoƌiĐal iŵpeƌatiǀe, ŶaŵelǇ to ͚act only in accordance with that maxim through 
which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law͛.767 That is to say, 
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764 O͛Neill ;ϮϬϭϲͿ, p. ϯϱ 
765 O͛Neill ;ϮϬϭϲͿ, pp. ϭϵϲ-197 
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given the plurality of agents, and the need of an agreement of all with some 
pƌiŶĐiples, O͛Neill Đlaiŵs that KaŶt iŶtƌoduĐes, oƌ constructs, or builds the Formula of 
Universal Law through which he eventually aims the principles adopted not be ones 
that Đould Ŷot ďe ǁilled ďǇ all ageŶts. EǀeŶtuallǇ, O͛Neill ĐhaƌaĐteƌizes the Foƌŵula 
of UŶiǀeƌsal Laǁ as ͚the ďest-kŶoǁŶ ǀeƌsioŶ of KaŶt͛s pƌoĐeduƌe of ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ͛, 
aŶd KaŶt͛s aĐĐouŶts oŶ ƌeasoŶ, ethiĐs, politiĐs, aŶd justiĐe as puƌe ĐoŶstƌuĐtiǀist 
accounts without foundations.768 
Yet, even if the Kantian Formula of Universal Law is a construction, still a 
construction needs foundation. A foundation or base is the most crucial element of 
an architectural structure that connects it to the ground. There are either shallow or 
deep foundations, but, in any case, the crucial point is that all building structures 
should not lack a specific foundation. This is a pragmatic claim that directly opposes 
O͛Neill͛s ŵoƌal ĐoŶstƌuĐtiǀist thesis that theƌe ĐaŶ ďe ĐoŶstƌuĐtions without 
foundations.769 Consequently, even if it is indeed a Kantian construction, the 
Formula of Universal Law needs a deeper foundation. I see the foundation of the 
Formula of Universal Law to be the following: As a formulation of the Categorical 
Imperative (CI), the Formula of Universal Law (FUL) is grounded in the Moral Law (in 
singular) commanded further by Pure Practical Reason.770 
Moreover, throughout his opus, Kant does not essentially show anything 
about the construction of reason, ethics, politics, and justice. Rather he directly 
points to foundationalism. We could focus on passages such as the passage 4:439, in 
the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in light of which Kant does not seem 
to ďe a ĐoŶstƌuĐtiǀist oƌ aŶtiƌealist. KaŶt ǁƌites: ͚The essence of things is not changed 
by their external relations; and that which, without taking account of such relations, 
alone constitutes the worth of a human being is that in terms of which he must also 
be appraised by whoever does it, even by the supreŵe ďeiŶg͛.771 Also, one must 
consider the notorious passage in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in 
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which Kant describes the moral concept of human dignity. Kant writes in 4:434-5 in 
the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: ͚that ǁhiĐh ĐoŶstitutes the ĐoŶditioŶ 
under which alone something can be an end in itself has not merely a relative worth, 
that is, a price, but an inner worth, that is, dignity͛.772 He then argues in 4:436 that 
͚Autonomy is therefore the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every 
ƌatioŶal Ŷatuƌe͛.773 Apparently, here the role of the fundamental moral principle of 
autonomy as the foundation of the dignity of human beings does not allow for 
attributing to Kant the characterization of the constructivist, or non-foundationalist, 
philosopher. Finally, one must also take into consideration the 5:47 passage in the 
Critique of Practical Reason, iŶ ǁhiĐh KaŶt aƌgues that ͚… the ŵoƌal laǁ is giǀeŶ, as it 
were, as a fact of pure reason of which we are a priori conscious and which is 
apodictically certain, though it be granted that no example of exact observance of it 
can be found in experieŶĐe͛ [eŵphasis added].774 Here again, Kant expresses his 
foundationalism or moral realism. Consequently, because of these passages, and 
ŵaŶǇ otheƌ oŶes iŶ his opus, I ĐaŶŶot see KaŶt, as O͛Neill does, ŶaŵelǇ as a 
constructivist or antirealist philosopher.  
To conclude, in this section, I have applied the new DBA to the case of 
children living in extreme poverty. Within this context, I have philosophically 
examined 1) the grounds of the right of children to be free from extreme poverty, 2) 
the content of the aforementioned right, and 3) who the duty-bearers are. More 
specifically, I have argued that the socioeconomic right of children to freedom from 
severe poverty: 
• is grounded in the specific perfect moral duty of right to protect children 
from extreme poverty (grounds);  • ĐoŶsists of the ƌight to Đlaiŵ the oŵissioŶ of aŶǇ aĐt that pƌohiďits ĐhildƌeŶ͛s 
freedom from extreme poverty (negatively); as well as the right to claim the 
peƌfoƌŵiŶg of aĐts that guaƌaŶtee ĐhildƌeŶ͛s fƌeedoŵ fƌoŵ eǆtƌeŵe poǀeƌtǇ 
(positively) [content]; and 
                                                          
772 Gregor (1996), pp. 84-85 
773 Gregor (1996), pp. 84-85 
774 Gregor (1996), p. 177 
295 
 
• is based on a duty which is not of all others, but of specific others, e.g. the 
relatives or/and the friends of the child, the local authorities, states, and 
organizations (duty-bearers). 
 
In addition, I have responded to possible objections against the proposed 
philosophical foundation. Within this context, I have emphasized the moral priority 
of duties over rights; I have explained why the socioeconomic right of children to be 
free from extreme poverty is not a typical human right, but a socioeconomic right; 
and, finally, I have explained the reasons why Kant is not a moral constructivist; 
hence the foundation of rights, as we understand them today, in a broad Kantian or 
deontological mode is feasible. 
 
4. Towards a future account of international justice 
On the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), in 
1998 in the city of Valencia, a Universal Declaration of Human Duties and 
Responsibilities (DHDR) was written, of which aim was to reinforce the 
implementation of human rights under the auspices of the United Nations.775 In the 
same vein, in 2009, the Government in the United Kingdom issued a Green Paper 
eŶtitled ͚‘ights aŶd ƌespoŶsiďilities: deǀelopiŶg ouƌ ĐoŶstitutioŶal fƌaŵeǁoƌk͛, iŶ 
which the authors Jack Straw and Michael Wills strongly disapproved of the fact that 
͚... responsibilities have not been given the same prominence as rights in our 
ĐoŶstitutioŶal aƌĐhiteĐtuƌe.͛776  
Unfortunately, in spite of the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Duties and Responsibilities in 1998, no efforts have been made since then in order to 
reinforce the idea of duties in international and regional legal order. Also, regarding 
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the aforementioned Green Paper in the UK, even though in the debate following the 
publication of it there was indeed considerable support for the idea of a legal charter 
of responsibilities, unfortunately no further steps were taken. The main reasons why 
these efforts have not been successful are: 1) the fear that a focus on duties would 
diminish the importance of rights, 2) the unclear or poor understanding of the idea 
of duties within a legal context, 3) the concern about whether duties can be 
enforced by law, and 4) the worry that the legislation would become even more 
prolix and complex. To all these concerns, an answer is provided through the 
development of the new duty-based justification of human and socioeconomic 
rights. 
First, as has already been explained in chapter 4, it cannot legitimately be 
claimed that a focus on duties today would diminish the importance of rights. On the 
contrary, a duty-based perspective on international, regional, and domestic justice 
would strengthen human rights even more by showing that duties actually function 
as indispensable complements to rights. Second, through the new Duty-Based 
Approach, the idea of duties –at least the duties from which our human and 
socioeconomic rights derive– has been made clear. That is to say, our human and 
socioeconomic rights are generated from our external moral duties arising from the 
lawgiving function of morality. Third, it is true that ethical duties cannot be 
externally enforced, that is, to be enforced by law, given that they are moral duties 
of which enforcement by means of social coercion is unacceptable because it is 
considered as a wrongful violation of our autonomy of the will. However, this does 
not mean that duties lack their own, ͛sui geŶeƌis͛, ŶoƌŵatiǀitǇ, deriving from the 
moral law itself and the moral commitment of individuals, states, and institutions to 
it. Fourth, it is human rights legislation today that has become hyper-complex and 
prolix, so that it could be argued that the enhancement of the human rights agenda 
ǁould ďe a supeƌfluous task. But this is Ŷot the Đase of the ͚duties ageŶda͛, of ǁhiĐh 
development still remains premature. Incidentally, who would deny the formulation 
of a future duty-based account aiming at a more effective protection of children 
living in extreme poverty? 
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Consequently, efforts should be made towards the drafting of a new Bill of 
duties in international level, for example a new (non-legally binding) Universal 
Declaration of Human Duties (UDHD), aiming at the reinforcement of the 
implementation of human rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR). Incidentally, I iŶsist oŶ the teƌŵ ͚duties͛ ;oƌ oďligatioŶsͿ, instead of the term 
͚ƌespoŶsiďilities.͛ The reason is that, contrary to the notion of responsibility, which is 
simply the state of one being responsible, the idea of duty entails an obligation on 
one to act. Within this context, my proposal refers to the formulation of a new 
UDHD equivalent and complementary to, yet independent from, the UDHR.  
Foƌ eǆaŵple, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to aƌtiĐle ϭϬ of the UDH‘ ͚Everyone is entitled in full 
equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the 
determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against 
hiŵ.͛777 What I propose, in effect, is the formulation of another article, part of a new 
UDHD, which would directly impose the relevant duties, e.g. independence and 
impartiality, to individual judges and the judiciary as a whole. This would be 
extremely important in the case of international tribunals, e.g. the international 
criminal tribunals. Contrary to states, which have a long tradition of judicial 
independence and impartiality, both typically ensured in national constitutions, in 
the case of international criminal tribunals these two significant principles are only 
ensured in the statutes of the courts and tribunals. But even though this is essential, 
it is not a sufficient to guarantee the relevant principles in international justice.778 
Overall, a new UDHD would not only render duties equal to rights, but it 
would also enable the discussion of both in parallel. Surely the prerequisite of the 
formulation of any future duty-based account of international justice would be the 
clarification within its corpus, e.g. in the Preamble of it, of the grounding basis of the 
relevant duties. One of the main goals of the present thesis was to provide such a 
philosophical foundation for our external moral duties, from which our human and 
socioeconomic rights are afterwards generated or developed. To conclude, I hope 
                                                          
777 See http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ [accessed 7 February 2018]. 
778 See also Meron (2005), pp.359-369. 
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this goal is provided, and, along with all other results of my research, as they are 
epigrammatically referred below, to be taken seriously into consideration in a 
theoretical discussion of justice, as well as in legal and judicial practice. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this last section, I epigrammatically state some of the main conclusions of the 
thesis: 
1. Because human and socioeconomic rights derive from moral duties which are 
grounded in the ethical lawgiving exercised by autonomous or good persons, that is 
to say, by persons who respect the moral law, these rights are effectively moral 
rights. Yet, this does not mean that, because they are moral, human and 
socioeconomic rights cannot further be secured through specific international, 
regional, and domestic legislation; or that they do not have significant political 
connotations and role within the international politics.  
2. Human and socioeconomic rights do have their own, sui generis, normativity, 
independently of their arrangement into a law (codification/ratification). Their 
normativity derives from the moral law itself and the (moral) commitment of 
individuals, states, and institutions to it. 
3. Only human –not socioeconomic– rights are universal rights, because they derive 
from universal perfect duties of right to others. 
4. Some rights are indeed genuine human or socioeconomic rights; while some other 
rights, such as the right to paid holidays, are not genuine moral rights. 
5. Within the context of a duty-based perspective, all human beings, including 
embryos, children, the mentally disabled, coma patients, criminals, and so forth are 
protected, not because they haǀe Ŷoƌŵatiǀe ageŶĐǇ, e.g. iŶ GƌiffiŶ͛s seŶse, ďut as a 
result of the fact that there are others (duty-bearers), from whose dutiful judgments 
and actions, their human and socioeconomic rights originate.  
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6. KaŶt͛s soft pateƌŶalisŵ is ĐleaƌlǇ shoǁŶ iŶ ϲ:ϰϱϰ iŶ the Metaphysics of Morals, in 
ǁhiĐh he ǁƌites: ͚I ĐaŶŶot do good to anyone in accordance with my concepts of 
happiness (except to young children and the insane), thinking to benefit him by 
forcing a gift upon him; rather, I can benefit him only in accordance with his 
ĐoŶĐepts of happiŶess.͛779 
7. Contrary to goods/interests-based accounts for the justification of rights, the 
Duty-Based Approach does not simply presuppose that duties are connected with 
rights, or that duties and rights correspond to each other, or that those who have 
rights have also duties and vice versa, but that our (human and socioeconomic) 
rights are generated or developed from moral duties. 
8. Contrary to the ͚basic needs͛ accounts, the Duty-Based Approach gives special 
attention to civil and political rights, for which it is specifically claimed that they 
derive from our universal perfect duties of right to others. 
9. CoŶtƌaƌǇ to ‘aǁls͛s liďeƌal aĐĐouŶt foƌ the justifiĐatioŶ of huŵaŶ ƌights, the Duty-
Based Approach is broader as it originates from our common human reason, so that 
by definition it refers to all human beings. Only in the case of socioeconomic rights 
the burden falls under specific duty-bearers. 
10. CoŶtƌaƌǇ to Beitz͛s aĐĐouŶt, the Duty-Based Approach allows for the fulfilment of 
duties, hence the protection of the relevant rights not only in modern societies, but 
in every society, even in the most isolated societies on earth. 
11. Through the new duty-based justification not only states, as Beitz argues, but all 
others, individuals, institutions, GOs, NGOs, and MNEs are responsible for the 
fulfilment of duties, from which rights are afterwards generated. 
12. The new Duty-Based Approach may be more successful than other rights-based 
justificatory approaches, iŶĐludiŶg the ͚offiĐial͛ digŶitaƌiaŶ ƌights-based justification, 
given that, contrary to the idea of rights, which is mostly recognized within the 
                                                          
779 Gregor (1996), p. 573. 
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ǁesteƌŶ soĐieties, the old ĐategoƌǇ of ͚dutǇ͛ is ƌeĐogŶized all oǀeƌ the world as it is 
an idea deeply rooted in the core of human nature. 
13. The moral concept of human dignity is not, as it is popularly argued, a value 
possessed by the right-holders, but a value (and a feeling) acquired by the duty-
bearers after the fulfillment of their (external) moral duties; hence it cannot be the 
basis of human rights of right-holders as it is popularly argued today.  
14. The Kantian dignity is an inner, not an intrinsic or inherent value, e.g. in the 
Catholic sense. 
15. Dignity belongs to the internal domain of morality, while human and 
socioeconomic rights typically belong to the external domain of law. 
16. Human beings are respected not because they (right-holders) have dignity, but 
because others (duty-bearers), by showing respect on them, have dignity.  
17. Dignity (internally) and duties (externally) –from which rights are afterwards 
developed– are coordinate ideas. 
18. According to the correct interpretation of human dignity, slavery or torture, or 
any other paradigmatic case of offence against human dignity, is not wrong because 
it is incompatible with the idea that slaves or the tortured woman, and so on, have 
dignity. Rather they are wrong because they are irrational acts performed by non-
dignified persons (duty-bearers), who actually fail to do their duties towards others 
(right-holders). 
19. According to the interpretation of dignity, in the present thesis, the embryo, 
young children, the mentally disabled, patients in coma, those who wish to or 
commit an assisted suicide, animals, plants, and so forth, are fully respected because 
other persons (duty-bearers), who show (externally) respect on them, by fulfilling 
their external moral duties to them, have dignity. 
20. The powerful moral conception of the autonomy of the will lies not only at the 
heaƌt of KaŶt͛s ŵoƌal philosophǇ, ďut also at the centre of his legal and political 
theory. In particular, what allows for the Kantian autonomy of the will to be involved 
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iŶ the eǆteƌŶal doŵaiŶ of laǁ is the ŶotioŶ of the ͚ethiĐal laǁgiǀiŶg͛ ǁhiĐh applies 
not only to internal but also to external duties. 
21. Autonomy, and not freedom, as Ripstein argues, is the genuine basis of our 
human and socioeconomic rights –even though they typically inhabit the external 
domain of law.  
22. KaŶt͛s legal aŶd politiĐal philosophǇ is ĐoŶsisteŶt ǁith his ethiĐs. Also it Đould 
plausibly be argued that the former is grounded in the latter –at least in the case of 
human and socioeconomic rights. 
23. Contrary to most of recent Kantian work on human rights of liberal orientation 
focusing on freedom, without any other moral considerations, it is claimed that 
KaŶt͛s pƌaĐtiĐal philosophǇ is iŶ effeĐt a philosophy of autonomy, and not a 
philosophy of freedom.780  
24. Through the new Duty-Based Approach, it is shoǁŶ that a kiŶd of ͚de-
tƌaŶsĐeŶdeŶtalizatioŶ͛ of the KaŶtiaŶ ŵoƌal aŶd legal/political theory is feasible; yet 
a kiŶd of ͚de-transcendentalization deeply respecting the transcendental character 
of KaŶt͛s opus iŶ geŶeƌal. 
25. The new Duty-Based Approach is an approach through which all human beings, 
iŶĐludiŶg iŵŵigƌaŶts, ƌefugees, the ͚apatƌides͛, those ǁho liǀe iŶ ĐouŶtƌies ǁhiĐh 
have not the characteristics of a democracy, those who live in non-democratic 
countries, those who still live in isolated jungle tribes in the world, and so on, are 
protected. 
26. Through the new Duty-Based Approach, both our civil/political (human) and our 
socioeconomic rights are protected. 
27. Through the Duty-Based Approach a substantive positive body of laws can be 
developed afterwards. 
28. Contrary to ŵetaphǇsiĐal aĐĐouŶts, e.g. FliksĐhuh͛s justifiĐatoƌǇ aĐĐouŶt, ǁhiĐh 
can hardly be applied to human rights practice, the justification of rights under the 
                                                          
780 For the opposite claim, see Varden (2015), pp. 213-237 
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new Duty-Based Approach is a justification which, although it originates from a 
transcendental concept (autonomy), yet, it eventually finds its way, through the 
ŶotioŶ of the ͚ethiĐal laǁgiǀiŶg͛, to the practical domain of law and justice (rights).    
29. There is an analogy, yet not absolute identity, between the moral concept of 
autonomy and the aesthetic notion of the sublime. 
30. We ŵust Ŷot doǁŶplaǇ the sigŶifiĐaŶĐe of KaŶt͛s thiƌd Critique within the Kantian 
opus; also, ǁe ŵust Ŷot igŶoƌe the ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ of the ǁoƌld of the ͚suďliŵe aƌt͛ to 
morality in general. 
31. The present thesis shows the consilience781 between four independent disciplines 
and domains of activity: morality, law, politics, and aesthetics; which further indicate 
or express the uŶitǇ of the KaŶtiaŶ ͚ƌeasoŶ͛, as ǁell as the uŶitǇ of ŵoƌal, legal, 
political, and aesthetic value judgments.782 
32. KaŶt͛s aesthetiĐ philosophǇ is ǀaluaďle iŶ oƌdeƌ oŶe to uŶdeƌstaŶd otheƌ KaŶtiaŶ 
abstract and vague concepts originating from his moral, legal, and political theory 
(e.g. autonomy, dignity). 
33. KaŶt͛s aesthetiĐ ŶotioŶ of the suďliŵe iŶ the thiƌd Critique is the key-notion in 
uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg KaŶt͛s oďsĐuƌe ĐoŶĐept of the autoŶoŵǇ of the ǁill. 
34. The full definition of the Kantian autonomy of the will is the following: It is the 
judgment and feeling of autonomous moral agents who, although they feel 
huŵiliated ďy the oŵŶipoteŶĐe of the ŵoƌal laǁ, they aďaŶdoŶ ͚ǀolitioŶ͛, that is, 
their inclinations, ideologies, wishes and so forth, and, freely self-legislating –yet 
requiring the same legislation from all others– respect the moral ideas of reason, 
such as the fulfillment of their moral duties, realizing their higher self as autonomous 
moral agents (self-approbation),783 while feeling (and being considered by others), at 
the same time, that they are persons with dignity.  
                                                          
781 See Wilson (1999) 
782 Neiman (1994); also, Dworkin, R. (2013) 
783 See 5:81, in the Critique of Practical Reason, in: Gregor (1996), p. 205 
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35. The ͚bottom-up͛ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of the autoŶoŵǇ of the ǁill, iŶspiƌed ďǇ the 
sublime, has great implications both in politics and law.  
36. The disinterestedness which characterizes the moral concept of autonomy 
applies to practical matters including legal and political matters.  
37. The KaŶtiaŶ ͚suďjeĐtiǀe uŶiǀeƌsal ĐoŵŵuŶiĐaďilitǇ͛ is sigŶifiĐaŶt iŶ politiĐs aŶd 
law. 
38. Under its new understanding in the present thesis, autonomy is disconnected 
from the Enlightenment and the (neo) liberal thought, according to which it is 
ideŶtified ǁith oŶe͛s sheeƌ iŶdepeŶdeŶĐe oƌ fƌeedoŵ fƌoŵ ĐoeƌĐioŶ. Noǁ, 
autoŶoŵǇ deŶotes oŶe͛s ĐapaĐitǇ to fulfill heƌ ŵoƌal, politiĐal, aŶd legal duties 
realizing her higher self. This new interpretation of the concept of autonomy 
destigmatizes it in both areas of politics and law. 
39. For Kant, duty is the fundamental concept in beneficent actions. Incidentally, this 
does not mean that a feeling of love is excluded for those who are benefited.  
40. The Kantian reason is not our absolute ruler, or despot. It is, to speak in 
AƌistoteliaŶ teƌŵs, the ͚ƌight ƌeasoŶ͛ ;orthos logos) inside us.  
41. The KaŶtiaŶ ͚autoŶoŵous ǁill͛ is Ŷot a steelǇ or holy will, but an ordinary rational 
will consisting not only of the strength/capacity/potential to accomplish a rational 
task, such as the fulfillment of our (moral, legal, political) duties, but also of desires, 
inclinations, fears, and wishes which contradict rationality.  
42. Kant is not the typical Enlightenment philosopher such as Descartes. 
43. Duties or obligations are more fundamental than rights. 
44. The emphasis on a theory of duties or obligations helps us regarding the two 
main problems of human rights today, namely the problem of their interpretation, 
and the problem of their universal validity. 
45. Socioeconomic rights are not human rights. 
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46. BǇ ͚good ǁill͛ KaŶt aĐtuallǇ ŵeaŶs the ͚autoŶoŵǇ of the ǁill͛ as it is aŶalǇzed ǀia 
the aesthetic category of the sublime. 
47. Kant is not a constructivist as it is often argued by Kantian scholars, e.g. Onora 
O͛Neill aŶd KatƌiŶ FliksĐhuh. 
48. In the case of human and socioeconomic rights –not other rights with strictly 
legal character– the Kantian principle of morality and the Kantian principle of right 
are not contradicting each other, but are complementing each other. The notion of 
the ͚ethiĐal laǁgiǀiŶg͛ is, iŶ effeĐt, the iŶteƌfaĐe ďetǁeeŶ KaŶt͛s ŵoƌal aŶd 
legal/political philosophy. 
49. Human and socioeconomic rights derive from the moral universal perfect duties 
of right to others, and the moral specific perfect duties of right to others, 
respectively. 
50. Not our membership in a specific biological species (humanity), but a specific 
characteristic, namely our rationality, as it is expressed in the autonomous agency, 
renders us capable of doing our moral duties. 
51. The Duty-Based Approach is not constrained only to human beings, but it is 
extended to all rational beings. 
52. The Duty-Based Approach may positively contribute to the clarification of 
existing duties, such as the duty of relatives, friends, and the legal authorities to bury 
oƌ Đƌeŵate oŶe͛s dead ďodǇ.  
53. The Duty-Based Approach may positively contribute to the determination of the 
nature and the grounds of indeterminate and unstated, yet extremely important, 
rights, such as the right of children to freedom from extreme poverty. 
54. The Duty-Based Approach may be the starting point as well as an important tool 
in the formulation of a future duty-based account of international justice aiming at 
the reinforcement of the implementation of human rights that are stated in non-
legally binding documents, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
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